Uppsatsens övergripande syfte är att undersöka författarens hypotes om att Warden och Papes teorier om luftmakt utgår från ett stormaktsperspektiv vilket minskar deras överförbarhet för mindre stater. I uppsatsens redogörs och blottläggs Wardens och Papes luftmaktsteorier för att förstå deras bakomliggande resonemang och krav. Ett urval av teoretikernas texter har analyserats enligt Fabers analysmodell vilket genererat en fragmenterad men analyserbar bild över respektive teori. Underlaget möjliggjorde för författaren att besvara uppsatsens två frågor: Vilka är huvuddragen i respektive teori? Vilka grundläggande förmågor är framträdande i respektive teori? Huvuddragen i Wardens teori kan sammanfattas med samhällets sårbarhet, parallell attack samt systemkollaps. Huvuddragen i Papes teori kan sammanfattas med att orsaka förluster, gemensam operation samt vinna territorium. Undersökningen visade att underrättelser, rörlighet samt skydd är framträdande förmågor i Wardens teori samt att uthållighet är framträdande i Papes teori. Avslutningsvis anser författaren att undersökningens resultat verifierar uppsatsens hypotes om luftmaksteoriernas stormaktsperspektiv minskar dess överförbarhet för mindre stater.

År 1921 gav luftmaktsteoretikern Guilio Douhet ut sitt första verk; The Command of the Air. Douhets teorier skulle snart spridas över hela världen och han är idag en av de mest kända luftmaktsteoretikerna. I den här uppsatsen kommer först Douhets luftmaktsteorier skalats ned och begripliggöras, vitala begrepp som t ex luftherravälde kommer att klargöras. Med hjälp av stödpunkter som har sitt ursprung i teorierna har sedan en fallstudie gjort på slaget om Malta. Maltas strategiska placering i Medelhavet gjorde att ön år 1940 drogs in i det andra världskriget. I fallstudien har författaren försökt att lyfta fram tyngdpunkter som har kopplingar till Douhets teorier i syfte att undersöka i vilken utsträckning som teorierna är användbara i analyserandet av en verklig händelse. Fallstudien har skett ur ett så neutralt perspektiv som möjligt då alla inblandade parter har analyserats mot Douhets teorier. Undersökningen visar att man till stor grad kan nyttja Douhets luftmaktsteorier för att analysera slaget om Malta under andravärldskriget, och säkerligen även många andra slag.

Under efterkrigstiden har ett antal operationer med luftmakt genomförts. Dessa krig har haft olika förlopp där vissa operationer har nått relativt enkla framgångar medan andra haft större svårigheter att effektivt uppnå framgång, trots överlägsna resurser. Genom en fallstudie av två moderna luftoperationer, operation Desert Storm i Irak år 1991 och operation Allied Force i Kosovo år 1999, undersöks tre luftmaktsteoretiska variablers betydelse för dessa operationers väg till framgång. Variablerna som undersöks är hämtade ur den moderna luftmaktsteori som John Warden har bidragit till att bilda och vars syfte är att bidra till att förklara hur strategisk förlamning av motståndaren uppkommer. Resultatet av undersökningen visar att systemperspektiv sannolikt bidrar till luftoperativ framgång, däremot kan inte parallell attack visas ha betydelse för att uppnå framgång. Den tredje undersökta variabeln, luftoperativ kontroll, befinns vara betydelsefull som en förutsättning för de övriga två variablernas funktion.

Uppsatsens resultat visar att det saknas ett entydigt luftmaktsteoretiskt ställningstagande. Istället återfinns en tudelad teoribild, dels den svenska traditionella defensiva luftmaktsteorin, men också den som inriktas mot en västlig modern expeditionär luftmaktsteori. Resultatet stöds av slutsatserna från studien av förmågeutvecklingen, en utveckling som spänner över en bred men traditionell förmågebas. Huruvida ett tudelat teoretiskt ställningstagande och ett i huvudsak traditionellt förmågeutvecklingsprogram, kommer vara effektivt att möta framtidens uppgifter och ekonomiska realiteter återstår att se. / The result of this paper can be summarized in that there are different air power theories in the strategic documents. There is mainly a twofold strategy based on a national non-alliance defence concept focusing on cooperation as well as a modern western airpower theory. The paper also shows an airpower development which focuses on traditional capabilities and may in some way lacking the means for facing possible future demands on airpower. However, based on the results, the Swedish airpower will still be a major instrument for political use in the future. In regards to the efficiency of a twofold theory, based on the assumption of increasing defence cost and varied future military tasks, there is no way of saying what the consequence will be, we will just have to wait and see.

The Air Power theories of today are often written from a superior air force perspective where the overall focus is on the offensive nature of Air Power. Very little is spoken about Air Power and its defensive role as well as the inferior states opportunities against superior opponents. A state that successfully has used Air Power through history is Israel. During both the Six Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur in 1973, Israel faced superior opponents consisting of a coalition of Arab states, including Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Despite Israel being the initially inferior state during both wars, they managed to gain initiative against the superior Arab states. This study will set the Air Power theories of Philip S Meilinger to a test through a validation process against two cases, the Six Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur in 1973. The aim is to analyse the Israeli air force during these two wars. The main goal is to try to explain how inferior states can succeed against superior opponents through Air Power. The result of the study demonstrates that an inferior state has the opportunity to achieve success through Air Power against superior opponents. The analyses of Meilingers theories indicates that high readiness, early employment of forces, use of Air Powers psychological effect and timing constitutes successful factors in gaining initiative. An additional important factor for achieving success through these variables is highly relevant intelligence.

There are two types of air forces; the US, and the others. Most of what is written today concerning airpower comes from the pens of large nations. This has led to small nations view of airpower is being characterized by the theories of larger nations. Shaun Clarke questions whether such writings are applicable to the airpowers of the world’s small nations. Clarke’s theory explores the potential of offensive airpower in the context of small sized defense forces. His airpower theory has often been praised with the exception that it’s not empirically substantiated. The aim of this study is to test and analyze the explanatory power of Clarke’s theory on the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the Second Lebanon War in 2006 with the purpose of creating empirical evidence in support of, or against, Clarke’s theory.   The results of the study are mixed. Clarke’s theory has a relatively high explanatory power about Israel’s success during the Yom Kippur War and low explanatory power during the Second Lebanon War. Finally, this study argues that smaller nations shouldn’t be discouraged from applying offensive airpower in a strategic manner.

While modern air power theory stresses the importance of operational tempo, self-sufficiency, and the ability to sustain operations, few studies highlight the role of military pilots. Though the profession represents high risk and high stress even in peacetime, during wartime pilots are expected to continuously operate their aircraft, even if returning after being shot down.  Using a qualitative method, this thesis examines the lived experiences of Swe- dish military pilots who have returned to flying duty after mishaps, ejections, and/or crashes. It reflects their experiences as they happened, their process of reintegration, and the effect those experiences has had on their continued pro- fessional career.  The results show that pilots demonstrate resilience in the face of adversity while relying on their squadron colleagues for support and motivation. Even though the questioned pilots indicate post-accident growth, the reintegration process takes time which implies consequences for both operational planning and existing air power theory.

Previous research regarding asymmetrical warfare has usually not considered airpower, meanwhile previous researchers and theorists of airpower oversee the small nations circumstances in aerial warfare. Therefore, this paper will analyze the asymmetrical factors connected to small nations airpower. The air forces that are going to be analyzed are Israeli Air Force during the six-day war and the Iraqi Air Force during Operation Desert Storm. The analysis will be conducted by applying the theory of SPOT-Bombing by Shaun Clarke in a case study. The paper seeks to highlight and see which of the asymmetrical factors contribute to success for small nations air forces in conflicts with a larger enemy. The results indicate that IAF: s ability to fulfill factors such as tempo, effect, asymmetrical response, minimizing casualties, initiative and use of other methods all contributed to the success during the six- day war while IrAF only partially managed to fulfill the factors minimizing casualties and use of other methods. Some conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis are that some factors seem to be more important than others. It also shows that there is a correlation between the factors, where fulfilling one of them contributes to fulfilling others. The paper also finds that Clarke’s theory does not present all factors regarding asymmetrical airpower. More research on the subject may contribute to better understanding of the asymmetrical factors.

This study intends to contribute to the understanding of air power theory by studying the contrasting theories of John A. Warden and Robert A. Pape onto a single case. Warden advocates strategic bombing, while Pape condemns it. The theories are applied onto the Israeli air power in the Six-Day War, a war which played an important role for air power and where air power played an important role for the outcome. Both theories are among the most discussed and criticized ones, including by the other author respectively. By thoroughly examining them onto the same single case, their generalizability is evaluated in relation to each other. The empirical data consisted of six descriptive works of the war, from which each event of air sorties was analysed and matched with the theories. The air sorties of each theory were then evaluated by occurrence and effect to the wars outcome, i.e. the contribution to the Israeli victory. The results of the analysis imply that Warden’s theory have a better ability to explain the success of the Israeli Air Force than Pape’s theory, but no major conclusions of their generalizability can be drawn. None of the theories where found fully sufficient to explain the case, i.e. some parts of the theories did not occur in Six-Day War according to the study.

The Swedish armed forces doctrine does not disclose where the knowledge about the use of airpower was acquired. Earlier research supports the fact that doctrine needs to contain theory to support its legitimacy.  The purpose of this study is to examine whether the doctrine contains air power theory. The author believes that increased internationalization may have caused international air power theories to have been integrated in the doctrine.  The research was conducted as a qualitative research of the Swedish air force doctrine documents. The research intended to see if the air power theories of John Warden and Shaun Clark have influenced the doctrine.  The result of this study shows that the ideas of Shaun Clarke had a much higher presence than the ideas of John Warden. The study has shown that the Swedish air force doctrine has theoretical support. The study concludes that internationalizing has affected but not to the point where the Swedish air force blindly copied air power theories without it suiting the Swedish air force.