En Haïti, l’effort public pour l’éducation reste insuffisant. De plus, l’enseignement primaire est peu développé et de qualité faible. Ainsi, en dépit des progrès substantiels qui ont été réalisés durant ces vingt cinq dernières années, le pays reste très en retard face á l’objectif de l’éducation pour tous (EPT). En effet, les dernières données statistiques disponibles indiquent que plus de 4 500 000 filles et garçons sont actuellement en dehors du système scolaire. Outre l’abandon, le redoublement, le mauvais regroupement des élèves, l’encadrement pédagogique est médiocre. Ce qui pèse négativement sur les acquisitions des élèves. Les mauvais résultats obtenus des élèves aux examens officiels en témoignent. Par ailleurs, la rémunération des enseignants est très insignifiante et les conditions d’exercice de la profession enseignante laisse à désirer. Enfin, le système scolaire souffre d’un déficit de pilotage, de gouvernance et d’efficacité externe.Pour accompagner les décideurs politiques haïtiens et planificateurs nationaux dans leurs stratégies d’action en faveur de l’éducation pour tous, les principales organisations multilatérales, notamment la Banque mondiale, mettent en œuvre le Projet d’Education pour tous (EPT I et II). Spécifiquement, le Projet d’Ecoles Publiques à Gestion Communautaire (EPGC) cible la scolarisation primaire universelle (SPU) dans des milieux ruraux défavorisés où l’accès à l’enseignement primaire de base demeure un bien rare, voire inexistant dans les régions ciblées. Par l’aide. Cependant, malgré les divers projets ou programmes d’aide internationaux dédiés notamment à l’expansion de la scolarisation universelle sur l’ensemble du territoire national du pays, atteindre l’éducation pour tous est très aléatoire.Les conclusions de l’enquête empirique montrent que de nombreuses difficultés nuisent à la mise en œuvre effective de l’aide et ceci tant au niveau central, départemental et communal. Les données collectées sur le terrain indiquent un impact significatif sur la participation des acteurs locaux dans la gestion des affaires éducatives. Sur le plan des réalisations éducatives, les analyses de l’investigation confirment des effets sur les taux nets d’accès à l’école ainsi qu’un impact appréciable sur la parité filles-garçons. Les conclusions de l’enquête révèlent quelques effets pervers par exemple sur la qualité de l’école, des dynamiques locales, ainsi que des modes d’organisation administrative et de gestion pédagogique du système scolaire dans les zones allocataires ciblées pour la mise en application du Projet EPGC. Aussi, l’objectif de l’éducation pour tous ne sera pas atteint en Haïti et le chemin semble encore long. . / In Haiti, the public effort for education is insufficient. Primary education is underdeveloped and is of low quality. Despite substantial progress made during the last twenty five years, the country is still far behind from achieving the goal of Education for All (EFA). The latest available statistics indicate that more than 4.5 million girls and boys are currently outside the school system. Abandonment, repetition, bad grouping of students and poor educational support reflect negatively on learning achievement. Teachers' salaries are insignificant and teaching conditions deprived. Hence, the school system suffers a deficit of control, governance and external efficiency.To accompany Haitian national planners and policy makers in their strategies for universal education, major multilateral organizations, including the World Bank, implement the Project Education for All (EFA I and II) also called. Through a program called “Project for Public Schools to Community Management (PPSCM)” they aim to achieve universal primary education in some disadvantaged rural areas where access to basic primary education remains inadequate or nonexistent. However, despite the various projects or international aid programs dedicated to the expansion of universal education all over Haiti, the goal of achieving Education for All is far from being reached.The findings of our empirical analysis show, the positive effect of international aid on school access and its significant impact on gender parity in Haiti. On the other hand, it exposes many difficulties that obstruct an effective implementation of international aid for education in Haiti at central, departmental and communal levels. The data collected in the field point out some negative effects, for example on the quality of the school, local dynamics, as well as administrative organization methods and educational management of the school system in areas where the PPSCM is implemented. The conclusion of this study reveals that the goal of Education for All will not be achieved and there still is a long way to go to provide school to all children in Haiti.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze different forms of North-South development assistance with regard to its widespread critique and to examine whether the field of international research capacity building holds alternative development cooperation strategies that have the potential to reconcile some of the criticisms. The focus is on the International Science Programme (ISP) and the empirical research carried out in Bangladesh and Sweden on the ISP-Bangladesh collaboration in the form of semi-structured interviews constitutes the core case study evidence. Three theoretical perspectives – realism, interdependence liberalism and constructivism – provide the framework of the case study and serve as guiding tools to understand the ISP’s role and motivations as an actor in international relations. The main goal is to investigate whether the ISP can be best perceived as an instance of self-interest, interconnectedness or social empowerment.

Tenu dans un contexte international de démocratisation et d’aspiration à la liberté de peuples africains subsahariens, la décision phare du sommet de La Baule de juin 1990 fut la résolution de la France de conditionner son APD aux efforts démocratiques des pays d’Afrique subsaharienne. Avec cette décision, Paris entend: 1. Encourager l’ouverture démocratique des Etats africains, condition sine qua non à l’instauration de la paix et à la réalisation du développement économique ; 2. Défendre et promouvoir des valeurs de la démocratie libérale qu’il estime universelles. Par contre, la flagrance de la relation démocratie-développement est relative. Le relativisme culturel pose souvent problème au principe de l’universalité des valeurs démocratiques et des droits humains. Des potentats africains invoquent d’ailleurs le relativisme culturel pour innocenter leur mauvaise foi démocratique. Il reste encore beaucoup d’efforts à réaliser pour l’implantation d’un véritable Etat de droit en Afrique subsaharienne, en dépit d’une tendance de normalisation des processus électoraux sur le continent. La stratégie de conditionnalité politique de la France poursuivant cet objectif en Afrique subsaharienne n’est pas toujours fidèle à l’esprit de La Baule dans sa mise en œuvre. La personnalisation des relations étatiques, la primauté des intérêts géostratégiques de la France, etc. prennent souvent le dessus sur l’idéal démocratique de La Baule. La France demeure très présente en Afrique subsaharienne où ses multinationales ont une très forte implantation. Les leviers de commande de l’économie sont contrôlés par la France à travers ses multinationales comme Bolloré, Orange et Areva. Cependant, au-delà de cette apparence, il est constaté une régression de l’influence française sur le continent. Ce recul est lié à des dynamiques endogènes telles que des opinions publiques nationales et d’un leadership politique apparemment conscients des enjeux géostratégiques que représente dorénavant l’Afrique subsaharienne sur la scène internationale. A cela s’ajoutent des dynamiques exogènes relatives notamment à la percée de la Chine dont l’orientation stratégique de sa politique internationale africaine porte atteinte à l’efficacité de la conditionnalité politique de la France. / Made in against the international backdrop of democratization and aspiration for the freedom of sub-Saharan African peoples, the landmark decision of the La Baule summit of June 1990 was France's commitment to conditioning its ODA to the democratic efforts of sub-Saharan African countries. Paris took this decision with a view to: 1. Encouraging the democratic opening of African States as a prerequisite for peace and economic development.2. Defending and promoting values of liberal democracy that she considers universal. On the other hand, the flagrance of the relationship between democracy and development is relative. Cultural relativism often poses a problem to the principle of the universality of democratic values and human rights. Moreover, African potentates invoke cultural relativism to exonerate their bad democratic faith. Despite a trend towards the normalization of electoral processes on the continent, a lot of work is yet to be done to establish genuine Rule of Law in sub-Saharan Africa. As regards its implementation, France’s poltitical conditionnality strategy pursuing this objective in sub-Saharan Africa is not always true to the spirit of La Baule. The personalized state relations, the primacy of the geostrategic interests of France, etc., often get the upper hand over the democratic ideal of La Baule. France remains very present in sub-Saharan Africa where its multinationals are very strongly settled. France has a hold over the control levers of the economy through its multinationals like Bolloré, Orange and Areva. However, beyond this appearance, there is a regression of French influence on the continent. This decline is linked to endogenous dynamics such as national opinions and political leadership seemingly aware of the geostrategic stakes that now represent sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, there are exogenous dynamics, particularly related to the breakthrough of China, whose strategic orientation in its African policy undermines the effectiveness of France's political conditionality

Au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale, avec le retour à la souveraineté, le Japon commença aussitôt à planifier la reconstruction de son économie et la création de nouveaux liens en Asie. C'est ainsi qu'il déclencha son « avancée vers le sud », à la recherche de matières premières et de marchés pour ses produits. Cependant le processus de pénétration de l'Asie du Sud-est ne fut pas seulement de nature économique mais aussi politique, et la valeur de la région dans la recherche d'une nouvelle position stratégique fut claire dans l'approche au problème indochinois, surtout après l'intensification de la guerre du Vietnam. Le Japon, désireux de contribuer de manière significative à une reconstruction régionale « après-­Vietnam », à la fin des années soixante lança une première série d'initiatives diplomatiques et de coopération dans la région entière. Ensuite les « tournants » de l'ordre bipolaire des années soixante-dix, surtout le « Nixon choc » et la chute de Saigon, ainsi qu'une majeure sensibilité vers le pays de la région, amenèrent de Tokyo à la systématisation de son approche et donc à la planification de la doctrine Fukuda. Cette première codification de la politique japonaise vers l'Asie du Sud-est est basée sur la fonction intra-régionale du Japon visant à lutter contre les tentatives hégémoniques de Pékin et Moscou et à profiter du désengagement militaire occidentale, afin de remodeler les relations avec les grandes puissances et assumer un rôle international de premier plan. / In the aftermath of World War II, after Japan had regained its sovereignty, the government started immediately planning the economic recovery and the creation of new ties in Asia. Thus it launched its "southern expansion", focused on the search of raw materials and markets for Japanese products. However, the penetration in Southeast Asia was not only an economic process, but also a political one. In the search of a new strategic role, the importance of the region became evident for Tokyo when facing the Indochinese problem, especially after the intensification of the Vietnam War. With the aim to provide a significant contribution to the regional reconstruction, even more important in the perspective of a "post-Vietnam", in the late l960s Japan launched a first set of diplomatic and economic initiatives in the whole region. The "turning points" of the Cold War in the 1970s, i.e. the "Nixon shock" and the fall of Saigon, combined to a closer attention to the expectations of Southeast Asian countries, eventually led Tokyo to the systematization of its regional approach and to the definition of the Fukuda Doctrine. In this first attempt to codify its policy towards Southeast Asia, Japan conceived its intra-regional role in opposition to the hegemonic moves of Beijing and Moscow and in connection to the Western military withdraw from the region, with the ambition to reshape its relations with the Great Powers and enhance its political standing in world affairs.

This dissertation deals with the Official Development Assistance. The purpose of this dissertation was, first of all, to find out whether the target aid is focused on the poorest countries of the world. The theoretical part concentrates primarily on the institutional history of the Official Development Assistance and also on the development of mainstream theories which influenced it to the highest degree. In the analytical part the dissertation draws particularly from the database of the Development Assistance Committee under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. From the global point of view, the dissertation is focused especially on the quantitative analysis of the changes in the allocation of the Official Development Assistance in the period from 1989 to 2008. From the geographical point of view, the spatio-temporal change in territorial priorities of important bilateral and multilateral donors and also the dependence of their expenditure on the socio-economic maturity of aid beneficiaries was analysed. The ability to clearly define the territorial priorities and on their basis to effectively target the development assistance is in national context analysed on the example of the Czech Republic. From the local point of view, the dissertation gives a brief description of the...

This study set out to explore how Official Development Assistance was practised in South Africa. An exploratory narrative design was followed to uncover the ‘strategy in the skin’ of strategy practitioners in the unit of analysis and to respond, therefore, to the research questions. This study has contributed to the body of knowledge in that it has brought together an alternative confluence of three theoretical perspectives of strategy as practice; complex adaptive systems and organisational hypocrisy and has explored the impact of the practice lens on these standpoints. While there has been extensive research on each of the theoretical perspectives, there has not yet been a study that has drawn together the three perspectives in relation to an empirical unit of analysis such as Official Development Assistance practices and practitioners. The study responded to a knowledge gap in relation to how public sector organisations, such as government units and the strategy practitioners of such units, practice strategy beyond the reified, formalised conceptions of strategy and in relation to their inhabiting complex, political organisational systems. The study arrived at two central theoretical findings. Firstly, that strategising represents a calibration of strategic practices towards strategic outcomes through the activities of complex adaptive practitioners v within the more politically inclined organisation. Secondly, that beyond the text of strategy, there is sub-text that is equally part of the micro strategy towards strategic outcomes.The skilful and sometimes delicate balancing act, that strategists perform to legitimise the calibrated combinations of action and politics in organisational strategy, equally needs nuanced, subtle and more complex forms of organisational communication. The study, therefore, makes the claim that complex adaptive systems and the characteristics of political organisations (as not being geared to action) are inherently broadened through the multiple dimensions of the practice turn and strategy as sub-text. The research confirmed that strategy as practice is a useful lens to understand strategy beyond the formally documented scripts and espoused pronouncements of strategy within organisational studies / Business Management / D.B.L.

There is always competition between regions when it comes to their needs after facing a conflict, disaster, or long-term crisis. Donors allocating ODA or Humanitarian Assistance must decide to whom they want to allocate their support. While the literature broadly identifies the motivation for sending allocation to specific recipients and not to others, it has not yet researched the processes of the opposite, the reduction or break-off of aid allocation. This thesis researches the topic at the level of Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA). The question focuses on donors of bilateral HMA allocation and their motives of decision-making, when under financial pressure and forced to shorten their overall HMA budget. Using a most-different in-depth case study based on two steps on the cases of Australia and Germany, the question is researched, if the donors base their decisions and priorities on the needs of people when they have to reduce HMA budgets. The findings show that HMA rarely is documented separately and mostly connected either with ODA or Humanitarian Assistance. To get clear answers about the thoughts and motivations of decision-makers when it comes to the reduction or cut of HMA allocation, deeper research including interviews is needed.

Les modes de négociation au CAD de l'OCDE sont organisés autour de la règle du consensus et d'un processus itératif conduit entre pairs. Ces modes de négociation ont produit la notion d'Etat fragile de 2004 à 2010, idée prête à l'usage et prête à être étendue par ses promoteurs initiaux comme par tous les représentants de bailleurs de fonds qui choisissent de s'y investir. La notion et l'agenda concernant les Etats fragiles entrent en 2005 dans la course à la démonstration de la légitimité de l'aide publique au développement comme des compléments nécessaires et comme des concurrents à l'agenda de l'effocacité de l'aide. Cependant les mêmes modes de négociations ainsi que les contraintes organisationnelles et normatives rencontrées dans les bureaucraties de l'aide qui participent à cette construction ont tendu à normaliser le contenu et à limiter la transposition politique et bureaucratique de ce nouvel agenda. Au sein du CAD, ces contraintes diminuent également la portée des tenants de l'agenda Etats fragiles qui doivent faire face à des normes établies. Cet agenda a cependant pu être diffusé rapidement en raison de sa malléabilité, de la nature proinstitutionnelle de son argumentaire et du risque normatif et politique relativement faible qu'il fait prendre aux acteurs qui s'en servent pour promouvoir leurs propres visions stratégiques de l'aide publique au développement. Dans ce contexte, le CAD constitue une arène internationale de négociation où s'analyse l'action organisée des représentants de bureaucraties bilatérales et multilatérales. / LModes of negotiation OECD DAC are organized around the rule of consensus and an iterative process led peer. These modes of negotiation produced the concept of fragile state from 2004 to 2010, an idea ready to use and ready to be extended by its promoters as the original by all representatives of donors who choose to invest. The concept and agenda for fragile states come into the race in 2005 to demonstrate the legitimacy of official development assistance as necessary complements and as competitors on the agenda of the effocacité help. However the same modes of negotiation and organizational constraints and normative encountered in aid bureaucracies involved in this construction have tended to standardize the content and limit the political and bureaucratic implementation of this new agenda. In the DAC, these constraints also reduce the scope of the proponents of the fragile states agenda should deal with established standards. This agenda has yet been released quickly because of its malleability, nature proinstitutionnelle of its arguments and the normative and political risk he is taking relatively small actors who use them to promote their own strategic visions of the official development assistance. In this context, the DAC is an international trading arena where analysis of organized action by representatives of bilateral and multilateral bureaucracies.

Foreign aid as an economic policy was previously widely accepted as a way to assist least developed economies to achieve economic growth. Over the years, aid effectiveness has been questioned, whilst aid dependency has continued to rise. To assist in aid reduction, various economists have proposed aid exit strategies that countries could adopt to reduce aid dependency. However, the adoption of these strategies has been rather slow. The purpose of this study was to review and assess the current literature on the different proposed foreign aid exit strategies, in terms of their feasibility and ease of implementation, taking into account the current state of African economies. The analysis focused on the exit strategies recommended by Tandon (2008), Moyo (2009) and Fee (2012). The main finding of this study suggests that the aforementioned exit strategies are feasible, but not necessarily easy to implement, due to the limitations faced by many least developed countries. / Economics / M. Com. (Economics)

Au cours de cette étude, nous avons cherché  à déterminer le niveau et les moyens de la puissance sud-coréenne. Nous nous sommes demandés si la Corée du Sud ne pourrait pas se présenter comme un État pivot capable de faire le lien entre des états ou des partenaires antagonistes, aussi bien en Asie du Nord-Est qu’en Asie du Sud-Est. Aussi après avoir examiné les moyens de la puissance sud-coréenne nous avons conclu que le pays était une puissance moyenne traditionnelle n’ayant pas encore acquis le statut de puissance régionale et qu’en ce sens elle constituait une puissance atypique. Confrontée aux trois grandes puissances que sont la Chine, les Etats-Unis et le Japon, la Corée du Sud ne dispose que d’une marge de manœuvre très étroite pour affirmer sa présence internationale. Le développement de sa présence en Asie du Sud-Est est donc devenu en l’espace de quelques années un impératif de sa politique étrangère du pays. A l’instar du Japon d’après-guerre, le Sud-Est asiatique constitue une aire d’apprentissage privilégiée pour la diplomatie sud-coréenne et pour son action extérieure. / In this study, we tried to determine the exact level and means of the South Korean power. We wondered if South Korea could present itself as a pivotal state that is able to bridge antagonistic partners, both in Northeast and Southeast Asia. After considering the aspects of the South Korean power we concluded that the country is a traditional middle size power that has not yet acquired the status of regional power. In that sense the country is an untypical power. Facing three major powers such as China, the United States and Japan, South Korea has only a very narrow latitude to establish its international presence. Therefore developing its presence in Southeast Asia has become in just a few years an priority of its foreign Policy. For South Korea Southeast Asia is a privileged place where to learn and to develop its own external action, like it was for the post war Japan. Eventually, a unified Korea with the North Korean nuclear arsenal could weigh as much as demographically declining Japan. However as long as the anachronism of the separation will remain, South Korea will continue to grow alone regionally and in the international stage and will seek for external alliances.