Comparison of Philosophies of Jan Ámos Komenský and René Descartes The aim of this work is comparison of philosophies of Jan Ámos Komenský and René Descartes based on their essential works, i.e."Labyrint světa a ráj srdce" (The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart) and "Úvahy o první filozofii" (Meditations on First Philosophy), in which God's existence and the difference between the human soul and body are proved. The philosophy of both contemporaries originated in the 17th century on the background of the Thirty Years' War and the Counter-Reformation. The rationalism of René Descartes, which starts Cartesian thinking, seems to be substantially different from the philosophy of Komenský based on Neoplatonism and Christianity. In the thought of Descartes analysis, mathematical operationalism, is principal, whereas Komenský synthesizes and puts the whole together. The first chapter of the thesis deals with the lives, period and works of Komenský and Descartes. It is possible to find significant similarities in their life stories. The second chapter deals with the interpretation of "The Labyrint of the World and the Paradise of the Heart" and the interpretation of "Meditations of First Philosophy", in which God's existence and the difference between the human soul and body are proved....

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The Anglo-Dutch philosopher Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) was among the most controversial figures writing in English in the eighteenth century. His satirical exploration of the nature of human sociability and economic prosperity infuriated his contemporary critics and deeply influenced the ideas of later Enlightenment philosophes. One of the most persistent questions about Mandeville's work concerns the sincerity of his declarations of Christian piety. Mandeville is commonly identified as a deist. This thesis explores the possibility that he was an atheist. The question is examined through an analysis of Mandeville’s major influences, most notably French Jansenism, Epicureanism, Scepticism, erudite libertinism, and Dutch republicanism. Key figures that Mandeville engaged with in his writings include Pierre Bayle, René Descartes, Shaftesbury, Thomas Hobbes, Pierre Nicole, and Pierre Gassendi. In the process of discussing Mandeville’s putative atheism, the methodological problem of researching and identifying atheism in early-modern Europe is explored. / Graduate

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This thesis explores the disciplinary relationship between natural philosophy (the study of nature or body) and theology (the study of the divine) in seventeenth-century England. Early modern disciplines had two essential functions. First, they set the rules and boundaries of argument – knowledge was therefore legitimised and made intelligible within disciplinary contexts. And second, disciplines structured pedagogy, parcelling knowledge so it could be studied and taught. This dual role meant disciplines were epistemic and social structures. They were composed of various elements, and consequently, they related to one another in a variety of complex ways. As such, the contestability of early modern knowledge was reflected in contestability of disciplines – their content and boundaries. Francis Bacon, Thomas White, Henry More and John Locke are the focus of the four chapters respectively, with Joseph Glanvill, Thomas Hobbes, other Cambridge divines, and a variety of medieval scholastic authors providing context, comparison and reinforcement. These case studies offer a cross-section of seventeenth-century thought and belief; they embody different professional and institutional interests, and represent an array of philosophical, theological and religious positions. Nevertheless, each of them, in different ways, and to different effect, put the relationship between natural philosophy and theology at the heart of their intellectual endeavours. Together, they demonstrate that, in seventeenth-century England, natural philosophy and theology were in flux, and that their disciplinary relationship was complex, entailing degrees of overlap and alienation. Primarily, natural philosophy and theology investigated the nature and constitution of the world, and, together, determined the relationship between its constituent parts – natural and divine. However, they also reflected the scope of man’s cognitive faculties, establishing which bits of the world were knowable, and outlining the grounds for, and appropriate degrees of, certainty and belief. Thus, both disciplines, and their relationship with one another, contributed to broad discussions about, truth, certainty and opinion. This, in turn, established normative guidelines. To some extent, the rightness or wrongness of belief and behaviour was determined by particular definitions of, and relationship between, natural philosophy and theology. Consequently, man’s place in the world – his relationship with nature, God and his fellow man – was triangulated through these disciplines.

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Rembrandt's use of light in his self-portraits has received an abundance of scholarly attention throughout the centuries--and for good reason. His light delights the eye and captivates the mind with its textural quality and dramatic presence. At a time of scientific inquiry and religious reformation that was reshaping the way individuals understood themselves and their relationship to God, Rembrandt's light may carry more intellectual significance than has previously been thought. Looking at Rembrandt's oeuvre of self-portraits chronologically, it is apparent that something happened in his life or in his understanding that caused him to change how he used light. A distinct and consistent shift can be observed in the location and intensity of light to the crown of the forehead. This change indicates that light held particular significance for Rembrandt and that its connection to the head was a signifier with intentional meaning. This meaning could have developed as a result of Rembrandt's exposure to and interest in the contemporary theological and philosophical debates of the seventeenth-century Netherlands, particularly those relating to the physical and eternal nature of the soul stemming from the writings of René Descartes. The relative religious and intellectual freedom of the Dutch Republic provided a safe place for Descartes to publish and defend his metaphysical ideas relating to the nature of the soul and know-ability of God through personal intellectual inquiry. The widespread disturbance to established thought caused by his ideas and methods sped their dissemination into the early seventeenth-century discourse. Rembrandt's associations with the educated elite, particularly Constantijn Huygens and Jan Six, increases the probability that he knew of this new philosophy and had the opportunity to consider its relevance to his own quest for self-knowledge. With his particular emphasis on self-exploration and expression, demonstrated through his prolific oeuvre of self-portraits, and his inclination toward emotive, complex, and interdenominational religious works, it follows that Rembrandt would be eager to embrace Descartes' metaphysics and demonstrate his awareness through his self-portraits. Light on the forehead becomes a metaphor for enlightenment and is the key to reading Rembrandt's late self-portraits through the lens of Cartesian influence.

La doctrine leibnizienne de la science repose-t-elle sur une théorie de la connaissance? Après avoir montré, dans des travaux préalables, qu’une telle dépendance ne se rencontre pas dans l’œuvre de la maturité, nous nous intéressons ici aux premiers écrits de Leibniz. La Nova Methodus discendae docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667) dresse, suivant l’exemple de Bacon, un inventaire raisonné des disciplines que doit réunir la nouvelle encyclopédie. Comme dans les projets leibniziens ultérieurs, cet inventaire est précédé de la distinction entre types de savoir en fonction des critères logiques selon lesquels les propositions se répartissent entre histoires, observations et théorèmes. Nous nous attachons en particulier à la définition de ceux-ci comme propositions « démontrables ex terminis ». Cette norme de la science étant posée, quels fondements in re Leibniz entend-t-il donner au savoir démonstratif ? Prenant pour fil conducteur sa polémique avec l’humaniste Marius Nizolius, nous étudions sa tentative pour fonder la validité des propositions de vérité éternelle sur des universaux subsistant indépendamment de l’existence des individus. Ce n’est cependant que dans les premiers écrits parisiens (1672-1673) que se dégage sa réponse définitive à ce problème : apparue d’abord comme un autre nom de la signification qu’« exprime » une définition, la notion d’idée y prend consistance en tant qu’archétype subsistant en Dieu. Les principaux traits de la théorie leibnizienne de la science sont ainsi fixés, indépendamment de toute « doctrine de l’entendement ». / Does Leibniz’s doctrine of demonstrative knowledge rest upon a theory of cognition? Having shown in previous articles that such was not the case in his mature works, we now turn to his early writings. The Nova Methodus discendae docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667) contains a reasoned inventory of the disciplines that should constitute the new encyclopaedia. As in later projects, Leibniz precedes this inventory with a classification of the types of knowledge based on the logical criteria according to which propositions are divided in histories, observations and theorems. Particular attention is given to the definition of the latter as propositions « demonstrable ex terminis ».This norm of scientific necessity once defined, what real (in re) foundation does Leibniz give to demonstrative knowledge? Following the various threads offered by his polemic against the Italian humanist Marius Nizolius, we study Leibniz’s attempt to ground the validity of propositions of eternal truth on universals subsisting independently of the existence of individuals. But one has to wait until the first Paris writings (1672-1673) to see the emergence of his mature answer to that problem: first conceived after the model of the significatio which a definition « expresses », the notion of idea reaches its latter ontological status as an archetype subsisting in God’s mind. The principal features of Leibniz’s theory of demonstrative knowledge are thus in place, prior to and independently of what he will later call his « doctrine of the understanding ».