Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / This study seeks to give a philosophical account of, and justification for the intuition that subjectivity is not a stable “Archimedean point” on the basis of which an intersubjective relation can be founded, but is instead profoundly affected by each different “Other” with which it enters into a relation. As a preliminary to the positive philosophical account of how this might work in Part II of the thesis, there is an attempt to critique certain of the classical accounts of intersubjectivity found in phenomenology, in order to show that these positions cannot give a satisfactory account of the type of intersubjective relation which gives rise to the abovementioned intuition. The thesis therefore starts off by examining the account of intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (especially the Fifth Meditation). Husserl is there engaged in an attempt to overcome the charge of solipsism that might be levelled at phenomenology, since phenomenology is concerned with experience as, by definition, the experience of the subject. We try to show that Husserl cannot give a satisfactory account of the Other because he tries to derive it from the Subject, and hence reduces the Other to the Same. We then turn to two other phenomenological thinkers – Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, both of whom are themselves critical of Husserl – to examine whether they provide a better account, but conclude that (although each represents a certain advance over Husserl), neither are able to provide a decisively better account, since each is still too caught up in phenomenology and its focus on consciousness. In Part II of the thesis, we then turn to a non- (or even anti-) phenomenological thinker, namely Gilles Deleuze, to try and find an alternative theory that would be able to provide the account we seek. Our contention is that Deleuze, by seeking to give an account of the constitution of the subject itself, simultaneously provides an account of the constitution of the Other as arising at the same time as the Subject. Crucial to this account is the inversion of priority between the poles of a relation and the relation itself. Deleuze argues that a relation is “external to its terms”, and precedes these terms. Hence, by returning to a level which precedes consciousness and the order of knowledge – that is, by returning to the level of the virtual multiplicities and singular events that underlie and precede the actualization of these events and multiplicities in distinct subjects and objects – we argue that Deleuze shows that, contra phenomenology, there is in fact no primordial separation between subject and Other. The contention is therefore that the problem of intersubjectivity as posed by phenomenology is a false one that can be eluded by means of Deleuze’s philosophy. This philosophy is not based on the subject, but instead shows the subject to be the product of an underlying network of relations. Finally, we turn to Deleuze’s appropriation of Nietzsche to trace out the transformation of “ethics” that result from adopting a position like that of Deleuze.

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / This study constitutes a conceptual analysis and critique of the notion of the subject, and the concomitant notion of responsibility, as it has developed through the philosophical history of the modern subject. The aim of this study is to present the reader with a critical notion of responsibility. This study seeks to divorce such a position from the traditional, normative view of the subject, as typified by the Cartesian position. Following Derrida, a deconstructive reading of the subject’s conceptual development since Descartes is presented. What emerges from this reading is that, despite various re-conceptualisations of the subject by philosophers as influential and diverse as Nietzsche, Heidegger and Levinas, their respective positions continue to affirm the subject as human. The position presented in this study challenges this notion of the subject as human, with the goal of opening-up and displacing the ethical frontier between human and non-human. It is argued that displacing this ethical frontier introduces complex responsibilities. These complex responsibilities resist the violence inherent to normative positions that typically exclude the non-human – particularly the animal – from the sphere of responsibility.

Thesis (DPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / The purpose of this thesis twofold: first, to develop an account of modernity as a “loss of the world” which also entails the “death” of the human as a meaningful philosophical, political or moral category, and second, to explore the possibility of recovering a sense of the world in us and with it, a sense of what it means to be human. This argument is developed by way of a sustained engagement with the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt, whose analogous critiques of modernity centre on the problem of the connection between humanity and worldliness. My argument consists of three parts, each of which spans two chapters. Part one of the thesis sets out the most important aspects of Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s respective critiques of modernity. Chapter one focuses on modernity as a rupture of a philosophical, political and religious tradition within which existence in the world could be experienced as unquestionably meaningful. Following arguments developed by Nietzsche and Arendt, chapter two establishes that the loss of this tradition results in a general crisis of meaning, evaluation and authority that can be designated as “modern nihilism”. The second part of the thesis deals with what may be called the “anthropological grounds” of the critique of modernity developed in part one. To this end, chapter three focuses on Nietzsche’s portrayal of the human as “the as-yet undetermined animal” who is neither the manifestation of a subjective essence nor the product of his own hands, but who only exists in the unresolved tension between indeterminacy and determination. This is followed in chapter four by an inquiry into Arendt’s conception of “the human condition”, which in turn points to the conditionality of being human. What is clearly demonstrated in both cases is that, in so far as the predicament of modernity is incarnate in modern human beings themselves, any attempt at overcoming this predicament would somehow have to involve re-thinking or transcending our present-day humanity. The third part of the thesis examines the way in which the reconceptualisation of the human as advocated by Nietzsche and Arendt transforms our understanding of “world”. The more specific aim here is to demonstrate that both thinkers conceive of a reconciliation between self and world as a form of redemption. In chapter five I explore their respective attempts to resurrect the capacity for judgement in the aftermath of the death of God as the first step in this redemptive project, before turning to a more in-depth inquiry into the “soteriology” at work in Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s thinking in chapter six. This inquiry ultimately makes clear that there is a conflict between the Nietzschean conception of redemption as amor fati (love of fate) and Arendt’s notion of redemption as amor mundi (love of the world). I conclude the thesis by arguing that what is at stake here are two conflicting notions of reconciliation: a worldly – or political – notion of reconciliation (Arendt), and a much more radical, philosophical notion of reconciliation (Nietzsche), which ultimately does away with any boundary between self and world. However, my final conclusion is not that we face an inevitable choice between these two alternatives, but rather that the struggle between these two dispositions is necessary for an understanding of what it means to be human as well as for the world in which our humanity is formed.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:28:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Henrique Garbellini Carnio.pdf: 985960 bytes, checksum: 42d78d1215a24045f62e9c94cde2d3d7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-12-16 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The work has the purpose to investigate the genesis of the process of formation of the law. Recognizing the right while a human creation, a product of the language, the proposal aims for a genealogical study of the law that returns to the origins of its obscure senses. This return is ruled from the examination of the relations in the primitive communities that indicates the true polemics on the process of formation of the law. This study makes possible a rescue on the legal forms and in the conceptions of law itself, promoting means for his best understanding, critics and applicability. For this, the proposal claims a radical joining between two thinkers who apparently are distanced philosophically, but, however, are shown at least in this field, similar and complementary. Kelsen in the work Vergeltung und Kauslatität presenting his etnological study on the principle of retribution and of the causality, from the primitive communities and Nietzsche in the Second Dissertation of Genealogy of moral presenting his theory on the (pre)history of the humanity, that initiates with the creation of the memory and occurs in a context completely determined by concepts and legal categories / O trabalho tem por escopo investigar a gênese do processo de formação do direito. Reconhecendo o direito enquanto uma criação humana, um produto da linguagem, a proposta visa a um estudo histórico-genealógico do direito que retorne às origens dos seus obscuros sentidos. Esse regresso se pauta pelo exame das relações nas primitivas comunidades que indicam a verdadeira polêmica sobre o processo de formação do direito. Seu estudo possibilita um resgate das formas jurídicas e da conceituação do próprio direito, fomentando possibilidades de sua melhor compreensão, crítica e aplicabilidade. Para tal empresa a proposta pretende uma junção radical entre dois pensadores que aparentemente se distanciam filosoficamente, mas que, na realidade, mostram-se ao menos nessa seara, semelhantes e complementares. Kelsen na obra Vergeltung und Kauslatität expondo seu estudo etnológico sobre o princípio da retribuição e da causalidade a partir das comunidades primitivas, e Nietzsche na Segunda Dissertação de Para a genealogia da moral apresentando sua tese sobre a (pré)história da humanidade, que se inicia com a criação da memória e ocorre num contexto completamente determinado por conceitos e categorias jurídicas

Submitted by Hellen Luz (hellencrisluz@gmail.com) on 2018-03-07T15:02:18Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_LugarPoetaEuripides.pdf: 1188738 bytes, checksum: 89c38c663129139fe0b5fad192a78946 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Edisangela Bastos (edisangela@ufpa.br) on 2018-03-12T16:20:23Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_LugarPoetaEuripides.pdf: 1188738 bytes, checksum: 89c38c663129139fe0b5fad192a78946 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-12T16:20:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_LugarPoetaEuripides.pdf: 1188738 bytes, checksum: 89c38c663129139fe0b5fad192a78946 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-22 / Em seu primeiro livro, Nietzsche ensejou tocar nos temas mais candentes de seu tempo, entre os quais se encontra o problema da ciência como modelo de apreciação da vida, cujo reflexo mais significativo se expressa na figura do homem teórico – fruto do racionalismo oriundo da metafísica socrático-platônica. Embalado por suas esperanças de renovação das artes germânicas, o filósofo procurou na Grécia uma espécie de contramodelo. Tal empreendimento exigiu todo um estudo a respeito da origem e declínio da arte trágica, no qual Eurípides ocupa um papel de destaque. Assim, buscamos refazer este percurso em torno do “Nascimento da Tragédia” de modo a pensar o poeta, para além do lugar comum (quase sempre ligado a uma cerrada crítica), também como uma possível e importante referência para aquele momento, pondo em evidência as tensões e ambiguidades acerca da interpretação nietzschiana da tragédia. Neste sentido, nossa pesquisa apresenta os deslocamentos teóricos operados pela filosofia trágica do jovem Nietzsche, de maneira a apontar para as bases com que ele lança sua própria proposta estética fundada na metafísica de artista. Na sequência, defendemos que Eurípides ocupa um lugar dentro do projeto nietzschiano de um antiplatonismo. Por fim, analisamos as máscaras ou facetas do tragediógrafo com e para além da crítica de Nietzsche. / In his first book, Nietzsche attempted to touch on the most burning themes of his time, among which there is the problem of science as a model of appreciation of life, whose most significant reflection is expressed by the figure of the theoretical man - the fruit of rationalism from the Socratic-Platonic metaphysics. Balanced by his hopes for the renewal of the Germanic arts, the philosopher sought in Greece a kind of counter-model. This undertaking required a study of the origin and decline of the tragic art in which Euripides occupies a prominent role. Thus, we seek to retake this path around the “Birth of the Tragedy” in order to think the poet, beyond the common place (almost always linked to a closed critic), also as a possible and important reference for that moment, putting in evidence the tensions and ambiguities surrounding Nietzsche interpretation for tragedy. In this sense, our research intends to present the theoretical displacements operated by the tragic philosophy of the young Nietzsche, in order to point to the bases with which he launches his own aesthetic proposal based on the metaphysics of an artist. In the sequence, we argue that Euripides occupies a place within Nietzsche’s project of an anti-Platonism. Finally, we analyze the masks or facets of the tragedy with and beyond Nietzsche's critique.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mauro Lucio Ribeiro de Souza.pdf: 584519 bytes, checksum: b617b2489a299ce8ba36604b3ceb69bf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-10-24 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The Divine Requiem: God s death in Nietzsche s The Gay Science , aims at describing the path the philosopher took to certify and proclaim the greater of all events. It is in Section 125 of The Gay Science that a madman shouts in the market place that the nihilist society killed God . By replacing the divine figure by the human being, by annihilating the transcendence and affirming the immanence, he promotes the Requiem . The metaphors announced pointed out to the end of a world view that served as the basis for the Western world and had now come to an end. In Nietzsche s opinion, God s death represents the end of the supreme values, the end of the Jewish-Christian moral and the destruction of the Socratic-Platonic metaphysics. A caustic critic of moral and religion, Nietzsche found the key to the labyrinths, showing that both are detractors and deniers of life. For the German philosopher, it was Socrates and his disciple Plato who erected the metaphysics with the dichotomy between the real world and the fake world. However, Nietzsche tries to destroy with his hammering philosophy such paradigm, which obscured the Western world perception for millenniums. The Christian religion is also seen, in his sharp point of view, as a product of the Socratic-Platonic metaphysics, which exhorts the crowd s moral and resentment, therefore denying life as it is here and now, with its happiness and challenges, leading mankind to an after-world existence, a supra-sensitive world. The Christianism is the moral of decadency, according to Nietzsche. His hammer should destroy this world view and create another way to face existence. If God dies, the human being is left with the possibility to construct him/herself, to be sure of life, to accept it / O réquiem divino: a morte de Deus em A gaia Ciência de Nietzsche, objetiva mostrar o itinerário que o filósofo percorreu para constatar e decretar o maior de todos os acontecimentos. É no fragmento 125 de A gaia Ciência que um louco anuncia na praça pública que a sociedade niilista assassinou Deus . Ao substituir o divino pelo humano, ao aniquilar o transcendente e afirmar o imanente, ocorre o réquiem . As metáforas anunciadas apontam para o fim de uma cosmovisão que alicerçava o mundo ocidental e agora chegou ao fim. Para Nietzsche a morte de Deus representa o fim dos valores supremos, o fim da moral judaico-cristã e a destruição da metafísica socrático-platônica. Crítico mordaz da moral e da religião, Nietzsche desvendou os seus labirintos, revelando que ambas são detratoras e negadoras da vida. Para o pensador alemão, foi Sócrates e seu discípulo Platão que erigiram a metafísica com a sua dicotomia entre o mundo verdadeiro e o mundo falso; entretanto, Nietzsche procura destruir com a sua filosofia a marteladas esse paradigma que obscureceu o pensamento ocidental por milênios. A religião cristã também é vista na sua aguçada visão como um produto da metafísica socrático-platônica, que prega a moral do rebanho e o ressentimento, negando consequentemente a vida aqui e agora com suas alegrias e desafios ao direcionar a existência para um além-mundo, um mundo supra-sensível. O cristianismo é a moral da decadência. Seu martelo deve destruir essa cosmovisão e edificar uma outra forma de se posicionar frente a existência. Morrendo Deus, resta ao ser humano a possibilidade construir a si mesmo, de afirmar a vida, de dizer sim à vida

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T20:22:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Araujo.pdf: 36212890 bytes, checksum: bb4f853dfec8cd0b698c88003e5eaf87 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-06-08 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This paper portrays different ways of experiencing horror, from the existing relationship between art and thought, looking for understanding some of the political forces that act over humanity in distinct contexts. We start off by the principle that experience of horror accompanies mankind since the first social forms and, through it, it s possible to look at the human condition and situations generated by the difficult sociability. The analysis of these difficulties involves the recognition of circumstances that act over humanity and set violence situations, impotence and suffering. The experience of horror in face of world s reality starts off by the individual itself attesting the Cartesian rationality consequences, and broadens toward the collective, revealing social and political problems, specially with modernity, when the work world asserts itself to mankind in an absolute way and life becomes something disposable. The pieces of artwork selected to the study express different ways of horror, produced in distinct contexts of oppression and carry on themselves important information about the worldly reality. The analysis of these works allowed new perspectives and established a dialogue with some thinker s ideas. In front of the absurd of the world, in which assignments appear to be tragic by its unachievement, an affirmative thought points to a creative way of existing, which diagnoses, values and potentiate life / Este trabalho apresenta um mapeamento de diferentes formas de experiência do horror, a partir da relação existente entre arte e pensamento, procurando entender algumas das forças políticas que atuam sobre os homens em distintos contextos. Partimos do princípio de que a experiência do horror acompanha o homem desde as primeiras formas sociais e, através dessa experiência, é possível lançar um olhar sobre a condição humana e sobre as situações geradas pela difícil sociabilidade. A análise dessas dificuldades implica o reconhecimento das circunstâncias que atuam sobre os homens e configuram situações de violência, impotência e sofrimento. A experiência do horror frente à realidade do mundo parte do próprio indivíduo, atestando as conseqüências da racionalidade cartesiana, e se amplia em direção ao coletivo, revelando problemas políticos e sociais, especialmente a partir da modernidade, quando o mundo do trabalho impõe-se ao homem de forma absoluta e a vida torna-se algo descartável. As obras de arte selecionadas para o estudo expressam diferentes formas de horror; foram produzidas em contextos distintos e carregam em si mesmas informações importantes sobre a realidade mundana. A análise das obras permitiu que novas perspectivas surgissem e estabelecessem um diálogo com as idéias de alguns pensadores. Diante do absurdo do mundo, em que as tarefas mostram-se trágicas por sua irrealização, um pensamento afirmativo aponta para um modo de existir criativo, que diagnostica, valoriza e potencializa a vida

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T14:57:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Araujo.pdf: 36212890 bytes, checksum: bb4f853dfec8cd0b698c88003e5eaf87 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-06-08 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This paper portrays different ways of experiencing horror, from the existing relationship between art and thought, looking for understanding some of the political forces that act over humanity in distinct contexts. We start off by the principle that experience of horror accompanies mankind since the first social forms and, through it, it s possible to look at the human condition and situations generated by the difficult sociability. The analysis of these difficulties involves the recognition of circumstances that act over humanity and set violence situations, impotence and suffering. The experience of horror in face of world s reality starts off by the individual itself attesting the Cartesian rationality consequences, and broadens toward the collective, revealing social and political problems, specially with modernity, when the work world asserts itself to mankind in an absolute way and life becomes something disposable. The pieces of artwork selected to the study express different ways of horror, produced in distinct contexts of oppression and carry on themselves important information about the worldly reality. The analysis of these works allowed new perspectives and established a dialogue with some thinker s ideas. In front of the absurd of the world, in which assignments appear to be tragic by its unachievement, an affirmative thought points to a creative way of existing, which diagnoses, values and potentiate life / Este trabalho apresenta um mapeamento de diferentes formas de experiência do horror, a partir da relação existente entre arte e pensamento, procurando entender algumas das forças políticas que atuam sobre os homens em distintos contextos. Partimos do princípio de que a experiência do horror acompanha o homem desde as primeiras formas sociais e, através dessa experiência, é possível lançar um olhar sobre a condição humana e sobre as situações geradas pela difícil sociabilidade. A análise dessas dificuldades implica o reconhecimento das circunstâncias que atuam sobre os homens e configuram situações de violência, impotência e sofrimento. A experiência do horror frente à realidade do mundo parte do próprio indivíduo, atestando as conseqüências da racionalidade cartesiana, e se amplia em direção ao coletivo, revelando problemas políticos e sociais, especialmente a partir da modernidade, quando o mundo do trabalho impõe-se ao homem de forma absoluta e a vida torna-se algo descartável. As obras de arte selecionadas para o estudo expressam diferentes formas de horror; foram produzidas em contextos distintos e carregam em si mesmas informações importantes sobre a realidade mundana. A análise das obras permitiu que novas perspectivas surgissem e estabelecessem um diálogo com as idéias de alguns pensadores. Diante do absurdo do mundo, em que as tarefas mostram-se trágicas por sua irrealização, um pensamento afirmativo aponta para um modo de existir criativo, que diagnostica, valoriza e potencializa a vida

A Vontade de Poder no pensamento de Nietzsche é a expressão da vida, sem nenhuma outra conotação, seja metafísica, religiosa, moral ou psicológica. Para seu entendimento como filosofema foram analisados outros conceitos correlatos, tais como vida e existência, sendo a vida a expressão puramente biológica e a existência a construção psicológica que atribui um sentido à vida; ser humano, como o ente que se construiu, criando e desenvolvendo características específicas como a razão, a inteligência, a memória, o querer e a concrescência; o conhecimento, como recurso para construção da existência. Para o entendimento deste ser humano, no pensamento de Nietzsche, é necessário enquadra-lo dentro daquilo que ele chama de espírito histórico, civilização, mundo e forças vitais. Somente dentro deste conjunto de conceitos a Vontade de Poder se sobressai não só como a expressão da vida, mas também como seu enaltecimento. A vida ou se fortalece continuamente ou perece. A maioria dos intérpretes, no entanto, se dedicou a analisar a expressão Vontade de Poder – Wille zur Macht – sob o aspecto metafísico. Aqui são analisados seis entre os principais – Arthur C. Danto, Maudemarie Clark, John Richardson, Peter Poellner, Martin Heidegger e Karl Jaspers – sendo que para alguns a expressão é um princípio metafísico e para outros não. A expressão Vontade de Poder – Wille zur Macht – nas obras de Nietzsche, tanto nas que foram publicadas como nas que não foram, não tem essa conotação metafísica. Nietzsche, pelo menos, não estava preocupado com a questão metafísica da Vontade de Poder. Sua preocupação era com a vida, e a vida neste mundo, que havia, segundo ele, perdido o sentido porque se fundamentou sobre valores supostamente absolutos e eternos, mas que ao perderem sua validade possibilitaram o surgimento do niilismo. Para Nietzsche, portanto, a Vontade de Poder é enaltecimento da vida – e nada mais! / The Will to Power on Nietzsche’s thought is the expression of life, without another connection, such metaphysical, religious, moral or psychological. For his understanding with phylosofema was been analyzed another correlated concepts, such like life and existence; the life purely biological and the existence the psychological construction which ascribes a sense to life; human being, like the being which constructs itself, creating and developing specific characteristics like the reason, the intelligence, the memory, the will and the conscience; the knowledge, as resource for existence’s construction. For the understanding of this human being, on Nietzsche’s thought, is necessary to frame it within of that which he call historical spirit, civilization, world and vital forces. Only within this concept’s complex the Will to Power excels so far the life’s expression as his enhancement. The life either continually grows or perishes. The interpreter’s majority, however, applied oneself to analyze the expression Will to Power – Wille zur Macht – under the metaphysical aspect. Here are analyzed six among the principals, Arthur C. Danto, Maudemarie Clark, John Richardson, Peter Poellner, Martin Heidegger e Karl Jaspers; this expression is a metaphysical principle for some and not for others. The expression Will to Power – Wille zur Macht – in Nietzsche’s works so in published as in unpublished, hasn’t that metaphysical connection. Nietzsche, at least, hasn’t worried with the metaphysical question of will to power. His preoccupation has with the life, and the life in this world, which, according to Nietzsche, has lost the sense because substantiate itself upon values so-called absolute and eternal, but that losing his validity enabled the nihilism’s emergence. Hence for Nietzsche the will to power is life’s enhancement – and nothing besides!

Following the writings of philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson, and Alfred Mele, in this thesis I defend some central claims of the self-control view of human agency. However, I not only defend, but also supplement this view in the following two ways. First, drawing on work by Mary Midgley and Sigmund Freud I advance the claim that self-control requires the experience of internal conflict between an agent’s motivations and intentions. Second, drawing on insights from Simone de Beauvoir and Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as recent research in social psychology and cognitive science, I will argue in this thesis that self-control and vulnerability are inextricably intertwined with one another, and that as a result both are to be seen as constitutive of human agency. While it is the capacity for self-control that marks us out as human agents, I argue that it is also our uniquely human vulnerability which distinguishes our agency from the kind of agency which we might attribute to other potential or actual forms of sentience. Further, while the concepts of human agency and personhood are typically conflated in the analytic tradition of philosophy, in this thesis I will show that there are good reasons for understanding these two concepts as subtly distinct from one another. The term personhood, I will argue, can fruitfully be understood in substantive rather than purely formal terms. A person, in the superlative sense, is to be understood as someone who exercises their agency well; and, as such, persons are answerable to a number of normative prescriptions. Following Midgley, Nietzsche and Martha Nussbaum, I argue against Frankfurt’s normative prescription for personhood in the form of what he calls ‘wholeheartedness’, and offer four normative prescriptions for personhood of my own.