The aim of the thesis – to theoretically analyze and scientifically explain civil liability of the financial intermediary as investor protection instrument, to provide reasoned assessment of the regulation of civil liability of the financial intermediary and its application practice in the USA and the EU, to identify relevant problems and suggest theoretically grounded solutions and recommendations for these problems which would also put an emphasis on practical efficiency of civil liability; thus supplementing the doctrine of the EU and national law in this field. This thesis consists of two related yet relatively independent parts. The first part covers the most common issues of civil liability of the financial intermediary against the investor and extensively analyzes the conditions of civil liability of the financial intermediary, i.e. fault, damages, causation and unlawfulness, last one being of particular importance because due to the massive regulation of the activities of financial intermediaries it covers the widest range of legal issues. The second part of the thesis analyzes the relevant questions of the application of civil liability, which is possible only when the required conditions for the rise of civil liability have been established. Therefore, it analyzes the cases under the law or the contract, where the financial intermediary is relieved of liability even if the conditions of civil liability are met. The main focus of the second part is placed on the... [to full text] / Disertacijoje siekiama teoriškai išanalizuoti ir moksliškai paaiškinti finansų tarpininko civilinę atsakomybę, kaip investuotojų apsaugos priemonę, pateikti argumentuotą finansų tarpininko civilinės atsakomybės teisinio reguliavimo ir taikymo praktikos nagrinėtose JAV ir ES jurisdikcijose įvertinimą, identifikuoti aktualias su tuo susijusias problemas ir pasiūlyti teoriškai pagrįstus, tačiau į praktinį civilinės atsakomybės taikymo efektyvumą orientuotus šių problemų sprendimo būdus, bei rekomendacijas, tokiu būdu papildant ES ir nacionalinės teisės doktriną šioje srityje. Disertacijos struktūrą sudaro dvi susijusios, tačiau kartu ir santykinai savarankiškos dalys. Pirmojoje darbo dalyje analizuojami patys bendriausi su finansų tarpininko civiline atsakomybe prieš investuotoją susiję klausimai ir taip pat plačiai analizuojamos finansų tarpininko civilinės atsakomybės sąlygos – kaltė, žala, priežastinis ryšys ir ypač neteisėtumas – atsakomybės sąlyga, kuri dėl masyvaus finansų tarpininkų veiklos teisinio reguliavimo, apima plačiausią klausimų spektrą. Antroji disertacijos dalis skiriama aktualiems civilinės atsakomybės taikymo, kuris aktualus tik tuomet kai nustatytos visos reikiamos civilinės atsakomybės atsiradimo sąlygos, klausimams analizuoti. Todėl joje nagrinėjami įstatymo ar sutarties nustatyti atvejai, kai net ir egzistuojant visoms civilinės atsakomybės sąlygoms, finansų tarpininkas nuo atsakomybės gali būti atleidžiamas, todėl atsakomybė jam netaikoma. Didžiausias... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]

O atual arcabouço normativo de proteção do investidor no mercado de capitais brasileiro teve suas linhas mestras cravadas pela reforma bancária introduzida pelas Leis 4.595, de 31 de dezembro de 1964, e 4.728, de 14 de julho de 1965, pela criação de um regulador especializado em mercado de capitais pela Lei 6.385, de 07 de dezembro de 1976, e pela reforma da legislação das sociedades anônimas introduzida pela Lei 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976. Desde 1976, o arcabouço normativo de proteção do investidor no mercado de capitais brasileiro vem sendo desenvolvido a partir dessas linhas mestras iniciais, incorporando as lições aprendidas com as turbulências e euforias vividas pela economia nacional. Esse arcabouço normativo que aí está desde 1976 foi inspirado por contribuições do direito federal norte-americano, as quais foram conscientemente captadas no Brasil pelo legislador e pela comunidade jurídica nacional. Difundiram-se internacionalmente dos EUA para o Brasil os preceitos da proteção do investidor no mercado de capitais calcados na existência de um órgão regulador do mercado de capitais, na divulgação de informações relevantes para decisões de investimento (disclosure), na regulação funcional dos agentes do mercado de capitais e na vedação de fraudes com valores mobiliários. / The current normative framework for the protection of investors in the Brazilian capital market had its main lines placed by the banking reform introduced by the Laws 4.595, as of December 31, 1964, and 4.728, as of July 14, 1965, by the institution of one regulatory body specialized in the capital market by the Law 6.385, as of December 07, 1976, and by the reform in the legislation on companies introduced by the Law 6.404, as of December 15, 1976. Since 1976, the normative framework for the protection of investors in the Brazilian capital market has been developed based on such original main lines and incorporating the lessons learned with the turbulences and euphoria lived by the national economy. This current normative framework in place since 1976 has been inspired by the contributions of the federal US law and such contributions have been consciously captured in Brazil by the legislator and the national legal community. The following precepts of the protection of investors in the capital market have diffused from the US to Brazil, namely, the existence of one regulatory body in charge of capital markets, the disclosure of information relevant to investment decisions, the functional regulation of the agents of the capital markets and the prohibition of frauds with securities.

Governança corporativa pode ser entendida como o conjunto de mecanismos de incentivo e controle, internos e externos, que visam a minimizar os custos decorrentes do problema de agência. O tema é importante por ser bem difundida a hipótese de que as práticas de governança afetam o desempenho das empresas. Esta tese tem como objetivo avaliar se os mecanismos de governança são exógenos e se exercem influência sobre o valor de mercado e a rentabilidade das companhias abertas no Brasil. A pesquisa foi dividida em três partes inter-relacionadas. A primeira parte investigou os determinantes da qualidade da governança corporativa, isto é, os fatores que fazem com que algumas empresas apresentem um nível de governança maior do que outras submetidas a um mesmo ambiente contratual. Como aproximação para a qualidade da governança corporativa, construiu-se um índice de governança para as 161 companhias componentes da amostra. O resultado principal desta primeira parte sugere que a estrutura de propriedade influencia a qualidade da governança corporativa. Especificamente, encontrou-se uma relação negativa significante entre o excesso de direito de voto em posse do acionista controlador e a qualidade da governança. Os resultados também indicaram que as empresas maiores, emissoras de ADRs e com melhor desempenho apresentam, em média, melhor governança corporativa. A segunda parte do estudo investigou os determinantes da concentração da propriedade, isto é, os fatores que fazem com que o acionista controlador detenha um percentual maior de ações nas companhias abertas. Aplicando técnicas de dados em painel para o período de 1998 a 2002, os resultados indicaram que a concentração da propriedade não parece ser determinada de forma endógena por outras variáveis corporativas. Os resultados, todavia, dependem do método de estimação dos coeficientes empregado, já que se obteve significância estatística pelo método dos Mínimos Quadrados Ordinário mas não pelos procedimentos de Efeitos Aleatórios e de Efeitos Fixos, que se mostraram mais adequados. A terceira parte da pesquisa investigou a relação entre governança e desempenho por meio de diferentes abordagens econométricas em escala crescente de complexidade. Os resultados não indicaram uma influência significante e consistente da qualidade da governança sobre o desempenho das empresas, já que houve mudança no sentido da relação entre o nível de governança e algumas variáveis de desempenho quando foi aplicada a abordagem de equações simultâneas, em relação aos resultados obtidos nas regressões múltiplas com equações isoladas. Das variáveis de desempenho testadas, Q de Tobin foi a que mostrou a relação positiva mais consistente com a qualidade da governança. Como outros resultados importantes, observou-se que as empresas com menor concentração do direito de voto em posse do controlador, menor nível de endividamento, maior proporção de intangíveis, maior tamanho, emissoras de ADRs e com ações mais líquidas apresentaram, em média, melhor desempenho. A discrepância dos resultados obtidos na relação entre governança corporativa e desempenho, em função da abordagem econométrica empregada, destaca a necessidade de um maior desenvolvimento da teoria sobre governança corporativa, de forma a melhor especificar, por meio de equações estruturais, os relacionamentos entre os diferentes mecanismos de governança. / Corporate governance can be defined as the set of incentive and control mechanisms designed to minimize the costs deriving from the managerial agency problem. The subject is important since it is well spread the hypothesis that governance practices impact firm’s performance. This thesis aims at evaluating if governance mechanisms are exogenous and if they influence market value and profitability of listed companies in Brazil. The research is divided into three interrelated sections. The first section investigated the determinants of firm-level corporate governance quality, trying to uncover which firm’s observable characteristics lead some companies to achieve higher governance ratings than others in the same contractual environment. In order to obtain a proxy for corporate governance quality, a governance index was built for the sample of 161 firms. The main result of the first section suggests that ownership structure influences corporate governance quality. Specifically, it was found a significant negative relationship between the excess of voting shares held by controlling shareholder and corporate governance rating. Furthermore, the results indicated that larger companies, ADR issuers, and firms with better performance have, on average, better corporate governance. The second section investigated the determinants of ownership concentration in Brazil. The analysis aims at uncovering which firm’s characteristics lead some controlling shareholders to have higher concentration of shares. By applying panel data techniques for 1998 to 2002 period, the results indicated that ownership concentration doesn’t seem to be endogenously determined by other corporate variables. The results, however, are sensitive to coefficients’ estimation method. Statistically significant coefficients were found when Ordinary Least Squares were applied. However, this method appeared to be less adequate than Random Effects and Fixed Effect procedures, whose resulting estimates revealed that none of the explanatory variables’ coefficients were statistically significant. The third section investigated the relationship between corporate governance and performance through different econometric approaches in increasing level of complexity. The results didn’t indicate a significant and consistent influence of governance quality on corporate performance, since there was a sign change of the relation between governance level and some performance variables when the simultaneous equation approach was applied, compared with the results obtained by the single equation regressions approach. From the performance variables used, Tobin’s Q showed the more consistent positive relation with governance level. The results also suggest that firms with lower voting rights’ concentration held by controlling shareholder, lower debt level, higher proportion of intangibles assets, larger size, more liquid shares and ADRs issuers show, on average, better performance. The discrepancy of the results on the relation between corporate governance and performance, due to the econometric approach employed, highlights the need for a better development of corporate governance theory, in order to improve the specification, through structural equations, of the relationships between different governance mechanisms.

Markets in Financial Instruments Directive I är ett direktiv framtaget av Europakommissionen som reglerar den finansiella marknaden i Europa, som ett resultat av finanskrisen som uppkom 2007. Direktivet har implementerats i hela Europa Unionen och infördes i Sverige 2007. Finanskrisen har lagt grunden för ytterligare skärpta regleringar för en effektivare tillsyn, eftersom det tidigare fanns reguljära brister på den finansiella marknaden. Från januari 2017 implementerades Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II och träder i lag i Sverige januari 2018. MiFiD II syftar till att täppa till de brister som funnits i det första direktivet. Syftet med studien är att undersöka om direktivet kan bidra till förändrade förutsättningar gällande konkurrens mellan aktörer som verkar på den finansiella marknaden samt vilka fördelar och nackdelar direktivet medför. En kvalitativ forskningsstrategi har tillämpats och semistrukturerade intervjuer har genomförts. Utvalda aktörer som verkar på den finansiella marknaden har intervjuats både personligt men också online. Ytterligare information om direktivet har samlats in från vetenskapliga artiklar, litteratur samt dokument från myndigheters hemsidor. Resultatet av studien visar att samtliga aktörer är positivt inställda till direktivet men att det fortfarande finns oklarheter gällande dess implementering, hur direktivet ska tolkas samt hur ett enhetligt utförande ska ske inom alla EU-länder. MiFID II syftar till att främja konkurrensen ytterligare, men baserat på respondenterna tenderar åtstramningarna att leda till ökade inträdesbarriärer, risk för stordriftsfördelar samt att mindre aktörer kan missgynnas. / Markets in Financial Instruments Directive I is a directive established by the European Commission that regulate the financial market in Europe as a result of the financial crisis that occurred in 2007. The Directive has been implemented in the European Union and introduced in Sweden in 2007. The financial crisis has laid the foundation of harder regulations and for supervision to be more effective, because of the previous shortcomings on the financial market. Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II were implemented in January 2017, and will be established as a law in Sweden in January 2018. The purpose of MiFID II is to overcome the shortcomings that have been identified in the first directive. The purpose of the study is to examine whether the directive can contribute to changing conditions for competition between players on the financial market and the advantages and disadvantages of the directive. The study has a qualitative research strategy, with a focus on semi-structured interviews. A number of players on the financial market have been interviewed both personally and online. Further, information on the directive has been collected from scientific articles, literature and documents from government websites. The result of the study shows that all respondents are positive to the directive but that there still are uncertainties about its implementation, how the directive should be interpreted and how all the EU countries should implement the directive in a uniform way. MiFID II aims to continue to improve the competition, but based on the respondents, harder requirements tends to increase barriers to entry, risk of economies of scale, and smaller players to be exposed.

La Porta 等人以提高內部人持股可使內、外部股東利益一致，進而降低代理問題的觀點出發，在2002 年發表的實證研究中指出，提高內部人持股有助於提升公司的價值，特別是在對外部投資人保護較差的國家；他們也發現，對投資人保護程度愈好的國家，該國企業的價值也較高。本研究則從提高內部人持股可能產生的代理問題著手，在利弊同時存在之下，以涵蓋範圍更廣、時間更長的樣本，探討在不同的投資人保護環境下，提高內部人持股對公司價值的影響，以及投資人保護程度對於內部人持股集中與分散的公司價值是否也有不同的影響。 本研究發現，在投資人保護較佳的國家，提高內部人持股會傷害公司價值，但在投資人保護較差的國家，提高內部人持股可增加公司價值。另外，公司價值與內部人持股率之間呈現曲線關係，當內部人持股率相對較低時，提高內部人持股對公司價值是弊多於利；當內部人持股水準相對較高時，提高內部人持股則是利多於弊。而投資人保護程度對於內部人持股較分散的公司而言，顯得較為重要。因此，法律層面對投資人的保護程度和內部人持股集中度對於公司價值的影響有顯著的替代效果。 / This paper uses a sample of companies from 34 countries around the world to shed light on the relationships among legal protection of shareholders, ownership structure, and firm value. La Porta et al. (2002) indicate a positive relationship between cash flow, ownership, and firm value, especially in countries with poor investor protection. Besides, they also find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders. However, they don’t consider the effect of higher ownership on the cost of stealing, which may cause the controlling shareholders to expropriate more from minority shareholders. Also, their study covers only large firms with a controlling shareholder by one year data. Their results can be restricted to large firms and a particular year. Therefore, we use more comprehensive time series and cross section data to probe into the subject. Using various specifications of the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998), we find that higher ownership improves valuation in poor protection countries while higher ownership deteriorates valuation in good protection countries. In addition, stronger legal protection improves firm value, especially the firms with low ownership concentration. That is, there is a substitute effect of legal protection and ownership concentration on firm valuation. Finally, we also testify that dividends are valued more in poor protection countries and firms with low ownership concentration.

Les trois essais dans cette thèse étudient les implications des frictions financières, telles que les contraintes de collatérale ou de crédit, pour les décisions économiques des agents et leur impact sur les variables macro-économiques agrégées. Dans le premier chapitre "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection" nous proposons une théorie du niveau de protection des investisseurs. Une faible protection des investisseurs implique un coût de financement externe plus élevé à cause des problèmes d'agence plus aigus entre les investisseurs et les entrepreneurs. À l'équilibre, ceci exclut les agents plus dépendants sur le financement externe de l'entrepreneuriat, ce qui augmente les profits des entrepreneurs qui restent actifs. Quand le niveau de la protection des investisseurs est choisi par un vote majoritaire, la théorie génère (i) une protection des investisseurs plus faible dans les économies avec plus grande inégalité dans les besoins de financement externe parmi les entrepreneurs, (ii) une dynamique non-monotone de l'output, (iii) améliorations (détériorations) de la protection des investisseurs suite à des ralentissements (accélérations) de l'output agrégé. L'évidence empirique donne un support à ces prédictions de la théorie. Dans le deuxième chapitre "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organization of Production", nous examinons comment la présence des frictions financières peut mener à la formation des conglomérats et des "business groups" diversifiées. Particulièrement, nous construisons un modèle d'équilibre général d'entrepreneuriat dans lequel les conglomérats émergent de façon endogène et substituent partiellement le marché du crédit imparfait. Nous montrons que ce modèle est capable d'expliquer quantitativement plusieurs faits stylisés concernant l'organisation de la production, les différences de productivité entre les firmes et les différences en présence des conglomérats entre les pays. Le troisième chapitre "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" étudie empiriquement la relation entre la taille, la productivité, et la structure organisationnelle d'une firme. Utilisant les micro-données sur les établissements manufacturiers canadiens, nous documentons plusieurs faits stylisés concernant la taille et la productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans les conglomérats et dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Nous trouvons que les établissements dans les conglomérats sont en moyenne plus larges que leurs contreparties dans les firmes non-diversifiées, les petits établissements dans les conglomérats sont moins productifs que les établissements de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées, mais les larges établissements dans les conglomérats sont plus productifs que ceux de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Cette évidence est consistante avec réallocation interne efficiente des ressources au sein des conglomérats. / The three essays in this thesis study the implications of financial frictions, such as collateral and credit constraints, for economic decisions of agents and their impact on aggregate macroeconomic variables. In the first chapter "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection", we propose a theory of the level of investor protection. Lower investor protection implies higher cost of external financing due to more severe agency problems between outside investors and entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, this excludes more financially dependent agents from entrepreneurship, increasing the profits of the remaining entrepreneurs. When the level of investor protection is chosen by majority voting, the theory generates (i) lower investor protection in economies with higher inequality in financial dependence across entrepreneurs, (ii) non-monotone output dynamics, (iii) improvements (worsening) of investor protection following output slowdowns (accelerations). The empirical evidence provides some support to these predictions. In the second chapter "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organization of Production", we investigate how the presence of financial frictions may lead to formation of diversified conglomerates or business groups. Specifically, we build a general equilibrium model of entrepreneurship in which business groups arise endogenously and partially substitute for imperfect credit market. We show that the model is able to quantitatively explain several key stylized facts on the way production is organized, on cross-firm productivity differences, and on cross-country differences in the degree of conglomeration. The third chapter "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" studies empirically the relation between size, productivity, and the organizational structure of a firm. Using micro-data on Canadian manufacturing plants, we document several stylized facts about size and total factor productivity of establishments in conglomerates and single-segment firms. We find that establishments in conglomerates are on average larger than their counterparts in single-segment firms, small plants in conglomerates are less productive than plants of similar size in single-segment firms, but large plants in conglomerates are more productive than those of similar size in single-segment firms. This evidence is consistent with efficient internal reallocation of resources in conglomerates.

Anlageberatung ist eine Form der Kooperation zwischen Banken und Kunden, für deren Funktionieren das Vertrauen der Kunden eine wichtige Grundlage darstellt. Geht Vertrauen verloren, wird die Realisierbarkeit von wechselseitig vorteilhaften und gesellschaftlich erwünschten Kooperationen gefährdet. In der Tat haben Banken in vielen Fällen durch ihr Verhalten gegenüber Privatkunden das Vertrauen in sich und die eigene Anlageberatung gemindert. Die vorliegende Dissertation modelliert den Prozess von Vertrauenswürdigkeit der Banken und ihrer Determinanten über die Vermittlung der Vertrauenswürdigkeit und Wahrnehmung bei Bankkunden bis hin zur Bildung von Vertrauen und seinem Einfluss auf die Kooperationsbereitschaft der Kunden. Ausgehend von diesem Modell werden Friktionen als empirische Bedingungen identifiziert und analysiert, die Banken von Investitionen in den Vermögenswert Vertrauenswürdigkeit bzw. von vertrauenswürdigem Verhalten abhalten. Aus den aus der Analyse gewonnenen Erkenntnissen werden Kriterien für angemessene Lösungsmechanismen abgeleitet. Ansätze aus dem Anlegerschutz- und Funktionsverbesserungsgesetz 2011 werden darauf aufbauend bewertet und Verbesserungsvorschläge abgeleitet.

Les trois essais dans cette thèse étudient les implications des frictions financières, telles que les contraintes de collatérale ou de crédit, pour les décisions économiques des agents et leur impact sur les variables macro-économiques agrégées. Dans le premier chapitre "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection" nous proposons une théorie du niveau de protection des investisseurs. Une faible protection des investisseurs implique un coût de financement externe plus élevé à cause des problèmes d'agence plus aigus entre les investisseurs et les entrepreneurs. À l'équilibre, ceci exclut les agents plus dépendants sur le financement externe de l'entrepreneuriat, ce qui augmente les profits des entrepreneurs qui restent actifs. Quand le niveau de la protection des investisseurs est choisi par un vote majoritaire, la théorie génère (i) une protection des investisseurs plus faible dans les économies avec plus grande inégalité dans les besoins de financement externe parmi les entrepreneurs, (ii) une dynamique non-monotone de l'output, (iii) améliorations (détériorations) de la protection des investisseurs suite à des ralentissements (accélérations) de l'output agrégé. L'évidence empirique donne un support à ces prédictions de la théorie. Dans le deuxième chapitre "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organization of Production", nous examinons comment la présence des frictions financières peut mener à la formation des conglomérats et des "business groups" diversifiées. Particulièrement, nous construisons un modèle d'équilibre général d'entrepreneuriat dans lequel les conglomérats émergent de façon endogène et substituent partiellement le marché du crédit imparfait. Nous montrons que ce modèle est capable d'expliquer quantitativement plusieurs faits stylisés concernant l'organisation de la production, les différences de productivité entre les firmes et les différences en présence des conglomérats entre les pays. Le troisième chapitre "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" étudie empiriquement la relation entre la taille, la productivité, et la structure organisationnelle d'une firme. Utilisant les micro-données sur les établissements manufacturiers canadiens, nous documentons plusieurs faits stylisés concernant la taille et la productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans les conglomérats et dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Nous trouvons que les établissements dans les conglomérats sont en moyenne plus larges que leurs contreparties dans les firmes non-diversifiées, les petits établissements dans les conglomérats sont moins productifs que les établissements de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées, mais les larges établissements dans les conglomérats sont plus productifs que ceux de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Cette évidence est consistante avec réallocation interne efficiente des ressources au sein des conglomérats. / The three essays in this thesis study the implications of financial frictions, such as collateral and credit constraints, for economic decisions of agents and their impact on aggregate macroeconomic variables. In the first chapter "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection", we propose a theory of the level of investor protection. Lower investor protection implies higher cost of external financing due to more severe agency problems between outside investors and entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, this excludes more financially dependent agents from entrepreneurship, increasing the profits of the remaining entrepreneurs. When the level of investor protection is chosen by majority voting, the theory generates (i) lower investor protection in economies with higher inequality in financial dependence across entrepreneurs, (ii) non-monotone output dynamics, (iii) improvements (worsening) of investor protection following output slowdowns (accelerations). The empirical evidence provides some support to these predictions. In the second chapter "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organization of Production", we investigate how the presence of financial frictions may lead to formation of diversified conglomerates or business groups. Specifically, we build a general equilibrium model of entrepreneurship in which business groups arise endogenously and partially substitute for imperfect credit market. We show that the model is able to quantitatively explain several key stylized facts on the way production is organized, on cross-firm productivity differences, and on cross-country differences in the degree of conglomeration. The third chapter "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" studies empirically the relation between size, productivity, and the organizational structure of a firm. Using micro-data on Canadian manufacturing plants, we document several stylized facts about size and total factor productivity of establishments in conglomerates and single-segment firms. We find that establishments in conglomerates are on average larger than their counterparts in single-segment firms, small plants in conglomerates are less productive than plants of similar size in single-segment firms, but large plants in conglomerates are more productive than those of similar size in single-segment firms. This evidence is consistent with efficient internal reallocation of resources in conglomerates.

Submitted by caio rego (caiovr@gmail.com) on 2017-02-06T22:50:34Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DissertaçãoCaioRego.pdf: 663195 bytes, checksum: bcc4ad3cf583380984dbf0d0b5671666 (MD5) / Rejected by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br), reason: Bom dia Caio, Para que possamos aprovar seu trabalho é necessário alguns ajustes conforme norma ABNT/APA. * Seu titulo esta diferente da ATA, caso realmente exista essa alteração é preciso o professor orientador vir até a secretaria para fazer a alteração no verso da ATA com o titulo atual. Caso contrário não poderei aprovar. (INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CONSTRAINTS RELIEF) * Verificar a segunda folha, pois seu nome esta no rodapé da pagina. * Na pagina onde tem a ficha catalográfica, não tem escrita abaixo da caixa. * Conforme a norma é necessário ter AGRADECIMENTO, ABSTRACT E RESUMO - palavras em letra MAIÚSCULA ( no seu caso nesta ordem por ser um trabalho em inglês ) Após os ajustes você deve submete-lo novamente para analise e aprovação. Obs.: Mandarei um modelo em seu e-mail para visualização. Qualquer duvida estamos a disposição, Pâmela Tonsa 3799-7852 on 2017-02-07T10:24:20Z (GMT) / Submitted by caio rego (caiovr@gmail.com) on 2017-02-07T14:33:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DissertaçãoCaioVieira.pdf: 664958 bytes, checksum: 191819e57bac8bd461bc698115d3f3ef (MD5) / Rejected by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br), reason: Boa tarde Caio, Para que possamos aprovar seu trabalho são necessários alguns ajustes conforme norma ABNT/APA. * Seu título na hora de postar deve ser como esta na ATA, não só na mudança do titulo no trabalho. (INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CONSTRAINTS RELIEF) * Verificar a primeira e a segunda folha, pois seu nome está no rodapé da página. ( isso acontece quando muda para pdf - ficar atento) * Conforme a norma é necessário ter AGRADECIMENTO, ABSTRACT E RESUMO - Letra Maiúscula Após os ajustes você deve submete-lo novamente para análise e aprovação. Qualquer dúvida estamos à disposição, Pâmela Tonsa 3799-7852 on 2017-02-07T16:04:37Z (GMT) / Submitted by caio rego (caiovr@gmail.com) on 2017-02-07T17:18:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DissertaçãoCaioVieira.pdf: 666485 bytes, checksum: 3cb122fce819ec6da1fde898c3518471 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2017-02-07T17:29:01Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DissertaçãoCaioVieira.pdf: 666485 bytes, checksum: 3cb122fce819ec6da1fde898c3518471 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-02-07T19:00:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DissertaçãoCaioVieira.pdf: 666485 bytes, checksum: 3cb122fce819ec6da1fde898c3518471 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-22 / Under financial constraints, firms are kept from following first-best policies. It is in the best interests of the regulators to diminish this inefficiencies as firms play such a important roles in the economy as generating employment and contributing to the GDP. One of the channels through which regulation may interfere with firms funding availability is by protecting investors. This research assesses the relationship between investor protection and firms’ financial constraints. I split some of the most common measures of investor protection among three classes: creditor protection, minority protection and external investor protection. This division is relevant to screen the importance of a given class to alleviate the constraints: constrained firms are likely to share some characteristics that make them more akin to rely on given funding source, for example: firms facing asymmetric information problems are more suitable to debt financing. The cash-flow sensitivity of cash is used as a proxy for financial constraints. I construct cash saving models based on a sample of 27471 firms in 393 industries (3 digit-SIC), from 2001 to 2015. The models are fitted in two groups: for firms more likely to be constrained, and for firms less likely. To classify the firms between this two groups I rely on the Size and Age index, and on switching regressions with unknown separation points. The results points that creditor protection is related to lower cash-flow sensitivities of cash for the constrained firms, while external investor protection are related to more prevalent constraints. Minority protection present a negative interaction with the cash-sensitivity of cash in the panel model (indicating constraints relief) but positive coefficient relative to the switching regression. For the unconstrained batch, however, the results are mixed for the creditor protection measure, while external investor protection always diminish the firms’ propensity to save cash. / Sob restrição financeira, as firmas se distanciam de suas políticas ótimas. É do interesse dos reguladores diminuir as essas ineficiências pois as empresas desempenham funções importantes como contribuir para o PIB e gerar empregos. Uma das formas com que a regulação pode contribuir com a disponibilidade de financiamento para as companhias é estipulando leis que protegem seus investidores. Essa pesquisa investiga a relação entre proteção ao investidor e a restrição financeiro no meio corporativo. Nela, eu divido as leis que protegem os investidores em três tipos: proteção ao credor, ao acionista e ao investidor externo. A importância dessa divisão se dá por permitir identificar o efeito relativo de uma certa categoria de proteção em aliviar restrições financeiras: firmas restritas possuem características que podem torná-las mais suscetíveis a se financiar por certa forma de financiamento, por exemplo: firmas enfrentando assimetria de informação têm no endividamento sua forma de financiamento mais adequada. Para identificar restrição financeira eu me apoio na sensibilidade do caixa ao fluxo de caixa. Eu construo modelos de formação de caixa baseados em uma amostra de 27471 firmas em 393 industrias (SIC de 3 dígitos). A amostra compreende os anos entre 2000 e 2016. Os modelos são ajustados para 2 grupos: o das firmas mais prováveis de enfrentarem restrição financeira e o das menos prováveis. Para realizar essa classificação eu utilizo o índice de Tamanho e Idade, e em uma switching regression com pontos de separação desconhecidos. Os resultados apontam que proteção ao credor está relacionada a menores sensibilidades do caixa ao fluxo de caixa para ao grupo restrito, enquanto proteção ao investidor externo está relacionada ao restrições mais prevalentes. Proteção ao acionista apresenta uma interação negativa com a sensibilidade da caixa ao fluxo de caixa no modelo em painel, mas o sinal oposto no modelo de switching regression. No conjunto de firmas irrestritas por outro lado, os resultados são inconclusivos para a variável de proteção ao credor, enquanto proteção ao investidor externo sempre aparece relacionado a uma diminuição da restrição financeira.

Submitted by Cristiane Oliveira (cristiane.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2011-06-03T20:46:44Z No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100265.pdf: 815492 bytes, checksum: 2a1bcbf2ff173c39a76fb108fafd747c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão(vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2011-06-03T21:07:31Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100265.pdf: 815492 bytes, checksum: 2a1bcbf2ff173c39a76fb108fafd747c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão(vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2011-06-03T21:30:45Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100265.pdf: 815492 bytes, checksum: 2a1bcbf2ff173c39a76fb108fafd747c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-06-03T22:09:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100265.pdf: 815492 bytes, checksum: 2a1bcbf2ff173c39a76fb108fafd747c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-02-08 / This paper investigates whether the institutional environment, related to the level of investor protection in Latin American countries, contributes to reducing earnings management by firms. We use four models to detect earnings management (the Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, Modified Jones Model with ROA and the Kang & Sivaramakrishna Model). Our sample comprises 313 publicly held companies listed in the stock exchanges in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, during the period from 2006 to 2010, a total of 9,986 statistics company-year. The discretionary accruals were estimated using a twostage regression, firstly with panel data models and then with the model residuals as the dependent variable and the level of investor protection as the independent variable. The score for each country, published in the Latin American Venture Capital Association (LAVCA) Scorecard, is used as a proxy for the level of investor protection. There is evidence in line with the theory that a better institutional environment contributes to reducing not only earnings management, but also the variability in earnings management. These findings reveal that investor protection is an important factor in the development of countries in Latin America. Countries with systems that provide incentives for private investment, with better tax treatment, creditor protection, corporate governance and a standardized accounting system, present companies with a lower level of earnings management. / Nesta dissertação analisamos se o ambiente institucional relacionado ao nível de proteção dos investidores dos países da América Latina contribuiu para uma redução na prática de gerenciamento de resultados das empresas. Utilizamos quatro modelos para detectar a prática de gerenciamento de resultados (Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, Modified Jones Model with ROA e o Kang & Sivaramakrishna Model). A nossa amostra é formada pelas empresas de capital aberto e listada em bolsa nos países da Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colômbia, México e Peru, somando 313 empresas, para os anos de 2000 a 2009, totalizando 9.986 dados de empresa-trimestre. Utilizamos uma regressão em duas etapas, primeira usamos os modelos com dados em painel para estimar o discretionary accrual, em seguida, com o resíduo do modelo como variável dependente na segunda regressão sendo a variável independente o nível de proteção do investidor. A nota alcançada pelo país na pesquisa da Latin America Venture Capital Association (LAVCA) é usada como proxy para o nível de proteção ao investidor.. Há evidências em linha com a teoria de que um melhor ambiente institucional contribui para a diminuição não só da prática de gerenciamento de resultado, mas também as variabilidades do gerenciamento de resultados essas evidências reforçam a importância do fator proteção ao investidor para o desenvolvimento dos países da América Latina. Os países que possuem um sistema que incentive o investimento privado, com melhores tratamentos tributários, proteção aos credores, governança corporativa e padronização do sistema contábil, apresentam empresas com um menor nível de gerenciamento de resultado.