Although the future socio-economic benefits of a new fibre-based ("next generation access", NGA) telecommunications infrastructure seem to be uncontroversial, most countries have to date only undertaken NGA investments on a small scale. Accordingly, a universal NGA coverage appears to be a rather unrealistic objective without government intervention. Indeed, many governments have already initiated diverse subsidy programs in order to stimulate NGA infrastructure deployment. We contend, however, that the current contract practice of fixing ex ante targets for network expansion is inefficient given the uncertainty about future returns on NGA infrastructure-based services and the public authorities' incomplete information about the capital costs of the network provider. This paper puts forward to delegate the choice of the network expansion to the NGA provider. Simple linear profit-sharing contracts can be designed to control the NGA provider's incentives and to put in balance the public objectives of network expansion and limitation of public expenditure. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

本文主旨是要說明：就《道德形上學》的論述而言，康德在何種意義上能夠被視為一個契約論思想家。本文將從兩條線索出發來理解康德所提出的契約論，這兩條線索分別是：康德的財產權理論、以及契約論中處理政治權威正當性時所必須面對的統一性問題。 本文認為：康德所提出的作為理念的原初契約，是一種提供給已處身在政治社會之下的個人，去設想當下所面對的法律強制力之正當性的方式。藉由康德在《純粹理性批判》之中對於「理念」的界定，可以將賦予原初契約一個確實的契約作用：人民的同意。儘管是一個被想像的同意，但康德賦予它積極的意義即形塑公民為一個自主、自律的主體，因此，在這個面向上，本文認為康德提出了儘管與霍布斯、洛克、盧梭迥異但卻仍然極富意義的契約論。 / The purpose of this thesis is that Kant should be seen as a theorist of the social contract theory in the discourse of the Metaphysics of Morals. This thesis will perceive the social contract theory provided by Kant in accordance to two clues, including the theory of property and the problem of unity. The main point of the thesis is that the original social contract as an idea of reason is the method providing for the individual existing in the civil society of constructing the legitimacy of the political authority. By definition of “Idea” in Critique of Pure reason, Kant gives the original social contract a meaningful function: the consent of people. Though the consent is a concept imagined by the people, Kant gives it a positive meaning of forming the people to the independent subject in politics. In conclusion, this thesis claims that Kant provided a meaningful social contract theory different from other theorists in the social contract tradition, such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.

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Chapter 11 of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) and the Retail Shop Leases Act 1994 (Qld) both introduce procedural requirements to the process for creation of land contracts and were both introduced to address a perceived lack of conscience in each of the industries affected. These represent a recent broadening of the ambit of consumer protection legislation in Queensland which deviates from more traditional methods of statutory intervention into land contracts. This paper focuses on the extent to which the Acts effectively introducing a conscience element into certain land contracts, and the extent to which this alters classical contract law. The effectiveness of the approach is then tested against the critiques of two alternative theories of law - law and economics and feminist contract theory - to see whether the legislative approach answers the deficiencies in contract identified within the terms of each theory.

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T20:58:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 GabrielRamirezCoelho09032007.pdf.jpg: 13935 bytes, checksum: 3f3eb512654eb4aab5795e66a64e3ff1 (MD5) GabrielRamirezCoelho09032007.pdf.txt: 55253 bytes, checksum: 70baafb810cc2a579c699206c014fc48 (MD5) GabrielRamirezCoelho09032007.pdf: 311369 bytes, checksum: 4bd2e40af4810a1317ab7434ded20f0e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-03-09T00:00:00Z / During the last two decades, the private equity and venture capital industry role in Brazil has significantly increased, with the expansion of resources under management and number of transactions. At the same time, the degree of sophistication of its legal environment and contractual structures has increased to cope with the particularly intense agency problems present due to (i) low liquidity of assets; (ii) the long term nature of contracts; (iii) the potentially huge asymmetry of information between investors and managers. This dissertation explores the presence of restrictions to the venture capital fund managers’ activities; and shows that there is a strong relation between the number of restrictions and the intensity of agency problems, but inconclusive evidence relating the restrictions to demand conditions. / Nas duas últimas décadas, o papel dos setores de private equity e venture capital no Brasil aumentou significativamente, com a expansão do volume de recursos sob gestão e do número de transações. Ao mesmo tempo, a sofisticação do marco legal e das formas de contratação aumentou para que fosse possível lidar com os problemas de agência, que são particularmente intensos devido (i) à baixa liquidez dos ativos em que investe, (ii) à duração do compromisso entre as partes e (iii) à potencialmente elevada assimetria de informação entre elas. Este trabalho explora a presença de restrições às atividades dos gestores de recursos de private equity e venture capital, e mostra que há uma forte correlação entre a quantidade de restrições e a intensidade dos problemas de agência, mas que as evidências quanto à relação entre as restrições e as condições de demanda não são conclusivas.

L’une des causes de la richesse des nations, la coopération, repose sur un échange de promesses. Si le droit des contrats est considéré comme un outil efficace - bien qu’imparfait - pour garantir ces dernières, il n’est cependant pas le seul : un tissu entier d’institutions formelles et informelles est à l’œuvre pour faciliter la coopération entre les agents économiques. Ce travail examine cette problématique dans le cadre de la finance islamique, considérée comme l’application moderne du droit des contrats islamiques. Alors qu’elle est censée utiliser des instruments de financement participatifs, la pratique de la finance islamique est dominée par le financement par la dette. Les causes généralement avancées pour expliquer cet état de fait sont des problèmes informationnels, considérés comme des vecteurs d’influence sur le comportement des banques. Cette thèse montre que ces problèmes informationnels ne sont en réalité que la conséquence d’un problème sous-jacent. Par une analyse du rôle et de la raison d’être des institutions, ce travail montre que le droit des contrats islamiques a été conçu à l’origine avec un objectif clair: assurer l’équilibre des transactions et garantir la propriété. Le respect des promesses était pour sa part assuré par d’autres types de mécanismes, notamment à travers la réputation, complétant dans les faits le droit des contrats. Cette conclusion permet d’appréhender le débat « forme vs substance » dans la finance islamique à travers l’échec d'un « transplant institutionnel intertemporel », pour montrer que les contrats évités sont dépendants du contexte dans lequel ils ont vu le jour et s’adaptent mal au contexte moderne. / One of the main causes of the wealth of nations, cooperation, is based on exchanged promises. Contract law is viewed as an efficient, though imperfect, tool to ensure promise keeping. However, contract law is not the only mechanism playing that role. A whole body of formal and informal institutions is at work easing economic agents cooperation.This work considers this issue in the Islamic finance framework which is seen as a modern application of Islamic contracts law. Islamic finance is a fruitful object of study as it is facing a paradoxe. While this finance is supposed to rely on participatory financing tools, its practice is dominated by debt based financings. Informational problems are usually identified as a cause of such practices.This work shows that information problems are not a cause but a consequence of a deeper problem. Through an analysis of the role and the raison d’être of institutions, this work puts the development of Islamic contracts law into the perspective of an economic and social context. It shows that Islamic contracts law had originally been developed with a clear goal: ensure transactions equilibrium and protect property. The respect of promises, for its part, was made possible by other mechanisms, such as reputation, supplementing contract law. This conclusion allows us to view the debate “form vs. substance” in Islamic finance as an “intertemporal institutional transplantation” failure and to show that the avoided contracts are dependent of their original context and adapt poorly to the modern one.

博士（商学） / 乙第395号 / 63p / 一橋大学

L’objet général de notre thèse est, d’une part, d’étudier l’influence de la légitimité du manager sur la motivation de son employé à l’effort et, d’autre part, d’analyser la manière dont le manager intègre cette influence potentielle dans ses comportements, et ce afin de renforcer son autorité. Enfin, nous nous intéressons aux stratégies que la firme peut mettre en place pour renforcer la légitimité de ses dirigeants en choisissant parmi plusieurs procédures de sélection des dirigeants. Notre approche est à la fois théorique, en nous appuyant sur la théorie des jeux, et empirique en utilisant l’économie expérimentale. Tout d’abord, nous définissons une légitimité procédurale qui consiste a considérer un dirigeant légitime si il a été promu à l'issue d'une compétition sans favoritisme. Ensuite nous définissons une légitimité méritocratique qui est acquise s’il maitrise les taches de son employé. Enfin, nous définissons une légitimité aristocratique qui est la compétence d’un individu à maitriser des taches de direction.Dans un premier chapitre, nous montrons que l’effort du futur dirigeant pendant la compétition n’est pas forcément un bon moyen de renforcer une légitimité procédurale car une très forte performance peut justement trahir le fait d’avoir bénéficié d’un avantage. Par ailleurs nous montrons que le perdant de la compétition sera toujours un « mauvais perdant » car sa croyance sur le fait qu’il ait été défavorisé pendant la compétition sera toujours renforcée. L’enjeu pour la firme est alors de déléguer à une entité externe la gestion de la sélection des dirigeants pour que tout traitement inéquitable présupposé pendant la compétition n’apporte aucune information concernant un potentiel traitement inéquitable à l’avenir. Dans un deuxième chapitre, nous montrons que sélectionner sur les compétences de direction permet d’augmenter le salaire des dirigeants quand bien même ces compétences sont moins difficiles à maitriser. La raison en est que cela neutralise les problèmes de rivalité entre employés et dirigeant et préserve ainsi la confiance en lui de celui qui a échoué à être promu (le rendant ainsi moins couteux à motiver). Le troisième chapitre est quant à lui un travail expérimental qui montrer qu’une procédure méritocratique incite les perdants du tournoi à demander une rémunération plus grande pour compenser leur découragement suite à leur échec. / The general purpose of our thesis is, on the one hand, to study the influence of legitimacy of the manager on the motivation of his employee to exert effort and, on the other hand, to analyze how the manager integrates this potential influence into his behavior in order to bolster his authority. Finally, we are interested in strategies that the firm can design to bolster the legitimacy of its managers by choosing between several procedures of selection. Our approach is both theoretical, based on game theory, and empirical using experimental economics.First, we define a procedural legitimacy that consists in considering an executive as legitimate if he was promoted through a competition with no unfair treatment. Then, we define a meritocratic legitimacy that is the ability to master the operational task exerted by the employee. Finally, we define an aristocratic legitimacy, which is the ability of an individual to master managerial tasks.In a first chapter, we show that the future leader's effort during the competition is not necessarily a good way to bolster a procedural legitimacy because a very strong performance can just betray the fact that he has benefited from an advantage. Moreover, we show that the loser of the competition will always be a "bad loser" because his belief that he was disadvantaged during the competition will always be reinforced if he behaves with Bayesian rationality. The stake for the firm is then to delegate to an external entity the management of the selection of leaders to ensure that any unfair treatment presupposed during the competition does not provide any information regarding a potential unfair treatment in the future. In a second chapter, we show that to select on managerial abilities allows to increase the salary of executives even though these skills are less difficult to master. The reason is that it neutralizes the problems of rivalry between employees and executives and thus preserves the self-confidence of the one who has failed to be promoted (thus making it less costly to incentivize). The third chapter is an experimental work that aims to show that a meritocratic procedure incites the losers to actually ask for higher wage to compensate their discouragements following their failure.

Cette thèse contribue à rendre le marché de la rénovation énergétique durable et autonome. L’objectif est de contribuer à quantifier le risque de non atteinte de la performance énergétique après rénovation. Tout d’abord, nous analysons les facteurs psychologiques des ménages à prendre en compte pour améliorer les modèles de prédictions de consommation d’énergie. Via le programme Je rénove BBC, nous mettons en évidence quatre biais cognitifs impactant l’écart de la consommation d’énergie réelle et prédite. Puis, nous étudions les structures de contrats les plus appropriés pour améliorer le déroulement des chantiers, incitant les artisans à mieux travailler. D’une part, nous déterminons des contrats pour un Agent devant effectuer deux tâches et sous-estimant l’impact de l’une d’entre elles sur la performance du bâtiment. D’autre part, nous testons des incitations individuelles et collectives sur la capacité de plusieurs artisans à se coordonner selon leur formation initiale (DORéMI, …). / This thesis aims at contributing to make the energy renovation market long-lasting and self-sustaining. To achieve this, our objective is to quantify the risk of not achieving energy performance after renovation. First, we analyze households’ psychological factors that should be considered to improve energy consumption prediction models. Drawing on the Je rénove BBC program, we highlight four cognitive biases that negatively impact the difference between actual and predicted energy consumption. We then study the most appropriate contract structures improving the flow and quality of renovation projects, encouraging craftsmen to work better. On one hand, we determine optimal contracts for an Agent who has to perform two tasks and underestimates the impact of one of them on the building's performance. On the other hand, we test individual-based and group-based incentives on the ability of several real Agents (craftsmen) to coordinate, according to their initial training (DORéMI, …).

I takt med att teknologin i nytillverkade bilar blir allt mer avancerad, ökar också antalet produktåterkallelserinom bilindustrin till följd av defekta komponenter. En produktåterkallelse ger upphov till enkostnadsökning för det berörda företaget och bör således ge en negativ effekt på aktiekursen, närmarknadsaktörer tar del av informationen. Det är inom bilindustrin vanligt att biltillverkande företagkontrakterar ut tillverkningen av fordonens komponenter. Den upptrappade outsourcingen frambringarfrågan om vilken part som ska ansvara för återkallelsens kostnader. Studien undersöker med hjälp aveventstudier och hypotesprövningar hur produktionsledets olika aktörer påverkas av information om enåterkallelse inom bilindustrin? Studien har valt ut 39 händelser när ett biltillverkande företag tvingas attåterkalla bilmodeller. Uppsatsens resultat visade att produktionsledets olika aktörer inte påverkas avinformation om en återkallelse, därmed gick det inte heller påvisa att komponenttillverkare drabbashårdare än biltillverkare av en återkallelse. Studiens resultat visade heller inget positivt samband mellanmarknadsreaktionen beroende på återkallelsens storlek, felorsak eller tidpunkten för tillkännagivandet. / As the technology in newly manufactured cars becomes more advanced, the number of product recallsin the automotive industry is also increasing due to defective components. A product recall gives rise toan increase in costs for the company concerned and should therefore have a negative effect on the shareprice when market participants consult the information. It is common in the automotive industry for carmanufacturing companies to outsource the production of vehicle components. The escalating outsourcingraises the question of which party should be responsible for the costs of the recall. The study examineswith the help of event studies and hypothesis tests how the different actors in the production stage areaffected by information about a recall in the automotive industry? The study has selected 39 events whena car manufacturing company is forced to recall car models. The results of the paper showed that thevarious operators of the production stage are not affected by information about a recall, so it was notpossible to demonstrate that component manufacturers are hit harder than car manufacturers by a recall.Furthermore, the results of the study did not show a positive relationship between the market reaction dueto the size of the recall, the cause of the withdrawal or the time of the announcement.