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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
71

O Império dos Direitos: lei e autoridade política em Ronald Dworkin / Rights Empire: Law and Political Authority in Ronald Dworkins Theory

Lima, Caio Moyses de 03 August 2011 (has links)
O objetivo desta dissertação é expor as características centrais da teoria do filósofo norte-americano Ronald Dworkin sobre a natureza dos direitos fundamentais ou morais. A referida teoria é aqui compreendida como uma defesa da noção de direitos fundamentais, tal como aparece no sistema constitucional norte-americano, contra os ataques do utilitarismo e do juspositivismo. A concepção dworkiniana dos direitos fundamentais como razões de justiça (ou princípios) que operam como trunfos contra a utilidade geral é contrastada com duas teses adversárias: a concepção utilitarista dos direitos morais de John Stuart Mill e a tese juspositivista das fontes sociais. A famosa querela entre Ronald Dworkin e os juspositivistas é analisada em um enfoque normativo, como uma disputa sobre o conceito de autoridade política: Dworkin compreende os direitos fundamentais como a fonte última da autoridade jurídica, enquanto os positivistas sustentam que uma das funções da autoridade jurídica é precisamente estabelecer quais são os direitos das pessoas. / The purpose of this research is to expound the main characteristics of Ronald Dworkins theory of fundamental (or moral) rights. Dworkins theory is herein considered as a defense of the idea of fundamental rights, as it appears in the United States Constitutional System, against the attacks advanced by the doctrines of utilitarianism and legal positivism. Dworkins conception of fundamental rights as reasons of justice (or principles) that function as trumps against the general utility is contrasted with two defiant theories: John Stuart Mills utilitarian conception of moral rights and the positivist social sources thesis. The well-known debate between Ronald Dworkin and the legal positivists is approached as a normative dispute concerning the concept of political authority: Dworkin regards fundamental rights as the ultimate source of legal authority, whereas legal positivists argue that one of laws main functions is precisely to settle peoples rights.
72

Tolerated illegality and intolerable legality: from legal philosophy to critique

Plyley, Kathryn 26 April 2018 (has links)
This project uses Michel Foucault’s underdeveloped notion of “tolerated illegality” as a departure point for two converging inquiries. The first analyzes, and then critiques, dominant legal logics and values. This part argues that traditional legal philosophers exhibit a “disagreement without difference,” generally concurring that legal certainty and predictability enhance agency. Subsequently, this section critiques “formal legal” logic by linking it to science envy (specifically the desire for certainty and predictability), and highlighting its agency- limiting effects (e.g. the violence of law en-force-ment). The second part examines multiple dimensions of tolerated illegality, exploring the permutations of this complex socio-legal phenomenon. Here the implications of tolerated illegality are mapped across different domains, ranging from the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of their lands, to the latent ideologies embedded in superhero shows. This section also examines the idea of liberal “tolerance,” as well as the themes of power, domination, politics, bureaucracy, and authority. Ultimately, this project demonstrates that it is illuminating to study legality and (tolerated) illegality in tandem because although analyses of “formal legality” provide helpful analytical texture, the polymorphous and entangled nature of tolerated illegality makes clear just how restricted and artificial strict analyses of legality can be. / Graduate
73

The code of Concord : Emerson's search for universal laws

Hallengren, Anders January 1994 (has links)
The purpose of this work is to detect a pattern: the concordance of Ethics and Aesthetics, Poetics and Politics in the most influential American thinker of the nineteenth century. It is an attempt to trace a basic concept of the Emersonian transcendentalist doctrine, its development, its philosophical meaning and practical implications. Emerson’s thought is analyzed genetically in search of the generating paradigm, or the set of axioms from which his aesthetic ideas as well as his political reasoning are derived. Such a basic structure, or point of convergence, is sought in the emergence of Emerson’s idea of universal laws that repeat themselves on all levels of reality. A general introduction is given in Part One, where the crisis in Emerson’s life is seen as representing and foreshadowing the deeper existential crisis of modern man. In Part 2 we follow the increasingly skeptical theologian’s turn to science, where he tries to secure a safe secular foundation for ethical good and right and to solve the problem of evil. Part 3 shows how Emerson’s conception of the laws of nature and ethics is applied in his political philosophy. In Part 4, Emerson’s ideas of the arts are seen as corresponding to his views of nature, morality, and individuality. Finally, in Part 5, the ancient and classical nature of Concord philosophy is brought into focus. The book concludes with a short summary.
74

O Império dos Direitos: lei e autoridade política em Ronald Dworkin / Rights Empire: Law and Political Authority in Ronald Dworkins Theory

Caio Moyses de Lima 03 August 2011 (has links)
O objetivo desta dissertação é expor as características centrais da teoria do filósofo norte-americano Ronald Dworkin sobre a natureza dos direitos fundamentais ou morais. A referida teoria é aqui compreendida como uma defesa da noção de direitos fundamentais, tal como aparece no sistema constitucional norte-americano, contra os ataques do utilitarismo e do juspositivismo. A concepção dworkiniana dos direitos fundamentais como razões de justiça (ou princípios) que operam como trunfos contra a utilidade geral é contrastada com duas teses adversárias: a concepção utilitarista dos direitos morais de John Stuart Mill e a tese juspositivista das fontes sociais. A famosa querela entre Ronald Dworkin e os juspositivistas é analisada em um enfoque normativo, como uma disputa sobre o conceito de autoridade política: Dworkin compreende os direitos fundamentais como a fonte última da autoridade jurídica, enquanto os positivistas sustentam que uma das funções da autoridade jurídica é precisamente estabelecer quais são os direitos das pessoas. / The purpose of this research is to expound the main characteristics of Ronald Dworkins theory of fundamental (or moral) rights. Dworkins theory is herein considered as a defense of the idea of fundamental rights, as it appears in the United States Constitutional System, against the attacks advanced by the doctrines of utilitarianism and legal positivism. Dworkins conception of fundamental rights as reasons of justice (or principles) that function as trumps against the general utility is contrasted with two defiant theories: John Stuart Mills utilitarian conception of moral rights and the positivist social sources thesis. The well-known debate between Ronald Dworkin and the legal positivists is approached as a normative dispute concerning the concept of political authority: Dworkin regards fundamental rights as the ultimate source of legal authority, whereas legal positivists argue that one of laws main functions is precisely to settle peoples rights.
75

La connaissance des choses divines et des choses humaines dans la "iuris prudentia" / The knowledge in divine and human things in the "iuris prudentia"

Lazayrat, Emmanuel 11 April 2014 (has links)
La iuris prudentia ou « prudence du droit » désignait le savoir des jurisconsultes romains. Bien que son importance soit capitale pour l’histoire de notre droit, nous n’en connaissons qu’une seule et unique définition inscrite aux Institutes et au Digeste de l’empereur Justinien. L’auteur originaire en serait Ulpien qui définit cette « jurisprudence » comme « la connaissance des choses divines et humaines, la science du juste et de l’injuste » (iuris prudentia est diuinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia). Face à cette définition, les commentateurs ont souvent considéré que seul le second élément (« la science du juste et de l’injuste ») formait le véritable critère épistémologique de la science juridique en cause, diminuant ainsi la fonction de la connaissance des choses divines et humaines (diuinarum atque humanarum notitia). Or, nous pensons qu’au contraire cette rerum notitia n’est pas un simple accessoire rhétorique mais qu’elle réfère à une forme éminente du savoir antique : la sagesse. Forme suprême de l’intelligence et du vécu antique, elle n’est pas le fruit particulier d’une école philosophique ou d’une pensée religieuse. Relative à un savoir générique, la référence à la « sagesse » dans la définition de la iuris prudentia désigne la pensée même du jurisconsulte. Car comment abstraire les règles (regulae) depuis les cas (res) sans une médiation intellective entre les choses et le droit ? Comment opérer le choix entre le juste et l’injuste sans une forme de savoir conceptuel ? Toute science a besoin d’une théorie de la connaissance pour fonder sa méthode. Toutefois, la iuris prudentia dont l’objet était le droit d’une cité devenu empire, ne pouvait faire reposer sa pensée sur une doctrine philosophique déterminée. De même, léguée par les jurisconsultes païens aux princes législateurs chrétiens, elle ne pouvait se définir à travers le prisme d’une religion particulière. Or, la référence à la sagesse, but suprême de la connaissance, permet de neutraliser les différences dogmatiques pour faire ainsi de la « prudence du droit » la seule connaissance antique véritablement universelle. Ce qui explique selon nous que cette fameuse iuris prudentia connaîtra une longue postérité qui fera la fortune historique de la sagesse du droit d’origine romaine dont nous ressentons encore aujourd’hui les échos dans notre propre système juridique. / The iuris prudentia or wisdom in matters of law referred to Roman jurists’ knowledge. Even though its importance was primordial for the history of our law, we only know one and unique definition written in the Institutes and inside Emperor Justinian’s Digest. The original author could be Ulpian who defines this jurisprudence as “the awareness of divine and human things, knowledge of what is just or unjust” (iuris prudentia is diuinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia). Faced with this definition, many critics have often considered that only the second element (knowledge of what is just and unjust) formed the genuine epistemic criteria of the legal science in question, thus decreasing the duty of the knowledge in divine and human things (diuinarum atque humanarum notitia). On the contrary, we believe that this rerum notitia is not only a simple rhetorical accessory but it refers to an eminent antique knowledge: wisdom. As the ultimate form of the antique intelligence and background, it is not the particular result of a philosophical school or a religious thought. Relating to a generic knowledge, reference to “wisdom” in the definition of iuris prudentia refers to Roman jurist real thinking. Indeed how to allow for abstract rules (regulae) for cases (res) without a spiritual mediation between things and the law? How to operate a choice between just and unjust without a kind of ideational knowledge? Every science needs a theory of knowledge to have a basis for its method. Nevertheless, the iuris prudentia (whose purpose was the law of a city-state which became an empire) was not able to base its way of thinking on a determined philosophical doctrine. Likewise, bequeathed by pagan Roman jurists to Christian Imperators, it could not define itself through the prism of a particular religion. Yet reference to wisdom, the ultimate goal of knowledge, allows neutralizing dogmatic differences. Wisdom in matters of law is the only truly universal antique knowledge. This therefore makes it clear to us why iuris prudentia will continue to have such an influence in posterity and why we still hear echos today of a legal system established by the Romans. [Tr. PHILIPPE JULLIEN]
76

Ochrana osobnosti z hlediska právní filozofie a platného práva / Protection of personality in scope of legal philosophy and applicable law

Němec, Ronald January 2013 (has links)
PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY IN SCOPE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND APPLICABLE LAW 1. Summary We can see law from two main perspectives. Law is either complex of written regulations, which are prepared by human beings based on some interests or it is a complex of rules, which altough are written, but its nature are originating from higher normative system. First is a present perspective. Current law science is prefering valid law as complex of regulations published in statute book. What is not banned by law, is allowed. Though this law philosophy is leading to instability in society. Every year legislator is making hundreds of amendements and create new laws to cover new circumstances which appear in the society. Despite legislator effort is society further unsatisfied with legal state. Society claims that law is enforceable for those who are able to hire big law firms, which can find neccesary grey areas. Immanuel Kant among the first draw a problem between legality and legitimacy. But it is not only matter of legislator whether he acts legitimately or legally, but as well as of receiver of law norm. Is every legal act of the recepient of the legal order of the Czech Republic legal as legitimate? Legal yes, if in conformity with legal order. But is it even legitimate? And is it moral? For juspositivism is...

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