Dans Suresh c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration) (2002), la Cour suprême du Canada en vient à la conclusion que les principes de justice fondamentale prévus à l'm1icle 7 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés autorisent, dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, l'expulsion d'une personne vers la torture. La Cour nous indique que l'identification des principes de justice fondamentale doit se fonder sur une démarche contextuelle et sur un consensus dans la société canadienne. Le fondement factuel dans le raisonnement de la Cour est pourtant inexistant. Elle ne traite ni du contexte en matière d'immigration, ni du contexte en matière de sécurité nationale entourant cette décision. La Cour prescrit un haut degré de retenue pour le contrôle judiciaire de la décision du Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration d'expulser une personne vers la torture. Cette retenue explique en partie le traitement déficient des faits. La Cour conclut qu'il y aurait un consensus dans la société canadienne sur le principe de justice fondamentale qui autorise l'expulsion d'une personne vers la torture sans fournir la preuve de ce fait social. L'absence de traitement des faits et de la preuve affecte la légitimité – la force persuasive - de la décision de la Cour suprême dans Suresh. / In Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), the Supreme Court of Canada concludes that the principles of fundamental justice in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom allow, in exceptional circumstances, to deport a person facing a risk of torture. The Court writes that principles of fundamental justice must be determined by a contextual approach and based on a significant societal consensus. There is however no factual basis in the Court's reasoning. There is no discussion of the immigration context or the national security context surrounding this decision. The Court chooses a highly deferencial standard of review for the judicial review in administrative law of the Citizenship and Immigration Minister's decision to deport a person facing a risk of torture. This choice partly explains the deficient treatment of facts in the Court's decision. The Court concludes that there is a societal consensus on the principles of fundamental justice allowing deportation of a person facing a risk of torture without providing any evidence of this societal facto The absence of a proper examination of the facts and the evidence at the basis of conclusions in Suresh, reduces the legitimacy – the persuasiveness – of the Court's decision.

Les Québécois sont de plus en plus conscients de l’environnement qui les entoure et de l’importance d’en assurer la qualité et la pérennité. Certains phénomènes, tels les changements climatiques, l’accumulation de polluants organiques persistants et l’amincissement de la couche d’ozone, que nous qualifierons de phénomènes environnementaux diffus, sont engendrés par de multiples émetteurs de polluants et ont des effets globaux qui ne peuvent être liés à un événement précis et dont les impacts sont difficiles à identifier et à quantifier pour le moment. En l’absence de preuve quant aux effets qu’auront ces phénomènes diffus sur les citoyens et les difficultés liées à la preuve scientifique du lien causal entre ce dommage et un émetteur de polluant donné, les recours classiques en responsabilité civile et pour troubles de voisinage, prévus aux articles 1457 et 976 C.c.Q., apparaissent inopérants. Nous nous interrogeons donc sur l’existence d’un droit à l’environnement qui conférerait aux citoyens le droit de vivre dans un environnement sain et leur permettrait ainsi de réclamer que cesse toute atteinte environnementale engendrée par ces phénomènes, même si elle n’a pas d’effet directement sur eux. Considérant l’importance de l’efficacité des recours qui pourraient permettre une mise en œuvre de ce droit, nous procéderons à l’analyse de trois sources potentielles d’un droit à l’environnement sous cet angle. À cet effet, nous étudierons les recours constitutionnels et quasi-constitutionnels liés à la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, à la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne et au recours institutionnel prévu dans la Loi sur la qualité de l’environnement. Considérant l’absence de reconnaissance suffisante d’un droit à l’environnement et de recours efficaces pour en assurer la mise en œuvre, nous proposerons ensuite des pistes de solution afin que puisse être développé un mécanisme permettant une réponse judiciaire aux phénomènes environnementaux diffus. / The quality of the environment has become a growing concern in the recent years for Quebec citizens. Phenomena such as climate change, persistent organic pollutants and the depletion of the ozone layer are caused by several sources, the effects of which cannot be distinguished one from the other and/or linked to a specific event. Furthermore, these phenomena have yet to create damage to Quebec residents in order to create the necessary standing for the introduction of legal proceedings. Also, the scientific uncertainty related to the source of potential damage and to the proof of said damage makes it impossible to legally attack the emitters of the pollutant contributing to this type of environmental phenomena under 1457 C.C.Q. or 976 C.C.Q. We have identified the 3 potential sources of a right to a clean environment which could entitle Quebec citizens to go before the courts in environmental matters, even in the absence of specific damages to their person or property. We have analysed the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and the Environmental Quality Act and looked at the potential right to a clean environment possibly contained therein and the legal actions that could be taken to ensure their respect. Considering the weakness of what our legal system had to propose, we have developed solutions that could be put forward in order to allow the war against climate change and other environmental phenomena of the same nature to become legally actionable.

Cette étude traite des difficultés que rencontrent les travailleurs agricoles salariés dans l’exercice de leur droit à la liberté d’association et à la négociation collective. Ils sont souvent exclus des régimes législatifs nationaux de protection des droits syndicaux ou restreints dans leur capacité de les exercer en dépit du fait qu’ils sont parmi les plus pauvres et mal nourris de la planète et donc requerraient une protection accrue. Quelles sont les causes historiques de ce traitement discriminatoire (première partie) ? Comment le droit international du travail contribue-t-il à remédier à cette situation (deuxième partie) ? En quoi est-ce que le droit international du travail a-t-il influencé le droit interne canadien pour la protection des travailleurs agricoles salariés (troisième partie) ? Les causes du traitement singulier accordé à ces travailleurs remontent aux origines mêmes de l’agriculture. Consciente des caractéristiques particulières de cette activité, l’Organisation internationale du travail affirmera dès le début du 20e siècle qu’il est injustifié d’empêcher les travailleurs agricoles salariés de se syndiquer. Elle insiste sur la valeur fondamentale des droits syndicaux devant différents forums onusiens et favorise leur promotion à travers l’élaboration de normes du travail mais également d’instruments de soft law, considérés mieux adaptés dans un contexte contemporain de mondialisation. Ce droit international du travail influencera ensuite l’interprétation de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés par les tribunaux canadiens dans leur analyse de la constitutionnalité de l’exclusion totale ou partielle des travailleurs agricoles salariés des régimes législatifs de protection des droits syndicaux. / This study analyses the difficulties faced by agricultural workers exercising their rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. These workers often find themselves excluded from national legislation providing for the protection of union rights, and when these rights are provided to them, their ability to exercise them is limited. Being amongst the poorest human beings on earth, agricultural workers would instead require stronger protection. What are the historical causes of this discriminatory treatment (part one) ? How has international labour law helped to correct this situation (part two) ? In what way did international labour law influence canadian domestic law in regard of the protection of wage earning agricultural workers (part three) ? The reasons for the singular treatment of this class of workers go back to agriculture’s very roots. Conscious of the particular characteristics of this activity, the International Labour Organisation asserted, at the very beginning of the 20th century, that no justification stood to limit the rights of agricultural workers to unionize. It later insisted on the fundamental value of union rights in front of diverse UN forums and favoured their promotion for agricultural workers through the elaboration of labour standards as well as extensive use of soft law tools, considered more suited to the globalised world. International labour law also contributed to the interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom by Canadian courts in their analysis of the constitutionality of total or partial exclusion of agricultural workers from legislation protecting union rights.

This research is an enquiry to find an electoral formula that conforms to Canadian constitutional values. Three core values that are pertinent to the issue of electoral systems are identified: democracy, diversity, and efficiency. Each of these core values is divided into different aspects. These aspects will form the backbone of the evaluation of different electoral systems in this work. I will begin with an evaluation of the plurality model of elections, which is currently used in Canada. I will demonstrate that many of the attributes of the current system are not in tune with Canadian constitutional values, in particular with the progressive interpretation that the Supreme Court of Canada has given to the right to vote as enshrined in Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Although the interpretation of the right to vote will be the main thrust of the constitutional scrutiny in this work, attention will also be given to other pertinent rights such as equality rights, minority rights, and the freedom of expression. Next, I will examine provincial electoral reform initiatives that were initiated in five Canadian provinces. All of these initiatives - three of which were put to referenda and eventually defeated - proposed adopting a variant of proportional representation. Accordingly, I will evaluate proportional systems according to the intended values. I will conclude that these systems have problems of their own and they also cannot strike a fine balance between competing values. In the final stage, I will make a new proposal for elections to the Canadian Parliament. First, I will demonstrate that majority systems are better candidates to attain the envisioned values. Then I will introduce a new variant of the majority model, which I call a majority-preferential two-round variant. I will demonstrate that this new variant will outperform the other variants in the attainment of values if adopted for elections to the House of Commons. Finally, I will argue that the combination of a House of Commons elected through the majority-preferential formula and a proportionally elected Senate will result in a more balanced approach to the relevant constitutional values.

In Canada’s recent history, the cases of Kanao Inouye, Omar Khadr, and Maher Arar shed light on the relationship between citizen-rights and sovereign power, a problem which this thesis studies through its three-pronged strategy of analysis. First, it takes a postmetaphysical approach to the problem of exceptionality as it has been explored in the works of Jacques Derrida, Gianni Vattimo, and Reiner Schürmann. Their responses to the problem of exceptionality provide a framework that enables this thesis to capture the relationship between citizen-rights and sovereign power in relative detail. Second, it applies Schürmann’s epochal theory in order to offer a historical periodization of citizen-rights in Canada that highlights the effect of sovereign power on citizen-rights. Lastly, in light of its philosophical and theoretical framework, it interprets the Inouye, Khadr, Arar cases in order to account for the effect of Charter rights on sovereign power. / Graduate / 0626 / tsujikt@gmail.com

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This research is an enquiry to find an electoral formula that conforms to Canadian constitutional values. Three core values that are pertinent to the issue of electoral systems are identified: democracy, diversity, and efficiency. Each of these core values is divided into different aspects. These aspects will form the backbone of the evaluation of different electoral systems in this work. I will begin with an evaluation of the plurality model of elections, which is currently used in Canada. I will demonstrate that many of the attributes of the current system are not in tune with Canadian constitutional values, in particular with the progressive interpretation that the Supreme Court of Canada has given to the right to vote as enshrined in Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Although the interpretation of the right to vote will be the main thrust of the constitutional scrutiny in this work, attention will also be given to other pertinent rights such as equality rights, minority rights, and the freedom of expression. Next, I will examine provincial electoral reform initiatives that were initiated in five Canadian provinces. All of these initiatives - three of which were put to referenda and eventually defeated - proposed adopting a variant of proportional representation. Accordingly, I will evaluate proportional systems according to the intended values. I will conclude that these systems have problems of their own and they also cannot strike a fine balance between competing values. In the final stage, I will make a new proposal for elections to the Canadian Parliament. First, I will demonstrate that majority systems are better candidates to attain the envisioned values. Then I will introduce a new variant of the majority model, which I call a majority-preferential two-round variant. I will demonstrate that this new variant will outperform the other variants in the attainment of values if adopted for elections to the House of Commons. Finally, I will argue that the combination of a House of Commons elected through the majority-preferential formula and a proportionally elected Senate will result in a more balanced approach to the relevant constitutional values.

La liberté de circulation et la liberté d’établissement sont reconnues comme fondamentales et intrinsèquement liées au principe de dignité humaine. Pourtant, au nom de la souveraineté nationale, les États imposent des limites à la mobilité humaine. La mobilité de la main-d’œuvre est nécessaire au fonctionnement de l’économie et peut répondre en partie aux enjeux de pénurie de travailleurs. Notre thèse propose une recherche en droit positif visant à circonscrire la portée du droit à la mobilité en droit canadien. De fait, l’article 6 (2) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés reconnaît aux citoyens et résidents permanents au Canada la liberté de circulation et le droit de gagner leur vie. Toutefois, l’alinéa 6 (3) a) de la Charte contient une restriction à ces droits. Les provinces demeurent autorisées à légiférer pour limiter la mobilité, tant qu’elles n’imposent pas de discrimination basée sur la province de résidence. Nous soutenons que dans l’état actuel de la jurisprudence canadienne, le droit à la mobilité n’est pas considéré comme une liberté fondamentale. Pour leur part, les accords de commerce entre les membres de la confédération, sur le plan national, et les accords bilatéraux, régionaux et multilatéraux entre le Canada et ses partenaires contiennent des dispositions encadrant la mobilité de la main-d’œuvre. Lors des négociations constitutionnelles qui ont précédé et suivi le rapatriement de la constitution canadienne en 1982, le développement de l’union économique au pays et l’inclusion du droit à la mobilité ont été au cœur des débats. Or l’analyse des décisions de la Cour suprême du Canada portant sur l’article 6 (2) démontre pourtant que c’est uniquement la non-discrimination sur la base de la province de résidence qui est garantie par la Charte. Les instruments internationaux relatifs aux droits de la personne établissent le droit à la mobilité comme un droit fondamental, mais la recension des différents accords de libre-échange permet de conclure que la mobilité de la main-d’œuvre est favorisée essentiellement pour répondre aux besoins économiques. Le droit à la mobilité ne devrait pas uniquement répondre aux besoins des aléas économiques. Dans cette perspective, la reconnaissance des compétences et des qualifications s’avère impérative pour que le droit à la mobilité soit réellement effectif. / The rights to move, the right to take up residence, and the right to gain a livelihood are recognized as fundamental and are intrinsically linked to the principle of human dignity. Yet, in the name of national sovereignty, states impose limits on human mobility. Labor mobility is a pillar of world economy and can address many aspects of workforce shortages. Our research examines current constraints to, and the scope of, the right to mobility under Canadian law. Indeed, section 6 (2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognizes the right to move and the right to gain a livelihood for citizens and permanent residents of Canada. However, section 6 (3) a) of the Charter contains a limitation on these rights. Provinces remain authorized to limit mobility, as long as they do not discriminate on the basis of province of residence. We argue that, as Canadian jurisprudence currently stands, mobility rights are not considered a fundamental freedom. On the other hand, trade agreements between members of confederation, at the national level, and bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements between Canada and its international partners, contain provisions regulating labor mobility. During the constitutional negotiations that preceded and followed the repatriation of the Constitution Act, 1982, the development of the economic union in Canada and the inclusion of mobility rights were at the heart of the debate. However, an analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions on section 6(2) shows that the Canadian Charter guarantees non-discrimination on the basis of province of residence. International human rights instruments establish the mobility rights as a fundamental right, but a review of various free trade agreements suggests that labor mobility is promoted primarily to meet economic needs. Mobility rights should not uniquely answer economic requirements. Against this background, the recognition of skills and qualifications is imperative to ensure that mobility rights are effective.