中游廠商面臨產業結構屬於獨寡占的上游廠商，兩者之間由於中游的經濟規模小於上游形成不對稱組織交易，再者中游廠商與上游存在依賴關係，前者需要後者提供原物料或技術服務以滿足下游顧客需求。本研究利用策略行銷成本架構(4C analysis)，並針對國內各大產業之中介廠商為研究對象，包含電機機械通路產業、半導體設計製造業以及旅遊資訊服務業等產業進行深度訪談。此獨寡占上游─中游─下游情境中，分別解釋產業鏈中的從屬關係。 首先是權力處於相對弱勢的中游廠商與上游的交易關係：中游廠商看似被上游供應商套牢陷入的狀況，但除了存在專屬陷入成本外，影響該交易關係尚存在外顯單位效益成本以及道德危機成本。接著，中游廠商為了與上游持續交易的目的下，採取的策略成本選擇為降低外顯單位效益成本，以及提高上游廠商對於中游的專屬陷入成本以達到與上游持續交易的目的，另一方面，順應此不利環境下，中游廠商滿足下游需求的做法有降低外顯單位效益成本、資訊搜尋成本、道德危機成本以及提高專屬陷入成本的方式。最後一部分為中游為減少對上游廠商的依賴，對於上游或下游投資抵銷性資產，使中游廠商提高本身的議價能力，對於上游廠商的依賴程度獲得減緩。 / In comparison to monopoly or oligopoly up-stream suppliers, mid-stream firms has smaller scale in terms of revenue, the transaction between the two can be described as asymmetric interorganizational relationship. Besides, the mid-stream firms depend on its supplier for key material or services, in order to fulfill the demand of their down-stream customers. This study focus on the monopoly/oligopoly upstream supplier to mid-stream firms to down-stream customer chain, interviewing mid-stream firms in different industries including dealer in electrical machinery industry, semi-conductor industry and tour agent and delve into the relationships between these characters by 4C analysis structure. First of all, the study took a closer look at the relationship between the mid-stream firms and their suppliers; the formers have an inferior bargaining power position and seemed being locked up by the latters, as known as cost of asset-specificity. But we also found that over cost per utility and cost of moral hazard would also be considered by the mid-stream firms. The mid-streams took some actions in order to assure the continuous cooperation with the suppliers, and under this circumspect they will also make efforts to save down-stream customers. We found that the 4C analysis can explain the strategies taken by those mid-stream firms. Finally, the mid-streams would like to reduce the control of the up-streams, so they would put resources in establishing offsetting investments to accumulate their bargaining power to the suppliers, to mitigate the dependence.

資訊不對稱的問題在股市中一直是受關注的議題，一個完善的市場，理應不應當存在資訊不對稱的現象。中國大陸股市在政府宣布開放B股前，上海交易所與深圳交易所中的A股與B股市場屬於完全區隔的現象，國內投資人（多為散戶）只能在A股市場投資，國外投資人（多為金融機構）只能在B股市場投資，在此種制度底下，價格發現機能易受扭曲，資訊不對稱的問題是容易產生的。然而大陸宣布B股開放後，國內投資人可到B股市場投資，資訊不對稱的程度應逐漸變小，改善同家公司在A股與B股市場上市的股票同權不同值的現象。 本文研究目的即在於探討A股市場與B股市場之間是否存在資訊不對稱問題。利用Hasbrouck（1995）提出的價格發現模型-資訊持有比例法（Information share method），計算何者在價格發現過程中佔有較多的資訊比例。研究對象為上海交易所及深圳交易所內同時有在A股市場與B股市場上市的公司每日股價收盤價。以B股宣告開放日2001年2月19日為中心，將樣本分為開放前與開放後兩階段。進一步在實證中應用Pascual, Pascual-Fuster, and Climent（2006）的研究發現。 本研究實證結果：第一，B股開放前，不論加入成交量與否，B股市場皆為價格發現支配者。說明A股市場與B股市場間的確存在資訊不對稱現象。第二，B股開放後，A股市場為價格發現支配者，B股與H股市場為衛星市場。推論原因乃來自於2002年後B股市場幾乎停止新股掛牌；B股開放後B股流動性改善，外資以往賺取的溢價減少；人民幣升值議題，加入WTO全面開放資本市場的承諾等。 / Information asymmetry is an important issue in the financial market. A perfect market should not exist this phenomenon. Before 2001, domestic investors could only buy A shares while foreign investors could only hold B shares. Under this regulation, the function of price discovery is easily distorted, and information asymmetry occurs easily. Shares with identical rights offered by one company would have different values while they are located in class A and class B. This problem, however, should be improved after the deregulation that domestic investors could buy B shares. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether information asymmetry exists between A-share and B-share markets. We use information shares approach (Hasbrouck, 1995) to calculate and compare which market has more information share in the price discovery process. The samples include all firms having stocks trading in A-shares and B-shares market on Shanghai Securities Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). The sample period, October 6, 1997 to October 31, 2005, is divided into two sub-sample periods. Moreover, the model provided by Pascual, Pascual-Fuster, and Climent (2006) is also implied into this paper. This paper concludes that (1) Before deregulating to allow domestic investors to hold B shares, B-share markets is a dominator in the price discovery process no matter considering trading volume or not. It means that A-share and B-share markets indeed exist information asymmetry. (2) After February 19, 2001, A-share markets become a dominator in the price discovery process while B-share and H- share markets become satellite markets. The possible explanations are that there are seldom companies listing in the B shares markets after 2002; the foreign investor gain less premium than before because of enhancing B-share’s liquidity; Renminbi appreciate and capital markets open completely in the end of 2006.

本研究探討私募宣告事件之資訊內涵，以瞭解私募宣告事件對公司整體價值所造成之影響，進而探討影響私募宣告效果的可能因素，並比較具備投資機會組與不具備投資機會組之累積平均異常報酬。 實證結果發現以股東大會日為宣告日之私募股權宣告具有資訊內涵，而且宣告效果提早反應。影響私募宣告後累積異常報酬之因素包括價格壓力、投資機會、發行價格及資訊不對稱程度。股票流動性高、股價波動程度低、具備投資機會、發行價格高或資訊不對稱程度高時，私募宣告後之累積平均異常報酬會較高。在事件日前，無投資機會組比具備投資機會組有較高之累積平均異常報酬；在事件日之後，具投資機會組比無投資機會組有較高之累積平均異常報酬。 / This study examines the information content of private placement announcement to unveil its impact on firm value, explores the factors affecting the effect of private placement announcement, and compares the market performance of firms with investment opportunities and those without investment opportunities. The results indicate that the information content of private placement announcement exists with early information leakage. Firms with higher stock liquidity, lower stock price variation, more investment opportunity, higher subscribed price or higher degree of information asymmetry will have higher cumulative average abnormal returns after the announcement. The cumulative average abnormal returns of companies without investment opportunity are higher than those with investment opportunity before the announcement date.

代工廠商承接訂單時，為特定品牌客戶投資各種專屬的設備和人力是普遍存在的現象。相較之下，台灣的代工廠商處於相對弱勢的地位。代工廠商並不容易在交易初期就從品牌客戶端，取得對等的保護機制，故契約的執行的風險也相對升高。但實務上，我們發現台灣的代工廠商在沒有事前保護機制的情況下，卻仍持續為特定客戶投資。如果代工廠商必須先承諾關係專屬投資，才能爭取得到訂單。在沒有事前保護機制的情況下，代工廠商該有那些配套措施，來保護交易關係？ 本研究以代工廠商角度，探討如何透過交易後的保護策略，改變代工廠商與客戶之間的依賴關係。本研究根據交易成本理論和權力依賴理論推論，代工廠商傾向先承諾關係專屬投資，並於交易後採取事後保護策略。事後保護策略有兩類，分別是槓桿策略（資源獲取、擴大客戶範疇）和連結策略（擴大垂直範疇、共同決策與行動）。槓桿策略企圖降低代工廠商的依賴程度；連結策略則會提高客戶的依賴程度。藉由代工廠商與品牌客戶之間的權力變化，進而保護關係專屬投資免於套牢的威脅。 本研究分三個子研究進行，分別為（1）探索性個案研究、（2）關係專屬投資量表發展、（3）問卷調查研究。第一、探索性個案研究發現，不對稱的組織間關係使得代工廠商必須配合品牌客戶的需求而承諾關係專屬投資，但在「小對大」的格局之下，較為弱勢的代工廠商仍有具有生存空間。個案研究發現代工廠商對品牌客戶的投資，除了單一交易的成本與利益之外，還會考量對未來交易以及其他交易對象的影響。所謂「將欲奪之，必固與之」，代工廠商透過關係專屬投資被整合到產業的價值網絡中，換取廠商的生存機會。 第二、關係專屬投資量表發展研究發現，關係專屬投資為一多構面構念，可分為「實體資產投資」、「無形資產投資」和「資產專屬程度」三個次構念。由此可知，關係專屬投資既是一種資產，有助於交易關係之維持；也可能成為負債，限於少數交易的困境。 第三、本研究整合交易成本理論和權力依賴理論，並根據個案研究和量表發展結果，推論關係專屬投資程度、事後保護策略、依賴程度三者之間的關係。問卷調查研究證實，代工廠商對品牌客戶的無形 資產投資會增加代工廠商的依賴程度。但如果代工廠商投資之後，採取資源獲取策略。藉由品牌客戶的背書，提升知名度或市場地位，則關係專屬投資與代工廠商依賴程度之間的關係就會減弱。另外，關係專屬投資也會提高客戶對代工廠商的依賴程度。投資實體資產和無形資產的代工廠商，會藉由擴大服務範疇，與客戶共同決策與行動，來提高客戶依賴程度。 / In original equipment manufacturer (OEM)-supplier relationships, OEM suppliers commonly make investments that are specialized to the requirements of a particular buyer. Taiwanese OEM suppliers are small-medium firms with limited resources and low in market visibility. They are initially in a weak bargaining position, so they have no ability to vertical integrate or demand any kind of ex ante safeguards at all. Knowing that clients may have opportunistic behaviors, suppliers in Taiwan still make relation-specific investments for them without their commitments. How do these suppliers governance the asymmetric interorganizational relationships to avoid falling into the trap predicted by the transaction cost theory? This study takes the view of a supplier, the small party in asymmetric OEM-supplier relationship, who adopts ex post strategies to create inter-organizational dependency with OEMs. According to transaction cost theory and power dependency theory, we argue that OEM suppliers are more likely to make relation-specific investments first and follow by ex post strategies. We model the ex post strategies adopted by OEM suppliers to protect specific investments in asymmetric OEM-supplier relationships by using leveraging strategy (resource acquisition, customer scope) and bonding strategy (vertical scope, joint action). Leveraging strategies will lower the level of suppliers’ dependence on OEMs while bonding strategy will increase the level of OEMs’ dependence on suppliers. We conducted three studies to explore the issues: (1) exploratory case research; (2) scale development of the construct of relation-specific investment; (3) survey research. First, we found that investment decision of small party is beyond the scope of a single transaction. After making relation-specific investments, OEM suppliers redeploy their resources and work closely with their buyers to maintain exiting and future transactions. They also acquire strategic resources from OEMs and apply them to a broader customer base. Second, the concept of relation-specific investment is a multidimensional construct with three sub-dimensions as tangible investment, intangible investment, and asset specificity. Relation-specific investments create an inherent dilemma because they have the potential both to promote and reduce transaction cost for investing parties. Third, we integrated two theories to explore the relationships between relation-specific investment, ex post strategies, and dependency. According to survey results of 146 OEM suppliers in Taiwan, we confirmed the positive relationship between suppliers’ intangible asset investment and their dependency on OEMs. However, if suppliers leverage their clients’ reputations and reposition themselves as first-tier suppliers, they can lower the level of suppliers’ dependency due to their relation-specific investments. On the other hand, the more relation-specific investments suppliers make, the morel likely suppliers would adopt bonding strategy by expanding vertical scope in supply chain and by actively involving in joint decision making. We found that relation-specific investment itself and suppliers’ bonding strategy will increase the OEMs’ dependency on suppliers.

2007年美國爆發次級房貸違約潮造成了其經濟、房市和股市的不景氣，也波及到持有美國房貸證券化商品的各國，使其承受重大的損失，因此房屋抵押貸款違約的影響因素和金融資產證券化機制對貸款違約風險的影響又再度成為不動產與金融市場上之重要議題。而以往針對美國次貸危機的研究多指出道德風險是造成此次危機的原因之一，但是較缺乏實證研究的支持。 有鑑於此，本研究以我國的台北市和新北市的房屋抵押貸款市場作為研究對象，探討逆選擇和道德風險這兩個資訊不對稱的問題對貸款違約率的影響。研究結果顯示「貸款成數高、貸款利率高、搭配信貸和設定二胎的貸款比較容易違約」，證實逆選擇和道德風險問題確實存在於房屋抵押貸款市場，而且會增加貸款違約的機率。為了降低違約機率，從降低資訊不對稱的角度來看，本研究建議：一、建立全國房貸資料庫；二、將信貸的金額納入房貸的貸款成數中考慮，以降低款人的道德風險。 再者，本研究認為造成次貸危機的根本原因是不當政策導致的保證機制浮濫，以及高風險的房貸證券化商品的氾濫。為了避免我國發生類似次貸危機的事件，從減少資訊不對稱的角度切入，本研究建議我國的金融資產證券化機制應該：一、將道德風險內部化，消除創始機構自利的動機以減少道德風險；二、使用外部信用增強的方式，以確實發揮分散證券風險的作用。 / The 2007 subprime mortgage crisis has severely struck the stability of the worldwide financial markets. Some researches indicate that moral hazard problems are the main factors causing the crisis. However, few studies support asymmetry problems existing in a mortgage market by empirical evidences. First, using the mortgage samples from Taipei City and New Taipei City this study would like to understand if the mortgage market are information asymmetry problems, adverse selection and moral hazard, and conduct the empirical analysis for these factors’ impact on mortgage default. The results show that mortgage default is influenced significantly by the Loan-to-Value （LTV） ratio, contract interest rates, the existence of second liens and credit loans, and jobs. It shows that adverse selection and moral hazard actually exist in the mortgage market. According to the empirical results, secondly, this study proposes suggestions for mortgage lending and financial asset securitization to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems and enhance the regulation environment and market’s stability. It is expected that the results of this study will be applied to avoid the occurrence of similar crisis in Taiwan.

為提升台灣資本市場之競爭力與國際化，我國行政院院會於民國97年3月通過「推動海外企業來台掛牌一二三計畫」，正式宣告開放外國企業來台上市。海外企業於我國第二上市發行台灣存託憑證（Taiwan Depositary Receipt，TDR），甫開放之初，市場反應熱烈，引發股市一陣TDR追價效應，有TDR蜜月期之戲稱。然而，資訊不透明、資訊揭露不對等之問題漸漸浮現，以及隨後發生香港僑威原股停止交易兩天，但僑威TDR仍在台繼續摸黑交易、日本爾必達聲請破產保護，爾必達TDR股價連續跌停板並下市等，種種情形影響市場信心、造成投資人卻步，今年更有萬宇科技TDR及超級咖啡TDR在外流通單位數過少，因流動性不足而下市之情形，顯示TDR之制度監理仍有需要改善的空間。 本文首先介紹臺灣存託憑證之發行組織架構與近期發行現況，並就紐約證券交易所、香港交易所以及新加坡交易所對於其境內存託憑證之事前審核、上市條件、事中監理至事後投資人保護措施之制度與我國制度分析比較，並提出我國制度可參考改善之建議。 目前雖然TDR市場進入冰封期，然而臺灣資本市場仍具TDR發展之利基，為提升臺灣之全球金融證券市場地位，主管機關應全面檢討TDR市場與制度，以利外資企業來臺發展TDR市場。同時，主管機關於推動臺灣證券市場國際化之時，亦應同時兼顧我國投資人之權益保障面向，尋求二者間之平衡點，使臺灣資本市場適應國際化之商品及交易，與國際資本市場接軌。 / To advance the competitiveness and internationalization of Taiwan’s capital market, in march 2008, the Executive Yuan passed the plan for promoting foreign companies to list in Taiwan, and announced officially that welcome the foreign companies to issue TDR. At first, TDR was highly thought of by the investors, however, the TDR’s problem comes up, such as the intransparency of information and information asymmetry. The situation led investors hang back. Obviously the regulation of TDR needs to be improved. This thesis introduced the structure of issuing TDR and recent developments, and analyzed the regulation of NYSE, HKEx and SGX to provide suggestions for Taiwan’s capital market. At the present time, the market for TDR is not lively, but there are still advantages of our capital market, the authorities should modify the regulation of TDR to attract foreign companies, meanwhile, to take both internationalization of capital market and investor protection into consideration, so that allow Taiwan’s capital market in connection with international capital market.

寬恕政策為政府打擊卡特爾不可或缺的重要工具，為了維持市場競爭公平性，各國相繼將其引入法條之中，該政策透過廠商主動揭露涉案行為，使得政府可有效掌握證據將其處置。本文建立兩種賽局模型並分別利用子賽局完全均衡及序列均衡的概念，嘗試討論一般情況下寬恕政策的效率及納入資訊不對稱情形下的政策有效性，並由兩模型推論出：實行寬恕政策且廠商主動申報聯合行為為社會最有效率的均衡、透過政府制定適當的罰鍰區間引導下，主動申報聯合行為的行為可視為一區隔廠商型態的訊號。 / The leniency policy plays an indispensable role in thwarting cartel formation. To maintain the fairness of market competition, most countries successively bring this policy into their antitrust legislation. After the enforcement of the policy, the involved firms may have incentive to self-report and provide evidences to the Antitrust Authority. Therefore, the authorities can get enough evidences to convict those firms of being cartel members. In this paper, we develop two kinds of game theoretical model and use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss the efficiency of leniency policy in general conditions, and the effectiveness of the policy under the condition of information asymmetry. We show that it is efficient to the society and the authorities when the cartel members self-report under the enforcement of leniency policy. Moreover, by setting up an appropriate fine payment, self-reporting can be a signal for the authorities to segment the type of the involved firms.

為了維護全球經濟的穩定與公平，近年來各國無不致力於反壟斷政策的執行，以期有效打擊卡特爾式的企業聯合行為。本文從三種不同的環境條件下，逐一探討採取聯合行為的廠商和反托拉斯政府之間的互動情況。透過本研究可發現，廠商在以利潤為優先考量下，來決定是否採取聯合結盟，以及合法或非法的合作型態。此外，為了朝全社會效率極大的目標邁進，本文針對三種環境設定下的均衡結果進行效率性的比較，得知其差異的成因在於政府和廠商報酬差異的大小。 / In order to keep the stability and fairness of global economy, most of the authorities around the world have been fighting for cutting down cartels by implementing Antitrust/Competition Law. In this paper, we analyze the interaction between joint ventures and antitrust authorities in three different cases. And we find that profit always takes priority in firms’ decision, no matter how the economic environment changes. Finally, in discussing social utility, we compare efficiency among the three cases, and reach our conclusion that the difference of government’s and firm’s return causes the efficiency or non-efficiency of those optimal strategies.

本論文包括3篇時間序列方法在財務的應用。第一篇以門檻向量自我迴歸模型(threshold vector autoregression)分析股市訊息傳遞的不對稱效果；第二篇利用不對稱共整合模型(asymmetric cointegration)分析中國大陸股市之間長期均衡關係；第三篇根據追蹤資料共整合檢定(panel Cointegration test)檢定購買力平價說。 第一篇文章利用門檻向量自我迴歸模型分析Nasdaq股市對台灣、日本與韓國股市不對稱的訊息傳遞效果。實證結果發現，當Nasdaq市場處於下跌狀態時（壞消息狀態），Nasdaq市場干擾對亞洲股市的衝擊較大，反之，當Nasdaq市場處於上漲狀態時（好消息狀態）時，Nasdaq市場干擾對亞洲股市的衝擊較小，而在壞消息狀態時，Nasdaq指數大跌對Jasdaq指數與Kosdaq指數的衝擊效果大於Nasdaq指數大漲的效果，Nasdaq指數小跌所產生的衝擊與小漲所產生的效果具有對稱性。 第二篇文章以Enders and Siklos(2001)不對稱共整合模型探討，中國大陸上海及深圳A股與B股股價指數之間長期不對稱的均衡關係，實證結果發現，在1992年10月至2001年8月，上海A股指數與深圳A股指數之間具有不對稱共整合關係，且當上海A股處於好消息狀態（股市上漲）時，其誤差修正項的調整速度較壞消息狀態（股市下跌）之下為快，此外，上海A股指數與深圳A股指數之間其有雙向的連動關係。在B股開放之後，則是深圳股市A股與B股指數存在不對稱共整合關係，同時Granger因果關係檢定顯示深圳B股指數領先A股指數。 第三篇文章利用Pedroni(2001)追蹤資料共整合檢定，探討大麥克漢堡價格與CPI兩種不同的價格指數用於檢定購買力平價說的有效性，根據14個國家1992-1999年的追蹤資料得到的實證結果顯示，以名目匯率作為被解釋變數，則大麥克漢堡價格與CPI都是支持PPP假說，然而若以相對價格為被解釋變數，則只有大麥克漢堡價格是支持PPP假說，而以CPI為基礎的PPP假說則是無法得到支持。除此之外，本文的實證結論並不受生產力差異的影響。 關鍵字：門檻向量自我迴歸模型、不對稱共整合、追蹤資料共整合、股票市場、購買力平價說 / This dissertation includes three financial applications using time series methods. The first article investigates the asymmetric effects of information transmissions in stock markets using threshold vector autoregression model. The second article uses asymmetric cointegration to study the long-run equilibium relationships among Chinese stock markets. The third article uses panal cointegration to test purchasing-power parity (PPP). Firstly, we examines the asymmetric effects of information transmissions of Nasdaq stock market on Taiwan, Japan, and Korea stock markets by using a threshold vector autoregressive model. And also, we check whether Nasdaq stock market have different impacts on organized stock exchanges (including TAIEX, NIKKEI 225 Index, Korea Composite Index) and over-the-counter markets (including Taisdaq Index, Jasdaq Index, and Kosdaq Index) or not. The empirical results indicate that negative innovations in Nasdaq market (bad news regime) have large influence on Asia stock markets. Particularly, the positive innovations in Nasdaq market (good news regime) have small influence on Asia stock market. The large negative innovations in Nasdaq market have great influence than those of the large positive innovations on Jasdaq Index and Kosdaq Index in bad news regime. The second article uses Enders and Sikios's (2001) asymmetric cointegration model to investigate the long-run asymmetric equihbrium relationships. The empirical results find that there exits an asymmetric cointegrated relationship between Shanghai A share index and Shenzhen A share index for the period from October 1992 to August 2001. The adjustment parameters of error correction term at Shanghai A share market are larger in bad-news regime than those in good-news regime. This result reveals investors at Shanghai possess over-reaction behavior on news of stock market. Moreover, there exists a bi-directional Granger causality between Shanghai A share index and Shenzhen A share index. We find there exists an asymmetric cointegrated relationship between Shenzhen A share index and Shenzhen B share index after 19 February 2001. Furthermore, the Shenzhen B share index leads Shenzhen A share index after 19 February 2001. The third article uses Pedroni's (2001) panel cointegration test to examine the validity of PPP hypothesis by two different price indces, i.e. Big Mac prices and CPI. Our panel observations include 14 countries from 1992 to 1999. The empirical evidence indicates Big Mac PPP and CPI PPP is supposed if we use nominal exchange rate as the explanatory variable. Nevertheless, the Big Mac PPP is valid but CPI PPP not valid if we use price level as the explanatory variable. Moveover, our concludtion does not influenced by productivity bias. Keywords: threshold vector autoregression, asymmetric cointegration, panel cointegration, stock markets, purchasing-power parity

近年來，金融資產報酬波動的推估一直是重要的研究課題。然而，過去的波動不對稱研究均集中在股票市場，探討外匯市場波動不對稱性的實證研究並不多，但若忽略其不對稱效果將影響未來波動預測的正確性。因此，本研究利用近十六年來美元及日圓兌台幣匯率日資料，以傳統的波動不對稱性指數型GARCH模型(EGARCH Model)、門檻型GARCH模型(TGARCH, GJR GARCH Model)，亦延用異質自我相關迴歸模型(HAR-RV Model)及修正型異質自我相關迴歸模型(Modified HAR-RV Model)分別探討美元及日圓兌台幣匯率波動是否存在不對稱現象及其不對稱程度，並加以分析。實證研究中，上述四種模型均顯示美元及日圓兌台幣匯率波動的確具有不對稱效果；美元兌台幣匯率波動，與股票市場一致，報酬率與波動度間呈負向關係，當台幣相對美元升值時，波動度較高；而日圓兌台幣匯率波動，與美元匯率變動方向相反，報酬率與波動度間呈正向關係，當台幣相對日圓貶值時，波動度較高。此外，以異質自我相關迴歸模型實證分析中，日波動落後項的影響力明顯大於週、月、季波動落後項，與Muller, et al. (1997)、Corsi (2004)及Andersen, et al. (2005)實證研究結果類似。