In the year of 2014 Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula. Eight years later, Russia escalated the war by carrying out a full-scale military invasion on the rest of Ukraine. Since then, the Russo-Ukrainian war have turned out to become a war of the military-industrial capacities between the west and Russia. Because of this, Russian military logistics is of vital interest to western scholars, professionals and the broader public, but the topic is unfortunately not easily understood. The purpose of this paper is in general to contribute to the broader research on military logistics and specifically to contribute to the understanding of Russian military logistics. This is done by conducting a case study on the operational logistics of the Russian Armed Forces in the Russo-Ukrainian war. This is achieved by using the theories of Moshe Kress on operational logistics as analytical framework. The method used is a qualitative text analysis. The results show that the logistics system of the Russian Armed Forces have the ability to improvise logistics proceedings and prioritize resources and partially have the ability to achieve stability in the logistic flow and to push the right quantity of supplies into the theatre of operations. In addition, the logistics system does not have the ability to decide on the “tooth-to-tail” ratio, and lastly, the Russian Armed Forces does not have the ability to protect its logistics system.

The Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström expressed in 2014 that Russia is erratic and making swedes fear Russia while claiming this to be a new phenome. The statement is a big difference if compared with the words of foreign minister Leila Freivalds during 2004 whom said that Russia was the most important cornerstone in the Swedish security policy work. The change is interesting. Russia has gone from being perceived as friend to being perceived as an enemy. This study contains an analysis the Swedish discourse on Russia in the security- and defence politics between the years of 2004-2015. The point of this study is to unveil veiled and hidden structures in the discourse in order to better understand the Swedish image of Russia and to reveal ´the other`. The study examines the extreme change in the Swedish perception of Russia from a critical discourse point of view. The critical discourse approach is used to understand how the image of Russia is perceived in the Swedish security- and defence politics. In attempting to understand whyRussia is perceived in a certain way a theoretical connection to Copenhagen´s school of securitazion is made. The study proceeds to take a starting point in Balzacq’s three assumptions to understand the connection to referent object. The material examined is the Swedish Foreign Policy Statements and defence propositions. The result of the study shows that Russia is framed as a threat, even while being mentioned as a friend. Russia is always perceived as ´the other´ and thus a constructed threat to Sweden.  The Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström expressed in 2014 that Russia is erratic and making swedes fear Russia while claiming this to be a new phenome. The statement is a big difference if compared with the words of foreign minister Leila Freivalds during 2004 whom said that Russia was the most important cornerstone in the Swedish security policy work. The change is interesting. Russia has gone from being perceived as friend to being perceived as an enemy. This study contains an analysis the Swedish discourse on Russia in the security- and defence politics between the years of 2004-2015. The point of this study is to unveil veiled and hidden structures in the discourse in order to better understand the Swedish image of Russia and to reveal ´the other`. The study examines the extreme change in the Swedish perception of Russia from a critical discourse point of view. The critical discourse approach is used to understand how the image of Russia is perceived in the Swedish security- and defence politics. In attempting to understand whyRussia is perceived in a certain way a theoretical connection to Copenhagen´s school of securitazion is made. The study proceeds to take a starting point in Balzacq’s three assumptions to understand the connection to referent object. The material examined is the Swedish Foreign Policy Statements and defence propositions. The result of the study shows that Russia is framed as a threat, even while being mentioned as a friend. Russia is always perceived as ´the other´ and thus a constructed threat to Sweden.  The Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström expressed in 2014 that Russia is erratic and making swedes fear Russia while claiming this to be a new phenome. The statement is a big difference if compared with the words of foreign minister Leila Freivalds during 2004 whom said that Russia was the most important cornerstone in the Swedish security policy work. The change is interesting. Russia has gone from being perceived as friend to being perceived as an enemy. This study contains an analysis the Swedish discourse on Russia in the security- and defence politics between the years of 2004-2015. The point of this study is to unveil veiled and hidden structures in the discourse in order to better understand the Swedish image of Russia and to reveal ´the other`. The study examines the extreme change in the Swedish perception of Russia from a critical discourse point of view. The critical discourse approach is used to understand how the image of Russia is perceived in the Swedish security- and defence politics. In attempting to understand why Russia is perceived in a certain way a theoretical connection to Copenhagen´s school of securitazion is made. The study proceeds to take a starting point in Balzacq’s three assumptions to understand the connection to referent object. The material examined is the Swedish Foreign Policy Statements and defence propositions. The result of the study shows that Russia is framed as a threat, even while being mentioned as a friend. Russia is always perceived as ´the other´ and thus a constructed threat to Sweden.

Several discussions rose in western media when Swedish high-jumper Emma Green Tregaro competed with her nails painted in the colors of the rainbow during the athletic world championship in Moscow, in August 2013. This was meant to show her support for the gay movement, but was viewed as a protest against the new Russian law which forbids gay propaganda.  Western media critizised Russian media for failing to report the incident to their readers and that is where we got interested in making this research. We got the idea of comparing a Swedish newspaper with a Russian one, to observe differences in how they chose to report the event.  Due to lack of knowledge of the Russian language and the kyrillic alphabet we had to turn to an English-speaking newspaper based in Russia: The Moscow Times.  We compared the Moscow Times with the Swedish daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter, to see their differences in terms of: How they chose to cover the event, from a gender perspective; what structures of power can be found, how Emma Green Tregaro and Yelena Isinbayeva are portrayed and what meaning the protest is given by the narrators. We achieved our results through narrative analysis, a qualitative method. We applied theories such as gender theory and media logic in order to obtain answers to our questions.   We came to the conclusion that there are great differences in how much attention the protest achieved in the two newspapers. From the Swedish perspective, more focus were put on Emma Green Tregaro where she is a brave messenger of love, while in the Russian, more emphasis lays on Yelena Isinbayeva as a defender of the Russian stance. While Dagens Nyheter has put resources into sending journalists to Moscow, The Moscow Times has used a lot of material from news bureaus such as Reuters and The Associated Press instead of covering the event themselves.  Another interesting fact is that the institutions presented in the news flow such as the IAAF, IOC and the Swedish Sports Confederation are only represented by men, and through the power structural dimension of gender theory we can see tendencies of control or influence over the female sports profiles’ actions.

<p>In this essay we map and evaluate obstacles and problems that can occur during the establishment of international companies in Russia. This is done by investigating Swedish companies, which are established in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. We used secondary and primary data from books, previous surveys, reports, articles and the Internet. We also interviewed the following companies: Alfa Laval, Kockum Sonics AB, Höganäs Keramik, Skanska, Assa Abloy, Advakom, AnoxKaldnes, Lindab, Delovoj Peterburg, HL-Display and also a journalist from the Swedish Radio.</p><p>Most of the problems named by the interviewees were similar, but some differences were also found. The differences were primarily found in the ranking of importance between the different problems. As a conclusion we can say that the most important factors were:</p><p>· crime such as bribery</p><p>· administrative problems such as licensing</p><p>· tax laws and political system</p><p>· culture and language.</p><p>These problems can however be avoided to some point by hiring Russian consultants to manage the contacts and agreement.</p>

This thesis purpose is to examine the development of the European Union’s threat perception and identetity construction in regards to Russia. It uses a qualitive text analysis to study the national security strategies formulated by the memberstates Sweden, Germany, Italy and Poland and how these countries view of Russia is formulated. Furthermore it compares the change from before the annexation of Crimea and the Ukraine crisis and how this influenced the possibly change in perception of Russia. The study finds that the Russian action in Crimea and Ukraine has changed the threat perception in Sweden, Germany and Poland but that Russia is not mentioned in the Italy papers. Hence the identity construction is similar in the countries north of the Alps but Italy does not contrast its identety to Russia. From this the study concludes that the Russian threat is not enough to construct an European identity throughout Europe but there are patterns within the Union, which might indicate how the European project might continue.

<p><p>Den här undersökningen syftar till att ta reda på om det fanns skillnader i svenska,</p><p>rikstäckande tidningars val av källor under krigsrapporteringen från Georgienkrisens tio</p><p>inledande dagar.</p><p>För att få svar på frågorna analyserades artiklar från Sveriges fyra största tidningar,</p><p>Aftonbladet, Expressen, Dagens Nyheter och Svenska Dagbladet.</p><p>Resultaten visade att det finns både likheter och skillnader mellan hur tidningarna</p><p>rapporterade, sett utifrån vilka källor de prioriterar och låter komma till tals. Officiella och</p><p>civila källor används till exempel i ungefär samma utsträckning av tidningarna.</p><p>Uppdelat i nationaliteter är källorna inte lika jämnt fördelade, då georgiska källor dominerar över de övriga parterna i konflikten.</p><p>Morgontidningarna är mer balanserade i sin rapportering i den mening att de använder fler källor än kvällstidningarna i så gott som varje kategori.</p><p>Ett annat mönster är att kvällstidningarna fokuserat mer på att använda civila georgiska källor i såväl text som bild än morgontidningarna.</p><p>Ingen av tidningarna, vare sig i text eller bild, använde civila abchazer som källa, trots att konflikten även pågick i det området.</p></p>

<p><strong><strong>The aim of this essay is to analyze how media constructs strategic positional statements in debates of great immediate interest in order to stress ideological standpoints. Two questions are derived on the basis of this aim.</strong></strong></p><p><strong>- How is Russia positioned in Svenska Dagbladet's and Dagens Nyheter's editorials in the debate on the Swedish defence during 09-01-13 - 09-01-31?</strong></p><p><strong>- Are there differences in the positional statements between the newspapers?</strong></p><p><strong>In the study a Critical Discourse Analytical (CDA) approach is applied, and more specifically that of Teun A. van Dijk. Both the theoretical basis and the methodological tools are based on van Dijks CDA. As the theoretical basis regards focus lies on van Dijks rather specific concept of ideology. The methodological tools applied in the study are lexicalization, implications and analysis of how actors are described as agent or patient in the propositional structure. Besides these micro oriented tools an analysis of the thematic structure is also applied. The analysis is based on a schema that is composed with regard to the aim, the theoretical basis and the methodological tools. In the study a total of eight editorials are analyzed; six from Svenska Dagbladet and two from Dagens Nyheter.</strong></p><p><strong>The result points out to a difference between the two newspapers positioning of Russia. Svenska Dagbladet polarizes Russia and this positional statement can be understood as both nationalistic discourse and, partly, as Russophobia. Dagens Nyheter doesn’t position Russia as a potential threat and Russia doesn’t play a significant role in Dagens Nyheter’s discourse. Dagens Nyheter is mainly focusing on the debate itself. Svenska Dagbladet’s opinion making might possibly be more effective, but at the expense of reproducing a negative construction of Russia.</strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p>

<p>This essay is called ”<em>The hunt for anarchists- a study</em> <em>about the police in Stockholm's collection of bandit portrait during the turn of the century 1900</em>”<em> </em>and it is about the criminal category ”Anarchists” who the police in Stockholm used at the turn of the century 1900.  In the archive from the police in Stockholm during the essays time perspective, 1899-1909,  there are about one hundred photographs in the category ”Anarchists”, about half of these pictures have no information besides the names of the people, but the other half, 48 persons, have some information about age, work title and where the person come from. The information showed that the people in the pictures where not from Sweden, and after controlling them in all different kinds of archives I found only ten of them have left any traces in Stockholm. What I realized then was that the people on the pictures are anarchists from different countries in Europe, mostly from Italy, and that the police in Stockholm had these pictures because different police stations around Europe had sent them to the police in Stockholm. The police in Stockholm where on the lookout for fugitive anarchists.</p><p>The literature about the anarchist movement in Italy during this time describe the hard situation for Italian anarchists. The police had persecuted, arrested and executed manyof them so many anarchists had fled abroad. The same was for Russian anarchists after the unsuccessful revolution in 1905. Eight of the ten anarchists of the police photographs who had been in Stockholm where Russians. They were a group who was accused of trying to kill the Russian czar visiting Stockholm in 1909.</p><p>None of the anarchists on the pictures have ever in Stockholm committed a political crime so to find out what a anarchist crime is have not been possible. But the general picture of the anarchists in the photographs is of a man in his 30’s with a working class job, in short: an everyday man.</p>

<p>I Estland 2007 utbröt vad som kommit att kallas ”Cyberwar I”, vari ett stort antal centrala myndigheters, tillika finansiella institutioners servrar attackerades av massiva så kallade Computer Network Attacks (CNA), utfört av framförallt ryska aktörer. Estland protesterade högljutt, men frågan huruvida CNA är att beteckna som olovligt är allt annat än klar. Prövningen sker mot den folkrättsliga regimen <em>Jus ad Bellum, </em>och huruvida metoden uppfyller vissa centrala begrepp. Men hur skall denna regim<em> </em>appliceras CNA?</p><p>De frågeställningar som avses besvaras är: hur kan CNA utgöra <em>våld </em>eller <em>hot om våld</em> i enlighet med FN-stadgans artikel 2(4) samt hur kan CNA utgöra <em>väpnat angrepp</em> i enlighet med FN-stadgans artikel 51? Detta avses göras genom en studie inbegripande flertalet folkrättsliga experters teorier på området CNA och våldsanvändning, samt applicering av desamma på en fallstudie av händelserna i Estland 2007.</p><p>Sammanfattningsvis konstateras att flertalet variabler har bärighet i hur CNA kan uppfylla artiklarnas centrala begrepp, vari frågan om <em>association, effekt, aktör </em>och <em>mål</em> tydligast faller ut. I en efterföljande diskussion påvisas dock hur variablerna endast är att betrakta som indicier på hur CNA kan klassas så som olovligt, varvid endast statspraxis kan ge den slutgiltiga bedömningen.</p>

<p>Rysslands doktrinella hierarki fungerar utan arenaspecifika doktriner. Det finns ett övergripande säkerhetsstrategiskt dokument, direkt underställt detta dokument finns den militära doktrinen. Ändå utformades 2001 en maritim doktrin som skall behandla det maritima läget och rysslands ekonomiska intressen på haven fram till år 2020. Varför denna doktrin utformades kan ha sitt svar i Rysslands ökade maritima intresse i och kring ryskt havsterritorium, men det kan även vara ett sätt att visa sina officiella ställningstaganden, intressen och intentioner öppet för världssamfundet. 2010 publicerades ett nytt säkerhetsstrategiskt dokument och samma år offentliggjordes även den nya militäradoktrinen. Det utformades i samma veva även en strategisk Arktisk doktrin som tillkännagav Rysslands intentioner och intressen i denna nya och oexploaterade region som tack vare jordens förhöjda medeltemperatur de senare åren har öppnat upp nya områden. Många nationer har blivit intresserade av detta nya område, bland annat USA, Kanada, Danmark och Norge. Detta har i sin tur skapat en grogrund, för tvister om gränsdragningar och om vem som har rätten till resursextraheringen i området. Det som detta arbete kommer att avhandla är, vad den äldre ryska maritima doktrinen har haft för inverkan påde senare utvecklade doktrinerna. Vad finns det för skillnader, likheter och vilka punkter har höjts till en merbeslutad nivå? Utifrån dessa kriterier kommer sedermera en estimering, om vad dessa variabler kan ha förinverkan, på ryska marinstridskrafters uppträdande i Arktis regionen i ett framtidsperspektiv.</p> / <p>Russian doctrine on set hierarchy works without specific arena doctrines. There is a comprehensive security strategy document, and as a direct subordinate to this document is the military doctrine. Yet in the year of 2001 a maritime doctrine was developed to deal with the maritime situation and Russia's economic interests in the seas until 2020. Why this doctrine was designed might have its answer in Russia's increased interest in maritime and Russian waters around the territory, but it can also be a way to show their official positions, interests and intentions open to the world community. In 2010 Russia published a new security strategy document, and the same year the new military doctrine was presented to the public. A strategic doctrine was also produced that announced Russia’s Arctic intentions and interests in this new and undeveloped region. That thanks to the earth's average temperature incensement in recent years has opened up new areas. Many nations are now interested in this new area, including the U.S., Canada, Denmark and Norway. This has created a dispute about the boundaries and who have the right to excavate the resources in the area. What this paper will discuss, is how the older Russian maritime doctrine has influenced the later developed doctrines. What are the differences, similarities, and what points have been raised to amore decision-making level? The based off these criteria will subsequently result, in an estimation of what impact these variables could have, on the Russian naval forces behaviour in the Arctic region ina future perspective.</p>