A presente dissertação tem por objetivo compreender o sentido que Nietzsche confere ao riso no interior de seu pensamento. Para tanto, foi preciso considerar o riso à luz do conceito de vontade de potência, de modo a determinar o aspecto sob o qual Nietzsche o interpreta e o motivo pelo qual esse riso é digno de seus investimentos filosóficos. Deste modo, partimos com a noção de que o riso se exprime como um juízo avaliativo: atitude valorativa que, no caso da valoração nobre, manifesta (e quer) aumento de forças. A partir desse primeiro tópico, analisamos o conceito de gaia ciência [alegre saber], apresentado em livro homônimo, com o qual o riso se irradia pelo pensamento e se torna um fator imprescindível diante das questões e tarefas a que Nietzsche se coloca. Aqui, o riso atua como páthos afirmativo e efeito da elevação de potência; os pensamentos a ele correspondentes são igualmente afirmativos, o que, por sua vez, permite um vigor filosófico para a crítica radical dos valores. A idiossincrasia desse riso de Nietzsche, se vê, pois, realçada quando o cotejamos com temas tais como a linguagem, o estilo, a crítica e o conceito de tartufesco. Com efeito, a partir de tais considerações procuramos esboçar algumas linhas acerca da relação do riso com a ideia do além-do-homem, bem como compreender a inovação que Nietzsche promove na história do pensamento filosófico sobre o riso. / The present dissertation aims to comprehend the meaning that Nietzsche gives to laughter within his thought. Therefore, it was necessary to accept laughter under the concept of will to power in order to precise the aspect in witch Nietzsche interprets it and the motive that makes laughter worthy of his philosophical investments. Thus, we start with the notion of laughter as an evaluative judgment, an evaluative attitude, which in the case of noble valuation, manifests (and wants) increase of forces. From this topic, we analyzed the concept of a gay science(presented in the eponymous book); in witch, laughter became an important factor regarding the issues that Nietzsche arise. Here, laughter works as an affirmative páthos and effect of an elevation of power, the thoughts related to laughter are correspondingly affirmative, which in turns allows a philosophical strength towards the radical critics of values. The idiosyncrasy of Nietzsches laughter highlights when collated with themes as language, style, critics and the concept of tarffufe. Indeed, from these considerations we may be able to outline a conclusion on laughters relation with the idea of overman, and understand the innovation that Nietzsche promotes on the history of philosophical thought about laughter.

Esta tese de doutorado estuda o perspectivismo na obra de Nietzsche, bem como o confronto com a verdade que ele representa. Para tanto, procuramos mostrar que esse confronto atravessa toda a obra de Nietzsche, pois já os seus escritos iniciais investigam as condições para o surgimento da crença na verdade, além dos interesses a que ela atendia. Expondo que Nietzsche, apropriando-se do legado crítico de Kant em suas primeiras obras, ensaia uma destruição completa da verdade, pretendemos demonstrar que ele falha em seus objetivos porque a radicalidade de seus argumentos destruiria os próprios pressupostos em que estão baseados, ou seja, os do idealismo transcendental kantiano. Nesse momento em que circunscrevemos nossa análise aos escritos inicias, tentamos demonstrar que Nietzsche limita-se a refutar a noção de verdade como adequação com a coisa-em-si, mas falha ao querer ampliar esse refutação além desses limites. Por isso, analisando a maneira pela qual o combate à verdade se posiciona a partir dos escritos da década de 80, defendemos que neles o perspectivismo se torna decisivo para os problemas enfrentados inicialmente por Nietzsche. Interpretando o perspectivismo como um fenomenalismo da consciência e um interpretacionismo, investigamos, no decorrer deste trabalho, a forma pela qual Nietzsche re-elabora a crítica à verdade em seus escritos tardios. Considerando essa crítica ainda a partir da apropriação de Kant, buscamos demonstrar que ela atinge os fins perseguidos por Nietzsche sem, contudo, ficar preso aos impasses das primeiras 5 obras. Isso implica mostrar que Nietzsche vai recusar não apenas a noção de verdade como adequação com a coisa-em-si, mas também a concepção moderna de verdade como certeza e fundamento para o conhecimento. Eis por que Nietzsche alveja a noção cartesiana do eu penso como a primeira verdade, assim como a concepção kantiana de verdade expressa nos juízos lógicos. Sustentamos, assim, que o fenomenalismo da consciência refuta a noção de unidade, pressuposto fundamental às filosofias cartesiana e kantiana. Em seguida, analisamos como Nietzsche, apropriando-se da ideia kantiana de princípios regulativos, afirma que todas as visões com que avaliamos o mundo são ficções, erros, ótica-de-perspectivas da vida com valor regulativo para a existência. Defendemos, por fim, que embora se posicione radicalmente contra a verdade a partir da luta de interpretações, o perspectivismo não se torna um relativismo, na medida em que se liga à teoria da vontade de potência, a qual é o critério para avaliar as perspectivas e ela mesma apresentada como interpretação. / This Doctoral Thesis studies perspectivism on the work of Nietzsche, as well as the confrontation with the truth it represents. In order to do so, we try to show that this confrontation pervades Nietzsche\'s work, as his former writings investigate the conditions for the emergence of the belief in the truth, beyond the interests to which it served. By expounding that Nietzsche, borrowing Kant\'s critical legacy in his early works, starts out a complete destruction of truth, we intend to demonstrate that he fails in his objectives. This occurs because the radicalism of his arguments would destroy the very foundations which they are based upon, that is, Kantian transcendental idealism. At the moment we circumscribe our analysis to the early writings, we intend to demonstrate that Nietzsche limits himself to refuting the notion of truth as an adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but fails to widen this refutation beyond these limits. Therefore, we analyze the means of the fight against the truth, as presented in his writings from the 80`s. We defend that, in these writings, perspectivism becomes decisive in relation to the problems formerly faced by Nietzsche. By interpreting perspectivism as a phenomenalism of the conscience and interpretationism, we investigate the means by which Nietzsche re-elaborates the critique of truth in his late writings. Through the understanding of this critique as an appropriation of Kant\'s ideas, we try to demonstrate that it reaches the goals set by Nietzsche. Therefore it bypasses the impasses of his early work. This is to show that Nietzsche declines not only the notion of truth as adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but also the modern concept of truth as certainty and foundation of knowledge. That is 7 why Nietzsche aims at the Cartesian notion of \"I think\" as the first truth, as well as the Kantian conception of truth as expressed in logical judgments. Therefore, we sustain that phenomenalism of the conscience refutes the notion of unity, fundamental presupposition to Cartesian and Kantian philosophies. Additionally, we analyze the way Nietzsche, appropriating the Kantian idea of regulative principles, asserts that every vision we take to evaluate the world is fiction, a mistake, a perspectives-optic of life with a regulative value to existence. We defend, finally, that, even perspectivism radically stands against the truth - understood as strife of interpretations. It does not become relativism, since it is connected to the Theory of the Will to Power, which is the criterion to evaluate perspectives and which is itself presented as interpretation.

Fonseca, Eduardo Ribeiro da. Psiquismo e Vida. O conceito de Impulso nas obras de Freud, Schopenhauer e Nietzsche. 2009. 280 f. Tese (Doutorado) Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas. Departamento de Filosofia, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2009. Esta tese procura reconstruir as origens do conceito de impulso de Freud a partir de uma leitura do que é dito sobre o mesmo tema nas obras de Schopenhauer e Nietzsche. Embora esses filósofos não sistematizem o conceito, ele é um operador teórico fundamental nas suas obras, o que torna possível uma tentativa de sistematização a partir do que é dito nos textos. Nosso trabalho consiste, em um primeiro momento, em reconstruir as formulações e reformulações da teoria do impulso em Freud, comparandoa com as teses desses filósofos sobre o psiquismo e a vida, que passam inexoravelmente pelos problemas do corpo e do impulso como representante do desejo ligado ao organismo. Tratase de expor e analisar os argumentos de Schopenhauer e Nietzsche de modo a construir uma imagem mais ampla da metapsicologia em seu contexto histórico e, ao mesmo tempo, mostrar em que sentido essa mesma abordagem de fundo psicanalítico pode contribuir para ampliar os horizontes dos estudos das obras de Schopenhauer e Nietzsche. Nesse sentido, o presente trabalho procura refletir sobre a dificuldade implicada na tarefa de abordar um conceito que não pode ser, devido à sua própria natureza, inteiramente esclarecido a partir de nossos pressupostos discursivos. Nosso desafio é examinar os pontos comuns à abordagem psicanalítica do impulso presentes em ambas as filosofias e investigar temas tais como a questão da oposição entre consciente e inconsciente, a circularidade da fisiologia do impulso. Além disso, a ausência de fundamento racional para o psiquismo preconizada nesses três autores exige que sejam expostas e comparadas suas opiniões sobre a ética do impulso. Este problema está relacionado, em todos eles, ao problema do sofrimento, do desamparo e do debate em torno da afirmação e da negação do desejo e da vida. É por isso que num terceiro e conclusivo momento, contraporemos as suas teses a respeito da sublimação, o destino privilegiado do impulso, mas considerado pelo psicanalista vienense o aspecto mais complexo e quase inabordável da psicologia do inconsciente. As dificuldades de Freud em escrever sobre a noção de sublimação do impulso expõem a necessidade de recuperar os argumentos de Schopenhauer e Nietzsche a respeito, na medida em que eles ajudam a esclarecer a lógica de funcionamento do impulso. Tal debate está no cerne das considerações sobre as possibilidades futuras não só da metapsicologia, como também da clínica cotidiana da psicanálise. / This thesis aims at reconstructing the origins of Freud\'s concept of drive from an understanding of what is said about the same subject in the works of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Although these philosophers did not systematize the concept, it is a fundamental theoretical operator in the works of these philosophers, what makes possible an attempt to systematize as from what is said at various moments in their works. Our task is, at first, to reconstruct the formulations and reformulations of the theory of drive in Freud comparing it with the arguments of these philosophers on psychism and life, which are inevitably the problems of body and drive as representative of the desire on the organism. It is about to expose and analyze the arguments of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in order to build a more wide metapsychology in its historical context and at the same time to show in what sense the same approach of psychoanalytic background can contribute to broaden the horizons of studies of the works of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. In this sense, this work aims to reflect on the difficulty involved in the task of addressing a concept that cannot be, by its very nature, entirely free from our discursive assumptions. Our challenge is to examine the commonalities of the psychoanalytic approach to drive present in both philosophies and investigate issues such as the opposition between conscious and unconscious, the circularity of physiology of drive. Moreover, the absence of rational ground for the psychism shared by these three authors requires that their views on the ethical drive to be exposed and compared. This issue is related, in all them, to the problem of suffering, helplessness and the debate on affirmation and negation of desire and life. Thus, at a third and concluding moment, we will contrast their thesis on sublimation, the privileged destination of drive, but considered by the Viennese psychoanalyst the most complex and almost inaccessible aspect of psychology of the unconscious. Freuds difficulties in writing on the concept of sublimation of drive expose the need for retrieving the arguments of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the subject to the extent that they help to clarify drives logic of operation. This debate is at the heart of considerations on the future possibilities not only of metapsychology, but also of the clinic\'s daily psychoanalysis.

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Com relação a defesa não achei a data na ata. on 2017-04-03T12:00:59Z (GMT) / Submitted by Erika Demachki (erikademachki@gmail.com) on 2017-04-05T17:53:57Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Anderson Nowogrodzki da Silva - 2017.pdf: 1741114 bytes, checksum: 6304ba9926289ff4eccc6751865e247c (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Rejected by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com), reason: A data de publicação está errada, é 2017. on 2017-04-06T11:12:09Z (GMT) / Submitted by Erika Demachki (erikademachki@gmail.com) on 2017-04-06T17:50:47Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Anderson Nowogrodzki da Silva - 2017.pdf: 1741114 bytes, checksum: 6304ba9926289ff4eccc6751865e247c (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Rejected by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com), reason: Verifique no formulário de metadados a data da defesa, pois você colocou 1993,na ata está 2017 e na dissertação a data de publicação, também, é 2017. 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No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Anderson Nowogrodzki da Silva - 2017.pdf: 1741114 bytes, checksum: 6304ba9926289ff4eccc6751865e247c (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 1993-02-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The present work is the result of some observations about the relations between power and knowledge, the regularities and the possibilities of resistance. We decided, then, think and discuss the articulation between the concepts of Will of Truth and Will to Power, in order to understand the way moral establishes itself in the set of interactions. We demonstrates, like that, the way the society commands itself based on the current knowledge and, at the same time, creates resistences, transforming itself through the confrontation of forces, of the logical of power. Then, the theorical-methodological postulate with wich one works is the study of the discourse by the Foucault’s archaeogenealogy, bringing also, to the research, Nietzsche’s notions and reflections, in order to better illustrate the way society is constituted and your ways to see and say. The use of this theoretical contribution is justified because it is based on numerous unfoldings and contributions to the studies of the language in a historicist perspective. Thereby, it seeks to highlight issues pertinent to this field of study; What means Will to Power? What means Will of Truth? How those concepts relate on na enviroment were resistence and regularity coexist? What are the consequences that these concepts can have in what we propose to investigate? How do you set up a moral control mechanism? Those are questions that guide this work and that tend to worry for a more accurate theoretical analysis. Another aspect that is relevant to this approach is the understanding of the concept of device; according Courtine (2013), we should look to the device as a set of knowledges that can be crossed and make others appear, having a strategic function regulated by the power relations. Foucault and Nietzsche provide a basis for reading the concepts that are discussed, being complemented by your readers. This study is qualitative in that we do not look for exhaustive but representative data. Therefore, will be described, related and crossed statements that present in the contemporaneousness the quest to control morally the body, observing the resumption of the “already said” in function of legitimizing the discourses, leading to the discussion of why a person who goes hungry do not steal to eat as an example of the dynamics of morality. Finally, we can infer that the subject of discourse, although situated sociohistorically in capitalist societies, that reinforce the morality control, can resist which leads to the continuous transformation. / O presente trabalho é fruto de algumas observações sobre as relações de poder e saber, as regularidades e as possibilidades de resistência. Decidiu-se, então, pensar e discutir a articulação entre os conceitos de Vontade de Verdade e Vontade de Potência, a fim de entender o modo como a moral se instaura no conjunto das interações. Demonstra-se, assim, o modo como a sociedade se ordena com base na atualidade do saber e, ao mesmo tempo, cria resistências, transformando-se por meio do enfrentamento de forças, da lógica da potência. Então, o postulado teórico-metodológico com o qual se trabalha é o estudo do discurso por meio da arqueogenealogia de Foucault, trazendo, ainda, para a pesquisa, as noções e reflexões de Nietzsche, a fim de melhor ilustrar o modo como se constitui a sociedade, seus modos de ver e dizer. Justifica-se o uso desse aporte teórico por se basear em inúmeros desdobramentos e contribuições para os estudos da linguagem em uma perspectiva historicista. Com isso, busca-se evidenciar questões pertinentes a esse campo de estudo; O que significa Vontade de Potência? O que significa Vontade de Verdade? Como esses conceitos se relacionam num ambiente em que coexistem a resistência e a regularidade? Quais os desdobramentos que esses conceitos podem ter no que se propõe investigar? Como se configura um mecanismo de controle moral? São questões que norteiam este trabalho e que tendem a inquietar para uma análise teórica mais apurada. Outro aspecto que se torna relevante à abordagem é um entendimento sobre o conceito de dispositivo; segundo Courtine (2013), deve-se olhar para o dispositivo como um conjunto de saberes que se entrecruzam e fazem aparecer outros, possuindo uma função estratégica regulada pelas relações de poder. Foucault e Nietzsche constituem a base de leituras dos conceitos que serão abordados, sendo complementados por seus leitores. Essa apreciação é de cunho qualitativo, em que não se buscam dados exaustivos, mas representativos. Assim, serão descritos, relacionados e entrecruzados enunciados, que apresentem, na contemporaneidade, a busca por controlar moralmente o corpo, observando a retomada do “já dito”, em função de legitimar os discursos, levando à discussão do motivo pelo qual uma pessoa que passa fome não rouba para se alimentar, como um exemplo da dinâmica da moralidade. Enfim, podemos inferir que o sujeito do discurso, ainda que situado sociohistoricamente em sociedades capitalistas, que reforçam o controle da moral, pode resistir, o que leva à transformação contínua.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2017-08-18T18:31:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 robioneantoniolandim.pdf: 1187432 bytes, checksum: ea5dea35dcb9a46e8c3a69fb1724e6af (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-08-24T12:02:48Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 robioneantoniolandim.pdf: 1187432 bytes, checksum: ea5dea35dcb9a46e8c3a69fb1724e6af (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-24T12:02:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 robioneantoniolandim.pdf: 1187432 bytes, checksum: ea5dea35dcb9a46e8c3a69fb1724e6af (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-22 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O presente estudo parte do anúncio da morte de Deus para pensar o sentido de religião em Nietzsche. Ainda que a filosofia deste pensador tenha proclamado a morte de Deus, essa mensagem não implica necessariamente na erradicação da religião. Ela favorece pensá-la em outros termos que não a vinculam a uma instituição específica, nem a um conjunto de dogmas e ritos, mas enquanto afirmação da vida. Assim sendo, a morte de Deus é tematizada de modo a evidenciar uma crítica a determinada visão de civilização e cultura que contribuíram para a desvalorização da vida. Enquanto um filósofo crítico da desvalorização da vida compreende-se o discurso hostil de Nietzsche em relação à religião cristã. O cristianismo é uma visão de mundo derivada do platonismo e do judaísmo. Nesse sentido, o cristianismo não se identifica com a figura de Jesus. Este aponta para um tipo de vida que no decorrer da sua morte na cruz foi distorcido pela intepretação do apóstolo Paulo. O cristianismo se tornou uma invenção paulina. Não obstante a sua crítica à religião cristã, o que se pretende demonstrar é que o instinto religioso ainda vive na filosofia de Nietzsche. O aspecto religioso presente em Nietzsche, porém, não se apresenta mais sob a aparência metafísica-religiosa tradicional. A religião vive, ela é importante, mas desde que afirme a vida. Trata-se de pensá-la de modo alusivo, com uma linguagem que enfatiza menos o seu aspecto ontoteológico, para destacar muito mais a sua dimensão simbólico-existencial. Para Nietzsche, o elemento religioso se mostra como resultado de um instinto criador. A vida enquanto vontade de poder inventa a religião, novos deuses, enfim, vários mecanismos capazes de fazer aumentar o seu poder. Assim, o instinto religioso continua a forjar novas espiritualidades, novos deuses para a vida. / The present study starts from the announcement of the death of God to think the sense of religion in Nietzsche. Although the philosophy of this thinker has proclaimed the death of God, this message does not necessarily imply the eradication of religion. It favors thinking it in other terms that do not bind it to a specific institution, or to a set of dogmas and rites, but as an affirmation of life. Thus, the death of God is thematized in order to highlight a critique of a certain vision of civilization and culture that contributed to the devaluation of life. While a critical philosopher of the devaluation of life is understood Nietzsche's hostile discourse on the Christian religion. Christianity is a worldview derived from Platonism and Judaism. In this sense, Christianity does not identify with the figure of Jesus. It points to a type of life that in the course of his death on the cross was distorted by the interpretation of the apostle Paul. Christianity became a Pauline invention. Notwithstanding his criticism of the Christian religion, what is meant is that the religious instinct still lives in Nietzsche's philosophy. The religious aspect present in Nietzsche, however, no longer appears in the traditional metaphysicalreligious appearance. Religion lives, it is important, but as long as it affirms life. It is to think of it in a allusive way, with a language that emphasizes less its onto-theological aspect, in order to highlight its symbolic-existential dimension much more. For Nietzsche, the religious element shows itself as the result of a creative instinct. Life as a will to power invents religion, new gods, in short, various mechanisms capable of increasing its power. Thus, the religious instinct continues to forge new spiritualties, new gods for life.

The ancient Chinese I Ching, the Book of Changes, and the philosophy of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) both assert that the universe exists in a state of change. The I Ching, originally a book of divination, illustrates the changing phenomena of the natural world in terms of sixty-four hexagrams, which are figures composed of six lines  yielding and firm lines, representing actual conditions and relationships existing in the world and caused by the interplay between two primordial forces, yin and yang. The I Ching shows that on the macro level the Tao works in the universe, in heaven and on earth, and on the micro level it applies to man. The I Ching teaches harmony with Tao and its power (natural law and moral law), so that its reader may take appropriate action in any given situation with reference to the hexagrams and their appended judgments as revealed by the oracle. Nietzsche, however, regards the world as the Will to Power, ‘a monster of energy’, like a storming and flooding ocean eternally changing, where harmony and order seems impossible. His mouthpiece, Zarathustra, who teaches the Übermensch, encourages a war-like attitude towards life. Zarathustra’s second metamorphosis of an evolving spirit, the warrior lion, marks the difference between the Nietzschean Übermensch and the Chinese sage who attains harmony and balance within and without, a mysterious union with heaven. Zarathustra’s third metamorphosis, a playing child, creates itself as its own ‘bridge’ through a process of self-overcoming, whereas the I Ching indicates order to be the ‘bridge’ over chaos, the order of the human world being expressed in the five cardinal relationships. Whereas the I Ching advises its reader to follow their own nature and fate in order to lead a harmonious moral life, Nietzsche’s Übermensch is ‘the annihilator of morality’ and paradoxically ‘the designation of a type of supreme achievement’ (EH Books 1). With his idea of the Übermensch, Nietzsche indicates that morality is a pose (BGE 216). He seeks to make us become aware that we should invent our own virtue and create our own way in order to become what we are. He criticizes Christian morality, calling himself ‘the first immoralist’. His shocking approach attempts to make us become aware of the possibility that a ‘noble morality’ and ‘higher moralities’ ought to be possible. His Übermensch represents such a higher mode of existence. Zarathustra also teaches the doctrine of eternal recurrence, implying that moment is eternity, changelessness within change. Multifarious manifestations are the expression of the Tao. Everything is interconnected and interdependent. Whereas ordinary men see the continuity of phenomena as real, enlightened beings are aware of the transitory and illusive nature of the self and all things. The Nietzschean Übermensch embodies the characteristics of an enlightened being, a Buddha or Bodhisattva in Buddhist terms, characteristics such as wisdom and compassion. Therefore, the practice of the Bodhisattva is explored as a feasible way for actualizing the Nietzschean hypothetical Übermensch. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Philosophy / unrestricted

Cette recherche s’inscrit dans trois perspectives. Celle d’abord de l’histoire des idées : quels sont les liens précis entre la pensée de Nietzsche et l’œuvre de Foucault ? Ce dernier ne cesse de revendiquer son nietzschéisme, mais, par –delà des références allusives, il n’a consacré à Nietzsche qu’un article, des cours – dont certains seulement ont été publiés, et une conférence. Réciproquement, dans quelle mesure la pensée de Nietzsche trouve-t-elle un éclairage dans les analyses foucaldiennes ? Celle ensuite plus proprement philosophique : quels sont les liens entre volonté de savoir et volonté de puissance ? Ces deux concepts sont au cœur de l’entreprise généalogique, et c’est leur articulation qu’elle vise à mettre en lumière. La généalogie permettrait ainsi de produire une analyse conjointe de la subjectivité et de l’espace social. Celle enfin de la politique : en quoi la généalogie permet-elle de comprendre le jeu du pouvoir et du savoir dans notre civilisation ? L’hypothèse de départ est que la généalogie permet de mettre au jour des mécanismes qui demeurent inintelligibles à partir des savoirs positifs traditionnels. La psychè contemporaine ne serait compréhensible qu’à partir des concepts élaborés par la généalogie. Cette dernière permettrait de dévoiler le biais idéologique des savoirs qui sont à l’origine de nos actions. Corrélativement, elle permettrait de montrer que le fonctionnement de l’idéologie n’est pas celui qui jusqu’à présent a été théorisé. La méthode utilisée est celle d’une mise en tension de textes choisis dans les œuvres respectives de Friedrich Nietzsche et de Michel Foucault. Il s’agit donc d’une démarche comparative permettant non une superposition ni une juxtaposition, mais un éclairage réciproque des textes entre eux, et, partant, des pensées entre elles. / This research follows three perspectives. First, that of the history of ideas: what are the precise links between Nietzsche’s thought and Foucault’s work? The latter keeps asserting his Nietzscheanism but, in spite of allusive references, he has only devoted to Nietzsche one article, courses –among which some have not been published yet, and a conference. Conversely, to which extent is Nietzsche’s thought clarified by Foucault’s analyses? Then, a more strictly philosophical perspective: what are the links between the will to learn and the will to power? These two concepts are at the heart of the genealogical undertaking, which aims at shedding light on the way they link up together. Genealogy would thus allow a joint analysis of subjectivity and social space. Last, the political perspective: does genealogy allow a better understanding of the interplay between knowledge and power in our civilization? The initial assumption is that genealogy can bring to light mechanisms which remain unintelligible on the basis of positive traditional knowledge. The contemporary psychè could only be understood with the help of the concepts elaborated by genealogy. The latter would allow to unveil the ideological distortion of knowledge which is at the bottom of our actions. Correlatively, it would allow to make clear that the mechanisms of ideology do not correspond to what has been theorized so far. The method used consists in confronting texts selected in the respective works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. So - far from superposition or juxtaposition - this is a comparative approach allowing a reciprocal illumination of texts, and hence thoughts, with one another.

[pt] A dissertação tem o intuito de percorrer algumas trilhas deixadas por Nietzsche em seus escritos filosóficos. Para tanto, iniciamos o trabalho investigando como o filósofo estudou as manifestações da vontade na Grécia antiga, relacionando, posteriormente, esta vontade com a razão socrática. Este é um gancho para iniciar o debate sobre a questão da razão e da vontade na filosofia do autor. Proposta que ocupa todo o restante do primeiro capítulo, culminando com o estudo sobre o livrearbítrio e a moral de senhor e de escravo. O segundo capítulo busca propriamente os desdobramentos políticos da filosofia apresentada na primeira parte. Analisando a gênese das regras sociais e também o Estado moderno. Culminando com o ensinamento de Zaratustra sobre o eterno retorno. / [en] The dissertation intent to pass through some trills leaved by Nietzsche in his philosophical writings. For that, we started the work by investigating how the philosopher has study the manifestations of the will in the old Greece, doing the relation between this will and the Socratic reason. This is a hook to initiate the debate about the question of the reason and the will in the philosophy of the author. Propose witch occupy all the rest of the first chapter, finishing with the study about the free will and the master and slave morality. The second chapter ride the political consequences of the philosophy presented in the first part. Analyzing the geneses of the social rules and, also, the modern state, culminating with the Zaratustra s teaching about the eternal return.

Cette thèse a comme objectif de repenser le rapport entre Descartes et Nietzsche à travers une continuité qui se construit sur le fil conducteur thématique du statut cartésien de l’ego. L’interprétation heideggérienne du lien entre Descartes et Nietzsche est pour cette raison fondamentale : en effet, en relevant à l’intérieur ce rapport les signes du déploiement d’un Même qui a marqué l’époque de la métaphysique de la subjectivité, Heidegger définit un espace fondamental commun entre les deux philosophes. Cet espace, qui se développe à partir de l’émergence de l’ego, semble cependant déborder les limites constitutives de la métaphysique, lorsque Nietzsche retrouve dans le commencement cartésien une ouverture de l’ego au sein du vivant interprété comme volonté de puissance. Sa démarche, loin de seulement le néantiser, vise à tra-duire l’ego dans une dimension morphologique : l’ego serait donc l’effet d’une organisation d’une agrégation de forces, qui prennent forme par le biais d’un centre en devenir. Le chemin de la déconstruction nietzschéenne suit des étapes bien précises : en premier lieu, reconduire le statut de l’ego à une égologie de la substance ; en deuxième lieu, déplacer la certitude fondamentale du cogito vers un sentiment de l’ego (Ichgefühl) qui se fixe comme semblant-à-être ; en troisième lieu dévoiler l’ipséité en tant qu’abime, contre toute possibilité d’interpréter le corps comme sujet, ou mieux, comme fondement. C’est en ces termes que la constitution onto-théo-logique de la pensée cartésienne élaborée par Jean-Luc Marion, permet de suivre le chemin nietzschéen : rapporter à l’ego la manière d’être de toutes les substances est le point de départ d’une généalogie qui vise à dépasser l’ego, tout en montrant sa nécessité à être, qui seule permet au vivant de dire je, à savoir d’être. / The purpose of this doctoral dissertation is to nuance the understanding of the relationship between Descartes and Nietzsche through the cartesian statute of the ego. From this perspective, Heidegger’s interpretation of the link between Descartes and Nietzsche is fundamental. Furthermore, Heidegger defines a fundamental philosophical area explored by both Descartes and Nietzsche. This common area, based on ego’s emergence, tends to exceed the constitutive bounds of metaphysics wherein the Cartesian beginning opens the ego as a form of life within the will to power . His argumentative path leads to a morphological concept of ego— the ego is taken as an effect of the organization of a multiplicity of forces, which take form by becoming a center. The Nietzschean deconstruction is realized through these specific steps: 1) to bring the ego’s statute on an ecology of substance; 2) to dislocate the fundamental certainty of cogito toward an ego-sentiment (Ichgefühl), which situates itself as a seeming-being 3) to reveal the selfness as an abyss, against any interpretations that consider the body as a fundament. At this regard, the onto-théo-logic constitution of Cartesian thought, elaborated by Jean Luc Marion, allows one to follow the Nietzschean approach: by bringing back the ego to the way of being of every substances, it is possible to fix the genealogical starting point to exceed the ego and at the same time to show its necessity to become a being, which only allows life to say I, that is to say to be.

La problématique traitée dans ce travail consiste à s’interroger sur les aspects « politiques » de la pensée de Nietzsche, et surtout sur sa dimension européenne et ses enjeux. Il n’est pas question ici de cataloguer Nietzsche de philosophe politique, ni sa philosophie de philosophie politique, dans le sens académique du terme. Mais essayer de montrer, à travers sa philosophie du sens et de la valeur, de sa méthode généalogique, les démarches et propositions de ce philosophe au « marteau » pour tenter d’éradiquer le nihilisme dans le but d’œuvrer pour une « grande politique » et favoriser l’avènement d’un « nouveau européen » dans une « nouvelle Europe ». En effet, cette Europe dont parle Nietzsche n’a rien à voir avec ce qu’on conçoit généralement comme l’Occident, et cette Europe ainsi que les européens dont il parle n’ont pas vraiment d’existence réelle, repérable avec des frontières, si on se place sur le plan géographique et géopolitique. Dans ce travail je tiens à souligner la contrainte de la sécularisation, et d’autres aspects du dépassement du nationalisme, qui est aussi un dépassement du nihilisme. Nietzsche était, peut-être, l’un des plus acides contempteurs des illusions européennes en démontrant – espérant par la même occasion éradiquer - cette fiction d’une Europe « non-contradictoire », platement conciliatrice, mais à la fois individualiste et revendicatrice d’une égalité des droits. Comportements dénoncés par le philosophe car ce vent pollué par le nationalisme, la puissance industrielle mercantile au détriment de la création vitale ne peuvent mener qu’à une catastrophe en étouffant, en empêchant le jaillissement, l’apparition de l’individu créateur, artiste. Les valeurs se sont donc déjà instituées dans un sens négatif et malsain, et ce dénigrement de la vie n’est pas politiquement indifférent. Ce n’est pas là un vitalisme simpliste. L’homme moderne occidental est le résultat de cette histoire. L’histoire est le résultat de cette « hominisation » inversée qui se fait par le troupeau, et qui est aussi une forme de déshumanisation programmée. C’est Dionysos qui constitue le remède à cette maladie, ce Dieu grec est le héros qui vaincrait cette européocentrisme et le chauvinisme. Soulignons que ce projet qui consiste à critiquer l’égalitarisme comme « dressage », privilégie le retour au texte et non pas la « construction conceptuelle ». Entre autres travaux pour cela : ceux de Patrick Wotling, Paolo D’Iorio, Giuliano Campioni, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Peter Sloterdijk,…Pour éviter toute confusion, malgré la partie « caractéristiques de la philosophie du sens et de la valeur » qui distinguera la « grande politique », soulignons ces quelques points : d’abord la séparation d’avec le vouloir-vivre de Schopenhauer, ensuite l’évaluation d’une transcendance de l’instinct qui fait que Nietzsche quitte le plan de l’irrationalisme furibond, enfin la forme du refus du darwinisme. Ainsi on peut parler d’une volonté de puissance qui n’est plus ramenée à une catégorie volitionnelle, et dotée d’une motivation (par exemple l’oppression physique et militaire ou l’accumulation du capital).Sa reconquête des valeurs doit être replacée dans un contexte mieux compris, et d’abord repensant le nôtre. Il n’est que de songer aux Règles pour le parc humain de Sloterdijk, en réponse à Heidegger, mais qui n’est que le prolongement de l’opposition dressage / élevage (Zähmung / Züchtung) qu’avait thématisée Nietzsche en faveur de ce que seraient de « bons européens ». Ainsi on comprend que les enjeux « politiques » consistent en réalité aux choix de civilisation (Kultur) qui engagent une conception purement anthropologique de l’homme. Seule une métaphysique de la culture permettra alors de dépasser le nihilisme européen et ses nombreuses versions éco-théologiques. / The main theme of this work is that of the “political” aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, particularly in terms of its European dimension and the issues at stake. The aim here is not to label Nietzsche as a political philosopher or his philosophy as political philosophy in the academic sense of the term. Rather, the aim is to show, through his philosophy of meaning and value, and his genealogical method, the approaches adopted and proposals made by this philosopher and his “hammer”, as a means of eradicating nihilism in order to work towards “greater politics” and thus encourage the arrival of a “new European” in a “new Europe”. This Europe of which Nietzsche spoke had nothing in common with what is generally perceived as being the West. His Europe, and its Europeans, do not really exist, and, from a geographical and geopolitical point of view, have no easily identifiable borders. In this work, we underline the restrictions of secularisation, and other aspects that go beyond nationalism, which is in itself a concept that goes beyond that of nihilism. It may be said that Nietzsche had the most acerbic contempt for European illusions, showing – and hoping to thus eradicate – the fiction of a “non-contradictory” Europe, a Europe that is blandly conciliatory but also both individualistic and demanding of equal rights. Such behaviour was denounced by Nietzsche because this wind of change, polluted by nationalism and mercantile industrial power to the detriment of vital creation, can only end in catastrophe, suffocating and preventing the resurgence or appearance of the individual creator, the artist. Values have thus already been adopted in a negative, unhealthy sense and denigrating life in this way is not indifferent from a political point of view. It is not a question of simplistic vitalism. Modern Western man is the result of this history. And this history is the result of the inverted “hominisation” produced by the herd effect, and which is also a sort of programmed dehumanisation. The cure for this ill is Dionysus, the Greek god who was the hero that conquered European centricity and chauvinism. It should be stressed that this project, which consists in criticising egalitarianism as a form of “domestication”, favours a return to the text, and not “conceptual construction”. This theme has also been studied by other authors, such as Patrick Wotling, Paolo D’Iorio, Giuliano Campioni, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and Peter Sloterdijk, to name but a few.To avoid any confusion, and despite the section on the “characteristics of the philosophy of meaning and values” which will identify the “greater politics”, we would like to stress the following points: first of all, the departure from Schopenhauer’s will to live, followed by an evaluation of the transcendence of instinct which shows that Nietzsche moved away from the level of furious irrationalism and, finally, the form taken by the refusal of Darwinism. It is thus possible to speak of a desire for power which is no longer reduced to being a volitional category, but which has become motivated (for example, physical and military oppression, or the accumulation of capital).Nietzsche’s reconquest of values needs to be approached within a context that is better understood, starting with a re-evaluation of our own. This recalls Sloterdijk’s Rules for the Human Zoo, written in response to Heidegger, but which is merely an extension of the domestication/breeding opposition (Zähmung/Züchtung) that Nietzsche conceptualised in favour of what would make “good Europeans”.It is thus that we can understand that the “political” stakes are, in reality, civilisation choices (Kultur), which require a purely anthropological conception of man. Only the metaphysics of culture can thus make it possible to go beyond European nihilism and its many eco-theo-logical versions.