This essay will examine Russia’s president Vladimir Putin and two of his speeches. The first speech is the one he held after the annexation of Crimea 2014 and the second speech is the one he held on the night of the invasion of Ukraine 2022. The speeches will be analyzed with the help of the rational choice theory while using a qualitative theory-consuming case study. Further the analysis uses two tools from the rational choice theory, self-interest and utility maximization. The aim is to get an explanation of Vldaimir Putin through the view of rational choice theory. The conclusion shows that Vladimir Putin is rational when applying his self-interest and utility maximization in the speeches. He is well aware of how he portrays himself to get the public's attention.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has been ongoing since 2014, the focus in this paper is the spread of disinformation. Russia's capability to spread their disinformation is partly because of how the Russian media is structured, it's structured in such a way that lets the government control it. In this report the authors also interviewed two Swedish government agencies, Myndigheten för Psykologiskt Försvar and Försvarshögskolan. These interviews were conducted to deepen the authors' understanding of the agencies' views on these kinds of problems. They helped the authors gain a deeper understanding of cultural differences and why they have succeeded and failed in the past. The paper also highlights the importance of the digital medium and how Russia is using so-called Internettrolls to further their agenda. To understand Russia's disinformation campaigns the authors also look at earlier events, such as MH17. The authors also discuss Russian media outlets that spread their disinformation. / Konflikten mellan Ryssland och Ukraina började 2014, i denna konflikt har mängder av information spridits i försök vinkla sanningar och vilseleda. Den här typen av informationsoperation kallas även för desinformation. I denna uppsats kommer Rysslands förmåga att använda sig av desinformation som medel diskuteras. I författarnas försök att skapa en djupare förståelse har de valt att intervjua två myndigheter, Myndigheten för Psykologiskt Försvar och Försvarshögskolan. Intervjuerna gav författarna en insikt i hur myndigheter ser på den här typen av problematik. Intervjuerna lade stort fokus på att försöka förstå bakgrunden till de desinformationskampanjer som de genomfört tidigare och varför Ryssland lyckats och misslyckats tidigare. Författarna har även försökt förstå varför Rysslands desinformationskampanjer är så effektiva mot den inhemska befolkningen, detta kan dels ses som att de kontrollerar stora delar av sin media. I sin spridning använder de sig av traditionella medier och även av så kallade Internettroll. Ryssland ser all information som konstruerad och därav så går den att bestrida. Eftersom konflikten pågått under en längre tid finns flera olika fall av desinformation, uppsatsen går även igenom händelser som är riktade mot andra länder.

Russian warfare is one of the most currently debated topics between military experts. Some define it as something wholly new and name it hybrid warfare. Others say that hybrid warfare is nothing but an old method brought back to life. Some experts also argue that any nation at war will use any method to win, regardless of being a defender or aggressor. One thing, however, binds these experts together—the will to understand Russian warfare.  Hybrid warfare uses both state and non-state actors together to achieve a common goal. Because of mixing these actors, it becomes hard to define further. Because of that, experts still struggle to understand Russian warfare and the use of hybrid warfare. Thus allowing Russia to continue to act within the grey area between a state of neither peace nor war.  By analysing Russia’s intervention in the ongoing conflict in Syria with Lewickis military and non-military dimensions. This study shows that Russian warfare and its actions in Syria are based more on international reputation. When there is a risk for tarnished reputation, they act through non-state actors. When there is a chance for improved reputation, they act through state actors. This study also shows that there are fundamental differences in what Russia does officially and unofficially, which is also based on international reputation.

In Ukraine 2014 the world saw a new type of war develop on the Crimean Peninsula. But what took place was not an open conflict between military forces on the battlefield and on the waves. Instead, it was a combination of covert operations by Russian special forces, organized crime groups from both Russia and Ukraine and the instigation of local ethnic groups. This study is focused on the use of civilian individuals and organizations to achieve a higher military goal in this conflict. This is to increase the understanding of what methods that were used in the Russo-Ukrainian war where connections between the military and the civilian in this conflict is blurred. The study finds that many methods that use civilians for a higher military purpose can be found in the conflict that could be used elsewhere with similar conditions. It also finds a rudimentary schematic for when and in what order these methods were used for successfully achieving their goals. It also finds a new scientific gap where future research could go to further understand and predict how these methods could be used in our future.

On February 4th in 1738, Daniel Tilas, an official of the Swedish Bureau of Mines travelled into Russia in order to study the metal and mining industries of the country. After just over two months of travelling between workshops, factories and mines, both abandoned and active ones, he returned home to Sweden with a rather rich description of his findings in Russia. During the early modern era travels like this one, namely with the purpose of gathering and describing knowledge, were a commonplace occurrence all over Europe. The Bureau of Mines sponsored many travels of this sort during it’s roughly 200-year existence in order to gain knowledge of the state of the metal and mining industries around Europe and even in Sweden, these travels also functioned as a crucial part in the education of the Swedish mining officials. But the Swedish travels to Russia were undertaken with partially different goals in mind, since the end of the great northern war Russia hade become the primary enemy on Sweden. This meant the Bureau of Mines sought after knowledge about and from Russia which could be used to effectively compete against them on a geopolitical scale. In this essay I thus attempt to explore the view of Russia which existed in the Bureau of Mines during the first half of the 18th century by primarily studying how Tilas depicted the Russian mining and metal industries and secondarily the Russian society in his writings. I do this through the analytical lens of the theory on “state-related knowledge” defined by historians Lothar Schilling and Jakob Vogel. I also make use of the concept of the “hybrid expert” as defined by historian Ursula Klein to deepen the analysis of Tilas depiction and description of Russia’s industry.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has, at the time of writing, been going on for over 14 months. Despite diplomatic efforts and international cooperation, no attempts have so far succeeded in reaching a peaceful end to the conflict. This study has aimed to investigate and analyze the factors that limited the diplomatic success of the international institutions in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The study has used neoliberal institutionalism as a theoretical framework to analyze and answer the question. This theory has been very helpful in identifying what flaws there may be in international systems that can affect conflict solutions. The study has analyzed a selection of factors which, according to a balance based on political relevance and theoretical starting points, are considered to be significant factors. The factors that have been analyzed are territorial, military, security policy and institutional as well as factors around international collaborations. The study's discussion shows how these factors played a role and in what way the limitations they led to may have affected the success of conflict resolution and may affect future conflicts and outcomes. The discussion also highlights the relevance and importance of a functioning and actionable international system based on the theoretical perspective. The study has contributed to highlighting important factors surrounding the Russia-Ukraine conflict that are relevant both to the case itself and to future conflicts.

Studien har i syfte att undersöka vilka genrer, diskursiva strategier och lingvistiska verktyg som Rysslands president Vladimir Putin använder sig utav och hur det kan kopplas samman med tidigare forskning om propaganda. Studien utgår från Putins tal på Moskvas Stadium den 18 mars 2022 då han adresserar åttaårsjubileet av Rysslands annektering av Krim. Metoden som använts för studien är diskursiv-historisk analys, som bygger på kritisk diskursanalys. För att koppla samman Putins tal med en vidare historisk kontext har även Joseph Stalins tal från den 7 november 1941 analyserats på samma sätt.  För att kort sammanfatta resultatet så visade det sig att det finns vissa likheter mellan Putin och Stalins tal i hänseende av genre samt diskursiva strategier, den största skillnaden handlar om att Putin använder ett försiktigare vokabulär än Stalin samt att Putin är mer argumenterande. / The study aims to examine the genres, discursive strategies and linguistic tools that Russian President Vladimir Putin uses and how it can be linked to previous research on propaganda. The study is based on Putin's speech at Moscow's Stadium on March 18, 2022, when he addresses the eighth anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The method used for the study is discursive-historical analysis, which is based on critical discourse analysis. To connect Putin's speech with a historical context, Joseph Stalin's speech of November 7, 1941 has also been analyzed in the same way. To summarize the results, it turned out that there are some similarities between Putin and Stalin's speeches in terms of genre and discursive strategies, the biggest difference is that Putin uses a more cautious vocabulary than Stalin and that Putin is more argumentative.

The purpose of this study is to analyze and compare the representations made by Aftonbladet (AB) and Dagens Nyheter (DN) of Swedish security policy due to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine 2022. The period of the investigation is one week for each conflict, based on when Russian troops officially invaded Ukraine.The essay has been done through a qualitative content analysis and a security policy theory. The results as for the Crimea conflict in 2014 show Swedish security policy changing tune after recognising the worse security position in Sweden´s immediate area and increased resources for the armoured forces. As for the Russian invasion 2022 many different consequences occurred for example again increased spending for the armoured forces, direct sanctions against Russia and Sweden sent apart from aide also military equipment to Ukraine.The analysis results showed that Sweden stopped focusing on inward-facing security policy goals and are today placing as much focus on outward-looking security policy goals.

The Russian actions in Ukraine are often described and analyzed as a form of hybrid warfare, a new concept that needs to be understood and countered with new methods, such as hybrid deterrence. This understanding of the conflict might be problematic since it could lead to a wasting of resources on non-functional methods and policies and an overgeneralized understanding of Russian methods and aims. Therefore, this study aims to test an older theory of conventional deterrence, to examine if the theory can give an adequate understanding of the conflict. This study uses the Ukraine conflict of 2014 to test if John Mearsheimers theory of conventional deterrence offers a capable approach to understand and analyze the case. This study uses a qualitative text analysis to examine three different secondary sources explaining the case. The results show that the theory is well suited to analyze the case, since the majority of the indicators in the framework are fulfilled. However, it is possible that some important non-military factors are overlooked, since the theoretical framework only applies to the relation between military risks and costs and political goals. This study argues that older theories successfully can be used to understand the conflict and be used as a point of departure for future studies of both the specific case and similar cases.

Sammanfattning: Teorier om luftmakt tar sin historiska utgångspunkt i resursstarka stormakters behov, varför de förutsatt stora resurser och avancerad teknik. För småstater har detta förhållande varit problematiskt då de varit tvungna att använda sig av stormakternas luftmaktsteorier trots att förutsättningar saknades i form av resurser och teknik. Under 2000-talet har några forskare utarbetat luftmaktsteorier utformade för småstater, vars förklaringskraft prövas i föreliggande studie.  Föreliggande studies syfte är att förklara effekten av luftmakt med luftmaktsteorier speciellt framtagna för småstater och teorierna som prövas är Clarkes modell ´Strategic, Persuasion, Oriented, Targeting bombing´ (SPOT) och Pashakhanlous ´The Underdog´s Model´ (UM).   Luftkriget i Ukraina är fallet som valts för att pröva teoriernas förklaringskraft mot ett aktuellt fall.  Ukraina är ett stort land med en stor befolkning, men knappa resurser gör att en landet har en större nytta av att tillämpa en småstatsstrategi än en storstatsstrategi. Studien visar att Ukraina uppnår bra resultat både inom SPOT- och UM:s modellkriterier. Resultatet påvisar att en småstats möjligheter att påverka eller vinna mot en starkare motståndare ökar om teoriernas kriterier tillämpas i sin helhet eller i delar. Studien har inte funnit några nya eller avvikande kriterier för mindre staters framgångar i luftmaktskriget.