Submitted by Rachel Lopes Telésforo (rachel@tclaw.adv.br) on 2017-03-15T19:58:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 RLT - DISSERTACAO MESTRADO - 2017.docx: 1963235 bytes, checksum: 3dcbac03c54376081f5116490cd805fa (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Publicação Direito Rio (publicacao.direitorio@fgv.br) on 2017-03-16T13:47:59Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 RLT - DISSERTACAO MESTRADO - 2017.docx: 1963235 bytes, checksum: 3dcbac03c54376081f5116490cd805fa (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-22T19:56:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 RLT - DISSERTACAO MESTRADO - 2017.docx: 1963235 bytes, checksum: 3dcbac03c54376081f5116490cd805fa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016 / Technologic innovation is inevitable. Regulation, optional. All over the world, economic trends emerge every moment. Regarding the individual transport system of passengers, focus of this work, sharing economy brought paradigmatic disruptions, as occurred with the arrival of Uber device that offers similar services to taxis and promises to reduce ― or even eliminate ― existing market failures for years. Taxi Market is known for taxis upregulation, and until then, little competition and low consumer satisfaction index. Uber´s presence brought greater expectations of quality, but in the opposite direction of the success with users, the regulator follow the following cycle of intervention all over the world: (i) Immediate app’s prohibition; (ii) Uber’s indirect prohibition, according regulation in accordance with the traditional system/ 'a la taxi' (planning permissions and other mechanisms) and (iii) studies to introduction of a specific regulation, that put together technologic benefices and real attendance to public interest. To look more closely to the cycles, this paper analyzed the regulator’s posture in 23 megacities all over the world, according definition of United Nations – UN, that exemplified agent´s conduct in the cities with more than seven million habitants. Faced with said interventions, this paper has concluded that there is a strong regulatory capture in the transport of passenger’s market ― and there was made a theoretical approach of the Public Choice Theory ― since the first and second cycles evidence benefices of small groups of interest in the sector, rather than the mass. Besides that, since technology can reduce problems involving situations of monopolies, asymmetric information and negative externalities, there is no reason to justify the necessity of maintenance of the regulation, already considered excessive in said market. Also, it is worth mentioning that the regulatory actions were directly countered not only by the popular opinion, but mainly by force of judicial decisions all over the world, that by means of preliminary injunctions prevented abrasive reactions of those agents, and that indicates that judiciary sector is not captured. The third cycle of regulatory intervention indicates a way of interconnection between collaborative economies and urban solutions with the objective of the collective benefice. Studies all over the world points the necessity of regulatory alternatives that can conciliate the public interest with the comprehension of the technologic progress. However, to achieve the third cycle of regulation, it is necessary that the regulator abandon the character merely supervisory and assumes a behavior more analytical and proactive, with the objective of finding regulatory alternatives able to bring gains in infrastructure and urbanization. / A inovação tecnológica é inevitável. A regulação, opcional. Ao redor do mundo, tendências econômicas surgem a cada instante. No que tange ao sistema de transporte individual de passageiros, foco do presente trabalho, a economia de compartilhamento trouxe rompimentos paradigmáticos, como o que ocorreu com a chegada do dispositivo Uber, que oferece serviços semelhantes ao de táxis e reduz ― chegando em alguns casos, a eliminar ― falhas de mercado existentes há anos. O mercado de táxis é conhecido pela alta regulação, tendo até então, pouca concorrência e baixo índice de satisfação do consumidor. A presença do Uber trouxe maior expectativa de qualidade, mas em contramão ao sucesso junto aos usuários, o regulador segue o seguinte ciclo de intervenção reguladora, ao redor do mundo: (i) proibição imediata do aplicativo; (ii) proibição indireta do Uber, por meio de regulação feita de acordo com o sistema tradicional/ 'a la táxi' (concessão de alvarás, dentre outros mecanismos) e (iii) estudos para implementação de uma regulação específica, que une os benefícios tecnológicos ao real atendimento do interesse público. Para analisar mais profundamente esses ciclos, estudou-se a postura do regulador em 23 megacidades ao redor do mundo, conforme padrão definido pelas Organização das Nações Unidas – ONU, o que exemplificou a conduta dos agentes em cidades com mais de sete milhões de habitantes. Diante de tais intervenções, chegou-se à conclusão de que existe forte captura regulatória no sistema de transporte de passageiros ― tendo sido feita uma abordagem da Teoria da Escolha Pública ― já que os dois primeiros ciclos apontam benefícios de pequenos grupos de interesse no setor, em detrimento do coletivo. Além disso, se a tecnologia é capaz de reduzir falhas envolvendo situações de monopólios situacionais, assimetrias de informação e externalidades negativas, não haveria outro motivo que justificasse a necessidade na manutenção da regulação, já tida como excedente no mercado em apreço. Válido mencionar que as ações regulatórias foram prontamente combatidas não apenas pela opinião popular, mas principalmente por meio de decisões judiciais ao redor do mundo, que por meio de liminares impediram reações mais abrasivas de tais agentes, e o que aponta que tal setor não se encontra capturado. O terceiro ciclo de intervenção regulatória indica um caminho de interconexão entre as economias de colaboração com medidas urbanas que busquem beneficiar o coletivo. Estudos ao redor do mundo evidenciam a necessidade de alternativas regulatórias que possam conciliar o interesse público com a compreensão da natureza do progresso tecnológico. No entanto, para que se chegue a tal ciclo interventivo, é necessário que o regulador abandone o caráter meramente fiscalizatório e assuma comportamento mais analítico e proativo, no sentido de aplicar alternativas regulatórias que impliquem em medidas que representem ganhos em infraestrutura e urbanização.

This thesis examines whether two sharing economy organisations, Uber and Bilpoolarna, can be characterized by Elinor Ostrom’s principles for cooperation of common goods or not. The idea for the research question came from the global difficulties with the decision-making regarding the climate issue and Elinor Ostroms studies about the possibility to create sustainable cooperations regarding the distribution of common goods. If cooperation is possible, we might be able to together develop the climate actions in the right direction and make sustainable distributions of resources we have despite missing actions on a global level. The current growth of the sharing economy could be a sign of that possibility. The final result is that the association Bilpoolarna fulfills all principles more or less while Uber fails to fulfill principle 3, 5 and 6, and only to a small extent fulfills the remaining principles. The result indicates that Ostrom’s principles of cooperation not only characterizes common, non-excludable goods such as water and land, but also can extend its principles to the distribution of modern resources, such as the cars of Bilpoolarna – as long as the cooperation is voluntary and on a local level.

近來共享經濟商業模式崛起，對各國既有相關市場皆造成不少之衝擊，當中，優步公司用以計算車資之「訂價演算法」，於美國實務亦引起許多爭議。美國司法案例中其中一個重要爭議即為優步公司單方制定之「訂價演算法」與其採行之「高峰動態訂價法」究否構成價格聯合行為。於美國實務近來2起與價格聯合行為相關之案例，即包含Meyer v. Kalanick案與Chamber of Commerce & RASIER, LLC v. City of Seattle案（以下簡稱「City of Seattle案」）中，皆可見Uber企圖正當化其價格聯合行為，以免於競爭法審查下有違法之嫌。而美國對於價格聯合行為之規範，載明於休曼法第1條；依據休曼法第1條規定，若原告擬主張被告行為違反卡特爾行為，則應證明系爭卡特爾行為符合合意主體要件、具合意或共謀行為，與造成限制性之競爭效果等三項要件。由於上述二案皆仍於訴訟前階段，判決尚未出爐，因此，此議題值得吾等分析之。本文擬以美國實務判決為基準，彙整相關爭議，進而探討Uber所採訂價演算法是否構成價格聯合行為。 本文發現，雖然此等訂價演算法究否構成價格聯合行為尚未有定論，然由於訂價演算法中之高峰動態訂價法可提高駕駛於尖峰時段中提供載客服務之誘因，將有助於調節市場機制與促進競爭。此外，Uber亦可利用其訂價演算法與設置平台所奠立之優勢，使其得以潛在破壞市場秩序之形式，創造競爭優勢。據此，Uber除可克服既有行政管制下市場進入之劣勢外，亦得使相關市場交易效率大幅提升、市場更加競爭。因此，於探討Uber價格聯合行為合法與否時，亦應將此等因素納入考量。 / The rapid expansion of sharing economy enterprises around the world has led to many challenges. And among these enterprises, one of the most disruptive examples is Uber because of its algorithm. In the United States, the lawsuits regarding Uber's algorithm has also gained massive attention. One of the controversial issues of the complaints relies upon whether Uber's algorithm which set by Uber, and “surge pricing” model do constitute an illegal price-fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In 2 recent high-profile cases, Meyer v. Kalanick & Chamber of Commerce & RASIER, LLC v. City of Seattle, Uber has tried to justify its price fixing to avoid antitrust scrutiny. There are three specific facts that the Plaintiff must prove to establish its antitrust claim in Section 1 of the Sherman Act: 2 or more entities entering into an agreement, conspiracy, and unreasonably restrains competition. Analysis regarding Uber's algorithm is significant because the trials are ongoing. Therefore, the thesis examines whether Uber's algorithm do constitute an illegal price-fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act by exploring the potential problems with regard to the elements based on U.S. judicial decisions. The thesis believes that Uber's algorithm can enhance the efficiency of transaction and has pro-competitive effects, leading to the impact of Uber's surge pricing on providing the incentives for drivers during peak hours. Establishing platform and Uber's algorithm create Uber's strengths and advantages. By having disrupted the existing industry, Uber's algorithm serves pro-competitive purposes.

摘要 本文探討近年興起之共享經濟商業模式及其合法性爭議，並且聚焦於共享經濟平台於競爭法上產生之問題，主要係以Uber為討論對象，整理及分析其於我國所產生之管制爭議，檢討評估是否違反我國競爭法之相關規定。Uber於我國產生之爭議主要分為管制、稅務及保險三方面，政府應將Uber在台所有營業所得列入營所稅課徵範圍，並且制定適合共享經濟平台之管制法規，使消費者保護、公平競爭及維護創新能夠達到平衡。在Uber所採取的營運模式中，其本身即為運輸服務提供者，與計程車業者處於同一相關市場，旗下司機則為其個別運送工作之承攬人，故Uber招攬司機若涉有不實廣告應適用公平交易法，而非針對不實招攬員工的就業服務法。且個別司機既係承接Uber已成交之運送工作，並未直接對外提供運輸服務，Uber對外使用同一計價方式並不構成司機間之水平聯合定價或其與司機間之垂直價格限制。Uber於汽車運輸服務市場中尚未具有獨占地位，亦不適用濫用獨占地位之規範。其載客訂價若未低於本身之平均變動成本，亦不致構成公平交易法第20條第3款之低價利誘行為。計程車業者係因現行管制規範導致成本偏高，難以與Uber競爭。公平交易法應堅守維護市場競爭之根本立場，對於Uber較具效率但不見容於現行交通法規之競爭行為，應該交由公路法處理，競爭法不應介入管制。

I examine whether Uber and Lyft are currently complements or substitutes of public transit, and how partnerships between cities and ride sharing companies can increase their complementary relationship and solve parking and mobility issues. The results suggest that transportation network companies (TNCs) like Uber and Lyft do not have a statistically significant effect on public transit ridership overall, but are complements of public transit for certain populations. Policies that give discounts for TNC rides taken to and from transit stops help solve the first mile / last mile problem, which consequently help increase transit ridership.

Essenslieferungen, Fahrdienste oder etwa die Erledigung von Kleinstaufträgen sog. „Microjobs“, besonders seit der COVID-19-Pandemie erfolgt diese Arbeit immer häufiger unter Vermittlung digitaler Plattformen. Diese Untersuchung eröffnet den Blick auf eine in der Vergangenheit gänzlich unbekannte Form der Arbeitsorganisation, bei der einer vermeintlichen Autonomie der Plattformarbeiter ein Intermediär gegenübersteht, der seine zentrale Position zur Steuerung und Kontrolle ebendieser Plattformarbeiter nutzt und dennoch das Vorliegen eines Arbeitsverhältnisses in der Regel vehement bestreitet. Die Dissertation arbeitet zunächst die theoretischen Grundlagen und wirtschaftlichen Hintergründe derartiger Plattformarbeit heraus. Im zweiten Schritt erfolgt auf Basis von Fallbeispielen – Clickworker, Deliveroo, Upwork – erstmals eine umfassende steuerrechtliche Einordnung des Phänomens Plattformarbeit. Hierbei werden die wesentlichen Besonderheiten im Vergleich zu tradierten Arbeitsverhältnissen, insbesondere die Steuerung der Plattformarbeiter mittels algorithmusbasierter Methoden der Verhaltensökonomie, und deren Auswirkungen auf die steuerliche Einordnung ausführlich beleuchtet. Es kann nachgewiesen werden, dass abhängig von der Art der zu erledigenden Aufgaben vom Intermediär ein Anreizsystem geschaffen werden muss, welches eine indirekte Steuerung des Plattformarbeiters zum Ziel und den Bezug von Einkünften aus nichtselbständiger Arbeit zur Folge hat. Abschließend werden für die ermittelten Unzulänglichkeiten der tradierten steuerlichen Abgrenzungskriterien Lösungsvorschläge entwickelt, etwa eine Beweislastregelung zu Gunsten der Plattformarbeiter. Auf Grund des Querschnittcharakters des Themas schafft die Arbeit zugleich interessante Ansatzpunkte für andere Rechtsgebiete, beispielsweise das Arbeits- oder Vertragsrecht. Stand des Werkes ist Juli 2020.

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