This master's thesis addresses the often overlooked aspect of transaction costs, capital injections, and withdrawals in fund management theory. The research collaboration with Havsfonden, a newly launched quantitative ESG investment fund, aims to enhance their understanding of transaction costs and capital injections while improving their investment model. The thesis includes a comprehensive literature review, the development of a portfolio model that integrates transaction costs and capital injections, and the numerical implementation and testing of the model using MATLAB. Three distinct models focusing on transaction costs, including linear, fixed, and a combination of both, were created. Additionally, three models were developed to examine capital injections, with one based on past performance and the others considering a constant inflow of capital. The findings indicate that our models provide reasonable implementation and effectively capture the nature of capital injections and transaction costs. / Den här uppsatsen ämnar belysa dem många gånger försummade områdena – transaktionskostnader och kapitalinjektioner – inom portföljeteorin. Uppsatsen är i samarbete med Havsfonden, en nylanserad kvantitativ ESG fond, och syftar till att utvidga förståelsen för hur transaktionskostnader och kapitalinjektioner beaktas och kan modelleras. Uppsatsen omfattar en litteraturstudie, ett ramverk som integrerar transaktionskostnader och kapitalinjektioner, samt en numerisk implementation i MATLAB. Tre modeller för transaktionskostnader har utvecklats, vilket omfattar linjära och fasta transaktionskostnader samt en kombinerad version. Därutöver har tre modeller för kapitalinjektioner utvecklas, varav en baseras på portföljens tidigare prestation, medan de andra baseras på ett konstant inflöde av kapital. Resultatet tyder på att modellerna har implementerats riktigt och lyckas skildra dem utmärkande attributen av transaktionskostnader och kapitalinjektioner.

This thesis is concerned with the investigation of numerical methods for the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations arising in European and American option pricing with proportional transaction costs. We first consider the problem of computing reservation purchase and write prices of a European option in the model proposed by Davis, Panas and Zariphopoulou [19]. It has been shown [19] that computing the reservation purchase and write prices of a European option involves solving three different fully nonlinear HJB equations. In this thesis, we propose a penalty approach combined with a finite difference scheme to solve the HJB equations. We first approximate each of the HJB equations by a quasi-linear second order partial differential equation containing two linear penalty terms with penalty parameters. We then develop a numerical scheme based on the finite differencing in both space and time for solving the penalized equation. We prove that there exists a unique viscosity solution to the penalized equation and the viscosity solution to the penalized equation converges to that of the original HJB equation as the penalty parameters tend to infinity. We also prove that the solution of the finite difference scheme converges to the viscosity solution of the penalized equation. Numerical results are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. We extend the penalty approach combined with a finite difference scheme to the HJB equations in the American option pricing model proposed by Davis and Zarphopoulou [20]. Numerical experiments are presented to illustrate the theoretical findings.

Submitted by Leonardo Gomes Ribeiro Gonçalves (lgribeirogoncalves@gmail.com) on 2016-03-17T23:30:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 GONÇALVES, Leonardo Gomes Ribeiro_dissertação.pdf: 1606735 bytes, checksum: 22d73e62ebec198cb8b8f9a1fcf85787 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2016-03-23T14:59:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 GONÇALVES, Leonardo Gomes Ribeiro_dissertação.pdf: 1606735 bytes, checksum: 22d73e62ebec198cb8b8f9a1fcf85787 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Almeida (maria.socorro@fgv.br) on 2016-03-30T17:30:18Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 GONÇALVES, Leonardo Gomes Ribeiro_dissertação.pdf: 1606735 bytes, checksum: 22d73e62ebec198cb8b8f9a1fcf85787 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-30T17:38:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 GONÇALVES, Leonardo Gomes Ribeiro_dissertação.pdf: 1606735 bytes, checksum: 22d73e62ebec198cb8b8f9a1fcf85787 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-22 / The water and sewage public service relevance is widely recognized. Nevertheless, there is high deficit level of access in Brazil, with different situations in the various country regions. In this sense, the objective of this dissertation is (i) from the interdisciplinary perspective of the Transaction Costs Economics, introduce an understanding of water and sewage public service in Brazil, currently regulated by Law No. 11,445/2007, (ii) evaluate the efficiency of the mainly used mode of governance, and (iii) eventually purpose alternative designs for the organization of the provision, economically superior in terms of reducing transaction costs for necessary investments to fulfill the fundamental objectives defined in art. 2 of Law No. 11,445/2007. The research used as a methodological strategy an interdisciplinary approach to law, economics and organizations, based on the new institutional economics. From the study of the basic institutional environment, with support in the theoretical framework, it was observed that the governance mechanism predominantly used to provide the water and sewage public service in Brazil, ie delegations to State Sanitation Companies through long-term contracts (program contracts) does not favor investments in specific assets (infrastructure) necessary for the supply and does not ensure policy goals. It was also found that there are viable alternatives to overall governance design, although the use of alternative forms probably are not feasible by implementing simple transplant standards, that is, by formal means. The modification of the prevailing water and sewage public service mode of governance, overcoming the verified low performance (low-level equilibrium), can not be held without charge. Therefore, it is necessary to overcome the costs for breaking the path dependence caused by hold-up carried out by the Sanitation State Companies to public service holders (municipalities), as well as costs for the disruption of path dependence in the Brazilian administrative law, which restricts the development of a legal theory of regulation to enable the construction of an adequate regulatory governance to reduce transaction costs in order to make viable investments in infrastructure assets with a high degree of specificity. / O serviço público de saneamento básico tem relevância amplamente reconhecida. Apesar disso, ainda são verificados no Brasil elevados índices de déficit ou de atendimento precário, com situações distintas nas diversas regiões do país. Nesse sentido, o objetivo desta dissertação é (i) apresentar, a partir da perspectiva interdisciplinar da Economia dos Custos de Transação, uma compreensão do serviço público de saneamento básico no Brasil, atualmente regulamentado pela Lei nº 11.445/2007, (ii) avaliar a eficiência do modo de governança majoritariamente utilizado e, (iii) eventualmente, propor desenhos alternativos para a organização da prestação que sejam economicamente superiores em temos de redução de custos de transação para a realização de investimentos necessários ao cumprimento dos objetivos fundamentais definidos no art. 2º, da Lei nº 11.445/2007. A pesquisa adotou como estratégia metodológica a utilização de uma abordagem interdisciplinar de direito, economia e organizações, nos termos da análise econômica da nova economia institucional. A partir o estudo do ambiente institucional básico, com apoio no referencial teórico, observou-se que o mecanismo de governança predominantemente utilizado no serviço público de saneamento básico no Brasil, isto é, delegações a Companhias Estaduais de Saneamento por meio de contratos de longo-prazo (contratos de programa), não favorece a realização de investimentos em ativos específicos (infraestrutura) necessários à prestação e cumprimentos de metas da política. Foi também constatado que existem alternativas de governança viáveis ao desenho predominante, embora a utilização de formas alternativas provavelmente não possua execução viável pelo simples transplante de normas, isto é, pela via formal. A modificação da forma de governança predominante no saneamento básico no Brasil, com a superação do baixo desempenho verificado (low-level equilíbrium), não é possível de ser realizada sem custos. Nesse sentido, é necessário superar os custos para o rompimento do path dependence provocado pelo hold up realizado pelas Companhias Estaduais de Saneamento Básico sobre os titulares do serviço público (municípios), bem como os custos para o rompimento do path dependence no direito administrativo brasileiro, o qual restringe o desenvolvimento de uma teoria jurídica da regulação apta a viabilizar a construção de uma governança regulatória adequada à redução dos custos de transação, de modo a tornar viáveis investimentos em ativos de infraestruturas com elevado grau de especificidade.

In this thesis we study the utility maximization problem for assets whose prices are cointegrated, which arises from the investment practice of convergence trading and its special forms, pairs trading and spread trading. The major theme in the first two chapters of the thesis, is to investigate the assumption of market-neutrality of the optimal convergence trading strategies, which is a ubiquitous assumption taken by practitioners and academics alike. This assumption lacks a theoretical justification and, to the best of our knowledge, the only relevant study is Liu and Timmermann (2013) which implies that the optimal convergence strategies are, in general, not market-neutral. We start by considering a minimalistic pairs-trading scenario with two cointegrated stocks and solve the Merton investment problem with power and logarithmic utilities. We pay special attention to when/if the stochastic control problem is well-posed, which is overlooked in the study done by Liu and Timmermann (2013). In particular, we show that the problem is ill-posed if and only if the agent’s risk-aversion is less than a constant which is an explicit function of the market parameters. This condition, in turn, yields the necessary and sufficient condition for well-posedness of the Merton problem for all possible values of agent’s risk-aversion. The resulting well-posedness condition is surprisingly strict and, in particular, is equivalent to assuming the optimal investment strategy in the stocks to be market-neutral. Furthermore, it is shown that the well-posedness condition is equivalent to applying Novikov’s condition to the market-price of risk, which is a ubiquitous sufficient condition for imposing absence of arbitrage. To the best of our knowledge, these are the only theoretical results for supporting the assumption of market-neutrality of convergence trading strategies. We then generalise the results to the more realistic setting of multiple cointegrated assets, assuming risk factors that effects the asset returns, and general utility functions for investor’s preference. In the process of generalising the bivariate results, we also obtained some well-posedness conditions for matrix Riccati differential equations which are, to the best of our knowledge, new. In the last chapter, we set up and justify a Merton problem that is related to spread-trading with two futures assets and assuming proportional transaction costs. The model possesses three characteristics whose combination makes it different from the existing literature on proportional transaction costs: 1) finite time horizon, 2) Multiple risky assets 3) stochastic opportunity set. We introduce the HJB equation and provide rigorous arguments showing that the corresponding value function is the viscosity solution of the HJB equation. We end the chapter by devising a numerical scheme, based on the penalty method of Forsyth and Vetzal (2002), to approximate the viscosity solution of the HJB equation.

新古典理論探析土地利用區位之決定，純粹從資源與技術因素探討理性人的經濟行為，而忽略經濟活動中人的受限理性因素，以及制度運行的交易成本因素，致無法圓滿解釋殯葬用地區位之形成。本文將抗爭交易成本當成都市地租理論的自變項，嘗試修正Alonso等人的新古典競租模型，並建構適合殯葬設施用途的競租理論，進而分析陰宅之負擔地租能力提高是否入侵陽宅用地，及抗爭阻力大小與殯葬用地區位距市申心遠近之關係。經實證結果發現，由於高額抗爭交易成本之存在，縱使人們對於陰宅需求增加，陰宅之負擔地租能力提高，亦可能無法入侵陽宅用地，迫使開發者往更遠離市中心之區位設置殯葬設施。高額抗爭交易成本隱含制度供給不足現象，同時阻礙了土地資源利用之合理有效配置。其次，殯葬設施設置之抗爭阻力大小與地點距離並無必然關係，顯示忽略交易成本因素，而純粹以地點距離為區位選擇考量的公共政策之缺陷。上開分析不但能深化新古典都市地租理論之意涵，也將有助於對鄰避型設施設置區位問題之掌握與了解，提供改善鄰避衝突公共政策問題之理論基礎。 經藉由交易成本理論觀點，探析殯葬用地區位管理政策之結果，發現我國之政策設計主要係基於確保公共衛生及避免妨害生活環境，於主要法規規範設置地點及距離，而忽略抗爭交易成本之制度因素存在。至於相關法規規範土地使用分區，其禁止設置的分區較多，容許設置的分區較少，有待調整改進。源於上述政策缺陷，本文研擬改進構想，包括賦予抗爭與反抗爭之間更多自主協商空間；強化殯葬設施規劃之人間性與文化性；改革不合時宜之殯葬禮儀文化；以及地方政府應慎選適當地點劃設專用區，供設置經營殯葬設施使用等，如欲落實至應用層面，有待制定法律將改進構想納入其中。 本文共分七章，第一章為緒論、第二章由文獻評述中獲得啟發，以建立分析架構。第三章從殯葬用地區位選擇之發展歷史中，探究在都市發展的過程中，殯葬用地相對於非殯葬用地的區位變遷情形，及其影響此種變遷的制度或非制度因素。第四章檢視傳統新古典區位理論運用於探究殯葬用地區位之限制，並從新制度主義交易成本理論之修正觀點建立本文之研究假設。第五章依研究假設實證估算抗爭交易成本之存在，並比較分析各殯葬設施設置抗爭案例，以了解抗爭交易成本大小與殯葬設施區位之關係及其隱含的制度、經濟與規劃意義。第六章根據實證分析結果，並配套考量行政管制及文化等其他制度因素，進而嘗試研議提供政府從事殯葬用地規劃與管理之參考決策。第七章為結論與建議。 關鍵字：殯葬用地、區位、交易成本、新古典競租模型、新制度主義 / Neo-classicalism explores the decision of the location of the land use by mainly analyzing the human economic behavior through the factors of resources and techniques. However, the theory is not able to explain the formation of the location of funerary lands well because it neglects people are restricted by the factors of bounded rationality in the economic activities and the transaction costs when the institutions is functioning. The paper tries to amend the Neoclassical Bid-Rent Model of Alonso by defining the factor of resisting transaction costs as the independent variable of the urban land rent theory, and establishes the suitable Bid-Rent theory for firnerary facilities. Furthermore, the paper analyzes if enhancing the ability of affording the rent of the firnerary Land will invade the nonfunerary land, the relationship between the degree of resisting obstruction and the distance from the firnerary land to the CBD. Through the identification, the funerary land won't invade the nonfunerary land due to the high resisting transaction cost even increasing the demand and the ability of affording the rent of the funerary land, thus, it will force the developer to establish the funerary facilities far away CBD. High resisting transaction costs imply the lack of system supply and hinder the reasonable and efficient allocation of the land resource use simultaneously. This expose the defect of the public policy for location decision only considering the site distance but neglect the factor of the transaction cost. The above analysis will not only deeply elaborate the Neo-Classical Urban Land Theory, but will also be helpful to understand the issue of sitting NIMBY facilities and to provide the basis of the theory to improve the public policies of NIMBY conflicts. Exploring the administrative policy of location selection through the transaction costs theory,The paper find out that in order to preserve public health and prevent disorder of living environment, the law regulates the site and distance from populous or water conservation areas without considering the transaction costs. In addition, the zoning system concerning the construction of funerary facilities puts more emphasis on prohibition than permission, which needs to be improved. Owing to the policy limitations, the paper proposes the improvement of the policies as follows. First, leave more spaces for negotiation between resistance parties and developers. Second, design the funerary facilities to meet human and cultural needs. Third, reform the culture of funeral rites. Fourth, choose the suitable site and plan special zones to provide the suitable areas for construction and management of funerary facilities. The relevant laws have to be amended or to be established so that the policies suggestion will be put to practice. Keywords : Funerary Lands, Location, Transaction Costs, Neoclassical Bid-Rent Model, Neoinstitutionalism

Dans cette thèse, nous nous intéressons à des sujets différents en mathématiques financières, tous liés aux imperfections de marché et à la technique fondamentale de la maximisation d'utilité. Elle comporte trois parties. Dans la première, qui se base sur deux papiers, nous considérons le problème d'investissement optimal sur un marché financier avec coûts de transaction proportionnels. On commence par étudier le problème d'investissement dans le cas où la fonction d'utilité est multivariée (ce qui s'adapte particulièrement bien aux marchés des devises) et l'agent a une dotation initiale aléatoire, qui peut s'interpréter comme une option ou un autre contrat dérivé. Après avoir analysé les propriétés du problème et de son dual, nous utilisons ces résultats pour examiner, dans ce contexte, certains aspects d'une technique de pricing devenue populaire dans le cadre des marchés incomplets, l'évaluation par indifférence d'utilité. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous étudions le problème d'existence d'un ensemble de prix (appelés "prix fictifs" ou "shadow prices") qui offrirait la même utilité maximale à l'agent si le marché n'avait pas de frictions. Ces résultats sont utiles pour clarifier le lien entre la théorie classique des marchés sans frictions et la littérature en croissance rapide sur les coûts de transaction. Dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse, nous considérons le problème d'évaluation de produits dérivés par indifférence d'utilité dans des marchés incomplets, où la source d'incomplétude provient du fait que certains actifs ne peuvent pas être échangés sur le marché, ce qui est le cas par exemple dans le cadre des modèles structurels pour le prix de l'électricité. Sous certaines hypothèses, nous dérivons une caractérisation en terme d'équations différentielles stochastiques rétrogrades (EDSR) pour le prix, et nous nous concentrons ensuite sur les options européennes en établissant en particulier l'existence d'une stratégie de couverture optimale, même lorsque le payoff présente des discontinuités et est éventuellement non borné. Dans la dernière partie, nous analysons un simple problème de principal-agent à horizon fini, où le principal est essentiellement interprété comme un régulateur et l'agent comme une entreprise qui produit certaines émissions polluantes. Nous traitons séparément les problèmes du principal et de l'agent et nous utilisons la théorie des EDSR pour fournir des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes d'optimalité. Nous effectuons également des analyses de sensibilité et nous montrons des résultats numériques dans le but de fournir une meilleure compréhension du comportement des agents. / In this thesis we deal with different topics in financial mathematics, that are all related to market imperfections and to the fundamental technique of utility maximization. The work consists of three parts. In the first one, which is based on two papers, we consider the problem of optimal investment on a financial market with proportional transaction costs. We initially study the investment problem in the case where the utility function is multivariate (which is particularly suitable on currency markets) and the agent is endowed with a random claim, which can be interpreted as an option or another derivative contract. After analyzing the properties of the primal and dual problems, we apply those results to investigate, in this context, some aspects of a popular pricing technique in incomplete markets, i.e. utility indifference evaluation. In the second contribution to the transaction costs literature, we investigate the existence problem for a set of prices (called shadow prices) that would provide the same maximal utility to the agent if the market did not have frictions. These results shed some light on the link between the classical theory of frictionless markets and the quickly growing literature on transaction costs. In the second part of this thesis we consider the utility indifference pricing problem in incomplete markets, where the source of incompleteness comes from the fact that some assets in the market cannot be actively traded, which is the case for example in the framework of structural models for electricity prices. We provide a BSDE characterization for the price under mild assumptions, and then focus on the case of European claims by establishing in particular the existence of an optimal hedging strategy even when the claim presents discontinuities and is possibly unbounded. In the last contribution we analyze a simple principal-agent problem in finite time horizon, where the principal is mainly interpreted as a regulator and the agent as a firm producing some kind of polluting emissions. We separately treat both the agent's and the principal's problems and use the BSDE theory for providing necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. We also perform some sensitivity analyses and give numerical results in order to provide a better understanding of the agents' behavior.

Die bisherigen Heranziehungsmodelle der Rechtsökonomik bei der Rechtsanwendung geht vor allem davon aus, dass die Effizienz als Rechtsprinzip in bestimmten Rechtsordnungen inbegriffen ist. Dies schränkt aber die Rolle der Rechtsökonomik für die Rechtsanwendung ein. Da der Rechtsanwender in Deutschland sowohl am geltenden Recht als auch an wissenschaftlichen Gesetzen binden soll, kann die Rechtsökonomik als die im Sinne vom kritischen Rationalismus genannte Wissenschaft zur Erklärung menschlichen Verhaltens unter Berücksichtigung der gegebenen Rechtszuordnungen bezeichnet werden. Daraus ergibt sich, dass die aus der wissenschaftlichen Rechtsökonomik abgeleitete Gesetzmäßigkeit dem Rechtsanwender nachkommen soll, sodass die Rechtsökonomik als Rechtsanwendungsmethode unbeschränkt bei der Rechtsanwendung verwertet werden kann. Bei der Auswahl rechtsdogmatischer Lehrsätze bei der Rechtsanwendung ist das Werturteil unvermeidlich, mithilfe des vom kritischen Rationalismus vertretenen Brückenprinzips und Komparativismus kann die Werturteilproblematik bei der Rechtsanwendung durch die positive Wissenschaft und Rechtsökonomik gelöst werden. Die konkrete Methode zur Auswahl rechtsdogmatischer Lehrsätze ist es, dass durch die positive Rechtsökonomik diese rechtsdogmatische Lehre auszuwählen ist, die im Vergleich mit anderen konkurrierenden Lehren das restriktive Minimum der Transaktionskosten darstellt und somit die faktische Geltung der entsprechenden rechtlichen Regelung unter dem gegebenen Umstand am höchsten verwirklicht. / The previous application models of economics of law in the judicial application assume that efficiency as a legal principle is included in the jurisdiction. However, this limits the role of economics of law in the judicial application. As the legal practitioner in Germany shall obey applicable laws and scientific laws, economics of law can be recognized as a real science in the sense of critical rationalism, explaining the human behavior under the condition of the given legal order. It follows that the regularity derived from the scientific economics of law shall be complied with by the legal practitioner, so that the economics of law can be indefinitely used in the judicial application. By selecting the concrete legal dogmatic doctrines in the judicial application, the value judgement is inevitable. With the help of bridge principle and comparativism of the critical rationalism, the value judgement problem can be resolved through the positive science and the positive economics of law. The concrete method of selecting legal dogmatic doctrines is that the legal dogmatic doctrine, which represents the restrictive minimum of the transaction costs and thus realizes the de facto validity of the relevant legal provisions under the given circumstance in highest grade, shall be selected through the positive economics of law.

Syfte: Studiens syfte är att analysera huruvida korruption i biståndsprocesser bättre kan hanteras via de blockkedjebaserade lösningarna kryptovalutor, smarta kontrakt och tokens, jämfört med traditionellt biståndsgivande. Vidare ämnar studien applicera resultaten från fallstudien på generella avtalsprocesser exponerade mot opportunism, för att analysera huruvida de blockkedjebaserade lösningarna bättre kan hantera transaktionskostnader jämfört med traditionella avtalslösningar. Bakgrund: Informationsasymmetrier, begränsad rationalitet och strategiskt beteende resulterar i tillitsproblematik vid avtalsprocesser, vilket ökar transaktionskostnaderna (Williamson, 1974). Biståndsprocesser är extra exponerade mot opportunistiskt beteende i form av korruption, vilket leder till att en stor del av biståndet försvinner på vägen (Transparency International, 2017). Blockkedjebaserad teknik ger möjligheten att ingå avtal utan tillit till motparten, men  lösningen är inte optimal för alla typer av avtal. Det motiverar en analys om huruvida tekniken kan hantera transaktionskostnader i biståndsprocesser bättre än traditionellt biståndsgivande. Genomförande: Studiens primärdata inhämtades via semi-strukturerade intervjuer med två svenska biståndsorganisationer och två experter inom blockkedjetekniken. Utöver intervjuerna genomfördes även en litteraturstudie och den insamlade empirin analyserades utifrån ett transaktionskostnadsperspektiv. Slutsats: Blockkedjebaserade lösningar kan hantera transaktionskostnader bättre än traditionellt biståndsgivande när Greenspans (2015) fem kriterium är uppfyllda. Kontexten, avtalets karaktär och avtalsparternas preferenser är de avgörande faktorerna huruvida kriterierna uppfylls i såväl biståndsgivande som generella avtalsprocesser. En ökad transparens, öppenhet och censurresistens måste värderas högre vid implementering än de medföljande säkerhetsriskerna. / Purpose: The purpose of this study is to analyze whether corruption in aid processes better can be managed through the blockchain-based solutions cryptocurrencies, smart contracts and tokens, in comparison to traditional donation of aid. The study also aims to apply the results from the case study to general contractual processes exposed to opportunistic behavior, to analyze whether the blockchain-based solutions better can manage the transaction costs in comparison to traditional contractual solutions. Background: Asymmetric information, bounded rationality and strategic behavior result in trust issues in contractual processes, which increases transaction costs (Williamson, 1974). Aid processes are particularly exposed to opportunistic behavior in form of corruption, which leads to aid disappearing on the way (Transparency International, 2017). Blockchain-based technology enables contractual relationships without trusting the counterpart, but is not an optimal solution for all types of contracts. This provides incentives for a further analysis whether the technology can manage transaction costs in aid processes better than traditional donation of aid. Completion: The study´s primary data was obtained through semi-structed interviews with two Swedish aid organizations and two experts in blockchain technology. A literature review was made and the empirical data was analyzed from a transaction cost perspective. Conclusion: Blockchain-based solutions can manage transaction costs better than the traditional donation of aid when Greenspan´s (2015) five criteria is met. The context, the characteristics of the contract and the preferences of the contracting parties are the decisive factors whether the criteria are met in the aid donation process and in general contractual processes. Increased transparency, openness and censor resistance must be valued higher when implementing the technology than the following security risks. / <p>Bilagor är inkluderade</p>

[pt] A forma de estruturação e gerenciamento dos canais de distribuição constitui para as firmas uma importante fonte de vantagem competitiva. Em linha com a sua visibilidade, o franchising vem atraindo a atenção de pesquisadores das mais diversas linhas teóricas, interessados em aprofundar a compreensão quanto as suas implicações econômicas e estratégicas. Esta pesquisa visa contribuir para ampliar os entendimentos quanto aos fatores que influenciam a adoção e o desenvolvimento do sistema, assim como da relação entre o seu grau de utilização e o desempenho das firmas. Com base na revisão da literatura, desenvolveu-se um modelo estrutural utilizando fatores preconizados pelas teorias da escassez de recursos, custos de transação e da agência. Esta modelagem do problema permitiu o teste das relações hipotetizadas e a mensuração das contribuições dos fatores na explicação do franchising e do desempenho das firmas. A investigação empírica utilizou informações de domínio público sobre 88 redes de fast food que operam no Brasil. De forma geral, os resultados corroboraram diversas proposições teóricas quanto aos efeitos dos fatores selecionados sobre do nível de utilização do franchising pelas firmas. Adicionalmente, revelou-se um impacto conjunto dos fatores antecedentes e da forma de estruturação das redes sobre o desempenho dos franqueadores. A análise da influência da maturidade das firmas permitiu diferenciar a importância relativa das relações estruturais do modelo entre franqueadores novos e maduros. Finalmente, foram discutidas as implicações acadêmicas e gerenciais das conclusões, bem como apontadas sugestões para futuras pesquisas. / [en] The distribution channel structuring and management represents to firms an important source of competitive advantage. Measure with its visibility, franchising has captured the attention of researchers from a wide variety of theoretical backgrounds, interested in deepening the understanding of its economic and strategic implications. This research aims at providing further comprehension about the factors that lead to the franchising adoption and development as well as the relationship between its level of utilization and companies´ performance. Based on literature review, a structural model was developed using factors nourished by the resource scarcity, transaction costs and agency theories. This problem-modeling approach allowed the testing of hypothesized relationships and the measuring of factors the contributions to the explanation of franchising and the performance of companies. The empirical investigation was developed using public information regarding 88 fast food chains operating in Brazil. Overall, the findings offered support for several theoretical propositions concerning the effects of each selected factors over the use if franchising level. Furthermore, the results revealed a combined impact of the selected factors and the network structure on franchisors´ performance. The examination of the company´s experience influence allows differentiating the relative importance of some structural relationships among young and mature franchisors. Finally, the academic and managerial implications of the conclusions were discussed and suggestions for future studies were provided.

La privatisation des entreprises industrielles en Algérie a été initiée en 1995 par le PAS (Programme d’Ajustement Structurel) appliqué à une économie qui était en cessation de paiement. La privatisation des entreprises sous l’égide du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale avait donc pour principal objectif d’alléger les dépenses de l’Etat pour rétablir l’équilibre budgétaire et l’équilibre des comptes extérieurs dans le contexte d’une économie en voie de libéralisation progressive. Les mesures du PAS dont la privatisation ne sont pas intégrées dans une politique industrielle. En 2001, une ordonnance stipule que toutes les entreprises sont privatisables. Un tournant a cependant été observé dés 2007 puisque la privatisation des entreprises est intégrée dans une politique industrielle. Elle doit désormais contribuer à freiner la désindustrialisation amorcée durant la décennie 1980 et aggravée par le PAS et à améliorer la compétitivité de l’économie algérienne. Après un échec, le bilan de la privatisation des entreprises s’améliore d’un point de vue quantitatif (dés 2005) et qualitatif (IDE hors-hydrocarbures) particulièrement en 2007, comme le montre notre bilan qui est global et qui traite aussi dans le détail de cas d’entreprises privatisées. Cependant, depuis 2008, le « climat des affaires » marqué par une instabilité juridique, l’interventionnisme, la crise économique mondiale semble peu propice à une privatisation qui pourrait permettre à l’industrie algérienne de sortir de sa dépendance vis-à-vis des hydrocarbures. Nous concluons que malgré quelques rares succès, la privatisation des entreprises en Algérie a échoué parce que ces dernières n’ont pas bénéficié, au préalable de restructuration stratégique. De plus, la privatisation n’a pas été encadrée par des institutions et une politique industrielle efficaces. / The privatization of industrial enterprises in Algeria was initiated in 1995 by the SAP (Structural Adjustment Program) applied to an economy that was insolvent. The privatization of companies under the aegis of the IMF and the World Bank had therefore the main objective to reduce government expenditure in order to restore the balance of both state budget and external accounts in the context of an economy in the process of gradual liberalization. The SAP measures including privatization are not integrated into an industrial policy. In 2001 an ordinance stipulates that all companies can be privatized. A turning point was however observed in 2007 because privatization is integrated into an industrial policy. Privatization must now help to stop the deindustrialization that began during the 1980s and exacerbated by the SAP and to improve the competitiveness of the Algerian economy. After a failure, the privatization results improves by a quantitative point of view (from 2005) and qualitative (non-hydrocarbon FDI), especially in 2007, as shown in our assessment that is global, and dealing also in details of cases of privatized enterprises. However, since 2008, the "business climate" marked by legal instability, interventionism, the global economic crisis does not seem conducive to a privatization that could help the Algerian industry to go out of its dependence on hydrocarbons. We conclude that despite a few successes, the privatization of enterprises in Algeria failed because these last ones have not benefited from prior strategic restructuring. In addition, privatization has not been supervised by effective institutions and industrial policy.