The growing volume of opinion data presents a significant challenge for policymakers striving to distill public sentiment into actionable decisions. This study aims to explore the capability of large language models (LLMs) to synthesize public opinion data into coherent policy recommendations. We specifically leverage Mistral 7B and Mixtral 8x7B models for text generation and have developed an architecture to process vast amounts of unstructured information, integrate diverse viewpoints, and extract actionable insights aligned with public opinion. Using a retrospective data analysis of the Polis platform debates published by the Computational Democracy Project, this study examines multiple datasets that span local and national issues with 1600 statements posted and voted upon by over 3400 participants. Through content moderation, topic modeling, semantic structure extraction, insight generation, and argument mapping, we dissect and interpret the comments, leveraging voting data and LLMs for both quantitative and qualitative insights. A key contribution of this thesis is demonstrating how LLM reasoning techniques can enhance content moderation. Our content moderation approach shows performance improvements using comment deconstruction in multi-class classification, underscoring the trade-offs between moderation strategies and emphasizing a balance between precision and cautious moderation. Using comment clustering, we establish a hierarchy of semantically linked topics, facilitating an understanding of thematic structures and the generation of actionable insights. The generated argument maps visually represent the relationships between topics and insights, and highlight popular opinions. Future work will leverage advanced semantic extraction and reasoning techniques to enhance insight generation further. We also plan to generalize our techniques to other major discussion platforms, including Kialo. Our work contributes to the understanding of using LLMs for policymaking and offers a novel approach to structuring complex debates and translating public opinion into actionable policy insights.

This thesis examines Robert Nozick’s critique of John Rawls’s theory of justice, focusing on the Chamberlain Argument as a challenging example in their debate. The Chamberlain Argument illustrates the tension between Rawls’s theory, which aims to distribute resources according to a certain pattern for social benefit, and its implications on individual freedom. Nozick argues that such patterned theories infringe upon individual liberty by coercively redistributing resources. Through analysis of patterned theory, it becomes evident, Nozick claims, that such frameworks prioritize specific distributions over individual liberty. I find that Nozick made a valid point in his objection to Rawls. However, I consider that the problem of patterned theories represented by Nozick in his critique of Rawls, is rooted in the first principle, not in the second. I assert that there is much more literature on Rawls’s second principle, but much less on his first principle. To address Nozick’s critique, this thesis proposes a modification to Rawls’s first principle, emphasizing self-respect as a foundational value. By reconceptualizing liberty within the Rawlsian framework, this thesis aims to fortify it against objections like the Chamberlain Argument, ultimately enhancing its coherence and theoretical robustness. For this reason, the research question is as follows: How can the Rawlsian theory overcome the Chamberlain argument? The one thesis I will pursue is that Rawls’s two principles can be immune to Nozick’s Chamberlain Argument, when the first principle is modified according to the priority of rights over liberty. To do so, the goal is to defend a Rawlsian pattern theory of justice. Firstly, I show that the first principle should be grounded on the priority of the rights instead of the good of the person. By reconceptualizing the concept of self-respect, I show that Rawls’s first principle is mainly focused on a negative concept of liberty, which I modify to a positive concept through what I call reciprocal self-respect. Secondly, I formulate responses to Nozick’s Chamberlain Argument and argue that social justice requires a holistic view of the society, not only as individuals, but also as collective and common. This view emphasizes the interdependency of individuals in a society, which presupposes duties of reciprocal self-respect, chosen rationally in the original position behind the veil of ignorance. Thus, Chamberlain would never have been able to make profits and succeed without society, infrastructure, opportunities and hotbed for success and self-determination.

Une des questions centrales de la métaéthique est celle de savoir si les propriétés morales sont des propriétés naturelles ou non-naturelles. Ce mémoire fait valoir que nous ferions bien de remettre en question une constellation d’arguments en faveur du non-naturalisme moral : l’argument de la question ouverte, l’intuition normative et l’argument du gouffre. L’influent argument de la question ouverte de Moore, d’abord, ne soutient le non-naturalisme que s’il commet une pétition de principe. L’intuition normative commet ou bien le sophisme d’inférer sur la base de sa différence spécifique qu’une chose n’appartient pas à un genre donné, ou bien sous-estime la panoplie de propriétés naturelles qui possèdent les caractéristiques censées être distinctives des propriétés morales et normatives. L’argument du gouffre, quant à lui, sous-estime l’ubiquité du fossé logique et conceptuel censé marquer une discontinuité métaphysique profonde entre les domaines normatif et naturel. / One of the burning questions among metaethical realists is whether moral facts and properties are natural or non-natural. In this thesis, I argue that we should treat a family of arguments for non-naturalism with considerable scepticism: the Open Question Argument, the Normative Intuition, and the argument from the Is-Ought Gap. Moore’s famous Open Question Argument only supports moral non-naturalism if it begs the question against the modest (non-reductionist) naturalist. As for the Normative Intuition, it either commits the fallacy of inferring on the basis of a thing’s specific difference that it does not belong to the genus it putatively belongs to, or it underestimates the breadth of natural properties that possess the features which non-naturalists allege are distinctive of moral and normative properties. The argument from the Is-Ought Gap, for its part, underestimates the ubiquity of the logical and conceptual gap that allegedly marks a deep metaphysical discontinuity between the normative and natural domains.

The general topic of the thesis is the history of the Ordinary Language Philosophy. To be more precise, it deals with the critical arguments, which were raised against is. The thesis offers a short historical and sociological review of the Ordinary Language Philosophy. Critical analysis shows two things: 1) the main reason for the rejection was a different understanding of meaning (and consequences of such a understanding); 2) critics begged the question and already assumed the justification of these rejections in their arguments. The area of this criticism was: the paradigm case argument, the empirical nature of the statements of meaning produced by the Ordinary Language Philosophy, the structural elements of meaning and the political implications of the theory of meaning. The thesis criticizes the Ordinary Language Philosophy in those parts (and in such interpretations), where its understanding of meaning does not differ from the understanding of the critics and where they share common assumptions. On the other hand, the thesis argues for an interpretation, which avoids classical understanding of meaning in all its consequences. Finally, the thesis asks how the Ordinary Language Philosophy can be useful for contemporary debates.

Der Unterstellungsbegriff ist ein zentraler Begriff innerhalb transzendentaler Argumente. Transzendentale Argumente sind Versuche, empirische Erkenntnis stabiler zu sichern als durch empirische Erkenntnis selbst. Dabei müssten, heißt es immer wieder, bestimmte grundlegende Sachverhalte unterstellt werden. Was genau bedeutet hier „unterstellen“? Exemplarisch wird in dieser Arbeit Habermas’ Verwendung des Unterstellungsbegriffs und des eng verwandten Voraussetzungsbegriffs nachvollzogen und interpretiertHabermas verwendet seinen Kernbegriff nicht einheitlich, insbesondere unterscheidet er nicht zwischen semantischem und epistemischem Voraussetzungsbegriff. Im Gegensatz zum semantischen Voraussetzungsbegriff, der eine Relation zwischen Sachverhalten beschreibt, kennzeichnet der epistemische Voraussetzungsbegriff eine Relation zwischen einem epistemischen Subjekt und einem Sachverhalt. Mit der Verwendung des Ausdrucks Unterstellung konstruiert Habermas einen internen, konstitutiven Zusammenhang zwischen unserer Kommunikationsfähigkeit und grundlegend verschiedenen propositionalen, epistemischen Einstellungen, ohne dass diese terminologisch voneinander abgegrenzt werden. Handelt es sich um Fiktionen, Hypothesen oder um handfeste Überzeugungen? Der rekonstruierte Zusammenhang erweist sich in Abhängigkeit von der durch das Verb unterstellen jeweils ausgedrückten propositionalen Einstellung – doxastisch-affirmativ, doxastisch-negierende oder nicht-doxastisch - entweder als unverständlich oder als trivial. Die als notwendige Voraussetzungen benannten Unterstellungen haben aufgrund der Semantik des Ausdrucks unterstellen hinsichtlich ihres epistemischen Status’ also keinen klaren Sinn. Damit scheitert a fortiori auch Habermas’ Versuch, notwendige Unterstellungen als schwach transzendentale Grundlage kommunikativen Handelns zu bestimmen. Die Inakzeptanz transzendentaler Argumente – auch in ihrer nicht-metaphysischen, von Habermas favorisierten „schwachen“ Lesart – wird durch die Formulierung „unterstellen müssen“ als Bestandteil des Schlussprinzips oder einer Prämisse transzendentaler Argumente systematisch verschleiert. / The concept of presuppositions is central for transcendental arguments. Transcendental arguments are efforts to validate empirical knowledge more effectively than through empirical knowledge itself. According to widely held views some fundamental propositions have to be presupposed for that purpose. But what – precisely – does “to presuppose something” mean? This paper will exemplarily reconstruct and interpret the use of the concept of presupposition in Jürgen Habermas’ work: Habermas doesn’t use this central concept in a homogeneous, standardized way: In particular he does not distinguish between the semantic and the epistemological concept. In contrast to the semantic concept, which describes a relationship between propositions, the epistemological concept characterizes a relationship between an epistemological subject and a proposition. Moreover, using the term “presupposition”, Habermas constructs an internal, constitutive connection between our ability to communicate and fundamentally different propositional, epistemological attitudes, without distinguishing them from each other. Is it a matter of fictions, hypotheses or beliefs? The reconstructed connection appears to be either incomprehensible or trivial given its dependence on the verb “to presuppose”, which can imply the propositional attitude of doxastic-affirmative, doxastic-negating or non-doxastic. The presuppositions claimed to be essential are not clearly defined in terms of their epistemological status because of the semantics of the term to presuppose. Therefore, Habermas’ attempt to determine essential presuppositions as a transcendental basis for communication also fails a fortiori. The non-acceptance of transcendental arguments – even in their non-metaphysic interpretation favoured by Habermas – is disguised as constituent of the premise of the corpus by the phrase “to have to presuppose”.

Contro l’argomento anselmiano del Proslogion sono state sollevate varie obiezioni, come quelle, molto note, di Gaunilone, di san Tommaso e di Kant. In questo saggio si sostiene la tesi che tutte queste critiche si basano fondamentalmente su una interpretazione imprecisa del testo di Anselmo che, se correttamente letto, ne risulta invece al riparo. Viene quindi offerta una nuova lettura dell’unum argumentum, con la quale, ricercandone lo spirito originario e più autentico, viene messa in risalto innanzitutto la sua struttura formale di dimostrazione per assurdo, illustrando in secondo luogo l’importante rapporto di complementarità che lega questa tipologia di prova a quelle strutturate in modo diverso, che procedono cioè a posteriori per costruzione diretta. / Many important Authors – as Gaunilo, Thomas Aquinas and Kant – have brought many well-known objections against the anselmian argument. This paper proposes the thesis that all these objections are based on an inaccurate interpretation of the Proslogion: in fact, an in-depth analysis of the text shows its fully validity. Therefore, it is offered a new reading of the anselmian argument, that looks for its original and authentic sense: firstly, it is enlightened its formal structure of proof by contradiction, and secondly it is showed its important complementary relationship with the other kind of a posteriori proofs.

Cette thèse est essentiellement composée de deux parties traitant des problèmes de Cauchy ou des problèmes périodiques. Dans la première partie, on étudie la stabilité de solutions régulières au voisinage d'états d'équilibre non constants pour un système d'Euler-Maxwell isentropique compressible bipolaire. Par des estimations d'énergie classiques et un argument de récurrence sur l'ordre des dérivées des solutions, on montre l'existence globale et l'unicité des solutions régulières du système lorsque les données initiales sont proches des états d'équilibre. On obtient aussi le comportement asymptotique des solutions quand le temps tend vers l'infini. Dans la deuxième partie, on considère la stabilité en temps long des solutions régulières de systèmes d'Euler-Maxwell et de Navier-Stokes-Maxwell compressibles dans le cas non isentropique lorsque les états d'équilibre sont constants. Grâce à des choix convenables de symétriseurs des systèmes et à des estimations d'énergie, on montre l'existence globale et l'unicité des solutions régulières des systèmes avec données initiales petites. De plus, par le principe de Duhamel et l'outil d'analyse de Fourier, on obtient des taux de décroissance des solutions quand le temps tend vers l'infini. / This thesis is essentially composed of two parts dealing with Cauchy problems and periodic problems. In the first part, we study the stability of smooth solutions near non constant equilibrium states for a two-fluid isentropic compressible Euler-Maxwell system.By classical energy estimates together with an induction argument on the order of the derivatives of solutions, we prove the existence and uniqueness of global solutions to the system when the given initial data are near the equilibrium states. We also obtain the asymptotic behavior of solutions when the time goes to infinity. In the second part, we consider the long time stability of the global smooth solutions for compressible Euler-Maxwell and Navier-Stokes-Maxwell systems in non isentropic case when the equilibrium solutions are constants. With the help of suitable choices of symmetrizers and energy estimates, we prove the existence and uniqueness of global solutions to the systems with given small initial data. Furthermore, using the Duhamel principle and the Fourier analysis tool, we obtain the decay rates of smooth solutions as the time goes to infinity.

Klasická lineární regrese a z ní odvozené testy hypotéz jsou založeny na předpokladu normálního rozdělení a shodnosti rozptylu závislých proměnných. V případě že jsou předpoklady normality porušeny, obvykle se užívá transformací závisle proměnných. První část této práce se zabývá transformacemi stabilizujícími rozptyl. Značná pozornost je udělena náhodným veličinám s Poissonovým a negativně binomickým rozdělením, pro které jsou studovány zobecněné transformace stabilizující rozptyl obsahující parametry v argumentu navíc. Pro tyto parametry jsou stanoveny jejich optimální hodnoty. Cílem druhé části práce je provést srovnání transformací uvedených v první části a dalších často užívaných transformací. Srovnání je provedeno v rámci analýzy rozptylu testováním hypotézy shodnosti středních hodnot p nezávislých náhodných výběrů s pomocí F testu. V této části jsou nejprve studovány vlastnosti F testu za předpokladu shodných a neshodných rozptylů napříč výběry. Následně je provedeno srovnání silofunkcí F testu aplikovaného pro p výběrů z Poissonova rozdělení transformovanými odmocninovou, logaritmickou a Yeo Johnsnovou transformací a z negativně binomického rozdělení transformovaného argumentem hyperbolického sinu, logaritmickou a Yeo-Johnsnovou transformací.

<p>This dissertation is concerned with two of the largest questions that we can ask about the nature of physical reality: first, whether physical reality begin to exist and, second, what criteria would physical reality have to fulfill in order to have had a beginning? Philosophers of religion and theologians have previously addressed whether physical reality began to exist in the context of defending the Kal{\'a}m Cosmological Argument (KCA) for theism, that is, (P1) everything that begins to exist has a cause for its beginning to exist, (P2) physical reality began to exist, and, therefore, (C) physical reality has a cause for its beginning to exist. While the KCA has traditionally been used to argue for God's existence, the KCA does not mention God, has been rejected by historically significant Christian theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, and raises perennial philosophical questions -- about the nature and history of physical reality, the nature of time, the nature of causation, and so on -- that should be of interest to all philosophers and, perhaps, all humans. While I am not a religious person, I am interested in the questions raised by the KCA. In this dissertation, I articulate three necessary conditions that physical reality would need to fulfill in order to have had a beginning and argue that, given the current state of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot determine whether physical reality began to exist.</p>

Text in Afrikaans, abstract in Afrikaans and English / Die regsposisie van die deelgenote tot 'n de facto huwelik word krities ondersoek met inagneming van die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse regsposisie, oorsigtelike regsvergelyking, die morele argument, en die invloed van die Grondwet van Suid-Afrika. Die verskillende vorme van de facto huwelike in sy bree interpretasie word in oenskou geneem en die volgende verbindings word bespreek: saamwoonverhoudings; inheemsregtelike huwelike; huwelike voortspruitend uit godsdienstige tradisies; en homoseksuele huwelike. Dit word gevind dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regsposisie tans baie onbevredigend is. Sekere voorstelle vir wysigings word aan die hand gedoen, en daar word gewys op die unieke kenmerke van die Suid-Afrikaanse situasie wat in ag geneem moet word in die vorming van 'n nuwe benadering. Dit word bepleit dat die regslui die uitdaging moet aangryp en met innoverende denke 'n nuwe bestel vir die Suid-Afrikaanse reg moet skep wat buigbaar en soepel is, maar terselfdertyd regsekerheid bevorder. / The legal status of the parties to a de facto marriage is investigated, taking into consideration the present South African position, legal comparison, the moral argument, and the influence of the Constitution of South Africa. The different forms of the de facto marriage in its wide interpretation are reviewed and the following relationships are discussed: cohabitation relationships; customary marriages; marriages resulting from religious traditions; and homosexual relationships. It is found that the present South African legal position is very unsatisfactory. Several suggestions for amendments are made, and the unique characteristics of the South African situation to be taken into consideration in forming a new approach, are highlighted. It is pleaded that the legal profession accept the challenge to create, with innovation, a new system for South African law which will be flexible, but, will at the same time ensure certainty in law. / Private Law / LL. M.