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Trata-se de uma leitura do livro O trabalho da obra Maquiavel (1972), opus magnum de Claude Lefort (1924-2010). Com base na distinção lefortiana entre discurso manifesto e palavra latente da obra de pensamento, concebemos nosso texto a partir de uma divisão tripla. Inicialmente, com o objetivo de localizar o leitor ciceroneando-o pelos mesmos caminhos que levaram Lefort a Maquiavel , perguntamos: se à obra do secretário florentino dedica-se o discurso manifesto do filósofo francês, como este objeto se inseriria na problemática de seu hic et nunc, temática latente que o motivou a levar a cabo o seu mais longo estudo? Em seguida, apresentaremos nossa interpretação do Maquiavel de Lefort, na qual veremos emergir ao primeiro plano a personagem do conspirador, trazendo à cena consigo a proposição da inevitabilidade da impostura do poder e a defesa da imprescindibilidade e da legitimidade do ato ilegal empreendido contra a legalidade ilegítima. Por fim, é à crítica ao idealismo democrático que somos conduzidos ao nos depararmos com o saldo de nossa leitura e, diante dele, questionarmo-nos: de que modo o Maquiavel de Lefort conteúdo manifesto deste trabalho pode nos ajudar a pensar o nosso próprio tempo, a sustentar os nossos desejos de saber e de agir, a nos engajarmos aqui e agora no enigma de uma paixão realista, palavra latente de todo e qualquer escrito que aceite o desafio do político? / This is a reading of the book Machiavelli in the making (1972), the magnum opus of Claude Lefort (1924-2010). Based on the Lefortian distinction between the manifest discourse and the latent word in the work of thought, the text is in three parts. Initially, with the aim of locating the reader by guiding him along the same paths that led Lefort to Machiavelli we ask: if the manifest discourse of the French philosopher is dedicated to the work of the Florentine Secretary, what is the place of this object in the problematic of his hic et nunc, the latent thematic that led him to undertake his longest study? Next, we present our interpretation of Leforts Machiavelli, in which we will see the conspirator\'s character emerge to the foreground, bringing with him the proposition of the inevitability of the imposture of power and the defense of the indispensability and legitimacy of the illegal act employed against illegitimate legality. Finally, we are led to a critique of democratic idealism as we are confronted with the results of our reading and, faced with this, we ask ourselves: how can Leforts Machiavelli the manifest object of this work help us to think about our own time, to sustain our desires to know and act, to engage ourselves here and now in the enigma of a realistic passion, the latent word of each and every text that accepts the challenge of the political?

Esta tese de doutorado estuda o perspectivismo na obra de Nietzsche, bem como o confronto com a verdade que ele representa. Para tanto, procuramos mostrar que esse confronto atravessa toda a obra de Nietzsche, pois já os seus escritos iniciais investigam as condições para o surgimento da crença na verdade, além dos interesses a que ela atendia. Expondo que Nietzsche, apropriando-se do legado crítico de Kant em suas primeiras obras, ensaia uma destruição completa da verdade, pretendemos demonstrar que ele falha em seus objetivos porque a radicalidade de seus argumentos destruiria os próprios pressupostos em que estão baseados, ou seja, os do idealismo transcendental kantiano. Nesse momento em que circunscrevemos nossa análise aos escritos inicias, tentamos demonstrar que Nietzsche limita-se a refutar a noção de verdade como adequação com a coisa-em-si, mas falha ao querer ampliar esse refutação além desses limites. Por isso, analisando a maneira pela qual o combate à verdade se posiciona a partir dos escritos da década de 80, defendemos que neles o perspectivismo se torna decisivo para os problemas enfrentados inicialmente por Nietzsche. Interpretando o perspectivismo como um fenomenalismo da consciência e um interpretacionismo, investigamos, no decorrer deste trabalho, a forma pela qual Nietzsche re-elabora a crítica à verdade em seus escritos tardios. Considerando essa crítica ainda a partir da apropriação de Kant, buscamos demonstrar que ela atinge os fins perseguidos por Nietzsche sem, contudo, ficar preso aos impasses das primeiras 5 obras. Isso implica mostrar que Nietzsche vai recusar não apenas a noção de verdade como adequação com a coisa-em-si, mas também a concepção moderna de verdade como certeza e fundamento para o conhecimento. Eis por que Nietzsche alveja a noção cartesiana do eu penso como a primeira verdade, assim como a concepção kantiana de verdade expressa nos juízos lógicos. Sustentamos, assim, que o fenomenalismo da consciência refuta a noção de unidade, pressuposto fundamental às filosofias cartesiana e kantiana. Em seguida, analisamos como Nietzsche, apropriando-se da ideia kantiana de princípios regulativos, afirma que todas as visões com que avaliamos o mundo são ficções, erros, ótica-de-perspectivas da vida com valor regulativo para a existência. Defendemos, por fim, que embora se posicione radicalmente contra a verdade a partir da luta de interpretações, o perspectivismo não se torna um relativismo, na medida em que se liga à teoria da vontade de potência, a qual é o critério para avaliar as perspectivas e ela mesma apresentada como interpretação. / This Doctoral Thesis studies perspectivism on the work of Nietzsche, as well as the confrontation with the truth it represents. In order to do so, we try to show that this confrontation pervades Nietzsche\'s work, as his former writings investigate the conditions for the emergence of the belief in the truth, beyond the interests to which it served. By expounding that Nietzsche, borrowing Kant\'s critical legacy in his early works, starts out a complete destruction of truth, we intend to demonstrate that he fails in his objectives. This occurs because the radicalism of his arguments would destroy the very foundations which they are based upon, that is, Kantian transcendental idealism. At the moment we circumscribe our analysis to the early writings, we intend to demonstrate that Nietzsche limits himself to refuting the notion of truth as an adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but fails to widen this refutation beyond these limits. Therefore, we analyze the means of the fight against the truth, as presented in his writings from the 80`s. We defend that, in these writings, perspectivism becomes decisive in relation to the problems formerly faced by Nietzsche. By interpreting perspectivism as a phenomenalism of the conscience and interpretationism, we investigate the means by which Nietzsche re-elaborates the critique of truth in his late writings. Through the understanding of this critique as an appropriation of Kant\'s ideas, we try to demonstrate that it reaches the goals set by Nietzsche. Therefore it bypasses the impasses of his early work. This is to show that Nietzsche declines not only the notion of truth as adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but also the modern concept of truth as certainty and foundation of knowledge. That is 7 why Nietzsche aims at the Cartesian notion of \"I think\" as the first truth, as well as the Kantian conception of truth as expressed in logical judgments. Therefore, we sustain that phenomenalism of the conscience refutes the notion of unity, fundamental presupposition to Cartesian and Kantian philosophies. Additionally, we analyze the way Nietzsche, appropriating the Kantian idea of regulative principles, asserts that every vision we take to evaluate the world is fiction, a mistake, a perspectives-optic of life with a regulative value to existence. We defend, finally, that, even perspectivism radically stands against the truth - understood as strife of interpretations. It does not become relativism, since it is connected to the Theory of the Will to Power, which is the criterion to evaluate perspectives and which is itself presented as interpretation.

A pesquisa a ser apresentada tem como objetivo indicar a existência de uma relação entre o uso do conceito de patrimonialismo por parte de Raymundo Faoro e Simon Schwartzman em suas principais obras, respectivamente Os donos do poder e Bases do autoritarismo brasileiro, além de também destacar a presença de uma utopia política liberal no pensamento dos dois autores. Neste sentido, haveria uma relação entre a dimensão explicativa de suas análises sobre a evolução histórica e política do país, acentuando o caráter centralizador e negativo do Estado brasileiro neste processo, e a defesa de uma saída política aos problemas. Vale observar que a escassa bibliografia que analisa os pensamentos desses autores costuma destacar confluências de suas análises, o que certamente tem pertinência. Contudo, e este é outro objetivo dessa pesquisa, é possível assinalar diferenças significativas entre tais abordagens que, inclusive, refletem na relação entre análise histórica e proposta política dos autores. / This dissertation aims to indicate that there is a connection between the use of the concept of patrimonialism by Raymundo Faoro and Simon Schwartzman in their major works, respectively Os donos do poder and Bases do autoritarismo brasileiro, besides the presence of a \"political liberal utopia in both authors. Furthermore, it is pointed out that there is a relationship between the explanatory dimension of their analysis of Brazilian historical and political development, stressing the centralizing and negative character of the State, and a political solution presented to the problems discussed. It is worth noting that the scarce literature that examines these authors often highlights confluences of their analysis, which certainly exist. However, and this is another objective of the dissertation, it is possible to indicate significant differences between such approaches that even reflect the relationship between their historical analysis and their political proposals.

Le présent travail porte sur le monisme neutre et montre qu'il s'agit d'une Idée qui sert de levier pour penser un réel antérieur au partage entre idéalisme et réalisme, avant la scission du monde entre intériorité et extériorité. Nous proposons une relecture des auteurs désignés par Russell lorsqu'il en invente la « catégorie ». Si chez Avenarius il s'agit de sauter par-dessus l'histoire car la logique à son principe est jugée viciée, et que chez Mach toute hypostase se trouve amenée à la fine pointe de sa dissolution identitaire, chez James le temps est le lieu même de déprise du dualisme et de neutralisation catégoriale : nous réinterprétons l'expérience pure comme la transposition sur le plan de l'être, pré-dual, du courant de conscience. Ce premier axe s'achève avec Russell, dont nous montrons qu'il est en réalité moniste neutre lorsqu'il en invente et critique la catégorie, selon un idéal de définitisation qui se trouve aussi bien en terrain gnoséologique (le Je pur se démultipliant à l'infini dans la construction logique du monde physique) qu'en terrain éthique (l'universalisation du désir). Le second axe conduit à la philosophie de l'immanence de Schuppe et Schubert-Soldem, ultime figure de réalisation de l'idée où le réalisme se trouve identifié à l'idéalisme, et l'unité restaurée entre la conscience et le monde. A ce titre, la Immanenzphilosophie constitue une version alternative à l'idéalisme transcendantal husserlien et dont la phénoménologie post-husserlienne retrouve certaines intuitions séminales. / Our thesis examines neutral monism and defends that is an Idea in order to think reality prior to its division between realism and idealism, before the world-split between interiority and exteriority. In the first part we shed a new light on the authors referred to by Russell when he invents the neutral monism category. Avenarius's aim is to abandon history since its logic is considered to be invalidated. Mach, since he wants to deconstruct all kind of hypostasis, is led to the self-destruction of identity. As for James, we propose to construe his notion of pure experience: time serves the purpose to neutralize all categories and to reject dualism, and thus results from the ontological­transposition of the psychological thought current. This first part ends with the study of Russell, where we demonstrate that he is more akin to neutral monism when he invented et rejected the term, in accordance with his rationalist ideal of universalization, in the theoretical field (the pure I which can multiply itself in order to logically construct the physical world) as well as in the ethical one (to universalize one's des ire). The second part leads to the philosophy of immanence of Schuppe and Schubert-Soldem: the idea is here realized, by the identification of realism and idealism, the reconciliation between consciousness and world. The Immanenzphilosophie can be regarded as an alternative to Husserl's transcendental idealism where the post-Husserlian phenomenology finds once again some of its seminal intuitions.

In the wake of the First World War, reformers across the Western world questioned laissez-faire liberalism, the self-oriented and market-driven ruling doctrine of the nineteenth century. This philosophy was blamed, variously, for the war, for industrialisation and for urbanisation; for a way of life shorn of any meaning beyond getting and keeping; for the too great faith in materialism and in science; and for the loss of a higher, transcendent meaning that gave a unifying altruistic or spiritual purpose to individual existence and to society as a whole. For many, the cure to these ills lay in reforming the liberal social framework in ways that made it more fulfilling to the whole person and that strengthened ties between individuals. Dartington Hall was an outstanding practical example of this impulse to promote holistic, integrated living. It was a well-financed, internationally-minded social and cultural experiment set up on an estate in South Devon in 1925 by American heiress Dorothy Elmhirst (née Whitney) and her second husband, Leonard, son of a Yorkshire squire-parson. The Elmhirsts' project for redressing the effects of laissez-faire liberalism had two components. Instead of being treated as atomised individuals in the capitalist market, participants at Dartington were to achieve full self-realisation through a 'life in its completeness' that incorporated the arts, education and spirituality. In addition, through their active participation in running the community, they were to demonstrate how integrated democracy could bring about the perfection of individuals and the progress of society as a whole. The Elmhirsts hoped that Dartington would provide a globally applicable model for a better way of life. This thesis is a close study of Dartington's interlinked constellation of experiments in education, the arts, agriculture and social organisation - experiments that can only be understood by tracing them back to their shared roots in the idea of 'life in its completeness'. At the same time, it explores how Dartington's philosophy and trajectory illuminate the wider reform landscape. The Elmhirsts' community echoed and cross-pollinated with other schemes for social improvement in Britain, Europe, America and India, as well as feeding into the broad social democratic project in Britain. Dartington's evolution from an independent, elite-led reform project to one split between state-led and communitarian reform matched the trajectory of other such enterprises begun in interwar Britain, making it a bellwether of changes in reformist thinking across the century.

This thesis explores the representation of conspiracy in the literature of the July Monarchy (1830-1848) and its engagement with conspiracy thinking, with particular reference to the work of Honoré de Balzac (1799-1850) and George Sand (1804-1876). In providing the first sustained scholarly exploration of conspiracy and cultural production in nineteenth-century France, it situates the novel within wider discourses on European political history in the years leading up to the upheaval of 1848. Through close readings of Balzac and Sand's common investment in conspiracist modes of explanation, this study makes the case for a new generic category, the novel of conspiracy, around which literary poetics, historical imagination and political fantasy come to coalesce. Chapter one proposes a re-evaluation of the dialectic between models of surface and depth reading in Balzac's Une ténébreuse affaire (1841), arguing that the conspiratorial landscape of this proto-detective novel belies Balzac's fraught relationship to the severed referentiality of his narrative. As illustration of a Balzacian poetics of conspiracy, Une ténébreuse affaire, it is suggested, points forward in literary history towards the Flaubertian aesthetic of platitude. Chapter two looks to the political criticisms Jacques Rancière makes of Sand's patrician benevolence to inform its reading of Le Compagnon du Tour de France (1840), which depicts workers' secret societies and the underground networks of Restoration liberalism. Accusations of misguided idealism, this thesis shows, align Rancière's critique and the literary-critical narrative informing Sand's twentieth-century aesthetic devaluation with the reproach that she herself levels at the Carbonarist conspirators of her novel. Chapter three, finally, turns to the alternative origin myth of 1789 that Sand elaborates in Consuelo-La Comtesse de Rudolstadt (1842-44). Her engagement with the founding text of the conspiracist tradition of explanation, it argues, provides the cornerstone for the interrogation of the tensions of a pre-Revolutionary Europe torn between Enlightenment and Illuminism. Framing the Balzacian and Sandian novel as emblematic of a wider discourse on the conspiratorial origins of 1789 has a two-fold advantage. On an immediate level, it nuances received critical ideas on these authors' relationships to history and literary genre (a realist Balzac incapable of looking back further than the Restoration whose demise he so lamented; an idealist Sand too caught up in a utopian future to envisage the historical past). In doing so, this study seeks to problematize the narrative of oppositionality behind the Balzac-Sand binary in terms of which the literary history of nineteenth-century France is habitually couched. Yet, more significantly, it also gestures towards the importance of the conspiratorial as a prism through which to approach the porosity of the very categories of 'literature' and 'history' in the nineteenth-century French context.

Le divin peut-il être à la fois mort et vivant ? Résonnant pour nous à partir de Nietzsche et de Heidegger, cette question traverse l’œuvre, d’abord poétique mais aussi pleinement philosophique, de Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843). Dès la querelle du panthéisme qui anime le débat intellectuel germanique au cours des années 1780, le dieu de la métaphysique identifié avec le dieu chrétien semble perdre son effectivité. Mais le divin n’est pas seulement pour Hölderlin un contenu dogmatique ou conceptuel : il désigne avant tout le lien qui s’établit avec la nature lorsque l’homme réfléchit le sentiment que celle-ci produit en lui-même. Dès lors, même s’il semble exposé à la mort en tant que Créateur transcendant du monde, Dieu ne cesse pas de pouvoir être approché comme la source vive de toute apparition. Il ne se manifeste toutefois comme tel qu’à condition de s’effacer comme antériorité et de donner lieu aux choses singulières, en une rupture de toute union prétendument originelle. Or, dire que le principe doit nier sa propre primauté, c’est dire que l’un tend à se séparer de soi pour accéder à sa propre unité, et qu’il doit nécessairement produire une image de lui-même. En défendant cette thèse héritière d’Héraclite et du néoplatonisme, Hölderlin s’oppose aux philosophes idéalistes subjectifs, qui identifient alors le principe de toute réalité avec le Moi, et il s’expose du même coup à l’objection d’être incohérent et exalté. Mais l’effet produit par ses poèmes, par son roman et par sa tragédie fait s’évanouir tout soupçon de Schwärmerei. La poésie hölderlinienne est réellement image de Dieu. L’étude de la méditation et de la mise en œuvre progressive d’une telle effectivité exige de distinguer trois périodes dans le développement de sa pensée. Entre 1785 et 1795, Hölderlin s’efforce de parvenir, après avoir lu Kant, Schiller, Fichte et Schelling, à une compréhension à la fois non subjective et non dogmatique de l’être. Entre 1795 et 1802, en nommant le principe à la fois « beauté » à partir de Platon et « un se différenciant en lui-même » à partir d’Héraclite, il conceptualise les moyens de traduire poétiquement la profusion de la vie divine. Entre 1802 et 1843, comme si la mort de Susette Gontard, l’isolement et la folie affrontés sur le plan biographique rejoignaient, sur les plans théorique et poétique, la méditation de Pindare, de Sophocle et de la figure du Christ, Hölderlin montre la dépendance de l’infini à l’égard de la finitude. Ainsi son œuvre entière donne-t-elle à voir, en sa tension interne entre le poème et la philosophie, la vie divine harmoniquement opposée. / Can the divinity be at once dead and alive? Resonating for us since the time of Nietzsche and Heidegger, this question runs all through the works of Hölderlin, in the first place poetic, but also, in the fullest sense, philosophic. From the time of the controversy over pantheism among German intellectuals in the 1780s the identification of the god of metaphysics with the Christian god seems to have lost its effectiveness. But the divinity for Hölderlin was not only a written dogma or concept ; it denotes above all the link established with nature when man reflects the feelings it arouses in him. From then on, god, even if he seems exposed to death as the transcendent creator of the world, continues to be approachable as the deepest source of all apparitions. However, god only manifests himself in this way if he effaces himself as anteriority, and breaking all union supposedly original, makes way for singular things. Now, to say that the principle denies its own primacy is to say that the one tends to separate from itself in order to reach its own unity, and that it must necessarily produce an image of itself. In defending this proposition, Hölderlin set himself in opposition to the subjective idealist philosophers, who identified the principle of all reality with the "I", and he exposed himself at the same time to the objection that he was incoherent and fanatical. But the effect produced by his poems, novel and tragedy dispels all suspicion of Schwärmerei. Hölderlin’s poetry really is the image of god. A study of his meditation and the progressive implementation of such a level of effectiveness makes it necessary to distinguish three periods in the evolution of his thought. Between 1785 and 1795, after having read Kant, Schiller, Fichte and Schelling, Hölderlin tried to achieve an understanding both non-subjective and non-dogmatic of Being. Between 1795 and 1802 he conceptualised the means of conveying through poetry the profusion of divine life, naming the principle both "beauty", after Plato, and "one differentiating in itself", after Heraclitus. Between 1802 and 1843, as if the death of Susette Gontard, isolation and madness confronted at a biographical level had conjoined, at a theoretic and poetic level, the meditation on Pindar, Sophocles and the face of Christ, Hölderlin showed the dependence of the infinite with regard to the finite. Thus, the whole body of his work, in its internal tension between poem and philosophy, reveals divine life in harmonic opposition.

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Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / In Australian Aboriginal affairs, the acculturative strand of assimilation developed in large part from Elkin’s religious and Idealist commitment, for which in the years 1928 to 1933 he won social-scientific authority. In competition with both an eliminationist politics of race and a segregationist politics of territory, Elkin drew upon religious experience, apologetics, sociology, and networks to establish a ‘positive policy’ as an enduring ideal in Aboriginal affairs. His leadership of the 1930s reform movement began within the Anglican Church, became national through civic-religious organs of publicity, and gained scientific authority as Elkin made religious themes a central concern in Australian anthropology. But from the 1960s until recently, most scholars have lost sight of the centrality of Idealism and religion in our protagonist’s seminal project of acculturative assimilation. This thesis aims to show how Elkin dealt with problems fundamental to twentieth century Aboriginal affairs and indeed to Australian modernity more generally – problems of faith and science, morality and expediency – in developing his positive policy towards Aborigines.