Given the teacher-as-technician view and the instrumentalist values that pervade professional schools, practices, and policy decisions (Kinsella & Pitman, 2012a; Zeichner, 2012) with regard to teacher qualification, evidence-based practices, and scripted curricula, there is growing concern that something of fundamental importance and moral significance is missing from the vision of what it means to be a professional, particularly in the field of education. In order to articulate teacher practical knowledge in a way that reflects the complexities of practice, a framework that captures the complexity of teaching practice and helps to define the type of knowledge beyond content and technique, which enables teachers to make practically wise decisions is needed. The purpose of this study was to explore and describe the practical reasoning of highly competent teachers as it is revealed through meaning making about their experiences of pedagogical reasoning. The aim of this study was to provide an interpretive description of teacher pedagogical reasoning, then utilize the construct of professional phronesis as a framework for understanding the dimension of teacher knowledge involved in judgment (Coulter & Wiens, 2002; Kinsella, 2012). In order to develop a detailed, multi-perspectival account of the constructs of pedagogical reasoning and professional phronesis, I employed an interpretive phenomenological case study design (Smith et al. 2009) to examine the experiences of three participants. Analysis of the data revealed the pedagogical reasoning of the participants as a knowledge that continuously develops over time through a corpus of instructional experiences including: purposeful professional development, problem solving and reflection. The pedagogical reasoning of the participants was also found to operate as an instructional decision-making process that occurs in two modes: in deliberate planning and preparation for instruction, and spontaneously as they engage in instruction. Finally, the pedagogical reasoning of the participants was characterized by an orientation towards achieving multiple goals at once. All participants acknowledged the content of her discipline as an established goal; however, they described their decision-making in terms of goals for both themselves as practitioners regarding their role in student learning, as well as goals for student outcomes that extended beyond the development of student content knowledge. Professional/personal and instructional goals are tied to the identities of the individual participants and reflect how the unique dispositions of the participants influences the factors they consider in making instructional decisions, regardless of operational mode. Finally, all participants discussed a personal paradigmatic shift in focus from an early-career focus on content delivery to a focus on the needs of individual students and the necessity of developing relationships with students in order to achieve their personal/professional goals and goals for student growth. These themes regarding the experience of pedagogical reasoning reflected the six features of professional phronesis outlined by Kinsella and Pitman (2012b), which suggests that phronesis is a viable construct within the practice knowledge of highly competent teachers.

「討論」對參與者在擴展知識面、增強理解力和判斷力各方面均能產生積極的作用；然而實務工作者發展出許多的討論操作策略，卻少有理論解釋的說明。更要緊的是，一旦「規定了討論就是對話」能否觸及教育場域中討論的實質經驗問題。準此，本論文研究目的為：（一）理解討論教學與教育實踐智慧的相關論述；（二）探索教育場域中討論的實質「經驗」問題；（三）闡釋教育場域中討論經驗的教育實踐意涵；（四）回應討論作為教育場域中實踐智慧開展的可能性；（五）援引理論向度提供實務操作之前瞻性。 本研究以現象學方法進行訪談與提取主題，首先給予討論經驗的一般性描述，再就主題的相關理論基礎進行論述呈現。後於探究教育場域中討論經驗所涉及的開放性、責任與對話三項主題而有以下六項發現：一、開放性具有「即興」的特質；二、討論場域中的成員透過說話構作現實性；三、討論場域中意義的「開放性」之所緣；四、討論場域中關於「責任」的“被看”與“看”；五、「遊戲概念」提供教育場域中的討論現象一種操作上的理論說明；六、釐清討論經驗的開放性、責任與對話三者的關係。 本研究結論包括：一、「有用性」的「無對象性」，需要實踐智之決斷；二、開放性、責任、對話三者需要實踐智之調和；三、討論的經驗是「朝向不確定的預先投身」或「朝向自身的可能性而投企」；四、對於討論場域中常見的「啞然、霎時無法回應」現象給出的一種解釋；五、討論作為教育實踐智慧的具體操作典型。最後研究建議則為：一、加入「語言-身體性」議題之綜合討論，作為後續研究之引線；二、進一步探究開放性、責任、對話三者在時間結構上的實踐意涵，或許可茲回應黑爾德指出實踐智所具有之實踐導向、反思判斷力及其來自「時間偶然性」與「互為主體性」兩項根本難題，給予一種參考路徑。本研究預期貢獻則著眼於闡述討論適可作為教育實踐智慧的具體操作典型，援引理論向度以提供討論實務操作之可能性、前瞻性。 / Having a discussion can play an active role in expanding the knowledge of participants and enhancing their understanding and judgment. However, many discussion-operating strategies have been developed yet a few theoretical interpretations have been made. What is more, whether the essential experience problems discussed in education field can be involved once “discussion is dialogue” is prescribed? Therefore, this study aims to: (I) understand and discuss the arguments relevant to teaching and educational Phrόnesis[practical wisdom]; (II) probe into essential experience problems discussed in the educational field; (III) interpret the implications of discussing educational practices to the educational field; (IV) respond to the possibility of considering “discussion” as a factor in the development of Phrόnesis in the educational field; (V) refer to the theory of dimension in providing insights for practical application. This study forms a discussion and summarizes the theme using the Phenomenological Method. First, it gives a general description of the discussion and proceeds to discuss and present the relevant theoretical basis for the theme. Later, it probes into three themes related to the discussion in the educational field; namely, openness, responsibility, and dialogue. The results summarized in six points are as follows: I. Openness implies “improvisation”; II. Participants in the discussion create reality through dialogue; III. The aspect of openness in a discussion; IV. To Discuss “being seen” and “seeing” in the concept of “responsibility”; V. The “play concept” provides a theoretical interpretation of the discussion in the educational field; VI. The need to clarify the relationship of openness, responsibility and dialogue in a discussion. The conclusions of the study are: I. “No-object nature” of “the availability” requires judgment and decision based on Phrόnesis; II. Openness, responsibility and dialogue demand the need for Phrόnesis; III. The discussion of experience is “the pre-projection towards unsure direction”, or “dedication into resoluteness towards the self-feasibility”; IV. An interpretation of the “inanity of immediate response” comes up frequently in the discussion; V. A discussion is perceived as a typical concrete model for educational Phrόnesis. Finally, this study recommends the following: I. Participate in a comprehensive discussion of “language-body”, as a basis for future research; II. Continue to explore the practical implications of openness, responsibility and dialogue to time structure, or promise to respond K. Held on his words that Phrόnesis has practical direction and reflective judgment, and respond to two difficult problems from “time contingency” and “inter-subjectivity”, to give a reference or approach. This study aims to contribute to the idea of “discussion” as a suitable and typical concrete model for educational Phrόnesis. It also refers to the theory of dimension to provide the feasibility and for practical application.

The central theoretical statement of this study proposes that practical wisdom as an executive virtue within positive psychology may be applied in a pastoral-theological paradigm. One of the main virtues in positive psychology, namely wisdom, is investigated and defined in this study. The article format has been used in this thesis, ultimately consisting of five articles. In Article 1 the scriptural perspectives found on practical wisdom in the Old Testament are discussed. From the information contained in the article, it is deduced that Old Testament wisdom should and can possibly be used to connect the reader with the teachings in a realistic way so that the person is enabled to apply the principles of Old Testament wisdom literature to everyday circumstance. Article 2 deals with the wisdom principles found in the Sermon on the Mount. It can be said that wisdom teachings found in the Sermon on the Mount could possibly be used to enable the reader to achieve personal happiness in everyday life. It is further concluded that the principle of the transforming initiative could possibly be used in a valid psychotherapeutic process by the Christian psychologist with Christian clients. In Article 3 the meta-theoretical fields of philosophy, psychology, and specifically positive psychology, are investigated in terms of wisdom principles. The study focuses on how practical wisdom can be used as an executive virtue within the context of a Christian psychotherapeutic process. The conclusions from this chapter are used to direct the empirical research on the executive function of wisdom. Wisdom is an essential part of the psychotherapeutic process and can be used to enable the client to achieve personal happiness in everyday life. Article 4 deals with the empirical research where practical wisdom as executive virtue in the psychotherapeutic process was used to drive a process of personal growth and exploration for the clients in this study. It is stated further that wisdom is not the primary aim of the therapeutic intervention, but a tool to assist the therapist and the client in a more effective, outcomes-based, measurable result of personal growth. In Article 5 a pastoral-theological model for the executive virtue of practical wisdom in positive psychology is formulated. This model could possibly be applied to a therapeutic context, providing the client has the ability to comprehend the concepts and that the spiritual dimensions fit into his religious frame of reference. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Pastoral Studies))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

The central theoretical statement of this study proposes that practical wisdom as an executive virtue within positive psychology may be applied in a pastoral-theological paradigm. One of the main virtues in positive psychology, namely wisdom, is investigated and defined in this study. The article format has been used in this thesis, ultimately consisting of five articles. In Article 1 the scriptural perspectives found on practical wisdom in the Old Testament are discussed. From the information contained in the article, it is deduced that Old Testament wisdom should and can possibly be used to connect the reader with the teachings in a realistic way so that the person is enabled to apply the principles of Old Testament wisdom literature to everyday circumstance. Article 2 deals with the wisdom principles found in the Sermon on the Mount. It can be said that wisdom teachings found in the Sermon on the Mount could possibly be used to enable the reader to achieve personal happiness in everyday life. It is further concluded that the principle of the transforming initiative could possibly be used in a valid psychotherapeutic process by the Christian psychologist with Christian clients. In Article 3 the meta-theoretical fields of philosophy, psychology, and specifically positive psychology, are investigated in terms of wisdom principles. The study focuses on how practical wisdom can be used as an executive virtue within the context of a Christian psychotherapeutic process. The conclusions from this chapter are used to direct the empirical research on the executive function of wisdom. Wisdom is an essential part of the psychotherapeutic process and can be used to enable the client to achieve personal happiness in everyday life. Article 4 deals with the empirical research where practical wisdom as executive virtue in the psychotherapeutic process was used to drive a process of personal growth and exploration for the clients in this study. It is stated further that wisdom is not the primary aim of the therapeutic intervention, but a tool to assist the therapist and the client in a more effective, outcomes-based, measurable result of personal growth. In Article 5 a pastoral-theological model for the executive virtue of practical wisdom in positive psychology is formulated. This model could possibly be applied to a therapeutic context, providing the client has the ability to comprehend the concepts and that the spiritual dimensions fit into his religious frame of reference. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Pastoral Studies))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

La bienveillance est un motif d'action qui vise le bien de l'autre où répond à un bienfait de l'autre ; elle constitue également un élément du contexte organisationnel, qui participe du climat éthique dans lequel chaque membre agit. Elle prend diverses formes selon l'importance donnée au bien de l'autre, au sien propre et à la relation : elle peut être gratuite, utilitariste réciproque, instrumentale, etc. jusqu'à une forme de « bienveillance mutuelle », faite de gratitude, orientée vers l'autre dans une relation. La bienveillance organisationnelle - comme bienveillance d'un agent en tant qu'il participe avec d'autres de l'expérience organisationnelle, l'influence et est influencé par elle- peut émerger et se développer dans un engagement réciproque de agents, favorisant alors la coopération et un dépassement des normes d'action : elle est efficace - et paradoxalement, elle est d'autant plus efficace qu'elle ne vise pas cette efficacité. Cette bienveillance peut être comprise dans son rapport aux règles et aux rôles organisationnels: un rapport d'interprétation ou de réinterprétation réciproque. Cette thèse comprend trois essais :-Le cynisme organisationnel comme réponse à une violation de contrat psychologique: un moindre mal ? Le cas d'un cabinet de conseil -La bienveillance organisationnelle: prescrite ou proscrite? Les parcours de bienveillance dans un cabinet de conseil. Co-écrit avec Ghislain Deslandes.-Mercier, G. & Deslandes, G. (2016). There are no Codes, only Interpretations. Practical Wisdom and Hermeneutics in Monastic Organizations. Journal of Business Ethics. DOI: 10.1007/s10551-016-3055-4. / Benevolence is a motive for action that aims at the other's good or is an answer to the other's good deed; it constitutes also an element of the organizational context, which participates to the ethical climate within which each member acts. It takes various forms according to the importance give to the other's good, to one's own good and to the relationship: it can be gratuitous, utilitarian reciprocal, instrumental, etc. up to mutual benevolence', made of gratitude, directed at the other in a relationship. Organizational benevolence - as the benevolence of an agent in as much as he/she participates with others to the organizational experience, influences it and is influenced by it - can emerge and develop in a agents' reciprocal commitment, thus fostering cooperation and the exceeding of norms of action; it is efficient -and paradoxically, it is all the more efficient that it does not seek such efficiency. This benevolence can be understood in its relation with rules and organizational roles: a relation of reciprocal interpretation or reinterpretation. This thesis comprises three essays: -Organizational cynicism as a response to the violation of the psychological contract: A lesser evil? The case of a consulting firm -Organizational benevolence: prescribed or proscribed? Courses of benevolence in a consulting firm Co-authored with Ghislain Deslandes-Mercier, G. & Deslandes, G. (2016). There are no Codes, only Interpretations. Practical Wisdom and Hermeneutics in Monastic Organizations. Journal of Business Ethics. DOI : 10.1007/s 10551-016-3055-4.

This study is a contribution to the bioethical debate about new and possibly emerging reproductive technologies. Its point of departure is the intuition, which many people seem to share, that using such technologies to select non-disease traits – like sex and emotional stability - in yet unborn children is morally problematic, at least more so than using the technologies to avoid giving birth to children with severe genetic diseases, or attempting to shape the non-disease traits of already existing children by environmental means, like education. The study employs philosophical analysis for the purpose of making this intuition intelligible and judging whether it is justified. Different ways in which the moral problems posed by reproductive technologies are often framed in bioethical debates are criticised as inadequate for this task. In particular, it is argued that the intuition cannot fully be made sense of in terms of harm to the children that such technologies help create. The study attempts to elaborate an alternative to that broadly consequentialist approach, by drawing on Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, Hans Jonas’s ethics, and Aristotle’s practical philosophy, as it has been received and developed in the hermeneutical tradition. It is suggested that reproductive choices, unlike decisions for already born children, are characterised by a peculiar one-sidedness: the future child appears to the parents as something wholly theirs to decide about, not as a concrete other with whom they must interact in a responsive and attuned way. This is problematic because it means that such choices cannot call upon the particularised moral understanding only gained in interpersonal encounters. In particular, it makes them easily shaped by various tendencies, to which parents are always susceptible, to relate to children in instrumentalising ways, and at risk of reinforcing such tendencies. However, this does not mean that all uses of reproductive technologies are equally troubling. When selecting against severe disease the parents can rely on a widely shared illness experience to escape the dangers that one-sidedness involves. It is concluded that the intuition under discussion, thus explicated and in some ways qualified, makes sense morally. / Avhandlingen är ett bidrag till den bioetiska debatten om olika reproduktionstekniker som antingen nyligen blivit tillgängliga eller som kan komma att utvecklas i framtiden. Utgångspunkten är en intuition som många verkar dela, nämligen att användningen av sådana tekniker i syfte att välja icke-sjukdomsegenskaper – som kön och känslomässig stabilitet – hos framtida barn, är mer moraliskt problematiskt än både att forma sådana egenskaper hos redan existerande barn genom exempelvis utbildning och att använda teknikerna för att undvika att barn föds med svåra sjukdomar. Studien är ett försök att genom filosofisk analys begripliggöra denna intuition och avgöra om den är berättigad. Olika sätt på vilka man i den bioetiska debatten ofta gestaltar de moraliska problem som reproduktionstekniker ger upphov till kritiseras som otillräckliga för denna uppgift. I synnerhet framhålls att intuitionen inte helt kan förstås som en oro över att de barn som sådana tekniker sätter till världen kan komma till skada. Med avsikt att utveckla ett alternativ till detta konsekvensorienterade synsätt söker sig författaren till Martin Heideggers teknikfilosofi, Hans Jonas etik och Aristoteles praktiska filosofi, som den tolkats och utvecklats i den hermeneutiska traditionen. Med hjälp av dessa teorier betonas hur reproduktiva val, till skillnad från beslut gällande redan existerande barn, kännetecknas av en slags ensidighet. Det framtida barnet framstår för föräldrarna som föremål för beslut som är odelat deras, snarare än som en konkret andre som de måste interagera med på ett lyhört, noga avpassat sätt. Detta är problematiskt eftersom det innebär att sådana val inte kan ledsagas av det slags partikulära moraliska förståelse som bara uppnås i möten mellan människor. I synnerhet innebär det att valen lätt formas av, och i sin tur riskerar att underblåsa, olika för föräldraskapet karaktäristiska tendenser som ständigt riskerar förmå föräldrar att förhålla sig till sina barn på ett instrumentaliserande sätt. Men detta betyder inte att alla användningar av reproduktionstekniker är lika problematiska. Val som syftar till att undvika svåra sjukdomar kan undgå de faror som ensidigheten öppnar för genom att åberopa en gemensam mänsklig sjukdomserfarenhet. Avhandlingens slutsats är att intuitionen som diskuteras är berättigad, med vissa reservationer, om den förstås på detta sätt.

While research concerning ethical competence in medical practice is frequent, ethical competence in health care management is less often studied. This thesis focuses ethical competence and its preconditions, particularly with regard to health care managers’ identification and handling conflicts of interest. Based on the empirical analysis it also discusses what kind of ethical competence health care managers need, and how this competence can be developed in the organization. The study is based in action theory and takes an organizational pedagogical point of departure. Qualitative, semi-structured interviews were carried out twice with ten health care managers in the Stockholm region. Data were analysed using a thematic, step-wise method. The analysis revealed several examples of conflicts of interest and different ways in which they were managed. The all-embracing conflict involved weighing and prioritizing patients’ needs, patient safety, and work environment against political and economical goals. In most cases the informants did not manage to strike a balance between professional ethics and business management. The dominance of purposive/instrumental rationality tended to inhibit the managers’ ethical competence. At the same time, as shown by the analysis, some of the managers were able to use ethical competence to pursue value/belief-oriented rationality in achieving such a balance. Of great importance for success are having rational emotions and an adequate ethical language, and organizing for the task of handling conflict of interests in order to support action and provide qualifying experiences to learn from in the work processes. But the political and administrative control system also needs to clearly articulate the ethical dimensions of the managers’ task, allocate resources, and ensure that support systems and evaluation focus not only on finances but also on the value-rational aspects.

This thesis is a critical discussion of political thinker Hannah Arendt’s moral thought, as developed in her works from EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM onwards. Arendt, I argue, sought to respond to the moral challenge she saw posed by the phenomenon of banal evildoing, as revealed in Nazi Germany. Banal evildoers are agents who, under circumstances in which their ordinary moral triggers and guides (conscience, moral habits and norms, the behavior of their peers, etc.) are subverted, commit evil despite having no evil intent. Such subversion of ordinary moral voices would appear to absolve these agents from moral responsibility for their acts, which led most commentators to reject claims to such subversion by Nazi collaborators. Arendt, who sees the phenomenon of banal evildoing as factually substantiated, set out to show that such agents possessed other mental capacities (namely, critical and speculative thinking, reflective judging, and free willing), more appropriate for moral decision-making, on which they could have relied even under Nazi conditions. It is for their disregard of such capacities that banal evildoers can be held morally responsible. In this thesis I critically engage with this Arendtian argument. I show how the Nazi subversion of German agents’ ordinary moral voices was achieved. I then exegetically explicate Arendt’s (unfinished) analysis of the above mental capacities and of their moral role. I then argue for the addition of the capacities of empathetic perception and practical wisdom to this understanding of moral performance. In the course of this analysis I show that in responding to this challenge, Arendt develops a powerful argument regarding the moral dangers of overreliance on mental shortcuts in decision-making, a strong argument regarding the interconnectedness between morality and humanness, and implicitly, a novel conception of selfhood that sees otherness as interrelated and interconnected with selfhood, such that concern for others is part of what constitutes, and therefore is inscribed into, care for the self. I end by critically assessing the applicability of Arendt’s moral analysis to more ordinary decisional circumstances than those of Nazi Germany, and the insight this analysis points to regarding the relationship between moral and political decision-making.

This thesis is a critical discussion of political thinker Hannah Arendt’s moral thought, as developed in her works from EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM onwards. Arendt, I argue, sought to respond to the moral challenge she saw posed by the phenomenon of banal evildoing, as revealed in Nazi Germany. Banal evildoers are agents who, under circumstances in which their ordinary moral triggers and guides (conscience, moral habits and norms, the behavior of their peers, etc.) are subverted, commit evil despite having no evil intent. Such subversion of ordinary moral voices would appear to absolve these agents from moral responsibility for their acts, which led most commentators to reject claims to such subversion by Nazi collaborators. Arendt, who sees the phenomenon of banal evildoing as factually substantiated, set out to show that such agents possessed other mental capacities (namely, critical and speculative thinking, reflective judging, and free willing), more appropriate for moral decision-making, on which they could have relied even under Nazi conditions. It is for their disregard of such capacities that banal evildoers can be held morally responsible. In this thesis I critically engage with this Arendtian argument. I show how the Nazi subversion of German agents’ ordinary moral voices was achieved. I then exegetically explicate Arendt’s (unfinished) analysis of the above mental capacities and of their moral role. I then argue for the addition of the capacities of empathetic perception and practical wisdom to this understanding of moral performance. In the course of this analysis I show that in responding to this challenge, Arendt develops a powerful argument regarding the moral dangers of overreliance on mental shortcuts in decision-making, a strong argument regarding the interconnectedness between morality and humanness, and implicitly, a novel conception of selfhood that sees otherness as interrelated and interconnected with selfhood, such that concern for others is part of what constitutes, and therefore is inscribed into, care for the self. I end by critically assessing the applicability of Arendt’s moral analysis to more ordinary decisional circumstances than those of Nazi Germany, and the insight this analysis points to regarding the relationship between moral and political decision-making.

経営博士（DBA） / 243 p. / Hitotsubashi University