À la lecture d’ouvrages philosophiques anciens, nous sommes souvent surpris par la virulence des critiques adressées à l’écriture, dans la mesure où ces critiques nous parviennent au moyen de textes écrits. N’est-il pas paradoxal de tout à la fois rejeter et utiliser une même technologie ? Ou est-ce que les pratiques de l’oralité et de l’écriture des philosophes grecs, telles que ceux-ci les décrivent dans leurs ouvrages, peuvent être cohérentes avec leurs critiques ? Notre thèse visait, d’une part, à répondre à ce questionnement en confrontant les pratiques des philosophes anciens aux critiques qu’ils adressent à l’écriture, par le biais d’une étude systématique des discours sur la lecture et l’écriture dans des textes anciens d’auteurs et d’époques variés, et notamment des textes qui n’ont pas l’écriture pour objet. D’autre part, comme les travaux déjà publiés sur ce thème tentaient le plus souvent de trouver le point de rupture entre la tradition orale et la tradition écrite (cf. Havelock 1963, Lentz 1989), nous avons voulu inscrire notre objet d’étude dans une plus longue durée, ce qui nous a permis de constater qu’une rupture radicale entre les philosophes de tradition orale et ceux appartenant à la tradition écrite n’avait pas eu lieu, et que l’on observait plutôt une continuité des critiques et des pratiques de l’oralité et de l’écriture depuis l’époque classique jusqu’à l’Antiquité tardive. Malgré le développement de nouveaux supports matériels pour l’écriture, l’émergence d’une religion du livre, et la mise à l’écrit des poèmes homériques, la tradition philosophique grecque témoigne d’un usage circonspect de l’écriture et du refus de rejeter définitivement l’oralité. / When we read ancient philosophical works, often we are surprised to find that the Greek philosophers strongly criticize literacy, as we are still confronted with a written text. Is it not paradoxical to reject a technology while still using it? Or is the philosophers’ practice of literacy, as described in their works, consistent with their criticism? Is the philosophers’ practice of literacy, as described in their works, consistent with their criticism of it? This thesis aims to answer these questions, firstly, by comparing the ancient philosophers’ criticism of literacy to their practice of it, through the study of what various authors from various periods say about reading and writing. On the other hand, since earlier works on this topic have proposed that the classical period witnessed a sudden and, to a certain extent, definitive turn to literacy, and have tried to locate this turn in time, I have examined the situation in a broader perspective, over a longer period of time. The results show that, if we consider how philosophers criticize literacy and how they describe themselves in their own discourses, literacy patterns tended to remain similar until late Antiquity; and that, in spite of Aristotle's new use of literacy, the criticism we find in Plato lingers on. As a result, what we usually call the transition from an oral tradition to a written tradition could be better viewed as a cultural continuity. In spite of the commitment to writing recording of the Homeric poems, of the emerging of a book-centered religion, and notwithstanding an evident use of literacy, the ancient philosophical tradition testifies to a refusal, both theoretical and practical, of throwing away orality.

Chacune des éditions de la Critique de la raison pure contient une preuve de la réalité du monde externe : la première se trouve dans le « quatrième paralogisme » et la deuxième dans la « Réfutation de l’idéalisme ». Ce travail examine l’évolution du premier argument vers le deuxième, en rendant compte de deux critiques importantes de la première édition qui ont influencé le second travail de Kant. La deuxième partie de ce travail se concentre sur des problèmes propres à la Réfutation, où sont traités des sujets particulièrement problématiques, tel que la structure de la conscience empirique déterminée, le rôle du permanent dans l’établissement de l’objectivité, ainsi qu’un argument secondaire présenté dans les notes de bas de page du texte principal et de la préface. / Each edition of the Critique of Pure Reason contains a proof for the reality of the external world: the first is located in the “Fourth Paralogism”, the second, in the “Refutation of Idealism.” This work examines the evolution from the first argument to the second, taking into account two significant criticisms of the first edition which influenced Kant’s second attempt. The latter half of this work treats topics particular to the Refutation only, focusing again on the issues which were stumbling blocks, namely the structure of determined empirical consciousness, the role of the permanent in establishing objectivity, as well as a secondary argument found in the footnotes of the main text and preface.

In this study of the nineteenth-century German-Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen, I argue that Cohen’s revision of Kantian ethics and moral theology is permeated with concepts drawn from and logically contoured by his interpretation of Maimonidean rationalism and Jewish sources, more generally. Through an idealizing hermeneutic, Cohen normativizes certain philosophical problems in post-Kantian philosophy and addresses them under the title of "pantheism" and "positivism". Between both pantheism and positivism, Cohen’s idealism presents a middle path, which I describe as "prophetic idealism", or a philosophy of time and ideality that interprets history, law, and ethical normativity as future-oriented. In other words, "prophecy" intimates a methodological role for temporality in practical philosophy and introduces a new meaning for legality in ethics. Cohen therefore offers a philosophy of Judaism, as a philosophy of religion, by normativizing the idea of prophecy and making it a conceptual model for reason-giving, agency, legal norms and ethical action. By focusing upon the critique of both pantheism and positivism, this dissertation therefore argues that Cohen’s negotiations of nineteenth-century philosophical problems introduces a normative role for Judaism as a public philosophy and the argument concludes by suggesting that Cohen’s philosophy of Judaism is instructive for contemporary public philosophy.

In this study of the nineteenth-century German-Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen, I argue that Cohen’s revision of Kantian ethics and moral theology is permeated with concepts drawn from and logically contoured by his interpretation of Maimonidean rationalism and Jewish sources, more generally. Through an idealizing hermeneutic, Cohen normativizes certain philosophical problems in post-Kantian philosophy and addresses them under the title of "pantheism" and "positivism". Between both pantheism and positivism, Cohen’s idealism presents a middle path, which I describe as "prophetic idealism", or a philosophy of time and ideality that interprets history, law, and ethical normativity as future-oriented. In other words, "prophecy" intimates a methodological role for temporality in practical philosophy and introduces a new meaning for legality in ethics. Cohen therefore offers a philosophy of Judaism, as a philosophy of religion, by normativizing the idea of prophecy and making it a conceptual model for reason-giving, agency, legal norms and ethical action. By focusing upon the critique of both pantheism and positivism, this dissertation therefore argues that Cohen’s negotiations of nineteenth-century philosophical problems introduces a normative role for Judaism as a public philosophy and the argument concludes by suggesting that Cohen’s philosophy of Judaism is instructive for contemporary public philosophy.

This dissertation examines the conceptualization of the ideal society in Western culture in relation to changes in communication modes. The utopian discourse is defined by a concern with the relationship between language and reality. I explore this concern as a reflection of the theoretical disposition invited by changes in communication modes, which are perceived as crises of representation. Plato and Thomas More’s enlightened communities in the Republic and Utopia reflect comparable idealistic perspectives on education. In my view, this optimism stems from the social reality of growing literacies with the advent of the alphabet and printing, respectively. I contend that these writers are animated by an ethical impulse to teach their readers that language is representation. From the vantage point of this knowledge, each individual may employ language symbolically in order to create and perpetuate a moral and spiritual mode of thought. I argue that the discourse of the ideal is the symbolic expression of humanity’s engagement with death, the ultimate existential concern made acute by the aspect of historical discontinuity in the crisis of representation. Plato and More exhibit comparable efforts to open to their readers the superior space of critical reflexivity which they themselves inhabit. From this conceptual, pre-representational space of conscious choice, language is subjected to achieving spiritual progress. I introduce the concept of post-utopia, which describes a pragmatic moment when the relationship between author and the ideal society is brought into the foreground and reinforced as a way of addressing concerns with textual authority. I examine these developments in Augustine’s De Civitate Dei, François Rabelais’s episode of the Abbaye de Thélème in Gargantua, and Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis. These authors draw on the ideologies of representation inherent in utopian discourse, and position the authorial figure as link between scriptural teleology and history, ensuring spiritual and societal betterment in the textual cultures of late antiquity and early modernity. The figure of the author emerges as a symbol of history and of man’s ability to assume the limits of the mind and of language.

Cette thèse jette un œil sceptique sur plusieurs théories courantes de l’état d’urgence. La plupart de ces théories de l’état d’urgence présupposent que la notion d'une « urgence » est claire, conceptuellement et pratiquement. J'argue que ceci n'est pas le cas et que cette certitude mal placée produit des problèmes pratiques et conceptuels avec ses théories. De plus, cette thèse démontre que cette certitude mal placée dans la clarté du concept de l'urgence mène les autorités gouvernementales à agir arbitrairement plutôt que selon des principes libéraux et démocratiques pendant des états d’urgence. Contre cette certitude mal placée et contre plusieurs théories contemporaines influentes des états d'urgence, j'offre une théorie rigoureuse et analytique du concept de l’« urgence. » Une fois que le concept de l'urgence est défini, et que cette conception est défendue, la thèse démontre les diverses manières dont les malentendus du concept, mènent aux utilisations arbitraires (de la puissance monopole de l'état) en situation d’urgence. En considérant les états d’urgences, comme événements rares, la thèse évite la tentation de les considérer comme événements exceptionnels capable de fragmenter l'ordre politique établi (comme d’autres théories le font). La thèse argue que les mesures prises par le gouvernent pendant l’état d’urgence devraient être compatibles plus généralement avec les valeurs démocratiques et libérales. En rejetant l'idée que les états d'urgence sont des événements exceptionnels, la thèse crée un espace conceptuel dans lequel des propositions plus constructives concernant la gestion des états d'urgence peuvent être entendues. De plus, en analysant les diverses manières dont les autorités gouvernementales utilisent leur forces de façon arbitraire pendant les états d’urgence, la thèse argue clairement pour la supervision institutionnelle accrue en ce qui concerne les procédures d’urgence et leur déploiement pendant des états d'urgence. En conclusion, la thèse argue que les démocraties libérales n'ont pas besoin de craindre les états d’urgences tandis que les démocraties libérales ont déjà les ressources requise pour administrer les états d’urgence. Contrairement à ce que d’autres théories l’état d'urgence recommandent, les démocraties libérales ont déjà les ressources institutionnelles et conceptuelles pour administrer les états d’urgences. / This dissertation casts a skeptical eye on theories of emergency government. It argues that far from being self-evident, most accounts of emergency government assume that the notion of an “emergency” is clear, both conceptually and practically. I argue that this is not the case and that this misplaced certainty generates both practical and conceptual problems. Further, this dissertation shows that this misplaced certainty in the clarity of the concept of emergency leads authorities to act arbitrarily rather than on principle in times of emergency. Against this misplaced certainty and against many influential contemporary accounts of states of emergency I offer a more perspicuous account of the concept of “emergency.” Once the concept of emergency is defined and defended, the dissertation proceeds to show the various ways in which misunderstandings of the concept lead to arbitrary uses of state power in emergencies. By closely examining the work of competing theories of emergency, the dissertation is able to reveal where these other theories go wrong. By viewing emergencies as rare events, the dissertation avoids the temptation to view them as exceptional events that sunder the established political order. Arguing that emergency measures should be compatible with liberal democratic values more generally, the dissertation makes the case for treating emergencies from within the ambit or existing liberal democratic institutional mechanisms as opposed to jettisoning these mechanisms as some other theorist recommend. In undermining the idea that states of emergency are exceptional events, the dissertation creates a conceptual space within which more constructive proposals pertaining to emergency management can be heard. Further, by unearthing the various ways in which state authorities arbitrarily employ power in emergencies, the dissertation makes clear the need for increased institutional oversight as concerns emergency powers and their deployment in emergencies. In conclusion, the dissertation advances that liberal democracies need not fear emergencies as much as they do and argues for the view that democracies already have the required resources for dealing with emergencies in an institutional manner that is both politically liberal and institutionally democratic. Against those skeptical of these resources, the dissertation offers comprehensive philosophical reasons for abandoning said skepticism.

This study focuses on Charles Taylor’s educational thought with a view to understanding his contributions to the discipline of Philosophy of Education. No comprehensive study of Charles Taylor’s educational thought has been attempted. There is a single dissertation and a dozen or so published periodical articles that do take Taylor’s educational views into consideration, to be sure. Yet these studies, which limit themselves to Taylor’s account of the recognition and/or non-recognition of identity in multicultural societies, are insufficient on five accounts: i) they are indifferent to the historical nature of Taylor’s scholarly work; ii) they neglect the philosophical sources of his educational thought; iii) they fail to highlight the interconnections between the key educational themes he takes up; iv) they disregard his major critics and the dialectical tensions raised by these critics; and v) they are somewhat dated in that they do not consider his more recent scholarship. My dissertation seeks to fill these scholarly gaps. My thesis is that an inner logic is implicit in Charles Taylor’s educational thought. I argue that Taylor’s views on the modern condition, (i.e. in his readings of Descartes, Kant, Herder, and Hegel), are closely interwoven with his views on modern education, and that interconnected currents in the modern history of ideas elucidated by Taylor, (i.e. scientific rationality, exclusive humanism, and the ethics of authenticity), have contributed to the rise of, and the sensitivity toward, both the theory and the practice of the politics of recognition in contemporary educational institutions. I conclude that an education for culturally diverse minds and hearts, anchored in human, historical, and epistemological recognition, and democratically open to both immanence and transcendence, is the true calling of Taylor’s educational thought.

Étant pourtant un phénomène extrêmement répandu, la procrastination a très peu fait l’objet d’études philosophiques. Inversement, la faiblesse de la volonté et les différents phénomènes qu’on lui rattache sont encore aujourd’hui étudiés en profondeur comme des cas paradigmatiques de défaillance de la rationalité pratique. Or, la procrastination présente un cas de défaillance de la rationalité pratique particulier dans notre rapport avec le temps, rapport qui est très souvent laissé de côté dans l’étude de la faiblesse de la volonté. Après avoir présenté dans le premier chapitre les phénomènes majeurs associés à la faiblesse de la volonté et les problématiques qu’ils soulèvent, dans le deuxième chapitre, nous examinerons leurs liens avec la procrastination. Nous verrons comment la procrastination, avec son emphase sur le caractère temporel de notre agentivité, permet de mieux saisir et d'expliquer les problématiques soulevées par la faiblesse de la volonté en les insérant dans un cadre explicatif plus large. / Even if procrastination is extremely widespread, it is still rarely the subject of philosophical study. Conversely, weakness of the will and the various phenomena which are related to it are still extensively studied as paradigmatic cases of failure of our practical rationality. However, procrastination seems to be a failure of our practical rationality related to our relationship with time, a relationship that is often overlooked in the study of weakness of will. After presenting, in the first chapter, the major phenomena associated with weakness of will and the issues they raise, we will examine their relationship with procrastination in the second chapter. We'll see how procrastination, with its emphasis on the temporal nature of our agency helps us to better understand and explain the issues raised by weakness of will by inserting them in a broader explanatory framework.

Ce mémoire traite de la critique communautarienne du libéralisme et se donne deux projets. D’abord, il s’agit de formuler une position de synthèse à partir des travaux des philosophes Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre et Michael Walzer. Cette synthèse s’articule autour de trois axes, soit ontologique, sociale et méthodologique. Le deuxième projet est d’évaluer cette position pour statuer sur son rapport au libéralisme, et, plus précisément, pour déterminer si elle est seulement une critique, une alternative, ou encore une variante à l’intérieur du libéralisme. Il est conclu que le communautarisme est réconciliable avec une certaine forme de libéralisme et que sa critique permet même de l’améliorer. / In this essay about the communitarian critique of liberalism I seek to reach two goals. First, it is to form a synthesis from the works of philosophers Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer. This synthesis is articulated through three axes: ontologicial, social and methodological. Building on this, my second objective is to assess its relation to liberalism. More specifically, I seek to determine whether communitarianism is merely a critique, an alternative or a variant of liberalism. My conclusion is that communitarianism is reconciliable with a certain form of liberalism and that its critique allows to improve it.

L’inflation a diminué de façon importante dans les pays riches depuis le début des années 80. Cette baisse de l’inflation n’est pas un hasard et peut, en partie, être liée à la mise en place de nouvelles institutions et politiques monétaires. Ce mémoire examine la relation qui existe entre deux de ces institutions, l’indépendance politique et le conservatisme d’une banque centrale, et l’idéal d’égalité économique. Peut-on, demandons-nous, être égalitariste et défendre, à la fois, l’indépendance politique d’une banque centrale et la volonté «conservatrice» de faire de l’inflation une priorité relativement au chômage? Le mémoire se divise en trois grandes parties. Une version crédible de l’égalitarisme économique est d’abord présentée. La relation qui existe entre le phénomène d’inflation et l’égalitarisme est, ensuite, examinée. Une réflexion critique sur les fondements théoriques de l’indépendance politique et du conservatisme est, enfin, développée. Nous concluons que la théorie égalitariste ne permet pas, à elle seule, de déterminer si un modèle particulier de banque centrale est moralement désirable. Pour se porter à la défense d’une banque centrale indépendante et conservatrice, un égalitariste doit adhérer à des prémisses économiques contestées. / Inflation has been decreasing in rich countries since the beggining of the 80’s. The creation of new monetary institutions in the western world is, partly at least, responsible for this fall. This Master’s thesis examines the relation beetween the ideal of economic equality and two important monetary institutions: Central bank conservatism and political independance. Can egalitarians support, I ask, the conservatism and the political independance of a central bank? This work is divided in three parts. We, first, present a credible definition of what egalitarism is. We examine the relation that exists beetween inflation and egalitarianism. Finally, we analyse and criticize the theoretical foundation of political independance and monetary conservatism. We conclude that egalitarianism cannot determinate, by itself, the moral quality of monetary institutions. Egalitarians can defend central bank political independance and conservatism, but to do so they have to accept controversial economic premisses.