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The Quakers and the Establishment, 1660-1730, with specific reference to the North-West of EnglandMorgan, N. J. January 1985 (has links)
No description available.
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O governo civil no \'Segundo Tratado Sobre o Governo\' de John Locke / Civil government in John Locke\'s \'Second Treatise of Government\'Tsuji, Alessandra 05 January 2018 (has links)
Em cenário permeado por guerras civis e religiosas advindas da busca por poder político, no século XVII, Locke dedica-se a demonstrar a origem, extensão e finalidade do governo civil, bem como sua dissolução, assumindo o poder político como ponto de partida. Isso porque é preciso elucidar a quem cabe esse poder, de direito, na sociedade civil. Nesse sentido, Locke empenha-se em refutar os argumentos de Robert Filmer, para quem a única forma de governo possível é aquela que tem como pressuposto o domínio particular e a jurisdição paterna de Adão como fonte de todo o poder. Locke critica a visão filmeriana que implicaria em assumir que nenhum homem é livre por natureza e refuta o argumento de Filmer no campo da lei natural. Para tanto, parece valer-se, entre outros elementos, de um procedimento próximo ao da medicina empírica de Thomas Sydenham, mais preocupada em observar as alterações e circunstâncias em que a doença se manifesta do que em buscar suas causas ocultas. Por essa via, precisa reconhecer antes de tudo, os limites do conhecimento humano e concentrar-se na utilidade da reflexão voltada para a prática. Daí ele ressaltar, de modo semelhante, a importância do trabalho de observação no Segundo Tratado desde a discussão sobre a lei de natureza, como lei moral que visa à preservação da humanidade, passando pelo reconhecimento dos inconvenientes do estado de natureza e da necessidade de remediá-los via consentindo para a formação do corpo político e do governo, até o direito de resistência que, conforme interpreta Jean-Fabien Spitz, parece depender de que os membros da sociedade civil mantenham certo direito individual de julgar que limitam as ações daqueles autorizados a exercer o poder legislativo. / In a scenario permeated by civil and religious wars arising from the search for political power in the seventeenth century, Locke is dedicated to demonstrating the origin, extension, and purpose of civil government, as well as its dissolution, assuming political power as a starting point. This is because it is necessary to elucidate to whom this power belongs, of right, in the civil society. In this sense, Locke endeavors to refute the arguments of Robert Filmer, for whom the only form of government possible is that which assumes the particular domain and the paternal jurisdiction of Adam as the source of all power. Locke criticizes the filmerian view that would imply assuming that no man is free by nature and refutes Filmer\'s argument in the field of natural law. For this, it seems to be worth, among other elements, a procedure close to the empirical medicine of Thomas Sydenham, more concerned with observing the changes and circumstances in which the disease manifests itself than in seeking its hidden causes. In this way, one must first recognize the limits of human knowledge and focus on the usefulness of practice-oriented reflection. Hence the importance of the work of observation in the Second Treatise from the discussion of the law of nature - as a moral law aimed at the preservation of humanity, through the recognition of the inconveniences of the state of nature and the need to remedy it - to the right of resistance which, as interpreted by Jean-Fabien Spitz, seems to depend on the members of civil society maintaining an individual right to judge. So they can limit the actions of those authorized to exercise the legislative power.
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O governo civil no \'Segundo Tratado Sobre o Governo\' de John Locke / Civil government in John Locke\'s \'Second Treatise of Government\'Alessandra Tsuji 05 January 2018 (has links)
Em cenário permeado por guerras civis e religiosas advindas da busca por poder político, no século XVII, Locke dedica-se a demonstrar a origem, extensão e finalidade do governo civil, bem como sua dissolução, assumindo o poder político como ponto de partida. Isso porque é preciso elucidar a quem cabe esse poder, de direito, na sociedade civil. Nesse sentido, Locke empenha-se em refutar os argumentos de Robert Filmer, para quem a única forma de governo possível é aquela que tem como pressuposto o domínio particular e a jurisdição paterna de Adão como fonte de todo o poder. Locke critica a visão filmeriana que implicaria em assumir que nenhum homem é livre por natureza e refuta o argumento de Filmer no campo da lei natural. Para tanto, parece valer-se, entre outros elementos, de um procedimento próximo ao da medicina empírica de Thomas Sydenham, mais preocupada em observar as alterações e circunstâncias em que a doença se manifesta do que em buscar suas causas ocultas. Por essa via, precisa reconhecer antes de tudo, os limites do conhecimento humano e concentrar-se na utilidade da reflexão voltada para a prática. Daí ele ressaltar, de modo semelhante, a importância do trabalho de observação no Segundo Tratado desde a discussão sobre a lei de natureza, como lei moral que visa à preservação da humanidade, passando pelo reconhecimento dos inconvenientes do estado de natureza e da necessidade de remediá-los via consentindo para a formação do corpo político e do governo, até o direito de resistência que, conforme interpreta Jean-Fabien Spitz, parece depender de que os membros da sociedade civil mantenham certo direito individual de julgar que limitam as ações daqueles autorizados a exercer o poder legislativo. / In a scenario permeated by civil and religious wars arising from the search for political power in the seventeenth century, Locke is dedicated to demonstrating the origin, extension, and purpose of civil government, as well as its dissolution, assuming political power as a starting point. This is because it is necessary to elucidate to whom this power belongs, of right, in the civil society. In this sense, Locke endeavors to refute the arguments of Robert Filmer, for whom the only form of government possible is that which assumes the particular domain and the paternal jurisdiction of Adam as the source of all power. Locke criticizes the filmerian view that would imply assuming that no man is free by nature and refutes Filmer\'s argument in the field of natural law. For this, it seems to be worth, among other elements, a procedure close to the empirical medicine of Thomas Sydenham, more concerned with observing the changes and circumstances in which the disease manifests itself than in seeking its hidden causes. In this way, one must first recognize the limits of human knowledge and focus on the usefulness of practice-oriented reflection. Hence the importance of the work of observation in the Second Treatise from the discussion of the law of nature - as a moral law aimed at the preservation of humanity, through the recognition of the inconveniences of the state of nature and the need to remedy it - to the right of resistance which, as interpreted by Jean-Fabien Spitz, seems to depend on the members of civil society maintaining an individual right to judge. So they can limit the actions of those authorized to exercise the legislative power.
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A Pragmatic Standard of Legal ValidityTyler, John 2012 May 1900 (has links)
American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law.
These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism.
In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method.
This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior.
The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent.
The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will.
Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil.
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