In this thesis I present and defend an interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience as it stands from the viewpoint of his empirical realism. My central contention is that Kant’s is a conception of everyday experience, a kind of immediate phenomenological awareness as of empirical objects, and although he takes this to be representational, it cannot itself amount to empirical knowledge because it can be non-veridical, because in such experience it is possible to misrepresent the world. I outline my view in an extended introduction. In Part I I offer a novel interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of sensibility and sensation. Utilizing a data-processor schematic as an explanatory framework, I give an account of how outer sense, as a collection of sensory capacities, is causally affected by empirical objects to produce bodily state sensations that naturally encode information about those objects. This information is then processed through inner sense to present to the understanding a manifold of mental state sensations that similarly encode information. I also give accounts of how the reproductive imagination operates in hallucination to produce sensible manifolds in lieu of current causal affection, and of the restricted role that consciousness plays at this low level of cognitive function. In Part II I turn to the role of the understanding in experience. I offer a two-stage model of conceptual synthesis and explain how Kant’s theory of experience is a unique blend of conceptualist and non-conceptualist elements. I show that it explains how our experience can provide us with reasons for belief while at the same time accounting for the fact that experience is what anchors us to the world. Finally, I return to non-veridical experience. I confront recent naïve realist readings of Kant and argue that, for Kant, the possibility of non-veridicality is built into the very nature of the human mind and the way it relates to the world.

Some things we know just by thinking about them: for example, that identity is transitive, that three are more than two, that wantonly torturing innocents is wrong, and other propositions which simply strike us as true when we consider them. But how? This essay articulates and defends a rationalist answer which critically develops a significant analogy between intuition and perception. The central thesis is that intuition and perception, though different, are at a certain level of abstraction the same kind of state, and states of this kind are, by their very nature, poised to play a distinctive epistemic role. Specifically, in the case of intuition, we encounter an intellectual state that is so structured as to provide justified and even knowledgeable belief without requiring justification in turn—something which may, thus, be thought of as given. The essay proceeds in three stages. Stage one advances a fully general and psychologically realistic account of the nature of intuition, namely, as an intellectual presentation of an apparent truth. Stage two provides a modest treatment of the epistemic status of intuition, in particular, how intuition serves as a source of immediate prima facie justification. Stage three outlines a response to Benacerraf-style worries about intuitive knowledge regarding abstract objects (e.g., numbers, sets, and values); the proposal is a constitutive, rather than causal, explanation of the means by which a given intuition connects a thinker to the fact intuited. / text

Les réflexions au point de départ de Bergson nous donnent une forte impression. Maintenant, nous pouvons dire qu'il y a là la puissance intuitive de négation et le temps qui " agit ". Et quand nous promenons nos yeux sur les œuvres de Bergson, il nous semble qu'on ne peut pas les négliger. En premier lieu, Bergson aboutit déjà à une méthode de la connaissance autre que l'intelligence. Comme l'intuition est une méthode de la connaissance propre à Bergson, l'intuition qui porte la puissance de négation est une découverte qui fait époque. En deuxième lieu, cette intuition incite elle-même à se rendre vers l'intuition immédiate. Elle soutient l'intuition de la durée. En troisième lieu, le temps qui " agit " est une appréhension originelle de l'expérience. Un des fondements et un des contenus de la liberté proviennent de ce temps qui " agit " et de cette intuition. En quatrième lieu, Bergson souligne que l'illusion du " possible " fait méconnaître " la nouveauté radicale ". Et cette appréhension montre que l'acte libre et l'univers sont la création du nouveau. L'idée d'illusion du " possible " qui s'établit dans les dernières années de sa vie provient des réflexions au point de départ. Enfin, obtenir une appréhension originale par la puissance intuitive de négation, semble être une façon d'étudier chez Bergson. Il recueille les faits scientifiques ou académiques qui font l'objet de son étude. Et il trouve un problème par la puissance intuitive de négation. Il semble que nous pouvions imaginer que ce qui est profond chez Bergson revient à ces deux points. Dès lors, nous pensons que les réflexions au point de départ sont dignes d'être pris comme objet de réflexion.

Réalisé au sein de l'IRCAM, en cotutelle avec Philippe Leroux. La version intégrale de cette thèse est disponible uniquement pour consultation individuelle à la Bibliothèque de musique de l’Université de Montréal. / « Vers une musique autogérée », est un regard sur mes œuvres des trois dernières années : un quatuor à cordes, un quatuor pour flûte basse, saxophone baryton, percussion et piano, une pièce pour voix de femme et douze musiciens et une pièce pour silent piano et dispositif électronique, qui sera le chapitre le plus exhaustif. Tout au long de cette étude, on examinera les notions qui m’inspirent, les points de départ de chaque pièce ainsi que les moyens employés pour arriver au bout de chaque idée. On parlera du tandem « intuition – processus » et comment il s’exprime chaque fois de façon différente, des réseaux qui se créent dans la musique, on abordera le concept omniprésent de l’incompatibilité et les relations que cela autorise, et on suivra l’évolution progressive de l’écriture vers une musique qui se veut « autogérée », en examinant comment ce terme se manifeste, selon les différents contextes. / « Towards an autoregulated music » is a look on my works of the past three years: a string quartet, a quartet for bass flute, baritone saxophone, percussion and piano, a work for female voice and twelve musicians and a piece for silent piano and real time electronics, the most thorough chapter. Throughout this study, we’ll examine the notions that inspire me, every piece’s starting points and the means applied to take every idea to its full potential. We’ll talk about the tandem « intuition – process » and how it’s expressed every time in a different way, the networks that exist in the music, we’ll approach the ever-present concept of incompatibility and the relations it allows, and we’ll follow the gradual evolution of the writing towards a music that calls itself « autoregulated », considering how this term is expressed, in different contexts.

Doctor of Education / Department of Educational Leadership / Sarah Jane Fishback / This qualitative inquiry was a naturalistic exploration of participants’ perception or understanding of their intuitive decisionmaking processes. A bounded case study explored how a purposeful sampling of U.S. Armed Forces officers−primarily U.S. Army officers−perceived or understood intuitive decisionmaking in the context of their experiences in contemporary military missions. The purposeful sample was comprised of ten volunteer participants attending their professional Intermediate Level Education (ILE) course in 2011 at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The review of relevant literature used Polanyi's (1958) theory of tacit knowing and personal knowledge [intuition] in making decisions as a philosophical and psychological baseline. U.S. Army doctrine promoted implicit [intuitive] and analytical [deliberate] decisionmaking. Army doctrinal guidance stated that in situations severely constrained in time and requiring an immediate decision, Army leaders rely significantly on intution. A complementary concept advocated creative and critical thinking in order to adaptively solve problems. However, minimal emphasis on intuitive processes and rescinding the term intuitive decisionmaking in Army doctrine indicated a significant gap in Army leader development. This research augmented professional literature on the art and science of military leadership and decisionmaking in the second decade of the 21st century. The exploratory study encouraged further research on how U.S. Armed Forces officers perceive discrete elements or emergent patterns among complex environmental stimuli; understand their tacit knowledge to sense situational cues affecting a problem; and develop their intuitive acumen as a complement to experience and learning toward professional expertise. The participants’ candid insights on their lived and vicarious experiences in intuitive decisionmaking suggested similar leadership value to the adult education community. Other practical benefits included an improved self-efficacy of participants to trust their personal intuition and expertise, and to further explore their tacit knowledge for effective day-to-day living in an ever-changing complex and uncertain world. The experiences of participants indicated the believability of Polanyi’s premise that “we can know more than we can tell.” (Polanyi, 1964, p. x).

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:26:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marco Aurelio de Mello Castrianni.pdf: 25069561 bytes, checksum: daef5acc3dc2c452c84bee0877334ac4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-11-08 / Logic is a Philosophy instrument, as well as for the other sciences. Among its methods are deduction and induction, which are discursive, and the intuition. By deduction, we reason from the general to the particular. By induction, we start from the particular to reach the general. Intuition is the direct way to acquire knowledge. The logic methods have their basis in Rationalism and Empiricism. For the former, the knowledge stems from exclusively in the reason; its method is deductive. For the latter, the knowledge is acquired by experience, either external or internal; its method is inductive. Intuition is the no discursive method. Using it, we can reach the values, the object of Axiology. The values implicate the genesis of the rules and juridical principles. The phenomenon of the values happens in the society and interact with the culture. The human being is the source value, and the Justice is the fundamental value. Equity is a kind of Justice, which surpasses in a certain way. The Juridical Logic is the application of the Logic as Law instrument. The operator uses either deduction or induction, i.e., are methods used for interpretation and application. The intuition is also applied by the Law operators, although its study has not been so developed. It can be seen by the analyses, as juridical, the principles and the rules, the doctrine and other works, the sentences, the jurisprudence, the habits, the analogy and criminal investigation. None of the methods is used in an isolated way, for interpretation and Law application, because they are not enough, although the three ones, objects of this study, are adequate. The methods which are most studied are deductive and inductive, but the intuition has also an important role in the interpretation and application of the Law, although the operator does not realize how often he makes use of it in his everyday work. The methods are, therefore, complementary and interdependent / A Lógica é instrumento da Filosofia e de todas as ciências. Entre seus métodos estão a dedução e a indução, que são discursivos, e a intuição. Pela dedução, raciocina-se do geral para o particular. Pela indução, parte-se do particular para se chegar ao geral. A intuição é forma direta de aquisição de conhecimento. Os métodos lógicos têm seu fundamento no Racionalismo e no Empirismo. Para o primeiro, o conhecimento se origina exclusivamente na razão; seu método é o dedutivo. Para o segundo, o conhecimento se adquire pela experiência, seja externa ou interna; seu método é o indutivo. A intuição se trata de método não discursivo. Por ela, se chega aos valores, objeto da Axiologia. Os valores implicam a gênese de normas e princípios jurídicos. O fenômeno dos valores se dá na sociedade e se interrelaciona com a cultura. O ser humano é o valor fonte, e a Justiça, o valor fundamental. A Eqüidade é uma espécie de Justiça e, de certa forma, a supera. A Lógica Jurídica é a aplicação da Lógica como instrumento do Direito. O seu operador utiliza tanto a dedução como a indução, ou seja, são métodos utilizados para sua interpretação e aplicação. A intuição também é aplicada pelos operadores do Direito, embora seu estudo ainda não esteja tão desenvolvido. Isso se constata pela análise, no âmbito jurídico, dos princípios, das normas, da doutrina e outros trabalhos, das sentenças, da jurisprudência, do costume, da analogia e da investigação criminal. Nenhum dos métodos é utilizado de forma isolada, para interpretação e aplicação do Direito, pois, por si só, não é suficiente, embora sejam todos os três, objeto deste estudo, adequados. Todos podem e devem ser utilizados. Os métodos mais estudados são o dedutivo e o indutivo, mas a intuição também tem um importante papel na interpretação e na aplicação do Direito, embora o operador possa até não se dar conta de quanto a utiliza em seu trabalho cotidiano. Os métodos são, pois, complementares e interdependentes

Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-27T13:46:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AZIZE MARIA YARED DE MEDEIROS.pdf: 1274502 bytes, checksum: 29ccf54a80bcbace6a44480cbf796b32 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-12 / The object of this essay is to understand the mystic formulated by Henri Bergson, in his last work The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. The philosopher s reflections show two kinds of religious manifestations, which he called static and dynamic. The first one is characterized by institutionalized religions, with its dogmas and doctrines, whose traces are recognized as responsible for the processes of social cohesion. The second, known as dynamic, is related with the mystic, object of analysis of this essay. The multiple meanings of the term mystic and the complexity of the phenomenon required research about the historic and linguistic development of its roots. Mystic is understood in this thesis as a subjective human experience, which establishes, in a conscious way, a direct relationship, with no intermediary, with God, or the Absolute or even better, with Mystery, causing deep transformation in the subject of the experience, with social and communal consequences. Mystic, a definitive expression of bergsonian metaphysics, derives from an intuitive process and establishes the impossibility of intelligence and rationality to reach the Absolut. His reflections are based on theories of evolution. He argues that there is no opposition between creationism and evolution, and establishes the existence of élan vital, a vital force which, along with matter, develops the planet and its species. We found, in the makeup of Bergson s metaphysic thoughts and using his intuitive method, elements which can sustain the proposal thesis: we understand that the individual impetus for the search of meaning is part of the structure of human consciousness, and the comprehension that there is an ascendant evolutionary process, inherent to life and undertaken by humanity, reaches its summit and the core, not only in the mystic experience, but also in the loving action generated by it. / É objeto deste trabalho compreender a mística, conforme formulada por Henri Bergson em As Duas Fontes da Moral e da Religião, sua última obra. As reflexões do filósofo apresentam os dois modos de manifestação religiosa, por ele denominadas estática e dinâmica: a primeira, caracterizada pelas religiões institucionalizadas, com seus dogmas e doutrinas, cujos traços são reconhecidos como responsáveis pelos processos de coesão social; a segunda, denominada dinâmica, identifica-se com a mística, objeto de análise deste trabalho. A polissemia do termo mística e a complexidade do fenômeno demandaram uma pesquisa sobre o desenvolvimento histórico e linguístico de suas raízes. A mística é compreendida nesta tese como uma experiência humana, subjetiva, que estabelece, de forma consciente, uma relação direta e sem intermediações com Deus ou o Absoluto ou, melhor ainda, com o Mistério, e causa profunda transformação no sujeito da experiência, com consequências sociais e comunitárias. A mística, expressão definitiva da metafísica bergsoniana, resulta de um processo intuitivo e estabelece a impossibilidade de a inteligência e a racionalidade atingirem o Absoluto. A base de suas reflexões se encontra nas teorias da evolução. Defende não haver oposição entre criacionismo e evolucionismo e estabelece a existência de um élan vital, um impulso criador da vida que, junto à matéria, desenvolve o planeta e suas espécies. Encontramos, na construção do pensamento metafísico de Bergson e na utilização de seu método intuitivo, elementos que podem sustentar a tese proposta: nosso entendimento de que a pulsão individual pela busca de sentido é parte da estrutura da consciência humana e a compreensão de que existe um processo evolutivo ascendente, intrínseco à vida e empreendido pela humanidade, cuja realização atinge seu ápice e âmago não somente na experiência mística, mas na ação amorosa que dela decorre.

No presente trabalho propomos aproximar criticamente as filosofias de Edmund Husserl e Martin Heidegger, no que concerne às concepções de intencionalidade, intuição categorial e a questão do ser. Com isso, o objetivo é apontar que a questão do ser articulada em Ser e Tempo é consequência de um processo investigativo do jovem Heidegger no qual a fenomenologia husserliana desempenha papel fundamental. Para isso, versamos mostrar conceitualmente como algumas das noções propostas por Husserl em particular a de intuição categorial são empregadas nas problematizações do jovem Heidegger. Desse modo, almejamos mostrar que a questão do ser formulada por Heidegger deve muito à noção de intencionalidade de origem husserliana. / In the present study we propose to approximate critically the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, regarding the conception of intentionality, categorial intuition and the question of being. Therewith, the aim is to point that the question of being articulated in Being and Time is a consequence of an investigative process of the young Heidegger, in which the husserlian\'s phenomenology performs a main role. Thereunto, we plan to show conceptually how some of the notions proposed by Husserl in particular the categorial intuition are employed in the thesis of the young Heidegger. Thereby, we intend to show that the question of being formulated by Heidegger owes much to the husserlian\'s notion of intentionality.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2017-06-27T17:05:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Godolphim Feijó_.pdf: 1835499 bytes, checksum: 9b7410f8b42d5a741ecbd275052ab216 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-27T17:05:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Godolphim Feijó_.pdf: 1835499 bytes, checksum: 9b7410f8b42d5a741ecbd275052ab216 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-31 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / FAPERGS - Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul / A filosofia kantiana da matemática é fundamentada sobre uma estrutura epistemológica intuicionista. As categorias do espaço e do tempo constituem as formas da sensibilidade, formas estas manifestadas por meio de uma intuição pura a priori. O presente trabalho busca realizar uma defesa razoável de tal intuição frente aos críticos contemporâneos, os quais propõem um programa logicista desprovido de estrutura epistêmica no que tange ao raciocínio matemático. Tais críticos afirmam que a aritmética não necessita da intuição pura do tempo para que as operações numéricas possam ser realizadas. Buscaremos demonstrar que a lógica quantificacional constitui um expediente meramente formalista que deixa de lado os problemas epistemológicos da cognição matemática e, por esse motivo, pode ambicionar desconsiderar a intuição pura kantiana. Portanto, buscaremos demonstrar que a intuição pura kantiana ainda pode lançar luz sobre a natureza dos cálculos da matemática. / The Kantian philosophy of mathematics is based on an intuitionist epistemological structure. The categories of space and time are the forms of sensibility, these forms manifested through a pure intuition a priori. The present work seeks to make a reasonable defense of such intuition in the face of contemporary critics, who propose a logicist program devoid of epistemic structure regarding mathematical reasoning. Such critics claim that arithmetic does not need the pure intuition of time for numerical operations to be performed. We will try to demonstrate that the quantificational logic constitutes a merely formalistic expedient that leaves aside the epistemological problems of the mathematical cognition and, for this reason, it can ambition to disregard the pure Kantian intuition. Therefore, we shall try to demonstrate that pure Kantian intuition can still shed light on the nature of mathematical calculations.

Submitted by Fabricia Fialho Reginato (fabriciar) on 2015-07-06T23:21:44Z No. of bitstreams: 1 CarlosFranco.pdf: 2349826 bytes, checksum: 04c86e29097d13a9ffab0780b0f37a32 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-06T23:21:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 CarlosFranco.pdf: 2349826 bytes, checksum: 04c86e29097d13a9ffab0780b0f37a32 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-06-16 / UFT - Universidade Federal do Tocantins / A presente tese buscou entender a tensão perceptória no audiovisual quando num plano não há cortes, cortes esses através dos quais tradicionalmente se confere ritmo a um fluxo. Partiuse de Bergson em Matéria e memória e Deleuze em Diferença e repetição, que versam sobre o tempo e o espaço, bem como de pensadores do audiovisual como Eisenstein, Martin e Aumont. A desconstrução das três dimensões do tempo (diegético, enunciatório e perceptório), clássicas no cinema, se deu em paralelo à análise de planos-sequência de materiais expressivos diversos. Utilizou-se o método intuitivo de Bergson, que permitiu cogitar a existência de uma quarta dimensão, a do tempo dos objetos no quadro, que comporta seu dinamismo bem como sua duração. Chegou-se assim a definir, como alternativa ao conceito de ritmo, a modulação do tempo como uma articulação entre o tempo perceptual e o tempo dos objetos, que abarca tanto o intervalo (enquanto espaços ou instantes perceptíveis no quadro) quanto a duração (e outras virtualidades, no fluxo). / This research tried to understand framed temporality phenomena inside audiovisual expression. This has begun from Bergson and Deleuze, with these theories that studies time and space, as well as motion pictured expressions authors as Eisenstein, Martin and Aumont. The unconstructing the three classical time dimensions (story time, opera time and perceptual time) has happened simultaneously with the non-cut scene analyses of several expressive materials. This has used the intuitive method by Bergson, which permitted speculate the existence of the forth time dimension beyond the three classical, the object time on a frame, composed by its spiritual time and dynamic time. This has defined, as alternative from rithm concept, the time modulation as an articulation between perceptual and object time, that contains the dynamic interval and spiritual time (durée).