The contemporary debate concerning the Christian theology of religions has been profoundly shaped by Alan Race’s three-fold typology of exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. Although the insufficiency of this typology’s descriptive and critical capacity has become increasingly acknowledged within the field, widespread agreement about its replacement remains elusive. This thesis argues that a replacement can be found in Hans Frei’s five-fold typology of Christian theology, which differentiates between a range of approaches to theology, from theology as philosophical discourse (Type 1) to theology as quarantined, Christian self-description (Type 5). It is suggested that the more basic question posed by Frei’s typology of how Christian theology is understood in relation to philosophy and other external discourses, provides a better means of accounting for the different positions in the Christian theology of religions within 20th century ecumenical movements. It is shown how Frei’s typology emerges from his emphasis on both the limitations and the significance of external discourses for Christian theology, an emphasis which results from his construal of the mystery of Christ’s universal presence as a function of the particular incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth. Chapter one considers the philosophical foundations upon which Race’s typology is constructed, with particular emphasis on Troeltsch’s historicism, Hick’s epistemology of religious experience and WC Smith’s phenomenological hermeneutic, concluding that they determine the typology’s apologetic approach. It is shown how these commitments lead Race’s typology to differentiate between types of Christian theology primarily in relation to the philosophical viability, as Race understands it, of their Christology. Chapter two focuses first on the theology of Hans Frei and his analysis of the relationship between Christology and historicism, epistemology, and hermeneutics. It is suggested that Frei’s focus on the ordering of the relationship between Christian theology and external discourses, while undermining Race’s approach, affirms the possibility of a theologically valuable relationship between Christian theology and external discourses. Moreover, unlike Race, Frei’s emphasis on the significance of external discourses for Christian theology is derived in light of, and not in spite of, a faith in the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Chapter three looks at Frei’s fivefold typology as a better means of accounting for the differences Race posits between exclusivists, inclusivists and pluralists. It is argued that in following Frei’s typological logic and the historical, epistemological and hermeneutical considerations characteristic of a Christian theology between types three and four, an approach to the theology of religions emerges which addresses the question of the universality of divine revelation – the central concern of Race’s typology – while also showing the inadequacy of Race’s typology and its prioritisation of philosophy. This will be shown by applying Frei’s typology to 20th century ecumenical movements and the positions on the theological significance of non-Christian religions that have emerged therein. Though Frei did not directly take up the issue of the Christian theology of religions, chapter three will demonstrate how his typology of Christian theology is of particular importance for this discussion. For his typology highlights the central question driving the theology of religions – how the ‘internal’ discourse of Christian self-description in reference to the gospels’ history-like witness to the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ relates to the historically contingent, public world outside the church. The conclusion will point toward a constructive proposal for a theology of evangelism and interfaith dialogue in pluralist societies of the 21st century, drawing on the ecumenical discussion viewed in relation to the theological and typological insights of Hans Frei.

A Sceptical Aesthetics of Existence: The Case of Michel Foucault Emmanouil Simos (Hughes Hall) Michel Foucault's genealogical investigations constitute a specific historical discourse that challenges the metaphysical hypostatisation of concepts and methodological approaches as unique devices for tracking metaphysically objective truths. Foucault's notion of aesthetics of existence, his elaboration of the ancient conceptualisation of ethics as an 'art of living' (a technē tou biou), along with a series of interconnected notions (such as the care of the self) that he developed in his later work, have a triple aspect. First, these notions are constitutive parts of his later genealogies of subjectivity. Second, they show that Foucault contemplates the possibility of understanding ethics differently, opposed to, for example, the traditional Kantian conceptualisation of morality: he envisages ethics in terms of self-fashioning, of aesthetic transformation, of turning one's life into a work of art. Third, Foucault employs these notions in self-referential way: they are considered to describe his own genealogical work. This thesis attempts to show two things. First, I defend the idea that the notion of aesthetics of existence was already present in a constitutive way from the beginning of his work, and, specifically, I argue that it can be traced in earlier moments of his work. Second, I defend the idea that this notion of aesthetics of existence is best understood in terms of the sceptical stance of Sextus Empiricus. It describes an ethics of critique of metaphysics that can be understood as a nominalist, contextualist, and particularist stance. The first chapter discusses Foucault's late genealogy of the subject. It formulates the interpretative framework within which Foucault's own conceptualisation of the aesthetics of existence can be understood as a sceptical stance, itself conceived as nominalist, contextualist and particularist. As the practice of an aesthetics of existence is not abstract and ahistorical but the engagement with the specific historical circumstances within which this practice is undertaken, the second chapter reconstructs the intellectual context from which Foucault's thought has emerged (Heidegger, Blanchot, and Nietzsche). The third chapter discusses representative examples of different periods of Foucault's thought -such as the "Introduction" to Binswanger's "Traum und Existenz" (1954), Histoire de la folie (1961), and Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir (1976)- and shows in which way they constitute concrete instantiations of his sceptical aesthetics of existence. The thesis concludes with responses to a number of objections to the sceptical stance here defended.

"Endymion" è il traît d'union tra i juvenilia di Keats ("Poems", 1817) e i suoi lavori più conosciuti ("Lamia, Isabella ... and other Poems"). Per sua natura, è un'opera di transizione e quindi concede allo studioso un punto di vista privilegiato sullo sviluppo della poetica e della lingua di Keats. Inoltre, l'"Endymion" è l'opera keatsiana più aspramente contestata dalla critica romantica. Gli studiosi moderni hanno analizzato il problema alla luce di considerazioni socio-politiche, il mio lavoro mira invece ad un'analisi più strettamente linguistica. Ricostruisco il contesto linguistico del diciottesimo e diciannovesimo secolo al fine di spiegare il disagio dei recensori nei confronti di "Endymion". Sostengo che il prescrittivismo del Settecento nasce da una profonda ansia relativa alla lingua, causata dalle teorie di Locke. L'atteggiamento prescrittivista influenza la critica romantica e i critici di Keats in particolare, più di quanto potessero fare considerazioni di natura politica. Analizzo le peculiarità linguistiche e strutturali di "Endymion" al fine di provare che Keats elabora una 'poetica dell'incontrollabilità', una serie di strategie stilistiche e testuali, che violano le convenzioni linguistiche e narrative e che vengono quindi percepite come destabilizzanti e stranianti. / "Endymion" is the traît d’union between Keats’s juvenilia ("Poems", 1817)and his better known, and, conventionally, ’mature’ works ("Lamia, Is- abella ... and other Poems", 1820). By its nature, it is a transitional work, and thus gives the scholar special insight into the development of Keats’s poetics and idiom. Moreover, "Endymion" is the Keatsian work which most irritated and provoked contemporary critics; the two pieces of venomous invective it received in the periodical press of the time have become the stuff of scholarly legend. Recent scholarly work has analysed the language of "Endymion" in socio-political terms; my work focuses on more strictly linguistic concerns. I reconstruct the linguistic context of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in order to explain the reviewers’ unease with regard to "Endymion". I maintain that eighteenth-century prescriptivism arose from a deep-seated anxiety regarding language, Lockian in origin, and that the ensuing desire to stabilize and therefore control language informed Romantic criticism in general, and the criticism of Keats’s work in particular, more fundamentally than politics could or did. I analyse the imaginative and linguistic markers of "Endymion" in order to prove that Keats had elaborated a “poetics of uncontrollability”, a series of textual and stylistic strategies, which violated linguistic and narrative standards and were therefore perceived as unsettling.

Στόχος της παρούσας εργασίας είναι η εξέταση του δικτύου των σχέσεων, οι οποίες αναπτύσσονται εντός των σοφιστικών και φιλοσοφικών κύκλων που παρουσιάζονται σε δύο βιογραφικά corpora, στους Βίους Σοφιστῶν του Φιλοστράτου και στους Βίους Φιλοσόφων καὶ Σοφιστῶν του Ευναπίου, καθώς και του κεντρικού ρόλου που διαδραμάτισαν οι σχέσεις αυτές (κυρίως η σχέση δασκάλου και μαθητή) στη συγκρότηση των δύο συλλογών. Η μελέτη του δικτύου αυτών των σχέσεων στοχεύει στην ανάδειξη της μοναδικότητας των δύο συλλογών από άποψη δομής, η οποία καταδεικνύεται, επί παραδείγματι, από την ένταξη ορισμένων σοφιστών ή φιλοσόφων και τον αποκλεισμό άλλων. Ταυτόχρονα, διερευνάται πώς αυτές οι σχέσεις λειτουργούν ως μια βασική οργανωτική αρχή των Βίων και μας επιτρέπουν να διαμορφώσουμε μια σαφέστερη εικόνα για τη σοφιστική/φιλοσοφική ταυτότητα κατά την ελληνορωμαϊκή αυτοκρατορική περίοδο. Το πλέγμα σχέσεων που διαμορφώνεται ανάμεσα στους σοφιστές και τους φιλοσόφους, καθώς και ο τρόπος ταξινόμησής τους στα δύο βιογραφικά corpora μας επιτρέπουν να αναγνώσουμε τις συλλογές ως ρυθμιστικά, κανονιστικά κείμενα, τα οποία υπαγορεύουν και εξασφαλίζουν την επιβίωσή των βιογραφουμένων προσώπων για τις επόμενες γενιές. / The aim of this thesis is to examine the network of relationships developed among the sophists and the philosophers in two biographical corpora, Philostratus’ Lives of Sophists and Eunapius’ Lives of Philosophers and Sophists, as well as the pivotal role these relationships (especially those of master and student) played in the formation of the two collections. The study of the nexus of these relationships aims to demonstrate the structural singularity of these corpora, which is pointed, for instance, by the inclusion of certain sophists/philosophers and the exclusion of others; at the same time, these relationships are shown to constitute a major organizational principle of the Lives, allowing thus a sharper understanding of the sophistic/philosophical identity in the Graeco-Roman Imperial period. The two corpora are read as regulatory, canonistic texts, in the sense that they dictate and determine, to a great extent, the type of the biographised sophists and philosophers worth preserving for future generations.

This dissertation is the application of counterfactual criticism to Shakespearean tragedy—supposing we are to ask, for example, “what if” Hamlet had done the deed, or, “what if” we could somehow disinherit our knowledge of Lear’s madness before reading King Lear. Such readings, mirroring critical practices in history, will loosely be called “counterfactual” readings. The key question to ask is not why tragedies are no longer being written (by writers), but why tragedies are no longer being felt (by readers). Tragedy entails a certain urgency in wanting to imagine an outcome different from the one we are given. Since we cannot change events as they stand, we feel a critical helplessness in dealing with feelings of tragic loss; the critical imperative that follows usually accounts for how the tragedy unfolded. Fleshing out a cause is one way to deal with the trauma of tragedy. But such explanation, in a sense, merely explains tragedy away. The fact that everything turns out so poorly in tragedy suggests that the tragic protagonist was somehow doomed, that he (in the case of Shakespearean tragedy) was the victim of some “tragic flaw,” as though tragedy and necessity go hand in hand. Only by allowing ourselves to imagine other possibilities can we regain the tragic effect, which is to remind ourselves that other outcomes are indeed possible. Tragedy, then, is more readily understood, or felt, as the playing out of contingency. It takes some effort to convince others, even ourselves, that the tragic effect resonates best when accompanied by an understanding that the characters on the page are free individuals. No amount of foreknowledge, on our part or theirs, can save us (or them) from tragedy’s horror.

On a l’habitude, concernant Bergson et Popper, de souligner que le second emprunte au premier la notion de « société ouverte » en la détournant de son sens. C’est une erreur : au moment où il met cette notion au centre de La société ouverte et ses ennemis, Popper est persuadé d’être l’inventeur de la notion. Lorsqu’il apprend que Bergson en a fait usage avant lui, il marque la différence entre les deux sociétés ouvertes tout en reconnaissant une similitude entre les deux sociétés closes. Mais comment, si la société close s’oppose, par définition, à la société ouverte, et si les deux notions de « société close » sont similaires, les deux notions de « société ouverte » pourraient-elles être fondamentalement dissemblables ? Nous nous demandons, dans une première partie, jusqu’où les deux sociétés closes peuvent être considérées comme similaires et s’il est possible d’en construire une conception unifiée. Nous cherchons d’abord à montrer comment Bergson et Popper, en partant de problèmes différents, finissent par se rejoindre sur la notion d’une morale naturelle close. Nous montrons ensuite que ces deux modalités du clos — exclusivisme guerrier et holisme conservateur — se trouvent chez les deux auteurs, sans qu’ils ne leur accordent la même importance : un certain nombre de différences souterraines annoncent les oppositions à venir sur la société ouverte. Ces différences n’empêchent toutefois pas l’élaboration d’une conception unifiée de la société close. Nous suivons Bergson pour articuler les deux modalités du clos en considérant que la cohésion sociale trouve en partie sa source dans l’hostilité à l’égard des ennemis. Notre deuxième partie se demande si ce qui apparaît au premier abord comme contradictoire entre les deux sociétés ouvertes ne pourrait pas plutôt être considéré comme des tensions au sein d’une même société ouverte. Nous insistons d’abord sur ce qui peut apparaître comme contradictoire en montrant que l’ouverture n’a pas le même sens chez Bergson et chez Popper : passage de la cité à une société comprenant l’humanité pour le premier, passage à une cité où sont libérés les pouvoirs critiques de l’homme pour le second. La société ouverte de Popper est close pour Bergson, la société ouverte de Bergson relève pour Popper d’une nostalgie pour la société close. Mais la contradiction vient du fait qu’on compare la modalité de l’ouvert que chacun privilégie et qui n’est pas la même. Il faut, pour avoir une vision plus juste, comparer la modalité rationaliste de l’ouverture chez les deux auteurs, et la modalité mystique de l’ouverture chez l’un et chez l’autre. En procédant à cette comparaison, on peut montrer que ces deux modalités sont l’une et l’autre une façon, pour une société, de transcender la nature, d’être créatrice. En ce qui concerne la modalité rationaliste de l’ouverture, c’est Popper qui parvient à en montrer le caractère créateur, sur le plan théorique comme sur le plan pratique — Bergson en étant empêché par sa conception de l’intelligence ; pour ce qui est de la modalité mystique, c’est Bergson qui montre comment elle permet à une société de transcender, au moins partiellement, la nature — Popper en étant empêché par sa conception de l’amour. A partir de là, il ne semble pas impossible d’élaborer une conception unifiée de la société ouverte articulant ces deux modalités : la modalité rationaliste de l’ouverture repose sur la foi en la fraternité humaine, laquelle ne peut trouver son plein élan que dans la modalité mystique. Il est vrai qu’il y a tension entre ces deux modalités de l’ouvert, mais leur équilibre est nécessaire à la société qui s’ouvre : la présence de la modalité mystique évite à la modalité rationaliste, qui permet le conflit, une dégénérescence guerrière ; la présence de la modalité rationaliste évite à la modalité mystique, qui transcende les conflits dans l’enthousiasme, de dégénérer en « nationalisme mystique ». / It is usually said, when talking about Bergson and Popper, that the former borrows the notion of “open society” to the latter and diverts its meaning. It is a mistake: when he puts this notion in the center of The open society and its enemies, Popper is convinced that he is the one who came up with the notion. When he learns that Bergson used it before him, he underlines the differences between both open societies, while admitting a similarity between both closed societies. But how, if the closed society opposes, by definition, the open society, and if both notions of “closed society” are similar, could both notions of “open society” be fundamentally dissimilar?We are wondering, in our first part, to what degree the two closed societies can be considered similar, and if it is possible to build a unified conception of both of them. We are first seeking to show how Bergson and Popper, while starting from different issues, end up reuniting on the notion of a closed natural morality. We are then showing that these two modalities of the closed – warrior exclusivism and conservative holism – are found in both authors, although they don’t give it the same degree of importance: a number of underlying differences are announcing the upcoming oppositions on the open society. These differences, however, do not prevent the elaboration of a unified conception for the closed society. We are following Bergson to articulate both modalities of the closed while considering that social cohesion comes partly from hostility towards enemies. Our second part questions if what first shows up as a contradiction between both open societies could not be considered rather as tensions among one same open society. We first insist on what can appear as contradictory by showing that openness doesn’t have the same meaning for Bergson it does for Popper: for the former, it’s stepping from the city to a society containing humanity. For the latter, it’s stepping to a city where man’s critical powers are liberated. Popper’s open society is closed to Bergson, and Bergson’s open society is, to Popper, an expression of the longing for the unity of the closed society. But the contradiction comes from comparing each author’s preferred modality for openness, which differs. It is necessary, to have a better vision, to compare the rationalist modality of openness for both authors, as well as the mystical modality of openness for one and the other.By proceeding to this comparison, we can show that these two modalities are both a way for a society to transcend nature, for it to be inventive or creative. When it comes to the rationalist modality of openness, Popper is the one who manages to show its creative aspect, in both theory and practice – Bergson being restrained to do so by his conception of intelligence; when it comes to the mystical modality, it is Bergson who shows how it allows a society to transcend, at least partially, nature – Popper being restrained to do so by his conception of love.From this point, it doesn’t seem impossible to elaborate a unified conception for the open society articulating both of these modalities: the rationalist modality of openness is based on faith in human fraternity, which can only reach its fullest with the mystical modality. It is true that there is tension between these two modalities of openness, but their balance is necessary for a society that opens up: the mystical modality’s presence prevents the rationalist modality, that allows conflict, to fall into warrior degeneracy; the rationalist modality’s presence prevents the mystical modality, that transcends conflicts in enthusiasm, to degenerate into “mystical nationalism”.

This study examines the rise, development, and crisis of theological encyclopaedia in nineteenth-century Germany. As introductory textbooks for theological study in the university, works of theological encyclopaedia addressed the pressing questions facing theology as a ‘science’ (Wissenschaft), a rigorous, critical discipline deserving of a seat in the modern university. The project of theological encyclopaedia, I argue, functioned as the place where theological reflection and the requirements of the institutional setting in which that reflection occurred—here the German university—converged. I explore its roots as a pioneering idealist model for organizing knowledge in the German university system in the late eighteenth century. I focus especially on Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), the father of modern Protestantism and principal intellectual architect of the University of Berlin (1810). Schleiermacher’s programme transformed the scholarly theological enterprise into one defined in terms of science. That transformation laid the groundwork for the later historicization of theology, which I investigate in the two predominant ‘schools’ of German university theology in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Hegelian ‘speculative’ school and ‘mediating theology’ (Vermittlungstheologie). Among the latter, I emphasize the remarkable international influence of the Swiss-German Karl Hagenbach (1801–74), whose theological encyclopaedia was among the most widely read theological books in German-speaking Europe from the 1830s through World War I. Finally, I analyze the project’s downfall in the context of Wilhelmine Germany and the Weimar Republic, beset by radical disciplinary specialization, a crisis of historicism, and the attacks of dialectical theology. Throughout, I contend that theological encyclopaedia represented the institutionalization of the idea of theology as science, which furnishes an explanatory grid for understanding the relationship between theology and the university. The project resulted in a powerful synthesis that fundamentally shaped the reigning theological paradigms in nineteenth-century Germany and beyond.

This dissertation is the application of counterfactual criticism to Shakespearean tragedy—supposing we are to ask, for example, “what if” Hamlet had done the deed, or, “what if” we could somehow disinherit our knowledge of Lear’s madness before reading King Lear. Such readings, mirroring critical practices in history, will loosely be called “counterfactual” readings. The key question to ask is not why tragedies are no longer being written (by writers), but why tragedies are no longer being felt (by readers). Tragedy entails a certain urgency in wanting to imagine an outcome different from the one we are given. Since we cannot change events as they stand, we feel a critical helplessness in dealing with feelings of tragic loss; the critical imperative that follows usually accounts for how the tragedy unfolded. Fleshing out a cause is one way to deal with the trauma of tragedy. But such explanation, in a sense, merely explains tragedy away. The fact that everything turns out so poorly in tragedy suggests that the tragic protagonist was somehow doomed, that he (in the case of Shakespearean tragedy) was the victim of some “tragic flaw,” as though tragedy and necessity go hand in hand. Only by allowing ourselves to imagine other possibilities can we regain the tragic effect, which is to remind ourselves that other outcomes are indeed possible. Tragedy, then, is more readily understood, or felt, as the playing out of contingency. It takes some effort to convince others, even ourselves, that the tragic effect resonates best when accompanied by an understanding that the characters on the page are free individuals. No amount of foreknowledge, on our part or theirs, can save us (or them) from tragedy’s horror.

En mettant fin aux privilèges et à une société d’ordres, la Révolution aurait dû vouer le château à la ruine, ne le laissant subsister dans le paysage que comme les vestiges d’un temps révolu. Mais au contraire, le XIXe siècle devient un véritable âge d’or des châteaux, en France comme dans toute une partie de l’Europe. À travers la France, les constructions, les restaurations et les remaniements de châteaux se comptent par milliers, sous le double effet du repli de la noblesse sur ses terres et de l’essor et de l’enrichissement de la bourgeoisie. Dans l’Allier, le Cantal et le Puy-de-Dôme 464 chantiers et projets voient le jour sous l’impulsion de familles de la vieille noblesse désireuses de réparer sur leur demeure les outrages du temps et de la Révolution et de bourgeois fortunés soucieux d’avoir une résidence prestigieuse, témoin de leur ascension sociale. Au XIXe siècle, on pose un nouveau regard sur le Moyen Âge et le château des siècles passés fait rêver. L’architecture doit s’inspirer des styles historicistes, parfois d’origine lointaine, tout en offrant un intérieur adapté au mode de vie et aux aspirations au confort des châtelains. Certains architectes se spécialisent pour satisfaire ces commandes entre historicisme et modernité / As the French Revolution put an end to privileges and the hierarchical division of society, castles seemed meant to disappear or survive only as remains of a bygone era. But the 19th century actually turned out to be a golden age for them – both in France and in many countries in Europe. In France, countless castles were built or overhauled, as the nobility returned to their lands and the bourgeoisie grew in power and wealth. In the three French départements of Allier, Cantal and Puy-de-Dôme, no less then 464 projects or actual construction works were launched. They originated either from ancient noble families wishing to erase the damages of time and History on their properties or from wealthy bourgeois willing to own high-profile mansions that would be of testimony of their social uplift. The 19th century was also a period where the Middle Ages was re-discovered and ancient castles became attractive again. Architectural trends were influenced by historicism, sometimes exotic styles, while interior design had to suit the lifestyle and need for comfort of the landlords. Some architects specialised in such projects, both historicist and modern

This thesis studies the clash between the hero and the First World War in the works of Rupert Brooke, Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen. It explores the impact on their poetry and attitude towards the concept of the hero as it applied to them as people and poets. The study shows that over prolonged contact with the horrors of the First World War, it is evident in both literary sources and their poetry that both Sassoon and Owen changed their attitudes negatively towards both the idea of heroes and heroism, as well as the War as a just and glorious cause.  However, the myth of the hero was still a core belief of their society, and in order to not be branded cowards and discarded along with their warnings, they had to become heroes in the eyes of their society, to openly attack the concept and the war it fueled. This thesis then studies how and why First World War poetry and literature should be utilized within the subject of English in the Swedish School System, as a means to provide a multicultural and critical education.