This dissertation, empirically examines ownership structure and its impacts on shareholder wealth. In the first chapter I examine the relation between ownership structure and M&A target selection when family firms purse acquisitions, focusing on the factors that influence family selection of targets. My results indicate that family firm acquirers select targets that are smaller and have low growth potential. I focus on short- and long-run stock market reactions to merger and acquisition announcements of family versus nonfamily bidders and their associated targets. I find that acquirers with family ownership have better cumulative average abnormal returns in the short run and higher buy-and-hold abnormal returns up to one year after the acquisition. Family firms also take a greater share of the merger synergy than do nonfamily bidders while the overall merger synergy is invariant to ownership structure. These results suggest that family firms pick different targets than nonfamily firms and benefit minority shareholders when they acquire. This chapter provides evidence that family ownership does not destroy value during M&A transactions; instead, the analysis indicates that family owners appear to choose better targets. In the second chapter I examine firms with dual class structures. Firms with limited voting shares, dual class firms, persist over time in spite of the widespread view that they embody a “corruption of the governance system” (Calpers, 2011). I find that founders and their heirs control 89% of dual class firms, making it difficult to disentangle family control and voting rights. I document that family owners hold 30% greater economic exposure in dual class firms than in single class family firms. Investors place lower values on both single and dual class family firms relative to non-family firms. In contrast, non-family dual class firms exhibit a 19% premium relative to single class firms. Further analysis shows that 8 industries contain 58% of these limited voting share firms - industries that require high brand maintenance and intangible assets. Strikingly, I find that outside shareholders of dual class firms earn excess returns of about 350 basis points per year relative to single class nonfamily firms. Additional tests reveal that institutional investors hold more of the floated equity of dual class family firms than found in single class nonfamily firms. Exploring a succession risk premium perspective, I discover these lower values and greater excess returns primarily occur in descendent-controlled firms. Overall, my analysis suggests that limited voting shares provide an important mechanism used by controlling shareholders that arise in industries with specific characteristics. / Business Administration/Finance

On July 1, 1971, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified which prohibited states from denying citizens who had attained the age of eighteen the right to vote. Having passed 96-0 in the Senate and 401-19 in the House of Representatives, the amendment was widely considered a bipartisan effort with minimal resistance from within the two major political parties. This paper seeks to determine how this largely politically unifying amendment process became so politicized since its passage, including an analysis and comparison of factions who fought against initial passage with those who seek to suppress the youth vote. A historical analysis will look deeper into how those battles were won with the ultimate passage of the amendment. Using a mixed methodology approach including a quantitative analysis of polling data and a qualitative analysis of partisan methods to influence youth voter turnout, the paper shows a trend towards increased politicization that has peaked in today's political landscape. Three specific elections serve as case studies and a lens through which to analyze changes in the law, changes in campaign strategies, changes in rhetoric, and changes in salient issues. Youth engagement is particularly valuable to political leaders and to the nation. In American politics, youth voter turnout has become less of a normative good--in many cases it has been deeply politicized. There is a strong association between specific methods taken by political parties and interest groups and their efforts to mobilize or disincentive youth voter turnout. / Master of Arts / A Constitutional amendment requires two-thirds of the House of Representatives and two-thirds of the Senate to propose it and then must be ratified by three-fourths of the states. This process is difficult to accomplish and one that requires bipartisanship in Congress and must have broad support throughout the nation. Outside of the original Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments, only seventeen amendments have been ratified since the inception of the Constitution. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment is an important milestone in the history of the United States as it ultimately lowered the voting age to 18 throughout the country. The amendment passed 96-0 in the Senate and 401-19 in the House of Representatives and was passed by the necessary number of states in less than four months. It marked the quickest ratification timeline of any amendment in the history of the United States. The amendment was a largely bipartisan effort with minimal resistance from within the two major political parties. This paper seeks to determine how this largely politically unifying amendment process has become so politicized since its passage. The paper shows a trend towards increased politicization that has peaked in today's political landscape. Three specific elections serve as case studies and a lens through which to analyze changes in attitudes about young voters. As a high school teacher who values the importance of youth engagement and voting, I provide some strategies that I believe will help overcome the level of polarization and voter suppression laws that have recently been enacted. Both of the two major political parties have an incentive to engage young voters and encourage them to show up for their side.

Les études et les travaux empiriques consacrés à l’impact de la structure du vote dans les organisations internationales dans le cadre de la théorie des choix publics sont très rares. Par conséquent, cette thèse s’attache à étudier de plus près l’impact de la structure du vote sur le fonctionnement et les performances des organisations internationales. L’analyse dans ce travail de recherche se veut, en premier lieu, empirique et en second lieu, positive. Cette dernière nous permettra de comprendre comment les organisations internationales réellement fonctionnent et réagissent (Lafay et Lecaillon, 1993). Nous avons montré que les organisations inter-gouvernementales avec une structure de vote "un pays – une voix" assurent une redistribution, en termes de contributions et de dépenses, des riches vers les pauvres et la classe moyenne, tandis que la redistribution en termes de contributions est moindre dans les organisations inter-gouvernementales à "vote pondéré". Toutefois, la redistribution des prêts dans les organisations à "vote pondéré" s’avère plus répartie parmi les classes de revenu. Ainsi, d’une part, les organisations avec une structure de vote "un pays – une voix" sont plus performantes que les organisations à ‘vote pondéré’ en termes de contributions et conformément au principe "d’équité" fondée sur la "capacité de payer" des pays membres. D’autre part, en termes de prêts et dépenses, les organisations avec une structure de vote "un pays – une voix" et à "vote pondéré" sont aussi performantes les unes que les autres par rapport à la nature de leur structure de vote et de leurs activités ou missions. / Empirical studies and literature on the impact of voting structure in international organizations within public choice theory are very scarce. Therefore, this thesis attempts to examine more closely the impact of the voting structure on the functioning and performance of international organizations. The analysis in this research is, first, empirical, and second, positive. The latter allow us to understand how organizations actually function and react (and Lecaillon Lafay, 1993). We show that the redistribution of contributions and expenditures in “one-nation, one-vote” inter-governmental organizations is from rich to poor and middle classes, while there is less redistribution in terms of contributions in “weighted voting” inter-governmental organizations. However, the redistribution of loans in weighted voting organizations is more spread among income classes. Thus, on the one hand, “one-nation, one-vote” organizations perform better than ‘weighted voting’ organizations in terms of contributions and in accordance with the principle of' “fairness” based on “capacity to pay” of member states. On the other hand, in terms of loans and expenditures, “one-nation, one-vote” organizations and “weighted voting” organizations are both effective relatively to the nature of their voting structure and their missions or activities.

Les rémunérations des dirigeants des sociétés cotées suscitent un vif débat tant sur leur montant que sur les principes guidant leur détermination. Ce débat est souvent intensifié par une forte médiatisation prompte à indigner l’opinion publique et à inciter le législateur à se saisir de la question. Celui-ci cherche alors à encadrer les pratiques litigieuses tantôt en imposant des mesures impératives, tantôt en favorisant l’autorégulation. La présente étude a pour ambition d’apprécier la pertinence et l’efficacité de l’ensemble de ces règles relevant du droit dur et du droit souple. Un tel examen du droit positif montre une réelle incapacité à apporter une réponse au problème de l’acceptabilité sociale des rémunérations par le biais de l’outil juridique. En témoigne l’évolution de la législation française depuis ces vingt dernières années, basée sur l’impératif de transparence et l’évolution des procédures de détermination et d’attribution des rémunérations des dirigeants. Les juges ne semblent pas davantage disposer de leviers efficaces de lutte contre l’excès des rémunérations en droit des sociétés. Maints espoirs ont donc été fondés sur les principes provenant du droit souple et en particulier de la gouvernance d’entreprise, espoirs cependant également déçus à bien des égards. Finalement, demeure particulièrement prégnante la question de savoir si le droit, qu’il soit dur ou souple, peut constituer cet outil utile et efficace de régulation du niveau de rémunérations des dirigeants de sociétés cotées / The remuneration of directors of listed companies generated a lively debate and even controversy as to their amount or to the principles guiding their determination. This debate is often intensified by vivid media coverage aimed at instigating the public opinion and encouraging the legislator to take up the question. The latter then seeks to regulate the practices in question either by imposing mandatory measures at times, or by encouraging self-regulation at others. This study aims to assess the relevance and effectiveness of all of these rules under the hard law and soft law. Such an examination of the substantive law shows a real inability to provide an answer to the problem of the social acceptability of these remunerations through legal tool. It also reviews the evolution of French legislation during the last twenty years, based on the need for transparency and the development of procedures for determining and awarding the remuneration of directors. Judges do not appear to have effective leverage and means of struggle in the Corporate Laws against the excesses of the remuneration. So many hopes have been based on the principles derived from the soft law and in particular, Corporate Governance, yet those hopes were however deceived in many ways. Finally, the question that remains particularly urgent and haunting is whether the law, be it hard or soft, can be a useful and effective tool for regulating the level of remuneration of directors and executives of listed companies

Inaug. _ Diss.: Philosophische Fakultät II: Zürich: 1973. Bibliogr. p. 108-109.

Quels sont les éléments qui ont une influence sur le vote ?En tentant de répondre à cette question fondamentale en démocratie, les travaux de recherche ont mis au jour les différents paramètres à prendre en compte lors d'une campagne électorale. Aussi, quand un candidat ne propose que des avantages individuels pour les électeurs, le débat ne s'élève pas au-dessus des satisfactions personnelles de chaque électeur. Promesses, distribution de prébendes et autorisations dérogatoires au droit commun ne constituent alors qu'un catalogue de propositions diverses. Les systèmes de valeurs, les principes, les opinions, l'appartenance et les familles politiques s'effacent devant la personnalité du candidat, et les avantages attendus par chaque électeur. / What are the factors that influence the vote ? In attempting to answer this fundamental question in a democracy, the research revealed the various parameters to be considered during an election campaign. Also, when a candidate only offers benefits to individual voters, the debate does not rise above each voter's personal satisfaction. Promises, distributing bribes, and derogation to the common law permits then constitute a catalog of various proposals. Systems of values, principles, beliefs, membership and political families are superseded by the candidate's personality, and the expected benefits of each voter. / En un intento de responder a esta pregunta fundamental en una democracia , la investigación ha pusto de manifesto los diferentes parámetros a tener en cuenta durante la campaña electoral. Además, cuando un candidato sólo ofrece beneficios a los votantes individuales, el debate no se levanta por encima de la satisfacción personal de cada votante. Promesas, distribución de sobornos, y permisos derogatorios a la ley común constituyen un catálogo de las diversas propuestas. Los sistemas de valores, principios, creencias, la pertenencia y las familias políticas se desvanecen ante la personalidad del candidato, así como los beneficios esperados de cada votante.

Cette thèse porte sur l'étude de différents aspects de la sécurité des protocoles de vote électronique à distance. Ces protocoles décrivent comment organiser des élections par Internet de manière sécurisée. Ils ont notamment pour but d'apporter des garanties de secret du vote, et de vérifiabilité - ie, il doit être possible de s'assurer que les votes sont correctement comptabilisés. Nos contributions portent sur deux aspects principaux. Premièrement, nous proposons une nouvelle technique d'analyse automatique de propriétés d'équivalence, dans le modèle symbolique. De nombreuses propriétés en lien avec la vie privée s'expriment comme des propriétés d'équivalence, telles que le secret du vote en particulier, mais aussi l'anonymat ou la non-traçabilité. Notre approche repose sur le typage: nous mettons au point un système de typage qui permet d'analyser deux protocoles pour prouver leur équivalence. Nous montrons que notre système de typage est correct, c'est-à-dire qu'il implique effectivement l'équivalence de traces, à la fois pour des nombres bornés et non bornés de sessions. Nous comparons l'implémentation d'un prototype de notre système avec les autres outils existants pour l'équivalence symbolique, sur divers protocoles de la littérature. Cette étude de cas montre que notre procédure est bien plus efficace que la plupart des autres outils - au prix d'une perte de précision (notre outil peut parfois échouer à prouver certaines équivalences). Notre seconde contribution est une étude des définitions du secret du vote et de la vérifiabilité - ou, plus précisément, la vérifiabilité individuelle, une propriété qui requiert que chaque votant soit en mesure de vérifier que son propre vote a bien été pris en compte. Nous prouvons, aussi bien dans les modèles symboliques que calculatoire, que le secret du vote implique la vérifiabilité individuelle, alors même que l'intuition et des résultats voisins déjà établis semblaient indiquer que ces deux propriétés s'opposent. Notre étude met également en évidence une limitation des définitions existantes du secret du vote par jeux cryptographiques : elles supposent une urne honnête, et par conséquent expriment des garanties significativement plus faibles que celles que les protocoles visent à assurer. Nous proposons donc une nouvelle définition (par jeu) du secret du vote, contre une urne malhonnête. Nous relions notre définition à une notion de secret du vote par simulation, pour montrer qu'elle apporte des garanties fortes. Enfin, nous menons une étude de cas sur plusieurs systèmes de vote existants. / In this thesis we study several aspects of the security of remote electronic voting protocols. Such protocols describe how to securely organise elections over the Internet. They notably aim to guarantee vote privacy - ie, votes must remain secret -and verifiability - it must be possible to check that votes are correctly counted. Our contributions are on two aspects. First, we propose a new approach to automatically prove equivalence properties in the symbolic model. Many privacy properties can be expressed as equivalence properties, such as in particular vote privacy, but also anonymity or unlinkability. Our approach relies on typing: we design a type system that can typecheck two protocols to prove their equivalence. We show that our type system %, together with some additional conditions on the messages exchanged by the protocols, soundly implies trace equivalence, both for bounded and unbounded numbers of sessions. We compare a prototype implementation of our typechecker with other existing tools for symbolic equivalence, on a variety of protocols from the literature. This case study shows that our procedure is much more efficient than most other tools - at the price of losing precision (our tool may fail to prove some equivalences). Our second contribution is a study of the definitions of privacy and verifiability - more precisely, individual verifiability, a property that requires each voter to be able to check that their own vote is counted. We prove that, both in symbolic and computational models, privacy implies individual verifiability, contrary to intuition and related previous results that seem to indicate that these two properties are opposed. Our study also highlights a limitation of existing game-based definitions of privacy: they assume the ballot box is trusted, which makes for significantly weaker guarantees than what protocols aim for. Hence we propose a new game-based definition for vote privacy against a dishonest ballot box. We relate our definition to a simulation-based notion of privacy, to show that it provides meaningful guarantees, and conduct a case study on several voting schemes.

Alors que le vote connaît un poids symbolique croissant dans le système français de relations professionnelles, notamment depuis la réforme de la représentativité syndicale de 2008, la science politique et la sociologie des relations professionnelles ne se sont que très marginalement intéressées à la pratique électorale dans le champ professionnel. Au croisement de ces deux disciplines, ce travail de thèse a pour ambition, en s'appuyant sur les modèles explicatifs du vote proposés par la sociologie électorale, de restituer les logiques individuelles, contextuelles et environnementales de la mobilisation et du choix électoral des salariés lors des scrutins professionnels.Pour ce faire, notre travail, qui se concentre sur les salariés du secteur privé, mobilise et croise des matériaux quantitatifs et, dans une moindre mesure, qualitatifs, collectés à plusieurs niveaux : la base de données électorales MARS (Mesure d'audience pour le calcul de la représentativité syndicale), les données des enquêtes REPONSE (Relations professionnelles et négociations d'entreprise) et SRCV (Statistiques sur les ressources et conditions de vie) ainsi qu'une enquête par questionnaire réalisée auprès d'agents de Pôle Emploi.A la lumière de ces matériaux, il apparaît que les comportements électoraux des salariés aux scrutins professionnels, loin d'être inexplicables, dépendent de logiques sociales. Toutefois, si les modèles proposés par la sociologie électorale s'avèrent relativement pertinents, il apparaît nécessaire de les adapter aux spécificités du champ professionnel. Ainsi, à l'image de ce qu'observe Daniel Gaxie dans le champ politique, un « cens caché » de la « démocratie sociale » apparaît. Mais les barrières invisibles mises en évidence sont bien plus liées aux conditions et aux contextes de travail des salariés qu'au capital scolaire dont ils disposent : ce sont les salariés les plus précaires, les moins intégrés professionnellement, les plus jeunes ou encore les salariés des petites entreprises qui sont à la fois moins confrontés au vote et qui, lorsqu'ils peuvent effectivement voter, s'abstiennent significativement plus. De la même manière, si la mobilisation et le choix électoral des salariés dépendent des contextes dans lesquels leurs votes sont produits, ce sont les interactions nouées dans le travail, entre les salariés et leurs représentants ou entre les salariés eux-mêmes, qui sont déterminantes.Mettre ainsi au jour les ressorts des votes des salariés aux scrutins professionnels permet de contribuer non seulement à l'étude des relations professionnelles, mais aussi aux discussions autour des modèles explicatifs du vote en sociologie électorale, d'autant plus que la participation aux scrutins politiques et la participation aux scrutins professionnels s'articulent fortement. / While the vote has a growing symbolic weight in the French system of industrial relations, especially since the reform of union representativeness in 2008, political science as well as industrial relations and labour studies have shown only marginal interest for electoral practices in the professional field. At the crossroads of these two disciplines, this thesis aims to render the individual, contextual and environmental logics of electoral mobilization and choice during workplace elections, building on the explanatory models of voting proposed by electoral political sociology.To this end, our thesis, which focuses on private sector employees in France, mobilizes and combines quantitative and, to a lesser extent, qualitative materials, collected at several levels: the MARS electoral database (Audience Measurement for the Calculation of Union Representativeness), the data from the REPONSE surveys (Industrial Relations and Company Negotiations) and from the 2010 SRCV survey (Statistics on Incomes and Living Conditions) as well as a questionnaire survey carried out among Pôle Emploi employees.In light of these materials, it appears that the workers’ electoral behaviour in professional elections, far from being inexplicable, depends on social logics. However, if the models proposed by electoral sociology prove relatively relevant, it appears necessary to adapt them to the specificities of the professional field. Thus, in the same way as Daniel Gaxie observed for the political field, there appears to be a "hidden census" in "industrial democracy". But the highlighted invisible barriers are much more related to the employees’ working conditions and contexts than to their educational capital: those who are both less likely to face workplace polls and, when they can actually vote, significantly more likely to abstain, are the most precarious employees, the least professionally integrated, the youngest as well as those employed in the smallest businesses. Similarly, if the employees’ electoral mobilization and choices depend on the contexts in which their votes are produced, what is decisive are the interactions in the workplace between the employees and their representatives or between the employees themselves.To reveal the reasons for employees' votes in professional polls helps to contribute, not only to the study of industrial relations, but also to the discussion on the explanatory models of voting in electoral sociology, especially since participations at political and workplace elections are closely linked.

Le droit de vote est la prérogative politique suprême de l’associé. Si de nombreux débats se sont intéressés à son caractère essentiel et à ses conditions d’attribution, peu de réflexions se sont concentrées sur ses modalités d’exercice. Celles-ci font pourtant l’originalité de ce droit individuel qui ne peut s’exercer que collectivement et sont déterminantes de son effectivité, lui qui ne peut se manifester qu’épisodiquement au gré des réunions de la collectivité des associés. La recherche des principes gouvernant son exercice, sujet méconnu car relevant surtout de la pratique, devrait permettre de mieux cerner sa portée. Sur le plan individuel, le principe essentiel est celui de la liberté du vote, qui peut même neutraliser partiellement les règles de son attribution, comme en cas d’abstention ou d’activisme actionnarial. Cette liberté suppose toutefois que l’intégrité du vote et son caractère éclairé soient préservés. Or il peut être altéré par des pressions extérieures, motivées par la valeur économique du droit de vote, ce qui requiert des dispositifs renforcés de protection. Sur le plan de l’organisation collective du scrutin, l’accent est mis sur l’intérêt social, justifiant la prédominance de la loi de la majorité et venant tempérer la liberté du vote. Ces règles organisationnelles, tout en garantissant le droit de participer aux décisions collectives, promeuvent une certaine loyauté du vote, notamment en sanctionnant les abus du droit de vote, et une certaine éthique du vote, comme au travers du say on pay. Cette prise en compte croissante des intérêts collectifs lors du vote invite à renouveler certaines réflexions majeures du droit des sociétés. Elle interroge en particulier sur le rôle de l’associé et sur le bien-fondé de certains principes tels que celui qui prohibe les cessions de droits de vote. / The right to vote is the supreme political prerogative of shareholders. While many debates have focused on its essential nature and the conditions under which it is granted, little thought has been given to how it should be exercised. The mode of exercise makes the right to vote unusual in that it arises from an individual right which can only be exercised collectively and indeed is critical for its effectiveness since voting rights can only be utilized episodically within the framework of general meetings of shareholders. The consideration of the principles governing the exercise of voting rights, a relatively unexplored topic since most effort in this area refers to practical aspects, should clarify the impact of this mechanism. At the individual level, the freedom to vote is a key principle, which can even partially neutralize the rules of its allocation, as in the case of abstention or shareholder activism. However, this freedom presupposes that the integrity of the vote and the right to information related to it are preserved. However, these features can be altered by external pressures motivated by the economic value of voting rights, which leads to a requirement for reinforced protection measures. At the collective level of the organisation of the ballot, the emphasis is placed on corporate interests, justifying the predominance of the majority rule and tempering the freedom to vote. These organisational rules, while guaranteeing the right to participate in collective decisions, promote a certain loyalty, in particular by punishing abuses of the right to vote, and via the application of a collective ethical approach (e.g. say-on-pay). This growing influence of collective interests in the voting process invites us to reconsider certain major company law principles. In particular, questions are around the role of the shareholder and the validity of certain of those principles such as that prohibiting the sale of voting rights.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo traçar os principais contornos do instituto do benefício particular, positivado na legislação brasileira por meio do artigo 115, §1º, da Lei n. 6.404/76, diferenciando-o do instituto relativo ao interesse conflitante nas sociedades, insculpido no mesmo dispositivo supra citado. A partir da análise do Direito Comparado, constatou-se que o benefício particular, tal como o conhecemos hoje no Brasil, tem origem na legislação francesa, especificamente nas Leis de 17 de julho de 1956 e 24 de julho de 1867. Os contornos de sua conceituação, portanto, estão intimamente ligados às razões de ordem histórica e teleológica que levaram o legislador estrangeiro a criá-lo, o qual visava, à época, afastar os abusos e inconveniências decorrentes da aprovação, em assembleia, de vantagens especiais e exclusivas pelo próprio sócio beneficiário dessas vantagens. Complementarmente, por meio da análise e interpretação sistemática da legislação societária brasileira e de outras fontes de direito disponibilizadas, como a doutrina e a jurisprudência, pôde-se definir algumas das características mais marcantes do instituto, das quais se pode destacar a licitude, a gratuidade e o caráter social das vantagens a ele associadas, garantindo ao beneficiado acesso aos fundos sociais. Em paralelo, para fins de mera comparação com o instituto do benefício particular, foram abordados alguns aspectos relativos ao instituto do conflito de interesses, reafirmando conceitos doutrinários já sedimentados acerca do alcance do interesse social e procurando, a partir da análise da legislação brasileira e comparada, fixar alguns elementos intrínsecos a esse instituto, tal como a ilicitude e o caráter extrassocial da vantagem visada pelo acionista conflitado. Comparando as características do benefício particular e do conflito de interesses, pode-se concluir que, apesar da aparente semelhança que carregam, tratam-se de institutos distintos, que regulam situações diversas, não podendo ser confundidos ou tomados um pelo outro, sendo possível, de fato, se estabelecer um critério relativamente seguro para distingui-los entre si, conferindo uma maior segurança jurídica aos aplicadores do direito, evitando-se, assim, algumas interpretações equivocadas acerca dos institutos, tais como aqueles constantes nos posicionamentos da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários analisados ao final desse trabalho. / The current paper has the sole purpose of designing the main lines of the private benefits regulation, reaffirmed by means of Act 115, §1st, in the Brazilian law number 6.404/76, distinguishing it from institutions that relate to conflicting partnership interests, comprehended by the same aforementioned Act. From assessing the Paired Law regulation, it has been understood that the private benefits, such as it is currently recognized in Brazil, is based on the French legislation, more specifically on the July 17, 1956 and July 24, 1867 Acts. Therefore, the contours of its conceptualism are intimately connected to historic and teleological reasoning that took the foreign regulator to create it and which aimed, at that time, to keep away abuse and inconveniences resulting from the approval, in an shareholders meeting, of special and exclusive advantages by their own beneficiary parties. In addition, by means of systematically assessing and interpreting the Brazilian Corporate Law and other Law resources made available, such as the Law doctrine and jurisprudence, it was possible to determine some of the most outstanding characteristics of such an institute, among which the lawfulness, gratuity and social character of the advantages associated with it can be highlighted, thus assuring the access of the beneficiary party to social funds. In parallel, by means of solely comparing the private benefits regulation, some aspects regarding the conflict of interests were also assessed, reaffirming doctrine concepts about the reach of social interests that are already established and trying to determine, by means of analyzing the Brazilian Corporate Law and Paired Law, some of the elements that are inherent to that establishment, such as its wrongfulness and the extrasocial character of the advantage pledged by the conflicting party. By pairing the characteristics of private benefits and the conflict of interests, it is concluded that, despite their apparent similarities, those are distinct institutes that regulate diverse situations, which cannot be confused or taken by one another and, in fact, it is possible to establish a relatively safe criteria to differentiate both, thus providing greater judicial accuracy to Law enforcers, and this way avoiding misinterpretation of regulation, such as those that are common to the positioning of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission that are analyzed in the end of this paper.