I inledningen av den storskaliga ryska invasionen av Ukraina tilldrog sig en relativt ny typ av vapensystem, den beväpnade drönaren, stor uppmärksamhet. Denna typ av system och dess framtida roll inom krigföringen har varit och är fortfarande omdebatterad. Forskningen har fram till nyligen, till stor del, saknat relevant empiri för att undersöka den beväpnade drönarens effekt i en mellanstatlig högteknologisk konflikt. Syftet med denna studie har varit att undersöka en mindre stats nyttjande av UCAV som ett sätt att projicera luftmakt. I det här fallet genom en fallstudie av konflikten i Ukraina. För att belysa Ukrainas användande av UCAV har en luftmaktsteori benämnd, Underdog’s Model, nyttjats. Modellen, framtagen av Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, syftar till att beskriva hur en mindre stat genom goda prestationer inom sex specifika faktorer, kan gå segrande ur en väpnad konflikt mot en starkare motståndare. Studien visar att Ukraina i mycket hög grad uppnått goda prestationer inom modellens faktorer. Effekten av de ukrainska UCAV-operationerna förefaller också, i krigets inledande fas vara mycket stor. Efter krigets första månader avtar dock denna effekt något, på grund av en motståndarens anpassning och nyttjande av motmedel. Underdog’s Model har en relativt god, om än inte fullständig, förklaringskraft beträffande Ukrainas användning av UCAV i konflikten. Nyttjande av UCAV framstår som en kostnadseffektiv väg för en småstat att projicera luftmakt i en asymmetrisk konflikt. Dock har vissa sårbarheter hos sådana system blivit mer framträdande varefter konflikten fortskridit.

Europe is once again a theatre of a major war, beginning on the 24th of February 2022 with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Hopelessly outnumbered the Ukrainians have proven them themselves a worthy opponent of the regional hegemon Russia. In the fall of 2022, the Ukrainians served Putin his greatest defeat thus far with a counteroffensive which liberated Kherson and all Ukrainian territory west of the Dnepr. The goal of this thesis is to examine the Ukrainian counteroffensive and how Ukraine managed to achieve success at the tactical level. The thesis does this by studying available information about the counteroffensive and analysing it with the help of manoeuvre warfare theories and satellite imagery. The thesis shows that Ukrainian tactical success during the Kherson counteroffensive can be attributed to their use of combined arms and the fact that surprise was achieved. However, it is worth noting that other factors may have contributed to Ukrainian tactical success and that more information about the counteroffensive may become available with time.

Denna studie syftar till att undersöka hur fyra högerorienterade alternativmedier, Samnytt, Nyheter Idag, Nya Dagbladet och Fria Tider, rapporterade om kriget i Ukraina utifrån sex nyhetshändelser. Sammanlagt har 22 artiklar analyserats genom en kritisk diskursanalys. Samtliga artiklar är hämtade från alternativmediernas egna sajter. För insamlingen av det empiriska materialet sammanställde vi ett kodschema med avgränsningar i form av utsatt tidsperiod och sökord. För utförandet av analysen konstruerade vi ett analysschema med inspiration från Faircloughs sociolingvistiska inriktning av diskursanalysen och Berglez analysmodell. Det teoretiska ramverket för studien är uppbyggt på ansatser från den kritiska diskursteorin. Resultatet av den kvalitativa undersökningen påvisar att en majoritet av de utvalda artiklarna präglas av ett ryssvänligt narrativ. Skillnader i hur aktörer framställs har identifierats i form av negativt laddade respektive neutrala ordval. Till följd av hur skribenterna framställer, refererar och hänvisar till olika källor i artiklarna genomsyras en del av texterna av en så kallad falsk balans. Slutsatsen av studien är att ryska aktörer och källor samt källor och aktörer som går i linje med det ryska perspektivet av kriget i Ukraina får större genomslag för sin agenda.

There has been a turning point in Germany’s foreign policy since the Russian annexation of Crimea, Ukraine in 2014. This study aims to investigate how Germany’s foreign policy has changed from 2014 until 2022. This thesis is relevant due to the uncertain development of the security of Germany and the rest of Europe. Additionally, it is important because the major changes in Germany’s foreign policy have not been analyzed by the theory Foreign Policy Change (FPC). The methodology that has been chosen for this thesisis case study and the research material has been based on primary and secondary sources. The conclusions that can be drawn from this thesis are that Germany’s foreign policy changed minimally after the Russian annexation of Crimea and the most significant changes happened after theRussian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Ryssland har efter det Kalla krigets slut fört en undanskymd roll på den internationella arenan.Efter Sovjetunionens kollaps var Ryssland för svagt för att överta dess roll som globalstormakt. Det bipolära världssystemet ersattes av ett unipolärt system med USA som ensamglobal stormakt. På senare tid har dock Ryssland börjat visa alltmer självförtroende i sittinternationella agerande. Frågan uppstår då om landet har en ambition att åter bli en globalstormakt. Studien syftar till att undersöka om Ryssland har dessa ambitioner. Studien har sinteoretiska grund i den politiska realismen och utgår från hypotesen att Ryssland har klaraambitioner att åter bli en global stormakt och att dessa ambitioner kommer att visa sig ilandets ageranden inom de militära, politiska och ekonomiska sektorerna. Genom att förstdefiniera revisionism och stormakt analyseras därefter Rysslands internationella agerandeinom dessa sektorer. I analysen visar Ryssland tydliga ambitioner att återta en roll som globalstormakt helt i linje med hypotesen. / Russia has after the end of the Cold war played a hidden role at the international arena. Afterthe collapse of the Soviet union Russia was to week to takeover its role as a global greatpower. The bipolar world system was replaced by a unipolar system with the USA as singleglobal great power. Lately however Russia has started to show more self confidence in itsinternational acting. The question then arises if the country has the ambition to once againbecome a global great power. This study aims to examine if Russia has these ambitions. Thestudy has its theoretical base in the political realism and assumes from the hypothesis thatRussia has clear ambitions to once again become a global great power and that theseambitions will be shown in the country’s acting within the military, political and economicsectors. By first define revisionism and great power Russia’s international acting is thenanalyzed within these sectors. In the analysis Russia shows clear ambitions to recapture a roleas a global great power in according to the hypothesis.

In recent years, Russia has significantly altered the global landscape through its aggressive conduct in various conflicts. Employing hybrid warfare tactics, Russia has merged conventional military operations with psychological warfare strategies, recognizing the potent influence of psychological manipulation. This study delves into Russia's utilization of psychological warfare tactics preceding conflict, focusing specifically on the cases of Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. The objective is to enrich the broader academic discourse by enhancing comprehension of Russia's behavioral patterns and facilitating the early detection of Russian psychological operations. The findings reveal that Russia extensively employed psychological warfare strategies before the conflict, primarily targeting the adversary's populace to instill doubt and foster division between the people and their leadership. Furthermore, Russia directs substantial efforts toward neutral parties to legitimize its actions and dissuade them from supporting the opposing side.

The Russian term maskirovka can be translated as deception. Maskirovka has been part of Russian military doctrine since at least WWII and is considered to be a central part of their warfare. Maskirovka has been broadly researched since WWII, although not specifically in two of Russia’s most recent wars in Georgia and Ukraine from 2022. The Russo-Georgian war and the Russo-Ukrainian war share common ground considering the conventional sphere; the use of regular units and the methods used. This study has aimed to research how Russia applied deception in these wars, and finally compared its application between 2008 and 2022, all through the theoretical framework for this study that was drawn from Barton Whaley’s theory of deception. The study identified many similarities in utilization of strategic maskirovka; the most vital one perhaps a military exercise north of the border to both Georgia and Ukraine, disguised as an exercise but functioning to mobilize troops. The study also showed similarities in Russian attempts to control the narrative and portray the enemy as bandits, both leading up to the invasion and ongoing throughout the war. Notable is that the attempts in Georgia had effects that caused confusion and made important factors of their success. In Ukraine and the attack against Kiev, the attempts of strategic maskirovka were predicted and seen through by both west and Ukraine. Russia used maskirovka on a tactical level in Georgia and Ukraine as well, which may had effect on individual battles rather than the warfare in general.

This essay maps the security policy consequences of Russia's export of gas and oil to Europe in the years 2014–2022. The essay analyzes the development of the EU's energy policy, which dealt with energy transitions. The author also examines changes in the Russian Federation's security policy, military thinking, and military spending, as well as EU actions directed at Russia. The source material consisted of digital and printed sources that were processed using the deductive and qualitative method. To interpret the sources and create the narrative, the Peak Oil theory of M. King Hubbert, Benedict Anderson's theory of nationalism and the groupthink theory of Irving Janis were used. The results of the survey confirm previous research that emphasizes the importance of cheap energy for a modern society. The survey confirms that energy transitions do not occur in a blink of an eye, as well as the claim that the countries that import gas and oil become dependent on the countries that export these fossil fuels. The survey results show that the security policy situation in Europe has become worse during the period 2014–2022. The war in Ukraine can be seen because of Russia's changed military thinking and security policy, as well as the EU's inability to use powerful sanctions against Russia. During the same period, the EU underwent an energy transition and was extremely dependent on oil and gas imports from Russia. The results of this essay show that Russia's policy was primarily driven by geopolitical ambitions, namely, to make Russia a great power. Incorporation of Ukraine was seen as one of the intermediate goals. The sanctions used by the EU had little or no effect. What could affect Russia's ability to continue the war was a total boycott of Russian oil and gas. The essay's results provide a clear indication of the consequences of an ill-conceived energy policy. The result also shows how geopolitics, power and economics are connected and can affect humanity both locally and globally. The research results offer a broad field for further research in the energy sector, historical and political geography.

The littorals, narrow seas, brown water or coastal areas, whatever definition, warfare in a coastal environment favors the defender due to environmental characteristics. But is this theory valid even when an actor does not hold the ability to organize an effective defensive system along its coastline? How can a weaker defensive actor create a naval ability to strike towards and deny a stronger opponents’ sea control?This thesis investigates the shift in initiative and command of the seas in the Black Sea during the first two years of the war between Russia and Ukraine.The result is two-folded; Even when almost totally erased, a coastal state can conduct sea denial and even establish local sea control to protect its own coast. Unfortunately, this thesis cannot validate if these actions will lead to victory at sea, even less victory of the war.

Denna studie syftar till att utforska och analysera hur svensk media presenterar internationella konflikter, med fokus på Ryssland och Ukraina kriget, samt Israel och Palestina konflikten. Metodologiska ansatserna för studien är en kombination av framing analys och kritisk diskursanalys med fokus på Faircloughs tredimensionell modell. Genom dessa två analysverktyg kan vi få en mer omfattande bild av svenskmedias framställning av de valda konflikterna. Den möjliggör en fördjupad förståelse av medias makt i att forma offentliga diskurser. För att stärka och stödja vår analys, tillämpades två teorier, dels diskurs, dels postkolonial teori inom Internationella Relationer. Resultaten indikerar att det finns betydande skillnader i rapporteringen om de två konflikterna. Detaljering av information kring civila offer i Ukraina tenderar att vara högre jämfört med Palestinska offer. Ytterligare en skillnad som betraktades, var den bristande benämning av historiska aspekter i både konflikterna, vilket tyder på att media väljer att framhäva vissa berättelser och ignorera andra.  Det fanns även likheter med konflikterna, exempelvis, användningen av starkt laddade ord vid framställningen av konflikterna. Detta tyder på maktspel som formar politiska och sociala attityder. En annan likhet mellan konflikternas presentation i svensk media var journalisternas sätt att väcka emotionell respons hos läsaren. De framställda narrativen påverkar mottagarens beteende, attityder och syn på rättvisa och moral. Slutligen, understryker denna studie vikten av medvetenheten om hur svensk media rapporterar om internationella konflikter. Det är därmed viktigt att fokuset ligger på en balanserad rapportering som inkluderar både aktuell och historiska kontexter.