本論文針對冷戰結束以來的十六年間，美國政府對中共角色與關係之定位，欲探討的問題具體言之是「為什麼美國政府再一九八九年以來，對中共的關係定位會在『戰略夥伴』與『戰略對手』間發生擺盪」。本論文首先指出，理性主義雖是解釋國際關係時較慣用的工具，然而不論新現實主義、新自由制度主義均無法對此研究主題提供一套有系統的解釋；本論文繼而發現，建構主義雖承繼部分理性主義的決策模式概念，卻能對上述關係定位變動做出系統性的詮釋。 本論文共計六章：第一章通盤概述研究的動機、目的、方法，並闡明整個主題架構及限制條件。第二章勾勒出老布希、柯林頓、小布希政府對中共關係定位的變化，完成本論文的「描述分析」，作為整體論述之背景。第三章依循理性主義觀點，發現新現實主義無法解釋何以美國在「確保相對收益」的考量下會與中共採取合作；再者，按照新自由制度主義「開創絕對收益」的邏輯，卻與美國視中共為戰略對手，並陷入人權、貿易、台灣議題等爭議的情況不相符。第四章介紹建構主義的主要論點，並針對何以選定溫特的主流建構主義提出解釋，再逐一檢視建構主義的本體論、認識論、方法論、世界觀。第五章依循國際權力架構、理念等兩大參考點，驗證建構主義之解釋力。發現「亞太扇型戰略」、「多層次統一戰線」、「新保守主義」、「攻勢現實主義」等理念，是美國政府為美、「中」關係定位的重要因素。從世界觀的角度切入，如果是霍布斯的文化架構，中共會被美國視為「戰略對手」；如果是康德的文化架構，中共會被美國視為「戰略夥伴」；如果是洛克的文化架構，美國會在接觸中保持戒慎。第六章為結論，認為儘管建構主義提供一個較寬闊的解析平台，但建構主義與理性主義並非必然相斥，尋求兩個典範之整合，乃成為本研究針對後續研究所提出的建議事項之一。 / This thesis addresses an issue regarding the US Government’s identification of the Chinese role as well as the bilateral relations between the two states during the past sixteen years ever since the end of the Cold War. It deals specifically with the following question: why the US administrations since 1989 have shuttled their identification of China between a strategic partner and strategic competitor? It firstly argues that rationalism, as conventionally an explanatory tool in IR, proves insufficient to provide a set of consistent answer. Unsatisfied, this thesis continues its argument that the question brought forth at the beginning can be effectively resolved, or interpreted, by constructivism, despite the constructivist rationale may not necessarily render rational choice model utterly invalid in this case. Structurally speaking, Chapter One gives a brief with respect to the whole thematic structure inclusive of purpose of the study mentioned above and research limitations. Chapter Two demonstrates an effort of descriptive study as a set of background information by sketching out different phases of identification about relations with China that have been harbored by successive US administrations from President Bush Sr., Clinton to Bush Jr.. Chapter Three can be seen as an account of this thesis’ trying effort to explore the question per se from the rationalist perspective. The findings in Chapter Three are as follows: Neo-realism fails to explain why the US, premised upon concern of relative gains, would have cooperation with China. Neo-liberal institutionalism, following the logic of maximization of absolute gains, is inconsistent with an answer to the question of why the US would not given in on the issues of human rights and trade deficits. The above findings are suggestive. They open up the need for this thesis to observe the Sino-US diplomatic interactions from a social perspective in IR, i.e., constructivism. Chapter Four ushers in main points of constructivism. Two arguments are therefore in order. First, it gives a justification for the choice of the mainstream of constructivism in IR advanced by Alexander Wendt. Second, to suit the purpose of this research, it funnels the ontological, epistemological, methodological arguments, world views raised by the constructivist school and thrashes out two reference points—world power structure and ideation—for further observations. Chapter Five brings up the main body of the argument. It argues that a series of ideas such as A Fan-mode Strategic Concept in Asia Pacific, Multi-layer United Front, Neo-conservatism and Defensive Realism have been influential on the US identification of the relations with China. They in turn strike an image of Sino-US bilateral relations reflective of three kinds of culture distinguished by constructivists. In Hobbes’ terms, China can be seen as a strategic competitor. In Kant’s, China is a strategic partner. In Locke’s, the US is engaged but remains sceptical. Chapter Six is the concluding part. It goes beyond the phenomena and moves into the theoretical realm by arguing that, although constructivism offers a broader analytic platform, rationalism and constructivism need not be exclusive. That much room for integration of the two paradigms becomes one of the recommendations for further researches.

2002年7月31日，中共在「東協區域論壇」外長會議中，提出了「中方關於新安全觀的立場文件」，全面有系統地闡述了中共在新世紀下的安全觀念和政策主張，中共自1996年就提出應共同培育一種新型的安全觀念，中共領導人更多次在國際場合呼籲建立新安全觀，強調以對話協商增進了解和信任，通過協調合作促進和平與安全。 近年來，中共積極參與雙邊國際協定、多邊國際組織，強調「和平發展」重於一切，其中「東協區域論壇」與「上海合作組織」更被中共視為是新安全觀的具體成功實踐。新安全觀顯然已經成為中共順應經濟全球化與倡導世界多極化的主要工具，勢將成為中共對外政策的主調。因此，本文除探究中共新安全觀的背景與理念，更透過中共安全觀的改變、國際建制的參與，以掌握中共可能採行的國家安全政策與所面臨的挑戰。最終，並省思「新安全觀」為兩岸關係帶來的啟示。

代表國際合作的國際組織對於國家的行為有什麼影響？趨同或趨異？這個問題國關學界主要是新現實主義與新自由制度主義兩個主流理論在進行辯論；前者的研究顯示，國際組織或其它國際合作類型，只是主權國家（特別是強權國家）的工具，本身沒有獨立性，更遑論能制約國家行為或導引國家行為的協調一致。而後者從賽局理論推演出合作的可能與必要性，並認為制度（或建制）是有效維繫合作關係與調和各國行為，進而穩定國際秩序的方法。 然而，在世界貿易組織的架構下，國際貿易合作中食品衛生安全的相關衝突一直存在著。而在國際貨幣基金或世界銀行的架構下，糧食援助的合作似乎造成許多受援國境內的糧食危機未減反增。這樣的結果與新自由制度主義的論點不符，同時暗示著維繫國際合作的制度（或建制）可能具有不當性或偏重對特定法益的保護。另一方面，這樣的情況也無法透過新現實主義得到周延的解釋，因為合作中的權力爭奪並不是只單單發生在體系層次，並且最後影響或主導結果的行為者也非該理論向來強調的主權國家。 當前國際食品貿易的進/出口規範與具有結構調整性質的糧食援助機制究竟是過度保護了貿易自由，還是能為每一個個人可能遭遇的食品衛生風險或糧食危機提供必要之保障？這是本研究的首要顧念。透過個案研究與過程追蹤的方法，本文認為在無政府狀態2.0的環境下，國際食品貿易與糧食援助的制度（或建制）存在著法益失衡與不當性；是一種無法公允保障進口國消費者食品安全或受援國農民糧食主權的合作模式。這樣的結果在既有的國關理論得不到全面性的分析和解釋，因此文中提出「寧靜政治」的論述對之進行補充，說明擁有貿易出口利益的國家，其政府在國內層次如何因為寧靜政治現象而流失權力（退位），成為跨國公司的代理人，而非最高的主權享有者與治權行使者。同時，在體系層次，這些國家還為跨國公司爭取利益最大化，假國際合作之名攻佔食品進口國或糧食受援國的國內市場，釀成公共衛生或糧食主權上的危機。 研究結果顯示，跨國公司是造成國際制度（或建制）成為失衡天秤與喪失正當性的幕後原兇。也是在國際經貿這個議題領域中導致國家退位的關鍵行為者。從強調資本主義和貿易自由化的經濟學角度來看，這或許是市場機制正常的發揮，即使有人不樂見，也毋需過於擔心。然而，任何「自由」都不能是毫無限制地，也不該是無所節度的。全球經貿自由化與市場資本主義的發展若是繼續以目前的方式在運作與擴張，跨國公司累積的財富與權力就會在更多的議題領域超越或擊退主權國家，屆時除了食品衛生安全與糧食安全外，恐怕還會有更多攸關人類安全的法益在商品化的國際市場上漸漸淪為類奢侈財。 從理性選擇的角度來看，此種結果或許是國家在參與經貿合作前本能預見之事，但基於理性選擇，認為這是可以忍受的代價。然而，本文質疑國家（特別是小國）所付出的代價真能讓其在合作過程中換取到大於損失的利益。就像個案中台灣在進口美國牛肉的問題上，或墨西哥在糧食援助的計畫裡，這些國家並沒有在國際合作中得到預期的好處，反而失去了原本可以享有的衛生安全與糧食自主性。退一步言，假設這些國家真的從合作中得到大於損失之利益，那麼這些利益的分配在其國內層次上往往也不否符合公平與正義。毋寧，利益最後只是由特定少數的行為者所享有，但衛生安全風險或糧食基本權的不利益卻轉嫁由進口國或受援國的全體人民買單。

第二次世界大戰結束以後，以美國為首的西方國家為了嚇阻蘇聯的入侵，遂成立了北大西洋公約組織。這也標誌著冷戰時期美蘇兩強對峙的局面。冷戰結束以後，許多學者因而預言北約即將瓦解。但多年以來，北約卻依然存在，更歷經了三次東擴。本文寫作的目的，便欲透過重新檢視國際關係理論三大主要學派的觀點，對於後冷戰時期的北約存續提出解釋。 在現實主義學者陣營中，摩根索與華爾滋的「權力平衡」論點與北約發展的史實不符；施韋勒的「扈從利益」論點僅部分解釋了國家聯盟行為，對於「扈從」概念的界定又出現前後不一；米爾斯海默的「推卸責任」論點試圖同時涵蓋「制衡」與「不制衡」兩種選項，而純粹的「推卸責任」策略又必須依賴其他國家願意承擔，因此不易成功。瓦特的「威脅平衡」理論雖仍有不足之處，但較適合解釋本文的個案。筆者認為，後冷戰時期的北約便是面臨了大規模毀滅性武器擴散、俄羅斯存在與恐怖主義等威脅，才強化了盟國繼續合作的意願。 從新自由主義學者的觀點而言，國家若欲在無政府狀態的國際體系中維持合作關係，便需要以互惠為基礎而運作的國際制度。當國際制度能隨著成員的需求而調整時，就能獲得更多支持。由於美國的優勢國力受到北約的制度規範與集體決策機制削弱，又具有軟權力的勸服力量，遂吸引了中、東歐國家加入聯盟。此外，民主國家之間較不容易發生戰爭。這些因素都維繫了北約盟國在後冷戰時期的合作關係。 由於後冷戰時期的北約在訴求「內群體」偏袒的同時，卻未激化「外群體」歧視。建構主義學者認為，若隨著聯盟關係的發展，成員之間能培養出休戚與共的集體身份，將個別的國家安全問題視同為集體的安全議題時，彼此便超越了傳統軍事聯盟在攻擊與防禦上合作的功能，而達到安全共同體的境界。北約所具備的規範特性也進一步增強了其對盟國的型塑能力。 聯盟的本質在於合作。但關鍵是國家為何合作、如何促進合作，以及如何決定合作對象或競爭對手。事實上，後冷戰時期的北約並未放棄對付共同威脅的核心目標，卻也逐漸發展出安全管理的功能，不但參與了維和行動，也建立起和俄羅斯與烏克蘭的對話機制，更凝聚了盟國的信念而形成具有集體身份的安全共同體。 / In the aftermath of WWII, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), mainly led by the U.S., was formed to deter U.S.S.R.’s aggression. This organization signified the bipolar system of international relations. When the Cold War came to an end, many scholars once predicted NATO would collapse. However, the alliance still endures for decades and enlarges eastward three times. The purpose of the dissertation is to reappraise the perspectives from three major schools of International Relation theory and provide some explanation of NATO’s endurance in the post-Cold War era. In the camp of realists, the balance-of-power theory raised by Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth N. Waltz is inconsistent with the facts of NATO’s development. The bandwagon-for-profit theory proposed by Randall L. Schweller only gives partial explanation of international alliances and takes a contradictory position on the concept of bandwagon. The buck-passing theory maintained by John J. Mearsheimer tries to include both the options of balance and not-balance on the one hand, while depends heavily on other states’ willingness to take the responsibility of balance on the other hand. As far as we know, the latter seldom results in success. Although the balance-of-threat theory sustained by Stephen M. Walt still has some shortcomings, it can provide a better explanation of the case discussed in the dissertation. This author concludes that NATO faces multiple threats of the spread of WMD, the existence of Russia and transnational terrorism in the post-Cold War era. That’s why the allies continue to cooperate. From the standing points of neo-liberalists, if states want to maintain cooperation under the anarchical international system, they will need international institutions based on reciprocity. When international institutions can be adjusted with the demand of their member states, they will obtain more supports. Because the primacy of the U.S. was reduced by the institutional rules and joint decision making process in NATO and accompanied with persuasive soft power, some Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) were drew to join the alliance. Moreover, there are few wars among democracies. For all these reasons, NATO still survives until now. When NATO seeks to develop in-group favoritism in the post-Cold War era, it does not activate out-group discrimination. Constructivists state that if members of alliances can cultivate their collective identities and transform national security problems into collective ones, they can go beyond traditional military alliances and become security communities. Features of norms in NATO also strengthen their capabilities in shaping the alliance. The essence of alliance is cooperation. Its key points for states lie in why they cooperate, how to facilitate their cooperation and how to choose their partners or opponents. As a matter of fact, in the aftermath of the Cold War, NATO doesn’t give up its core purpose of fighting against common threats, while it develops the function of security management gradually. Besides, NATO takes part in the peace-keeping operations and builds the mechanisms for communication with Russia and Ukraine. In the end, NATO solidates the belief from its member states and turns into a security community of collective identity.