La thèse a pour objet de traiter la rencontre entre l’arbitrage et les procédures collectives. Elle s’ordonne autour d’un triple constat. Dans un premier temps, marquée par un fort impérialisme, des considérations d’ordre public, l’ouverture d’une procédure collective n’est pas sans incidence sur les instances arbitrales en cours et sur les instances arbitrales qui n’ont pas encore débuté. L’ordre public des procédures collectives a un impact tant sur le déroulement de l’instance arbitrale que sur l’issue de la sentence arbitrale. Ensuite, l’arbitrage marqué à l’opposé par la volonté des parties, la liberté contractuelle, survit en dépit de l’ouverture d’une procédure collective. En effet, l’ordre public des procédures ne suffit pas à exclure l’arbitrage. La compétence de l’arbitre est maintenue pour tous les litiges qui ne sont pas nés de la procédure collective et sur lesquels celle-ci n’exerce pas une influence juridique. Enfin, persiste lors de la rencontre entre l’arbitrage et les procédures collectives, un contentieux post-arbitral. / The purpose of the thesis is to deal with the meeting between arbitration and collective proceedings. It is organized around a triple statement. At first, marked by a strong imperialism, considerations of public order, the opening of a collective procedure is not without incidence on the arbitration bodies in course and on the arbitration bodies which have not yet started . The public order of collective proceedings has an impact both on the conduct of the arbitral proceedings and on the outcome of the arbitral award.Secondly, arbitration, which is marked by the will of the parties, contractual freedom, survives despite the opening of a collective proceeding. Indeed, the public order of the collective proceedings is not sufficient to exclude arbitration. The arbitrator's jurisdiction is upheld for all disputes that are not born of the collective proceeding and over which the latter has no legal influence. Lastly, persists during the meeting between arbitration and collective proceeding, a post-arbitration litigation.

L’analyse comparée du raisonnement du juge européen et du juge de l’OMC est menée en deux temps. Le raisonnement est, d’une part, déterminé, et d’autre part, finalisé. Il apparaît tout d’abord que le raisonnement du juge de l’Union et du juge de l’OMC est déterminé par des caractéristiques systémiques et normatives de ces organisations. Ainsi, la fonction assignée au juge et le caractère incohérent ou lacunaire des systèmes européen et de l’OMC conduisent les juges à raisonner de façon comparable. De même, l’indétermination des règles juridiques et la substance économique du droit ont une influence sur leur raisonnement. Il apparaît ensuite que le raisonnement est finalisé. La première finalité est inhérente au juge d’une organisation internationale ou supra nationale, et le raisonnement est alors un instrument mis au service de la réalisation des objectifs des Traités. La seconde finalité est consubstantielle au juge qui raisonne afin d’assurer l'acceptabilité de ses décisions. / Comparative analysis of legal reasoning of the EU and WTO judge is conducted in two steps.On the one hand, reasoning is determined, on the other hand, harnessed. First, it appears that the reasoning of both judges is determined by the systemic and normative characteristics of these organizations. Thus, the function the judge is given, along with the incompleteness and inconsistencies of the european and multilateral systems, lead both judges to reason in asimilar way. Likewise, the indeterminacy of legal rules and the economic nature of the lawboth have an impact on reasoning. Second, it appears that reasoning is harnessed. As it is true for any supranational or international judge, reasoning is used as an instrument to achieve theTreaties' objectives. Furthermore, reasoning is an integral part of the judge who uses it in order to ensure the acceptability of his ruling.

Les libertés publiques sont connues et réclamées par tous et partout. Elles doivent être protégées contre toute atteinte. Les atteintes portées aux libertés publiques le sont souvent par l'administration. La première institution à garantir les libertés publiques contre l'administration est le juge administratif, son juge ordinaire. Le juge administratif est le juge de l'administration, il juge son action, annule ou confirme ses décisions et lui adresse même des injonctions. La jurisprudence administrative montre que le juge administratif utilise souvent tous les instruments dont il dispose pour protéger les libertés publiques contre les atteintes qui leur sont portées par l'administration. Parmi ces instruments figurent l'interprétation étroite des cas d'incompétence du juge administratif en la matière, l'assouplissement du régime de recevabilité du recours, l'application extensive du référé-liberté, la faculté de compléter la lacune législative qui est d'ailleurs large et voulue dans le droit administratif, la création des principes généraux du droit, dont les plus importants sont le principe du caractère exceptionnel des limites aux libertés publiques et surtout des mesures de police et le principe d'égalité, l'interprétation restrictive des lois défavorables aux libertés publiques, l'interprétation extensive des lois favorables aux libertés publiques et l'engagement de la responsabilité publique au service des libertés publiques. / Public freedoms are known and demanded by everyone, everywhere. They must be protected against any attack. The infringements of public freedoms are often by the administration. The first institution to guarantee public freedoms against the administration is the administrative judge, his regular judge. The administrative judge is the judge of the administration, he consider his action, rescind or conform its decisions and directed her orders. The administrative case law shows that the administrative judge often uses all the instruments at its disposal to protect public freedoms against violations by the administration. These instruments include the narrow interpretation of the cases of incompetence of the administrative judge in the matter, easing the admissibility of the action plan, the extensive application of the petition for freedom, the ability to complete the legislative gap that is to also broad and deliberate in administrative law, the creation of general principles of law, the most important being the principle of the exceptional character of limits on public freedoms and especially of the police measures and the principle of equality, the restrictive interpretation of laws unfavorable to public freedoms, the broad interpretation of laws favorable to public freedoms and the commitment of public responsibility in the service of public freedoms.

L'élaboration du moyen d'ordre public par le juge est une quête constante d'équilibre. Ce dernier est, en effet, soumis à deux impératifs potentiellement contradictoires. Il lui faut assurer la préservation du corpus de valeurs composant l'ordre public contentieux. L'obligation de relever d'office et d'autoriser son invocation à tout instant du procès, après l'avoir soumis à la contradiction, lui permet d'atteindre pleinement cet objectif. Cependant ce régime coercitif est susceptible de mettre à mal la bonne administration de la justice. Les sujétions que le juge s'impose peuvent alourdir considérablement sa tâche. La vérification systématique de la présence au dossier d'un moyen d'ordre public, la communication aux parties et la possibilité pour ces dernières d'y répondre tout comme la dérogation aux règles de recevabilité des demandes nouvelles ralentissent le procès quand le juge administratif est mis plus que jamais au défi de l'efficacité. Il lui appartient alors de dépasser cet antagonisme en conciliant la nécessité de protéger l'ordre public contentieux avec celle de dispenser une justice bien administrée. Le juge parvient à cet équilibre en agissant tant sur la notion que sur le régime des moyens d'ordre public. Celui-ci crée et entretient l'indétermination de la notion de sorte que la nomenclature de ces moyens est amenée à évoluer au cours des époques et des contentieux. Il trouve alors dans cette plasticité la liberté lui permettant de contrebalancer les obligations procédant de son régime. Ces marges d'appréciation paraissent néanmoins insuffisantes. La jurisprudence la plus récente du Conseil d'État vient neutraliser et concurrencer cette technique. Sa pérennité n'est toutefois pas remise en cause. Le moyen d'ordre public a vocation à demeurer et pourrait même être renforcé par la reconnaissance par le juge d'un pouvoir de relever d'office les moyens ordinaires. / L'auteur n'a pas fourni de résumé en anglais

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:27:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Robson Carlos de Oliveira.pdf: 3980997 bytes, checksum: 400c12d85b3f172abbe805421e1eb3d2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-04 / This thesis has the objective to examine and understand the exercise of the judge s power to execute certain amount against solvent debtor. The conscience grows each day that the State-judge, in the exercise of the part of the sovereignity that is given for him by the Federal Constitution, must grant jurisdicional provisions that result in effective and concrete answers in favor of that one who came to judgement. The jurisdicional person and the society do not accept formal and rhetorical answers, and lack of practical results from jurisditional organ. This relaxed attitude with the consequences of the jurisditional acts was particular to the Liberal State, but today it does not find support to the needy citizens necessities of protection. The demand of improvements of the effective instrument of the material right has provoked successive Reforms in the Civil Process Code, specially what concerns to the process of knowledge. The civil execution, particularly the execution for certain amount against solvent debtor, was not an object of so many Reforms, unless more recently with the publication of the Laws 11.232/2005 and 11.382/2006. Before or after the publication of these diplomas, it has tried to demonstrate that the judge s powers have origin in constitutional standards, like those that guarantee to a citizen the qualified access to the Justice and in reasonable time, so that the jurisditional powers are not totally linked to the strict quadrants of the legal rules. With support in authorized doctrine we demonstrate that the repertoire which the judge uses in the service of his powers is much bigger than that one that was formelyconceived by Liberal State. Contemporarily, the judge uses the rules, the legal principles, the douctrine and the jurisprudence to decide appropriately, ensuring the efficacy of his pronouncements. We check that, if this idea is accepted, with certain tranquillity in the cognitive demands, the same thing does not take place in the execution for certain amount. In this the judge s pronouncements are still too much linked to the classic liberal values, supported on own dogmas of the legal positivism, which tackle determined basic rights of the debtor like absolute obstacles to the effectiveness of the jurisdiction. However, the judge in the execution of certain amount against solvent debtor also has great freedom in order to exercise the powers that the legal system invests him aiming the approprately tutor the creditor basic rights. We analyse the concepts and the traces of the basic institutes of the Civil Processual Right, as well as those pertaining to civil execution, in the first thesis and the second one, since it is not possible to examine the exercise of the judge s powers in the forced execution without understanding its structure and functionality. At the last stage of this thesis, we outline an attempt of systematizing the judge´s power at the execution for certain amount against solvent debtor, at the same time in which we analyse several examples like these powers can and must be practised in each phase in which the execution can be divided, from the analysis of the jurisprudence. We conclude that the exercise of the jurisditional powers in the execution for certain amount must be stimulated by the same efficiency with which they are practised in the cognitive actions / Esta tese tem o objetivo de examinar e compreender o exercício dos poderes do juiz na execução por quantia certa contra devedor solvente. Cresce a cada dia a consciência de que o Estado-juiz, no exercício da parcela de soberania que lhe confere a Constituição Federal, deve outorgar provimentos jurisdicionais que redundem em respostas efetivas e concretas em favor daquele que veio a juízo. O jurisdicionado e a sociedade não aceitam mais do órgão jurisdicional respostas formais, retóricas e desprovidas de resultados práticos. Esta postura despreocupada com as conseqüências dos atos jurisdicionais era própria do Estado liberal, mas hoje não encontra apoio nas necessidades dos cidadãos carentes de tutela. A exigência de aprimoramento do instrumento de efetivação do direito material provocou sucessivas Reformas no Código de Processo Civil, especialmente no que diz respeito ao processo de conhecimento. A execução civil, particularmente a execução por quantia certa contra devedor solvente, não foi objeto de tantas Reformas, a não ser mais recentemente com a edição das Leis 11.232/2005 e 11.382/2006. Antes ou depois da edição destes diplomas, procurou-se demonstrar que os poderes do juiz têm matriz em normas constitucionais, como aquelas que garantem ao cidadão o acesso qualificado à Justiça e em tempo razoável, de tal sorte que os poderes jurisdicionais não se vinculam totalmente aos estritos quadrantes das regras jurídicas. Com apoio em autorizada doutrina demonstramos que o repertório de que se vale o juiz no exercício de seus poderes é muito maior do que apenas aquele outrora concebido pelo Estado liberal. Contemporaneamente, o juiz se vale das regras, dos princípios jurídicos, da doutrina e da jurisprudência para adequadamente decidir, garantindo a eficácia de seus pronunciamentos. Verificamos que, se essa idéia é aceita, com certa tranqüilidade nas demandas cognitivas, o mesmo não ocorre na execução por quantia certa. Nesta os pronunciamentos dos juízes ainda se encontram demasiadamente vinculados aos valores liberais clássicos, apoiados em dogmas próprios do positivismo jurídico, que enfocam determinados direitos fundamentais do devedor como óbices absolutos à efetividade da jurisdição. Todavia, o juiz também na execução por quantia certa contra devedor solvente tem grande liberdade para exercer os poderes que o sistema jurídico o investe visando a adequamente tutelar os direitos fundamentais do credor. Analisamos os conceitos e os lineamentos dos institutos fundamentais do Direito Processual Civil, bem como aqueles próprios da execução civil, na primeira e segunda partes da tese, pois não é possível examinar o exercício dos poderes do juiz na execução forçada sem antes compreender sua estrutura e funcionalidade. Na derradeira etapa desta tese, esboçamos uma tentativa de sistematização dos poderes do juiz na execução por quantia certa contra devedor solvente, ao mesmo tempo em que analisamos vários exemplos de como esses poderes podem e devem ser exercidos em cada fase em que a execução pode ser dividida, a partir da análise da jurisprudência. Concluímos que o exercício dos poderes jurisdicionais na execução por quantia certa deve ser animado pela mesma eficácia com que são exercidos nas ações cognitivas

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-08-09T12:33:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Antônio Veloso Peleja Júnior.pdf: 1880309 bytes, checksum: 34cf4d43d88c805ab51932534622c8fc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-09T12:33:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Antônio Veloso Peleja Júnior.pdf: 1880309 bytes, checksum: 34cf4d43d88c805ab51932534622c8fc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-06-26 / The complaint is a particular legal institute of Brazilian law whose mission is to ensure the jurisdiction and the consolidated understanding of the courts. The new Code of Civil Procedure, considerate on the proposition of these jurisprudential positions and on the "enforcement" of its observance by the court, expanded the operation of the complaint of article 988 assigning it as a guarantor of these understandings, which were qualified as "precedents". The channeling of a considerable number of complaints to higher courts forced, in the name of judicial policy and administration, the generation of atypical solutions to the situation, given the anomy in the discipline of the legal institute and the counter-claim represented by the prevalence of the quantitative aspect over the qualitative one. The transformation of the legal nature of the complaint to meet the demands of higher courts is performed by trampling on some constitutional and infra-constitutional principles, in a rearrangement of competences and appropriateness, which does not conform to the scenario of civil procedural law, recipient of the radiant efficacy of the Federal Constitution. On the other hand, after several years of constitutional and procedural reforms aimed at mitigating the workload of these Courts - which ended up by adjusting them more as thesis reductions than as a decrease of analysis of thousands of concrete cases - the procedural status quo of the complaint meets these changes. Resolutions no. 9/2012 and n. 3/2016 summarize a pool of legal institutes, regulations and judicial policies that should be properly analyzed before having their admission accepted into the Brazilian legal system besides proposing a solution to the status quo judicially constituted / A reclamação é um instituto singular da legislação brasileira cuja missão é garantir a competência e o entendimento consolidado dos tribunais. O Código de Processo Civil, pródigo na enunciação desses posicionamentos jurisprudenciais e na anunciação da “obrigatoriedade” de sua observação por parte do julgador, expandiu o manejo da reclamação no artigo 988, destinando-a como móvel fiador desses entendimentos, adjetivados como “precedentes”. A canalização de um número considerável de reclamações junto aos tribunais superiores forçou, em nome da política e da administração judiciárias, que se engendrassem soluções atípicas para a situação, em face da anomia na disciplina do instituto e do contrassenso representado pela predominância do aspecto quantitativo sobre o qualitativo. A mutação da natureza jurídica da reclamação para atender aos reclamos das cortes superiores é realizada atropelando alguns princípios constitucionais e infraconstitucionais, em um rearranjo de competências e cabimento, que não se amolda ao cenário do direito processual civil, destinatário da eficácia irradiante da Constituição Federal. Em contrapartida, após vários anos de reformas constitucionais e processuais com o objetivo de aliviar a carga de trabalho dessas cortes e de adaptá-las mais como cortes de teses e menos como cortes de análise de milhares de casos concretos, o status quo procedimental da reclamação vai ao encontro às referidas mudanças. As resoluções 9/2012 e 3/2016 condensam um pool de institutos, regramentos e política judiciária que precisam ser bem analisados para que se possa chegar a uma conclusão segura acerca de sua admissão no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, além de propor uma solução para o status quo construído judicialmente

A busca de soluções capazes de imprimir maior eficiência e efetividade ao processo tem norteado as diversas reformas processuais nas últimas décadas. Com esse escopo, aumentaram os poderes do juiz, para justificar essa ampliação no caráter público do processo. Consequência desse aumento de poderes, verificou-se uma alteração no comportamento dos sujeitos envolvidos em um processo, outrora fundamentado nas premissas do princípio dispositivo, fato esse justificado pelos escopos sociais e políticos do processo na busca por uma decisão mais justa. Além disso, a busca por maior efetividade fez com que a duração razoável do processo ganhasse status de Direito Constitucional expressamente reconhecido, de modo a exigir do juiz uma conduta mais ativa na busca de melhor prestação jurisdicional. Como consequência, relegou-se a um plano secundário a participação das partes no processo, que se restringiu, praticamente, à instauração da demanda, de modo que a instrução probatória, cuja premissa maior era a igualdade formal balizada pelos limites do princípio dispositivo, passou, então, a ser influenciada pela iniciativa do juiz. O presente trabalho busca, seguindo os influxos das novas tendências e tendo em vista ser da essência da própria jurisdição a equidistância do magistrado dos interesses em conflito e, como o princípio dispositivo resulta da autonomia da vontade que reina no âmbito de grande parte dos Direitos atuados pelo processo civil, estimular a reflexão sobre o fato de a revalorização deste princípio, que, embora mitigado, ainda orienta o processo civil brasileiro, para confiar às partes, integralmente, tarefas que hoje incumbem aos magistrados no âmbito da instrução probatória, constituiria uma alternativa capaz de solucionar o problema da morosidade que afeta o Judiciário e compromete a efetividade processual. Dentro dessa perspectiva, o presente estudo se desenvolverá em três partes e enfatizará as questões ligadas ao tema proposto. Na primeira parte, será feito um estudo do princípio dispositivo para avaliar os impactos da sua mitigação no processo civil brasileiro contemporâneo, bem como a importância de sua subsistência como limite à atuação do juiz na busca de maior efetividade processual. Na segunda parte, o estudo será dirigido aos poderes do juiz, para refletir se a sua postura proativa realiza, de fato, os escopos da jurisdição, visto que, em geral, no âmbito do processo, se cuida de direitos disponíveis. Na terceira parte, buscar-se-á traçar um panorama atual da instrução probatória no processo civil brasileiro e, ao compará-la a outros ordenamentos estrangeiros, estimular a reflexão, sob a perspectiva da instrumentalidade, quanto ao fato de a maior valorização do princípio dispositivo constituir uma forma de evitar dilações temporais desnecessárias no curso do processo, visto que, não obstante o fortalecimento dos poderes do juiz, a realidade demonstra que o interesse das partes é sempre a mais eficiente mola propulsora da vida dos direitos e da sua efetividade. / The seek for solutions capable of bringing more efficiency to the due process of law has guided the variety of procedural law reforms in the last decades. Aiming to deliver more effectiveness to procedural mechanisms, these reforms enhanced the judges power, using the public aspect of procedure to justify such increase. As a consequence of this increase of powers, there was a change into the parties behavior. Erstwhile this behavior was based on the premises of the dispositive principle, justified by the social and political goals and their seek for a fair solution. Furthermore, the seek for more effectiveness make the question regarding the length of a action receive a clearly recognized Constitutional law status, requiring a better management from the judge during the jurisdictional duty. Thus, the parties participation in the process assumed a marginal role. The parties practically were segregated only to the introduction of the claim. The evidence production, which previously had as a major concept the formal equality, became influenced by the judge proactivity. Once the new tendencies are the essence of jurisdiction and the freedom of choice is an fundamental principle of the rights defended by the civil procedure, this dissertation aims to stimulate the reflection regarding the reanalysis of this principle that, even mitigated, are the main guide to the Brazilian civil procedure law. Inserted in this perspective, the present study will be divided into three parts and will emphasize the issues concerning the theme. The first part will be done a study regarding the dispositive principle. The objective is to evaluate the impact of its mitigation in the current Brazilian procedural law, as well as the importance of its existence as a boundary of the judges power in the quest for greater procedural effectiveness. The second part will be dedicated to the judges discretionary powers. It will bring a reflection if the proactive posture brings, in fact, the main jurisdictional goals, since it generally deals with available entitlement under the procedural law. In the third part, the dissertation will attempt to draw an actual outlook regarding evidence statement on the Brazilian civil procedure law. This work will compare the Brazilian system with foreign jurisdictions and stimulate a debate if the instrumentality perspective is a way to avoid unnecessary time delays in the procedures or not, considering that despite the strengthening of the powers of judge, reality shows that the parties\' interests is always the most efficient \"driving force\" of rights life and its effectiveness.

This thesis examines the mode of trial concerns in the U.S.A., New York State, California, England and Wales and Canada --specifically the ability of the jury to comprehend complex cases and the perception/reality that bench trials may not be as fair as jury trials. Defining complex cases as those involving serious fraud indictments, capital murder trials, and lawsuits or indictments against corporations and their managers, the thesis examines problems associated with jury trials in such cases. It evaluates the comparative law and customs and practices regarding the use of juries, emphasizing problems with jury selection, deficits in jury deliberation and post trial problems associated with jury verdicts. The thesis also evaluates the judge only trial, attempting to determine whether a state imposed non jury trial in a criminal case as is presently proposed in the England and Wales Parliament creates an unfairness to the defendant because bench trials significantly differ from jury trials in the application of the rules of evidence and in the role of the judge. The thesis reports on the results of a survey of New York State trial judges, a like survey of New York State lawyers, and the opinions of nine England and Wales judges authorized to try serious fraud cases who were interviewed regarding these issues. The surveys and interviews finds that there is a high degree of support for jury verdicts expressed by the judges, examines evidentiary and pretrial practices in both modes of trial and attempts to evaluate whether claims of procedural flaws and prejudice in bench trials by respected academics are accurate. The thesis concludes by affirming the competence of juries to try complex cases, proposing modifications to post jury verdict procedures to evaluate jury misconduct and advocating that the bench trial evidentiary rules and conduct rules become comparable to the jury trial. The thesis recommends that mode of trial choices be given to the defendant, advocates that when a bench trial is selected that peremptory challenges of the trial judge be permitted and postulates that these reforms will make the bench trial a more attractive alternative to the jury trial in complex cases.

Les conflits de valeurs seraient, selon l’expression de Max Weber une guerre des dieux, traduction d'une irréductibilité sociologique des différentes cultures. La thèse s'inscrit dans la ligne de ce constat tout en s'efforçant d'en tempérer la portée. Cette dernière a pour objet de clarifier les équivoques qui pèsent sur le concept de valeur, à partir d'une étude critique du discours doctrinal dominant. Nous nous sommes placés pour ce faire dans un cadre relativement ouvert, celui des systèmes juridiques occidentaux, en y incluant les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et certains ordres juridiques régionaux (droit européen des droits de l’homme mais aussi le système théologique). Ces équivoques tiennent selon nous, en grande partie, au fait que la doctrine s'attache la plupart du temps, dans son approche de ce concept, à des problématiques prédéterminées qui limitent a priori la portée de l'analyse. Plus spécifiquement, l'une de ces problématiques, héritées du jus-naturalisme traditionnel et d'un certain positivisme juridique, est celle qui consiste à traiter des valeurs en termes d'intégration (ou non) de certaines normes d'un type particulier, à l'intérieur d'un ordre supposé clos ou relativement fermé sur lui-même. Cette proposition ne peut que déboucher sur une impasse. Il nous a donc semblé nécessaire d'échapper à ce dilemme, et nous avons eu recours, pour y parvenir, à une double directive méthodologique:- Proposer une théorie dialectique des valeurs, qui mette au premier plan le rôle du juge, et spécialement celui du juge constitutionnel, dans le cadre d'un processus de constitution d'un ordre spécifique, appelé parfois ordre de valeurs; - Puiser, pour rendre possible l'analyse de ce processus, dans une conception élargie des sources du droit, où la doctrine serait entendue, non comme une autorité, mais comme une "entité", selon l'expression proposée par Ph. Jestaz et Ch. Jamin, considérée dans ses relations avec les autres sources de droit. C’est ainsi qu'à travers un certain nombre de principes de base, revisités à l'aune de la question des valeurs (à commencer par le principe démocratique) nous avons pu fournir les éléments d'une théorie générale de la valeur, en faisant de cette dernière, l'un des éléments de la culture juridique des peuples. Le réalisme juridique, plus particulièrement sa variante interprétative occupe une place à part dans ce tableau, et sert de transition entre les deux parties de la thèse, dont la première est plutôt dédiée à la critique du système explicatif existant, à partir de ses origines plus particulièrement philosophiques et théologiques, alors que la seconde partie se veut constructiviste. Nous avons été conduits à cette fin à distinguer le réel, autrement dit le milieu et la réalité juridique, en analysant les rapports que ces deux derniers termes entretiennent avec les valeurs: celles-ci nous sont apparues alors tantôt comme des catégories juridiques spécifiques (droits, principes) tantôt comme un arrière-plan nécessaire au fonctionnement de l'ensemble. / This thesis tempts to clarify the ambiguities surrounding the concept of value, by means of a critical study which focuses on the dominant doctrinal discourse. The clash of values might be a clash of gods according to Max Weber who affirms (in Science comme vocation, 1919) that the sociological nature of cultures is irreducible. For this purpose we do that in a relatively open framework, that of the legal system in the Occident, including the United State of America and some other regional legal organisations like the European legal human right system and the theological system. We think that these ambiguities can be explained by the fact that this doctrine is quite often subject to predetermined issues which limit the focus of its analysis. One of these issues, related to traditional “jusnaturalisme” and to a kind of some legal positivism, is the one which deals with values in terms of integration (or not) of some particular norms in a system which is supposed to be closed or relatively self centred. Such a suggestion can only lead to a dead end. In order to bypass such a dilemma we have adopted a double directive methodology: -Suggesting a dialectical theory of values which enhances the role of the judge, especially that of a constitutional judge, within a constitutional process, with a specific system, sometimes called “system of values”. - Making use of a large set of legal sources, to allow analysis of this process, where the doctrine can be considered not as an authority but as an entity, as Ph. Jestaz and Ch. Jamin call it, considered with relation to other legal sources. In this regard and by means of some basic principles revisited through questions of values (including the principle of democracy) we have managed to provide aspects of a general theory of values by turning it into one of the elements of the people’s legal culture. Legal realism, especially interpretive realism, has a particular significance in this framework, and allows transition from the first to the second part of this thesis. The first part is dedicated to criticism of the existing explicative system, through its philosophical and theological origins, while the second is in fact quite constructivist. Accordingly, reality seems to be a constructed thing, whereas the “real” appears as a given data in an environment where different factors should bring society together, and which the judge should take into account. In conclusion, we have come to distinguish the « real », or said otherwise, the environment and the legal reality, by analysing the relationship that these two terms share with values. The latter terms appear sometimes as specific legal categories (law and principles), while in others as a necessary background for the functioning of the overall.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-06-14T12:37:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Letícia Mousquer Ritter_.pdf: 1992270 bytes, checksum: ce67306b6df31ca899d2c4d0cc46907c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-14T12:37:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Letícia Mousquer Ritter_.pdf: 1992270 bytes, checksum: ce67306b6df31ca899d2c4d0cc46907c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-04-06 / Nenhuma / As contínuas transformações da sociedade, em especial com o advento do Estado Democrático de Direito, proporcionaram uma profunda alteração na atuação dos juízes e tribunais. O novo paradigma constitucional deslocou o polo de tensão dos Poderes Executivo e Legislativo para o Poder Judiciário, fazendo com que os juízes, passem a ter a responsabilidade de fazer cumprir materialmente o pacto constitucional. Dentro desta perspectiva surge o juiz como ator determinante na efetiva criação do direito e na solução das legítimas pretensões sociais, realizando a democracia quando resolvido o caso apresentado ao Poder Judiciário. Entretanto, tal aumento da atuação do Poder Judiciário foi recepcionado na cultura brasileira como a afirmação de um necessário protagonismo judicial. A politização da justiça decorrente da expansão da jurisdição constitucional, acabou por conduzir os juízes a deixar de realizar julgamentos jurídicos, necessariamente calcados em argumentos e parâmetros de validade de natureza jurídico-constitucional, os levando a decidir com base em critérios pessoais. A sociedade passou, então, a defrontar-se não mais com a judicialização das relações sociais, mas com fenômeno distinto denominado como ativismo judicial. A questão central que se apresenta, então, é de saber quais as bases que legitimam democraticamente o Judiciário, na medida em que este Poder não advém do sufrágio universal como nas outras esferas de poder. Ou seja, trata-se de perquirir a acerca do papel funcional do Poder Judiciário, centrado na figura do juiz, justamente por este ser um órgão desprovido de controle político, sequer daqueles de natureza institucional, e que precisa colidir aos interesses da soberania. O estudo desenvolve-se como forma de propiciar uma análise acerca do processo de interpretação da norma, na medida em que a tomada da decisão judicial necessariamente passa por este processo. Diante disso aponta para a superação da crise interpretativa através da hermenêutica filosófica e, também aufere qual o papel dos princípios para resguardar a autonomia do direito. Buscando contextualizar um debate contemporâneo sobre o problema do ativismo judicial brasileiro, na tentativa de empreender um estudo que possibilite a análise de prováveis respostas ao problema do protagonismo judicial e da urgência de uma teoria judicial que esteja adequada a fornecer respostas corretas no vigente Estado Democrático de Direito, como forma de recorte do tema, serão abordados os elementos que propulsionam o ativismo judicial arbitrário: a indefinição do conceito de princípio, a problemática da distinção estrutural entre regra e princípio e a consequente profusão de princípios. Esses elementos, além de proporcionarem uma atuação ativista do magistrado, servem como pano de fundo para a análise do problema proposto a estudo na presente tese: qual o papel do juiz no Estado Democrático de Direito, pode o magistrado ter uma postura mais ativista sem que ponha em risco o Estado Democrático de Direito? Ou seja, a pesquisa visa a abordar as perspectivas sobre a função jurisdicional da magistratura no século XXI. / The continuous changes in society, especially with the advent of democratic rule of law, provided a profound change in the role of judges and courts. The new constitutional paradigm shifted voltage pole of the executive and legislative powers to the judiciary, making the judges start to have a responsibility to materially comply with the constitutional pact. From this perspective comes the judge as an actor determining the effective creation of the right solution and the legitimate social claims, conducting democracy when solved the case presented to the courts. However, such an increase in the judiciary action was approved in Brazilian culture as the affirmation of a necessary judicial role. The politicization of justice due to the expansion of constitutional jurisdiction, eventually led the judges to stop performing legal judgments necessarily grounded on arguments and parameters of validity of legal and constitutional nature, leading to decide based on personal criteria. The company then began to face is no longer with the judicialization of social relations, but with distinct phenomenon termed as judicial activism. The central question that arises, then, is to know what the basis that democratically legitimated the judiciary, to the extent that this power does not come from the universal suffrage as in other spheres of power. That is, it is to assert the about the functional role of the judiciary, centered on the judge's figure, precisely because it is a body devoid of political control, even those of an institutional nature, and that needs to collide with the interests of sovereignty. The study is developed as a way to provide an analysis of the interpretation of the standard process in that the decision of the court decision necessarily goes through this process. Therefore points to overcome interpretative crisis by philosophical hermeneutics and also receives the role of the principles for protecting the autonomy of law. Seeking contextualize contemporary debate about the problem of the Brazilian judicial activism in an attempt to undertake a study to enable analysis of likely responses to the problem of judicial prominence and urgency of a legal theory that is adequate to provide correct answers in the current democratic state Law as a way to cut theme, will address the elements that propel the arbitrary judicial activism: the vagueness of the concept of principle, the problem of structural distinction between rule and principle and the consequent profusion of principles. These elements, in addition to providing an activist role of the magistrate, serve as a backdrop for the analysis of the problem proposed the study in this thesis: the role of the judge in a democratic state, can the judge take a more activist stance without endangers the democratic rule of law? That is, the research aims to address the prospects of the judiciary of the judicial function in the twenty-first century.