This dissertation is concerned with a fundamental problem at the heart of Arendt’s The Human Condition—namely, ‘the problem of idleness’. This problem is related to the three types of human Arendt identifies as correlated to dominant activities in one’s life, animal laborans, homo faber, and the acting person. It explores Arendt’s predictions of an oncoming automation crisis, and the possibility of a corresponding crisis in the production—consumption cycle. The problem of idleness can be understood as the claim that if people are provided freedom from job-holding so that they may pursue other activities, they would likely turn to consumption to occupy their time. I claim that this problem of idleness is important in any consideration of an oncoming automation crisis, especially in relation to Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a solution to such a crisis. I claim that there is a hole in the UBI literature concerning this problem of idleness, and if left unaddressed it would result in both an ineffective UBI, and in a crisis of meaning for the general populace. This dissertation demonstrates what the problem of idleness is, why it is important, and what possible solutions exist. This contributes to the UBI literature by diagnosing and attempting to solve a gap in the literature which I argue would cause practical challenges in the implementation and stability of a UBI system. I also contribute to the Arendtian literature by problematizing traditional readings of Arendt, and offering a reappraisal of her thought on Marx, art, and the social.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Edith de Azevedo Marques.pdf: 1312593 bytes, checksum: 100558e3701e6f194cb50f0c71b94f7d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-06-22 / The development of the present paper has as objective a reflection on the right to peace in the classification of fundamental rights. The analysis of this intention lies in a reflection on the thinker Hannah Arendt, considered a fighter for the Jewish folk under Nazi persecution that culminated in the holocaust, in which millions of Jews were exterminated in an extremely cruel way. This violence against Jews made Hannah Arendt turn her life into a constant battle for peace with great determination in actions of courage and bravery. The peace we will talk about in this study refers to the peace not meaning the opposite of war but of violence, considering war a type of violence. We will briefly analyze two works of Hannah Arendt: ―The Origins of totalitarianism‖ and ―Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil‖, also developing historical, social and politic aspects, about the facts that raised the interest of their author. Finally, we present the concept of peace within the juridical norm, talking about social peace that derives from the function of the right of harmonizing relationships between subjects / A linha de desenvolvimento do presente trabalho tem como objetivo uma reflexão sobre o direito à paz, na classificação dos direitos fundamentais. A análise dessa pretensão nasce de uma reflexão voltada para a pensadora Hannah Arendt, considerada uma combatente em defesa do povo judeu, sujeito à perseguição nazista, culminada com o holocausto, onde foram exterminados milhões de judeus, de forma extremamente cruel. Essa violência contra os judeus fez com que Hannah Arendt fizesse, durante toda sua vida, uma constante luta pela paz entregando-se com determinação em ações de grande coragem e destemor. Essa paz, tratada nesse estudo, refere-se à paz não como o contrário da guerra, mas da violência, considerada a guerra um tipo de violência. São analisadas, de forma breve, duas obras de Hannah Arendt: ―Origens do totalitarismo‖ e ―Eichmann em Jerusalém: um relato sobre a banalidade do mal‖, desenvolvendo também aspectos históricos, sociais e políticos sobre os acontecimentos que suscitaram o interesse de sua autora. Para finalizar, apresenta-se a concepção de paz no âmbito da norma jurídica, tratando a paz social decorrente da função do direito de harmonizar as relações intersubjetivas

O direito à verdade frente a graves violações de direitos humanos foi criado recentemente e tem um significado jurídico que permanece incerto em diversos aspectos relevantes. As divergências em torno do seu conceito, que ainda está em formação, geram problemas práticos quando se busca tornar esse direito efetivo. A tese analisa a questão que está na base do debate jurídico-dogmático sobre esse direito, a saber, o significado que o termo verdade adquire ao se tornar o seu objeto. É feita uma investigação sobre a forma como este tema é abordado pelos estudos sobre justiça de transição e sobre como se deu a emergência e o desenvolvimento do direito à verdade no direito internacional dos direitos humanos, nas esferas universal e interamericana. O objetivo é, depois, buscar compreender o que, de um ponto de vista teórico, fez com que surgisse na história e no pensamento político-jurídico a necessidade de sua criação e passou a alimentar o esforço para a sua conceituação. Essa análise aponta que a verdade almejada com o direito em estudo tem outras dimensões para além da busca de informações desconhecidas sobre casos individuais de violações a direitos humanos. Como o tema da verdade, sabidamente, é de enorme extensão no campo filosófico, o presente trabalho faz uso de temas de reflexão de Hannah Arendt, que para essa temática tem tido grande repercussão inclusive em sede doutrinária, com o fim de, por meio de um desenvolvimento extensivo, examinar as diferentes dimensões do problema. / The right to the truth concerning gross human rights violations was created recently, and has a legal meaning that remains uncertain in many relevant aspects. The disagreements about its concept, which is still in development, cause practical problems when one tries to make this right effective. The thesis analyses the issue that underlies the legal-dogmatic debate about this right, i.e., the meaning of the term truth when it becomes its object. An investigation is undertaken on how this theme is addressed by studies on transitional justice and also on the emergence and development of the right to the truth in international human rights law, in the universal and in the inter-American systems. The goal is then to try to understand what, from a theoretical point of view, led to the emergence in history and political-legal thought of the need for its creation, and began to feed the effort to its conceptualization. This analysis indicates that the truth sought with the right examined here has dimensions other than the search for unknown information about individual cases of human rights violations. The theme of truth being, as known, a subject of enormous extension in the philosophical field, the present study makes use of topics of reflection by Hannah Arendt, which have had a great repercussion on this subject even in legal dogmatic thought, in order to examine, through an extensive development, the different dimensions of the problem. By doing so, it is intended to shed light on the way the conceptualization of the right to the truth is being consolidated and on the difficulties it faces.

This thesis makes a historically grounded theoretical contribution to an emerging “critical” approach to refugee studies. Utilising the insights of Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt, it seeks to reconceptualise academic and policy understandings of what has come to be known as “the refugee problem" through an examination and critique of its (implicit) conceptual foundations. The thesis proceeds through a series of historically-informed moves oriented by the relationship between power, subjectivity, and agency, and argues that the key to reconceptualising the refugee problem lies in understanding how these three concepts rely upon and reinforce one another in a particular historically contingent configuration. The objectives of this thesis are threefold and connected. First, it unpacks a deceptively unproblematic term, “the refugee problem” to reveal the complicity of understanding the “refugee (as) problem” in perpetuating the plight of increasing numbers of the world's population, despite the alleviation of the difficulties these people face being the professed goal of the refugee regime. Second, in so doing it contributes to a growing body of literature seeking to counter the voicelessness and abjection into which refugees and asylum seekers are cast. And third, on the basis of this, to begin a conversation about rethinking the nature of the “solutions” we seek to a reframed “refugee problem.” Engaging in a (Foucaultian) genealogical analysis of “the refugee problem”, the first half of the thesis charts the historically-contingent development of a distinct “refugee problem discourse”, revealing that the construction of refugees as passive victims of political forces is the effect both of such discourse and of the international refugee regime as a classificatory regime of truth and subjectivity, rather than an expression of any essential nature of “the refugee.” The thesis then turns to Hannah Arendt's work as a theoretical lens through which to reframe our understanding of the “refugee problem” and to investigate how to identify and open up creative forces for re-subjectification processes and “solutions” not tied to the classificatory and subjectivising logic of the refugee regime or sovereign state system.  Practices of rights claiming, and the City of Sanctuary movement in the UK are examined as two such processes, with the potential of posing “counter-narratives” of problems and solutions which challenge the technocratic, or population-management, approach of the refugee regime.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-02-16T19:29:01Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Nuria López Cabaleiro Suárez.pdf: 1538506 bytes, checksum: d7a9a5493a0653e42e6121fb291abd7f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-02-16T19:29:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nuria López Cabaleiro Suárez.pdf: 1538506 bytes, checksum: d7a9a5493a0653e42e6121fb291abd7f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-06 / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPq / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Starting from the factual premise studied by Arendt on the diversity and fluidity of moral judgments, particularly in the context of totalitarian regimes, this thesis analyses her last writtens in order to find in them relevant elements (variables) that could be articulated composing our judgments. Starting from a rupture with the isolation of the heideggerian subject, accept Jasper´s Existenz and open to the other, on the terms of the reading she does of Kant, both in a intrasubject perspective, from the enlarged mentality, and in a extrasubject perspective, pointing to a political philosophy rooted in a theory of action, whose lines could return to her early writtens. Furthermore, it highlights possible uses of Arendt´s studies as a philosophical model to recent researches about cognition and justice in neurosciences and also in the dialog with recent theories of justice, preponderantly turned to political philosophy. So it demonstrates, in a study from Hannah Arendt, the relevance of her work, that is able to provide a interdisciplinary vison of the dynamics of what we understand as justice / Partindo da premissa fática estudada por Arendt de diversidade e fluidez dos juízos morais, particularmente no contexto de regimes totalitários, esta tese analisa seus últimos estudos para encontrar neles elementos relevantes (variáveis) que possam se articular compondo nossos julgamentos. A partir de uma ruptura com o isolamento do sujeito heideggeriano, adere a Existenz de Jaspers, e abrindo-se, ao outro, nos termos da leitura que ela faz de Kant, tanto em uma perspectiva intrasujeito, a partir da mentalidade alargada, como em uma perspectiva extrasujeito, apontando para uma filosofia política enraizada em uma teoria da ação, cujos contornos podem voltar às suas obras anteriores. Ademais, ressalta possíveis utilizações dos estudos de Arendt como modelo filosófico para recentes pesquisas sobre cognição e justiça nas neurociências e também no diálogo com as recentes teorias da justiça, preponderantemente voltadas à filosofia política. Demonstra assim, em um estudo a partir de Hannah Arendt, a relevância de sua obra, capaz de prover em uma visão interdisciplinar da dinâmica do que compreendemos como justiça

En esta investigación se defiende que las concepciones de libertad, público y privado son categorías privilegiadas para abordar tanto la cultura griega como la filosofía práctica de Aristóteles. Apelando a los textos clásicos, se analizan tanto la génesis como la trascendencia de estos tres conceptos, lo que posibilita una clara percepción de lo que estos representan en la cultura griega y el cometido que desempeñan en la filosofía de Aristóteles. Desde estas premisas se examinan las dispares interpretaciones que de la filosofía aristotélica han realizado tanto la republicana Hannah Arendt como la liberal Judith Swanson. Análisis que concluye en que ambas pensadoras realizan lecturas incorrectas de los textos aristotélicos así como que el error de estas diferentes interpretaciones reside en que extrapolan sus propias concepciones de libertad, o la moderna concepción de la separación de esferas, trasladándolas anacrónicamente al análisis de los textos clásicos griegos. / This investigation intends to demonstrate that the concepts of liberty, public and private, are privileged categories which explore both Greek culture and Aristotle´s practical philosophy. Using the classic texts as background, the genesis and the transcendence of these three concepts are analyzed, which gives a clear perception of what they represent in Greek culture and their role in Aristotle´s philosophy. This thesis also examines the polarized interpretations of the Aristotelian philosophy of both the republican Hannah Arendt, and the libertarian Judith Swanson. This analysis concludes that due to the thinkers´ extrapolation of their own notions of liberty and a modern interpretation of the separation of spheres theory to the classic Greek texts, resulting in an anachronism, the Aristotelian texts are incorrectly interpreted.

This thesis focuses on the problem of defining and designing public space in contemporary mass society. "Assembly" revaluates a cultural understanding of public space as the space of regulation, consumption and leisure, and works to find spaces of freedom, agency and action. Three iconic sites located in Toronto from three successive generations are examined: Nathan Phillips Square, the Eaton Centre and the new Dundas Square. These three sites form the primary division of the work and are respectively paired with extended critiques from three thinkers: Hannah Arendt, Jean Baudrillard, and Guy Debord. The pairings centre on Arendt's account of the "rise of the social", on Baudrillard's analysis of consumption and on Debord's dissection of the spectacle. The argument is presented in the form of an assemblage. Although the nature of this method invites each reader to construct their own meaning, this thesis grounds itself on a defined polemic. It considers public space to be marked by 1) the erosion of a clear distinction between our public and private realms, and their subsequent dissolution into the realm of the social, 2) the ideology of consumption overtaking the realm of the social, and 3) the world of the commodity replacing reality with the world of the spectacle. "Assembly" first consists of three main sections corresponding to the three sites. Each of these parts is assembled from three distinct strands: factual, theoretical and visual. The factual strand forms the main "field" of each section and is made up of selected quotations from mass media ? newspapers, public documents and websites. The theoretical strand, consisting of pointed quotations from the relevant social theorist, is threaded through the field of mass media. The visual strand comprises two elements: a postcard that marks the beginning of the section and a series of authored photographs that follows and complements the text-based assemblage. <br /><br /> Inevitably, the relationship between general social values and those of individuals is fraught. Consequently, and perhaps also inevitably, architectural design tends to reduce the manifoldness of the public realm into a homogenous and singular public space: the "whole". This thesis pursues the question of how to conciliate individual agency with collective public experience. The process and form of "Assembly" deliberately celebrates this uncertainty of design, and takes "heterogeneity" as a necessary condition of public space. That it cannot offer a comprehensive solution is, perhaps, inherent to the question.

This thesis focuses on the problem of defining and designing public space in contemporary mass society. "Assembly" revaluates a cultural understanding of public space as the space of regulation, consumption and leisure, and works to find spaces of freedom, agency and action. Three iconic sites located in Toronto from three successive generations are examined: Nathan Phillips Square, the Eaton Centre and the new Dundas Square. These three sites form the primary division of the work and are respectively paired with extended critiques from three thinkers: Hannah Arendt, Jean Baudrillard, and Guy Debord. The pairings centre on Arendt's account of the "rise of the social", on Baudrillard's analysis of consumption and on Debord's dissection of the spectacle. The argument is presented in the form of an assemblage. Although the nature of this method invites each reader to construct their own meaning, this thesis grounds itself on a defined polemic. It considers public space to be marked by 1) the erosion of a clear distinction between our public and private realms, and their subsequent dissolution into the realm of the social, 2) the ideology of consumption overtaking the realm of the social, and 3) the world of the commodity replacing reality with the world of the spectacle. "Assembly" first consists of three main sections corresponding to the three sites. Each of these parts is assembled from three distinct strands: factual, theoretical and visual. The factual strand forms the main "field" of each section and is made up of selected quotations from mass media ? newspapers, public documents and websites. The theoretical strand, consisting of pointed quotations from the relevant social theorist, is threaded through the field of mass media. The visual strand comprises two elements: a postcard that marks the beginning of the section and a series of authored photographs that follows and complements the text-based assemblage. <br /><br /> Inevitably, the relationship between general social values and those of individuals is fraught. Consequently, and perhaps also inevitably, architectural design tends to reduce the manifoldness of the public realm into a homogenous and singular public space: the "whole". This thesis pursues the question of how to conciliate individual agency with collective public experience. The process and form of "Assembly" deliberately celebrates this uncertainty of design, and takes "heterogeneity" as a necessary condition of public space. That it cannot offer a comprehensive solution is, perhaps, inherent to the question.

Four years ago, on May 15th 2011, we witnessed in the Spanish State ‘something’ that was quickly and popularly referred to as 15M or the Indignados. Since that day, 15M has had a tremendous impact on the way a large part of the Spanish population understands itself and its response-abilities and rights. In addition, 15M has affected the way in which a large part of the Spanish population understands its environment and those living-beings with whom said environment is co-created and co-inhabited. In this essay I immerse myself in an on-going non-disciplinary, multi-traditional multilogue with individuals being 15M. What I witness, feels and looks like a complex; mutating and dialogic; collective and cooperative; agonistic and transformative 'climate' that many refer to as el clima 15M (15m climate). Allowing different 15M wisdoms to frame the research, I envision this essay as an attempt at gaining a dialogical understanding of what it is that we might be speaking of when referring to 15M. Through this exploration, I seek to place my work within the sketched parameters of what James Tully refers to as public philosophy. The essay engages with individuals being 15M and with the vast literature in Spain around 15M and party-movement Podemos by academics and participants, and the European literature around populism, horizontality and Podemos grounded in Antonio Gramsci. It also draws on reciprocal elucidation literature in theory and in participatory, community-based social science. Moreover, the essay enters into dialogue with a whole body of literature on instrumental versus constitutive means-ends views of political change going back to Mahatma Gandhi and forward to Aldous Huxley, Richard Gregg, Hannah Arendt, Robert Young, Gene Sharp and Cesar Chavez. By giving ‘perspicuous representation’ or thick description of 15M by means of reciprocal elucidation, I am able to make a unique contribution to the theoretical literature on reciprocal elucidation and public philosophy. I am also able to disclose the field of 15M (the phenomenon) in a way that shows it to be different from the way 15M appears in other theoretical frames. Finally, the use of this method of reciprocal elucidation makes a unique contribution to community-based and engaged forms of social scientific research. / Graduate / 0422 / 0615 / 0344 / pouziel@uvic.ca

「積極生活」與「沉思生活」乃是鄂蘭思想的核心關切，晚年更是致力於研究如何從心靈的活動走向實踐的行動。在眾多心靈能力中，鄂蘭特別看重能避免罪惡的「思考」與分辨對錯的「判斷」，兩者皆與現實政治關聯甚深。然而鄂蘭最終認為「判斷」是「最具政治性的心靈能力」，「思考」則難於政治處境中適用。對此，筆者認為「思考」與「判斷」並非截然對立的兩種能力，事實上兩者有許多相通之處，而真正的差異其實是「標準」與「角色」不同的兩種對話，且從鄂蘭建構「思考」的原型─蘇格拉底─身上亦能發掘許多實踐意義，這將是如何實踐更理想的政治的關鍵。 / “Vita activa” and “vita contemplentiva” are the two main subjects in Arendt’s thought. In her last years, she committed herself to find the path from “mental faculties” to “actions.” In all mental faculties, Arendt paid more attention on the evil-prevented ability called “thinking” and “judging,” which can telling right from wrong, both of them have a lot to do with real politics. But Arendt considered “judging” is “the most political of man’s mental abilities” and “thinking” is not applicable to politics at last. In my point of view, “thinking” and “judging” are not actually two different kind of “ability” but two kind of “conversation,” the difference between them is “standard” and “role”. If we delve into the model of “thinking” in Arendt’s thought –Socrates,– we can find out that there was lots of practical meanings in his actions, those will be the key to make ideal politics practicable.