Der Anlass der Arbeit ist die anhaltende Debatte um die Einführung des Ausschreibungswettbewerbs im Nahverkehr. Die Arbeit betrachtet schwerpunktmäßig die Gestaltung von Ausschreibungen im öffentlichen Straßenpersonennahverkehr, der in Deutschland durch das Personenbeförderungsgesetz (PBefG) geregelt wird. Gerade die Debatte um den Ausschreibungswettbewerb in diesem Bereich ist durch Kompetenzstreitigkeiten zwischen den Verkehrsunternehmen und den öffentlichen Aufgabenträgern bzw. ihren Vergabeinstitutionen gekennzeichnet. Beide Seiten beanspruchen dabei Verantwortlichkeiten auf der taktischen Ebene der Leistungserstellung, beispielsweise die Liniennetzplanung, die Fahrplangestaltung, das Fahrzeugkonzept und das Marketing. Das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit besteht darin, herauszufinden, ob es aus ökonomischer Sicht besser ist, diese o. g. Entscheidungskompetenzen den Verkehrsunternehmen oder den Vergabeinstitutionen der Aufgabenträger zuzuordnen. Nach einer Bestandsaufnahme der bereits bestehenden ordnungspolitischen Vorschläge und der gegenwärtigen Zuständigkeiten, wird, ausgehend von der Vertrags- und Auktionstheorie, die Frage erörtert, ob sich unternehmerische Gestaltungsspielräume auf der taktischen Ebene in eine Leistungsbeschreibung integrieren lassen. In einem zweiten Schritt wird die Gestaltung der Beziehungen zwischen Aufgabenträger, seiner Vergabeorganisation und dem Verkehrsunternehmen während der Vertragslaufzeit betrachtet. Die Theorie der unvollständigen Verträge wird dabei auf das Problem der ÖPNV-Verträge angewandt, um aufzuzeigen, ob ein Mehr an unternehmerischer Freiheit bei der Gestaltung des Verkehrsangebots aus der Sicht der Aufgabenträger eher mit Chancen oder mit Risiken behaftet ist. Chancen können sich insbesondere dadurch ergeben, dass das Unternehmen während der Laufzeit des Vertrages neue Möglichkeiten entdeckt, wie sich die Qualität der Leistung verbessern lässt. Risiken ergeben sich dadurch, dass das Unternehmen nach Abschluss des Verkehrsvertrages seine Gestaltungsspielräume ausnutzt, um die Kosten zu Lasten der bestehenden Dienstleistungsqualität zu senken. Im Rahmen von Fallstudien aus Australien, Schweden und den Niederlanden wird das im Rahmen der Betrachtungen zur Theorie unvollständiger Verträge erörterte Spannungsverhältnis aus Kostensenkung, Qualitätsverbesserung bzw. –verschlechterung untersucht. Die Fallstudien zeigen, dass Unternehmen, wenn sie Freiheiten bei der Angebotsgestaltung erhalten, ihre Anstrengungen vor allem auf kostensenkende Aktivitäten fokussieren, die auch zu Lasten der Qualität gehen können. Es wird deutlich, dass vor allem im Hinblick auf die Gewährleistung eines integrierten Angebots und die Sicherstellung von Investitionen allgemeinverbindliche Standards und ein intensives Monitoring durch die Aufgabenträger unerlässlich sind.

This essay intends to interpret the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (CETS No. 210) using discourse analysis and theories of the sexual contract (Pateman 1988) and the male protective logic (Young 2003). The purpose is to find out which feminist discourses can be made visible in the convention, which subject positions are constructed within the framework of those discourses and how re- sponsibilities are distributed in contemporary policy documents. In summary the results show that the central subject positions within the convention consist of the protector, the victim and the perpetrator, which in turn include the majority of underlying subjects that both overlap each other and sometimes oppose each other's positions. The same subject who holds the po- sition of protector can also be the perpetrator and in this paradox are found, among others, the state and the violent man. A feminist discourse that underlies the convention's presentation is that unequal structures between binary gender categories, which is described as a fundamental problem when it comes to violence against women. Pointing out these structures risks of re- producing stereotypical notions of women and men as generalizable groups, but the convention also contributes through these representations to an international recognition of patriarchal structures and to shift the problem of men's violence against women and domestic violence from being a private matter to a problem for which the state should take responsibility.

[pt] Essa tese estuda o impacto de mecanismos contratuais no valor de operações de fusões e aquisições e propõe três modelos distintos de avaliação. Ademais, sob a ótica da Teoria dos Contratos, ressaltamos o impacto do comportamento dos agentes nas características das cláusulas utilizadas ou ainda no sucesso da transação. Primeiro, desenvolvemos um modelo para earnouts fornecendo fundamentos para como essa cláusula em particular deve ser estruturada e como seu valor deve ser estimado, especialmente considerando sua similaridade com opções. Além disso, testamos diferentes formatos para o earnout, como opção binária e opção de compra. Segundo, modelamos a cláusula de anti-diluição, a qual proporciona uma proteção adicional para investidores, em especial no contexto de Venture Capital. Anti-diluição tem papel fundamental como seguro para investidores contra rodadas de investimento futuras com valuation abaixo do que fora previamente pago pelo investidor. Por fim, desenvolvemos um modelo de avaliação para preferência de liquidação, a qual também pode ser uma alternativa de garantia para investidores em operações de fusões e aquisições. Preferência de liquidação é tipicamente definida como o direito do investidor em receber seu investimento adicionado de um determinado montante em caso de algum evento de liquidação, em preferência os demais acionistas. Os resultados indicam que os mecanismos contratuais largamente utilizados em operações de fusões e aquisições tem impacto relevante no valor justo da transação. Adicionalmente, os resultados sugerem que os mecanismos contratuais são importantes ferramentas para mitigar o risco para investidores, viabilizando determinadas operações que se tornariam inviáveis, especialmente ao considerarmos a assimetria de informação entre comprador e vendedor. / [en] This thesis studies the impact of contractual mechanisms in MeA valuation deals and proposes three models to evaluate them. Also, under the Contract Theory lens, we draw attention to the parties behavior and its impact on clauses settings or transaction success. First, we develop a model for earnouts and provide the foundation for understanding how they might best be structured and how their value might be estimated, especially considering their similarity to financial options. Furthermore, we also test different features for the earnout, such as binary options and a combination of binary and call options. Second, we model the anti-dilution covenant, which provides additional protection for investors, especially in a venture capital context. Antidilution plays an important role as insurance for venture capitalists against down round, which is a subsequent financing event at a lower valuation. Lastly, we developed a valuation model for liquidation preference, which can be an alternative guarantee for investors in MeA deals. Liquidation preference is typically defined as the right of the investor (usually holding preference shares), to receive its investment amount plus a certain agreed percentage of the proceeds in the event of a liquidation of the company, in preference over the other shareholders. Our findings indicate that the typical legal covenants used in MeA deals have a relevant impact on their fair value and may work as important tools to bridge the gap between the buyer and the seller, especially considering the information asymmetry on this context. On the other hand, depending on the clauses settings, the risk may be too skewed to the seller side, making the deal structure too expensive under his perspective. By testing the model s parameters sensitivity, we provided the inputs the seller needs to evaluate and pursue the optimal contractual terms.

[pt] A presente dissertação expressa e narra meu processo de compreensão do meu desejo de saber, suas impossibilidades, e as conexões entre poder e reivindicações à verdade nas narrativas e sujeitos autorizados por tais reivindicações. Eu escolhi particularmente o processo de formação do sujeito como compreendido pela teoria psicanalítica desenvolvida por Jacques Lacan – em seu “retorno a Freud” – e pela teoria contratualista como desenvolvida por Thomas Hobbes. Esse processo de formação do sujeito é um que eu entendo, como Judith Butler, como co-constitutivo e codependente com o poder que o forma numa relação em que não há emergência de um sujeito a não ser que autorizado por alguma instância de poder, ao mesmo tempo que não há poder senão como efeito sobre e através dos sujeitos a quem sujeita. O caminho em particular que eu consegui traçar em minha exploração, primeiro, foi entendendo um certo caráter ou papel estruturante da linguagem na teoria de ambos Lacan e Hobbes. Isso me permitiu dar um passo além, na análise de como o sujeito neurótico e o sujeito do contrato social emergem não só dos mesmos contextos, mas, sendo assim, talvez sejam um e o mesmo sujeito. Para, então, seguir o processo de formação do sujeito como colocada por Lacan até o mecanismo do Nome-do-Pai, procurando entender nossos investimentos políticos em uma certa forma paternalista de autoridade. No último e final passo deste processo ao invés de se fechar e confirmar-se a si mesma, eu busco partilhar uma crítica de um certo modelo heteronormativo e falocêntrico no qual muito da teoria psicanalítica está baseada, seus efeitos danosos nos mecanismos de exclusão e autorização de determinados sujeitos na nossa sociedade, baseados em uma diferenciação sexual. Eu emerjo desta dissertação não só mais capaz de engajar livros, autores e literaturas, mas compreendendo melhor e sendo mais atenta ao meu próprio desejo de saber e os mecanismos de exclusão vigentes no nosso mundo. / [en] This dissertation expresses and narrates my struggle to grapple with my own desire of knowing, its impossibility, and the connections between power and claims to truth in those – people and narratives – authorized by claims to know. I chose the particular process of subject formation as understood by the psychoanalytical theory developed by Jacques Lacan – in his return to Freud – and the social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes. This process of subject formation is one I understand, rooted in the thought of Judith Butler, as a co-constitutive and codependent relationship, where no subject can emerge unless subjected by power, and power can only exist as the effects of authorization of certain subjects. The particular path through which I have been able to do this has been through the exploration, first, of a certain structuring character language has both in lacanian psychoanalytical theory and in the hobbesian political treatise. This allowed me to take one step further into analyzing how the neurotic subject and the social contract subject emerge and understand them as one and the same. So then I could be able to follow Lacan s exploration of subject formation in the device of the Name-of-the-Father, hoping it would make me understand a particular investment of the social contract theory subject in paternal authority. I chose to close this dissertation, then, not confirming and reiterating the movement I have been able to find and develop, but with a critique of the heteronormative, phallocentric model in which much of psychoanalytical theory is rooted in, and its damaging effects on the mechanisms of exclusion and authorization of subjects in our society, as based on sexual difference. I have emerged from this dissertation not only smarter from the books I have read and literature I have engaged with, but wiser in my own inquiries and desire to have access and know how the world works.

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are systems that integrate physical elements with a cyber layer that enables sensing, monitoring, and processing the data from the physical components. Examples of CPSs include autonomous vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), smart grids, and the Internet of Things (IoT). In particular, many critical infrastructure (CI) that are vital to our modern day cities and communities, are CPSs. This wide range of CPSs domains represents a cornerstone of smart cities in which various CPSs are connected to provide efficient services. However, this level of connectivity has brought forward new security challenges and has left CPSs vulnerable to many cyber-physical attacks and disruptive events that can utilize the cyber layer to cause damage to both cyber and physical components. Addressing these security and operation challenges requires developing new security solutions to prevent and mitigate the effects of cyber and physical attacks as well as improving the CPSs response in face of disruptive events, which is known as the CPS resilience. To this end, the primary goal of this dissertation is to develop novel analytical tools that can be used to study, analyze, and optimize the resilience and security of critical CPSs. In particular, this dissertation presents a number of key contributions that pertain to the security and the resilience of multiple CPSs that include power systems, the Internet of Things (IoT), UAVs, and transportation networks. First, a mathematical framework is proposed to analyze and mitigate the effects of GPS spoofing attacks against UAVs. The proposed framework uses system dynamics to model the optimal routes which UAVs can follow in normal operations and under GPS spoofing attacks. A countermeasure mechanism, built on the premise of cooperative localization, is then developed to mitigate the effects of these GPS spoofing attacks. To practically deploy the proposed defense mechanism, a dynamic Stackelberg game is formulated to model the interactions between a GPS spoofer and a drone operator. The equilibrium strategies of the game are analytically characterized and studied through a novel, computationally efficient algorithm. Simulation results show that, when combined with the Stackelberg strategies, the proposed defense mechanism will outperform baseline strategy selection techniques in terms of reducing the possibility of UAV capture. Next, a game-theoretic framework is developed to model a novel moving target defense (MTD) mechanism that enables CPSs to randomize their configurations to proactive deter impending attacks. By adopting an MTD approach, a CPS can enhance its security against potential attacks by increasing the uncertainty on the attacker. The equilibrium of the developed single-controller, stochastic MTD game is then analyzed. Simulation results show that the proposed framework can significantly improve the overall utility of the defender. Third, the concept of MTD is coupled with new cryptographic algorithms for enhancing the security of an mHealth Internet of Things (IoT) system. In particular, using a combination of theory and implementation, a framework is introduced to enable the IoT devices to update their cryptographic keys locally to eliminate the risk of being revealed while they are shared. Considering the resilience of CPSs, a novel framework for analyzing the component- and system-level resilience of CIs is proposed. This framework brings together new ideas from Bayesian networks and contract theory – a Nobel prize winning theory – to define a concrete system-level resilience index for CIs and to optimize the allocation of resources, such as redundant components, monitoring devices, or UAVs to help those CIs improve their resilience. In particular, the developed resilience index is able to account for the effect of CI components on the its probability of failure. Meanwhile, using contract theory, a comprehensive resource allocation framework is proposed enabling the system operator to optimally allocate resources to each individual CI based on its economic contribution to the entire system. Simulation results show that the system operator can economically benefit from allocating the resources while dams can have a significant improvement in their resilience indices. Subsequently, the developed contract-theoretic framework is extended to account for cases of asymmetric information in which the system operator has only partial information about the CIs being in some vulnerability and criticality levels. Under such asymmetry, it is shown that the proposed approach maximizes the system operator's utility while ensuring that no CI has an incentive to ask for another contract. Next, a proof-of-concept framework is introduced to analyze and improve the resilience of transportation networks against flooding. The effect of flooding on road capacities and on the free-flow travel time, is considered for different rain intensities and roads preparedness. Meanwhile, the total system's travel time before and after flooding is evaluated using the concept of a Wardrop equilibrium. To this end, a proactive mechanism is developed to reduce the system's travel time, after flooding, by shifting capacities (available lanes) between same road sides. In a nutshell, this dissertation provides a suite of analytical techniques that allow the optimization of security and resilience across multiple CPSs. / Doctor of Philosophy / Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have recently been used in many application domains because of their ability to integrate physical elements with a cyber layer allowing for sensing, monitoring, and remote controlling. This pervasive use of CPSs in different applications has brought forward new security challenges and threats. Malicious attacks can now leverage the connectivity of the cyber layer to launch remote attacks and cause damage to the physical components. Taking these threats into consideration, it became imperative to ensure the security of CPSs. Given that many CPSs provide critical services, for instance many critical infrastructure (CI) are CPSs such as smart girds and nuclear reactors; it is then inevitable to ensure that these critical CPSs can maintain proper operation. One key measure of the CPS’s functionality, is resilience which evaluates the ability of a CPS to deliver its designated service under potentially disruptive situations. In general, resilience measures a CPS’s ability to adapt or rapidly recover from disruptive events. Therefore, it is crucial for CPSs to be resilient in face of potential failures. To this end, the central goal of this dissertation is to develop novel analytical frameworks that can evaluate and improve security and resilience of CPSs. In these frameworks, cross-disciplinary tools are used from game theory, contract theory, and optimization to develop robust analytical solutions for security and resilience problems. In particular, these frameworks led to the following key contributions in cyber security: developing an analytical framework to mitigate the effects of GPS spoofing attacks against UAVs, introducing a game-theoretic moving target defense (MTD) framework to improve the cyber security, and securing data privacy in m-health Internet of Things (IoT) networks using a MTD cryptographic framework. In addition, the dissertation led to the following contributions in CI resilience: developing a general framework using Bayesian Networks to evaluate and improve the resilience of CIs against their components failure, introducing a contract-theoretic model to allocate resources to multiple connected CIs under complete and asymmetric information scenarios, providing a proactive plan to improve the resilience of transportation networks against flooding, and, finally, developing an environment-aware framework to deploy UAVs in disaster-areas.

This article traces different forms of the same present throughout several eras in American political and social history. I focus on two texts, John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, and Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney’s majority opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, in order to examine slavery as a legal institution in the United States, and, in particular, the constitutionality of slavery. Rather than a massive contradiction, the Dred Scott decision is just another iteration of American political and racial philosophy as it was 100, even 200 years earlier. Taney’s opinion is a reflection of what the Lockean social contract came to look like in a racially hierarchized, colonial society. The Dred Scott decision paints one of the most accurate pictures of American political thought but is always written off as nothing but bad law. A close examination of race and social contract theory as they influenced the American Constitution gives insight into more productive ways to talk about race today.

Diese Arbeit enthält drei unabhängige Kapitel, jedes davon im Bereich der Dynamischen Vertragstheorie. Kapitel I zeigt, dass deterministische dynamische Prinzipal-Agenten-Verträge immer mindestens so ertragreich sind wie stochastische, falls die sogenannte Methode erster Ordnung des dynamischen Mechanismus-Designs erfüllt ist. Meine Ergebnisse legen dar, dass die in der Literatur übliche Einschränkung auf deterministische Verträge zulässig ist, so lange die Methode erster Ordnung gültig ist. Kapitel II basiert auf einer gemeinsamen Arbeit mit Ilia Krasikov und Rohit Lamba. Ein Großanbieter (Prinzipal) handelt mit einer kleinen Firma (Agent) einen wiederkehrenden Geschäftsvertrag aus, wobei sich der Agent als ungeduldiger erweist. Der optimale Vertrag wird durch zwei Schlüsseleigenschaften beschrieben: Neustart und Abbruch, die vielerlei Eigenschaften der angebotenen Verträge darlegen. Kapitel III basiert schließlich auf einer gemeinsamen Arbeit mit Rohit Lamba. Darin besitzt der Agent dynamische private Information, die einem Markovprozess folgt. Ein monopolistischer Prinzipal verkauft dem Agenten ein nicht-dauerhaftes Gut und er verpflichtet sich in jeder Periode an den ursprünglich ausgehandelten Vertrag. Die entstehenden Informationskosten verhindern erst-beste Verträge bei auftretender Persistenz im Typ des Agenten. Diese Arbeit stellt einen Weg bereit, wie man den optimalen deterministischen Vertrag in dynamischen Prinzipal-Agenten-Modellen erhält. Der gewöhnliche Weg mit lediglich lokal nach unten bindenden Anreizverträglichkeitsbedingungen misslingt bei hoher Persistenz der Typrealisierungen und bei stark differenzierender Diskontierung. Zudem zeigt die Arbeit wann mit Gewissheit stochastische Verträge ausgeschlossen werden können. / This dissertation consists of three independent chapters, each in the field of dynamic contracting. Chapter I shows that deterministic dynamic contracts between a principal and an agent are always at least as profitable to the principal as stochastic ones, if the so-called first-order approach in dynamic mechanism design is satisfied. My results demonstrate that the usual restriction in the literature to deterministic contracts is admissible, as long as the first-order approach is valid. Chapter II is based on joint work with Ilia Krasikov and Rohit Lamba. We consider a large supplier (principal) who contracts with a small firm (agent) to repeatedly provide working capital in return for payments. The agent is less patient than the principal. The optimal contract is characterized by two key properties: restart and shutdown, which capture various aspects of contracts offered in the marketplace. Finally, Chapter III is based on joint work with Rohit Lamba. We consider the problem of optimal contracting where the agent has dynamic private information, which follows a Markov process. In each period, a monopolistic principal sells a nondurable good to the agent and she commits to the contract she made in the initial period. The emerging information costs prevent first-best contracts whenever there is persistency in the agent’s type. This thesis provides a strategy on how to obtain the optimal deterministic contract in dynamic principal-agent models with Markovian type realizations. We see that the usual approach with only local downward binding incentive compatibility constraints does not work for highly persistent type realizations and for large differences in discounting. Furthermore, I show in which situations we with certainty can exclude stochastic contracts.

Die Dissertation untersucht die Auswirkung fehlenden Commitments eines zentralen ökonomischen Akteurs in verschiedenen institutionellen Umfeldern. Aufsatz 1 bietet eine neuartige Erklärung für grobe Zertifizierung: Diese verringert die Anreize für Kollusion zwischen Zertifizieren und Zertifizierten. Kollusion wird verstanden als die Möglichkeit, gegen Bestechung, ein vorteilhaftes Zertifikat an einen Verkäufer zu vergeben. Konfrontiert mit einem Bestechungsangebot wägt der Zertifizier ab ob der kurzfristige Ertrag - in Form eines Bestechungsgeldes - die langfristigen Kosten – in Form des einhergehenden Reputationsverlustes – aufwiegt. Dabei erweist sich eine gröbere Zertifizierung als besonders nützlich um den kurzfristigen Ertrag zu reduzieren. Im zweiten Aufsatz werden optimale Vertragsmechanismen untersucht, wenn sich der Prinzipal nicht auf eine Auditstrategie verpflichten kann. Solche optimalen Mechanismen nutzen unparteiische Mediatoren aus. Die Verwendung eines Mediators ist profitabel, da somit Korrelation zwischen dem Report des Agenten und der Handlungsempfehlung an den Prinzipal erzeugt werden kann. Optimale Mechanismen verwenden zudem strikt mehr Verträge als Typen des Agenten, was unter vollständigem Commitment nie optimal sein kann. Der dritte Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit Verträgen welche die Abwanderung von Unternehmen verhindern können. Der Regulierer kann sich dabei nur auf kurzfristige Verträge verpflichten und die Firmen können standortspezifische Investitionen tätigen. Wenn im Gleichgewicht Abwanderung permanent verhindert wird, dann werden keine Subventionen in der Zukunft gezahlt. Dies bedeutet, dass die Firma in Zukunft gar keinen Anreiz mehr haben darf abzuwandern. Um dies zu erreichen muss also der heutige Vertrag enorme Investitionsanreize setzen. Im Extremfall ist dann teurer Abwanderung zu verhindern wenn die Firma investieren kann, als im hypothetischen Fall ohne Investitionsmöglichkeit. / This dissertation studies the impact of a lack of commitment of a central economic actor in a given institutional environment. Essay 1 offers a novel explanation for the occurrence of coarse disclosure in certification: coarseness reduces the threat of collusion between certifiers and sellers. Collusion is understood as the possibility of selling a favorable certificate to a seller. Upon accepting a bribing offer, the certifier trades-off short-run gains – in form of the bribe – against long-run losses, from loosing reputation. Coarse disclosure is shown effective in reducing the short-run gain. The second essay studies optimal mechanisms in a contracting problem where the principal cannot commit to an auditing strategy. In this framework optimal mechanisms make use of an impartial mediator. Employing a mediator is strictly beneficial because it allows for correlating the agent’s report with the recommendation to the mediator. In general, optimal mechanisms use strictly more contracts than types, which would be not profitable under full commitment. The third essay studies contracts that avert relocation of a firm. The regulator can offer contracts only on a short-term basis, and the firm can undertake a location-specific investment. If in equilibrium relocation is permanently averted, then there are no future transfer payments. But this implies the firm cannot have an incentive to relocate in the future. Tom guarantee the latter, the initial contract has to provide string investment incentives. In the extreme, averting relocation with the firm’s possibility of investing becomes more costly than in the hypothetical case without an opportunity to invest.

The diploma thesis is focused on social contract theories, as presented by the philosophers Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. My research is based on Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes, Second Treatise of Government by John Locke and Discourses and The Social Contract by Jean-Jacque Rousseau. In their respective theories, these authors present their opinions on how any state comes to life through entering into a social contract and how it should operate. The aim of my thesis is to look into their theories and using method of comparison to determine how they correspond with each other on the fundamental aspects of their ideas. These include the natural state, the act of entering into a social contract, the sovereign, sovereignty and the order of state establishment. The research suggests that although the authors agree on some points, in some cases they differ significantly. It also shows the significant influence of the environments and events experienced by the authors during their lives, on the formation of their thoughts and theories. At the very end of the thesis there is a reflection on the legitimacy of the Constitution of the Czech Republic and the contribution of the theories of appointed authors to today's society.

<p><strong> </strong></p><p>Dissertation in political science, C-level by Niklas Andersson, Spring Semester 2009. Tutor: Arne Larsson</p><p>“The Treaty of Lisbon – The Defence against Globalization?”</p><p>In the modern world globalization have undermined the nation-state and left it without the right measurements to adequately deal with the social and economic unrest that follows in its way. The states, built on contract theories, have an obligation to protect its citizens from the state of nature which seems to have failed as globalization has changed the rules.</p><p>The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the contract theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Rawls to identify the elements of a state and create a modern and ideal contract theory. The treaty shall then be used on the Treaty of Lisbon as it can be seen as a contract between the European states to create an entity in the shape of the European Union with the power to defend Europe from the unrest created by globalization.</p><p>My question for this was as follows:</p><p>Is the new treaty for the European Union acceptable as a new social contract according to the social contract theories?</p><p>During my research the following criteria’s for a social contract was found:</p><p>1. A legislative branch 2. An executive branch 3. A judicial branch 4. The Right to taxation</p><p>5. A centralized educational system 6. The right to property 7. Equalizing redistribution system 8. The right to leave the contract.</p><p>The first four is essential in creating a state and are the primary criteria’s for its existence while the other four is determining the character of the state that is created and are therefore not essential in the creation of the state and are consequently secondary criteria’s in a states creation.</p><p>The answer to the question is no, as the Treaty of Lisbon first of all don’t give the Union the right of taxation on its citizens and secondly, the Union are not given the mandate to act for an educational or an equalizing redistributive system. Without these criteria’s the EU don’t have the possibility to quickly act on its own to deal with urgent problems that rises from the negative aspects of globalization.</p> / <p>Statsvetenskaplig uppsats, C-nivå av Niklas Andersson, Vårterminen 2009. Handledare: Arne Larsson</p><p>"Lissabonfördraget - Försvaret mot Globaliseringen?"</p><p>I den moderna världen har globaliseringen underminerat nationalstaten och lämnat dem utan verktyg för att kunna ta hand om den sociala och ekonomiska oron som följer i dess väg på ett adekvat sätt. Staterna, byggda på kontraktsteorierna har en ansvar för att skydda sina medborgare från naturtillståndet, men som nu har misslyckats i och med att globaliseringen ändrat spelreglerna.</p><p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka kontraktsteorierna av Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau och John Rawls för att identifiera beståndsdelarna för en stat och utifrån det skapa en modern idealbild av kontraktsteorin. Kontraktet ska sedan jämföras med Lissabonfördraget då de i viss mån kan ses som ett kontrakt mellan Europas stater för att skapa en enhet utifrån den Europeiska Unionen med makten att skydda Europa mot oron skapad av globaliseringen.</p><p>Min fråga var följande:</p><p>Är det nya fördraget för den Europeiska Unioen acceptabel som ett nytt socialt ontrat enligt de gamla kontraktseorierna?</p><p>Under mon undersökning kom jag fram till följande kriterier för ett socialt kontrakt:</p><p>1. En lagstiftande instans 2. En verkställande instans 3. En lagstiftande instans 4. Rätten att beskatta</p><p>5. Ett centraliserat utbildningssystem 6. Rätten till ägande 7. Utjämnadne omfördelningssystem 8. Rätten att lämna kontraktet.</p><p>De första fyra är essentiella i skapandet av en stat och de primära kriterierna för dess existens medan de övriga fyra bestämmer karaktäen på staten som skapats och är ärmed inte avgörande och är därmed sekundära kriterier.</p><p>Svaret till frågan är nej, eftersom Lissabonfördraget först av allt inte ger Unionen möjligheterna till beskattning och för det andra , Unionen har inte fått madatet till att agera för ett utbildningssystem eller omfördelande ujämningssytem. Utan dessa kriterier har inte EU möjligheten att snabbt agera av egen kraft för att ta hand om brådskande problem som uppståt från globaliseringens negativa sidor.</p>