This thesis aims to investigate EU peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina, focusing on the ways in which EU actors engage with local cultural actors and vice versa. Given that, in the liberal peacebuilding tradition, civil society has been considered a key actor in the public sphere, peacebuilding actors have tended to neglect seemingly more marginal actors and their subtle ways of impacting on the peacebuilding process. However, this thesis contends that processes of interaction are not always direct and visible, but centre on discourse clusters, which I frame as imaginary ‘spaces of agency’. Through the creation of meanings within a space of agency and its translation into other imaginary spaces, actors develop the power to impact upon the peacebuilding process, often in coded ways and therefore invisible in the public sphere, as peacebuilding actors, including the EU, have created it. A typology of the modes of interaction and possible responses between spaces helps understand the complexities and nuances of peacebuilding interaction. The thesis uses this framework to analyse several exemplary spaces of agency of the EU, rooting them in institutional discourses with specific reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Based on this, I investigate a number of responses to those spaces on the part of local cultural actors, as well as how the latter contribute to the emergence of alternative localised spaces, where the EU’s spaces fail to connect to the everyday dimensions of peace. I suggest that this represents a way in which local actors try to claim the ownership of peacebuilding back in subtle ways. This also points to the ability of actors that have traditionally been excluded from the peacebuilding project to contextualise abstract and distant processes into what matters locally, as well as their capacity to reject and resist when the EU’s spaces remain irrelevant for local peacebuilding imaginations.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The emergence and rapid growth of the private security industry in the 1990s followed from the downsizing of the armed forces in the aftermath of the Cold War and the development of new security threats which increased demand for military manpower and expertise. This has led to a redefinition of security strategies and the restructuring of armed forces by Western governments, which has resulted in the elimination of non-core activities from the functions of many armed forces. Recently it has been argued that the private security industry can challenge what previously was believed to be a primary responsibility of states, namely to take on peacebuilding initiatives and support to other peace operations. This study seeks to assess the impact of the private security industry in peacebuilding efforts in African conflicts. The study suggests that the private security industry have taken on a much stronger role in conflicts world wide since the 1990s, and that its activities have significantly changed. Companies such as MPRI and DynCorp have managed to keep close contact with their home governments, which arguably has been a crucial factor to their growing business. Furthermore, the private security industry have sought to distance itself from the negative connotations associated with mercenaries and the activities of companies such as Executive Outcomes in the 1990s, by avoiding operations involving elements of direct combat. This has been illustrated through the extensive case study of the activities of three private military and security companies: Executive Outcomes, MPRI and DynCorp. Furthermore, this thesis has confirmed an increased presence of the United States on the African continent post-9/11, illustrated by the presence of American-based private military and security companies which arguably are being used as proxies for US foreign policy purposes. Furthermore, this study has discussed the various implications the private security industry has on the traditional notion of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This thesis has argued that the legitimate use to exercise violence is in the process of devolution from governments to other actors, which the extensive growth of the private security industry illustrates. Additionally, it has been argued that the privatisation of military and security services can harm the reliable delivery of essential services in conflict. Furthermore, the findings of this thesis has highlighted the dilemma that many countries do not want stricter regulation or elimination of the private security industry for the reason that these companies are viewed as valuable assets in fulfilling foreign policy objectives that for various reasons cannot be fulfilled by national armies. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die opkoms en vinnige groei van die privaatsekuriteitsbedryf in die 1990s was die gevolg van die afskaling van gewapende magte in die nasleep van die Koue Oorlog en die ontwikkeling van nuwe sekuriteitsbedreigings, wat die aanvraag na militêre arbeidskragte en kundigheid verhoog het. Dit het aanleiding gegee tot ’n herdefiniëring van sekuriteitstrategieë en die herstrukturering van gewapende magte deur Westerse regerings, met die gevolg dat niekernaktiwiteite van die funksies van talle gewapende magte uitgesluit is. Daar is onlangs aangevoer dat die privaatsekuriteitsbedryf aanspraak kan maak op ’n funksie wat voorheen as die primêre verantwoordelikheid van regerings beskou is, naamlik om vredesinisiatiewe en steun aan ander vredesverrigtinge te onderneem. Die doel van hierdie studie was om die impak van die privaatsekuriteitsbedryf in vredesinisiatiewe in Afrika-konflikte te assesseer. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat die privaatsekuriteitsbedryf sedert die 1990’s ’n baie groter rol in wêreldwye konflikte gespeel het, en dat die aktiwiteite van hierdie bedryf aanmerklik verander het. Maatskappye soos MPRI en DynCorp was suksesvol daarin om nabye kontak met hul tuisregerings te behou, wat stellig ’n deurslaggewende faktor in hul groeiende besighede was. Voorts het die privaatsekuriteitsbedryf gepoog om hom te distansieer van die negatiewe konnotasies wat met huursoldate en die aktiwiteite van maatskappye soos Executive Outcomes in die 1990’s geassosieer is deur bedrywighede wat elemente van direkte stryd inhou, te vermy. Hierdie poging is geïllustreer deur die omvattende gevallestudie van die aktiwiteite van drie privaat militêre en sekuriteitsmaatskappye: EO, MPRI en DynCorp. Die bevindinge van die studie bevestig voorts die Verenigde State van Amerika (VSA) se toenemende teenwoordigheid op die Afrika-vasteland ná 9/11, wat duidelik blyk uit die teenwoordigheid van Amerikaansgebaseerde privaat militêre en sekuriteitsmaatskappye wat stellig as volmag gebruik word vir die VSA se buitelandsebeleidsdoelstellings. Die verskeie implikasies van die privaatsekuriteitsbedryf vir die tradisionele siening van die regerings se monopolie ten opsigte van die wettige gebruik van magte word ook in die studie bespreek. Daar word aangevoer dat die wettige gebruik van geweld in die proses van devolusie is vanaf regerings na ander rolspelers, wat deur die omvattende groei van die privaatsekuriteitsbedryf bevestig word. Daar word verder ook beweer dat die privatisering van militêre en sekuriteitsdienste die betroubare lewering van noodsaaklike dienste tydens konflik kan benadeel. Die studie se bevindinge werp ook lig op die dilemma dat talle lande strenger regulering of uitskakeling van die privaatsekuriteitsbedryf teëstaan omdat hierdie maatskappye beskou word as waardevolle bates in die bereiking van buitelandsebeleidsdoelwitte, wat vir verskeie redes nie deur nasionale leërs bereik kan word nie.

What conditions lead to confidence among civil war combatants that they will not face accountability for perpetrating sexual violence? This study investigates the causes of impunity for sexual violence among armed actors. It develops a theoretical framework which identifies three explanations for armed group impunity for sexual violence, namely (1) flawed prohibitions inside an armed group; (2) negligent enforcement by its authorities; and (3) pardons in the form of amnesties during the peace process. Adopting a two-pronged approach, the study first explores the associations between amnesties arising from concluding peace agreements and post-settlement levels of sexual violence in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and South Africa. A small-scale, events-based dataset of sexual violence by governments and rebel groups in the first three years after war was constructed. The second and main part of the study is a comparison between two rebel groups in Burundi’s civil war (1994-2008), CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy) and Palipehutu-FNL (Palipehutu-Forces for National Liberation) and their practices of prohibition and punishment of wartime sexual violence, taking into account also the possible influence of amnesties. Based on original data from 19 focus groups of ex-combatants from these rebel organisations, it is found that flawed prohibitions and negligent authorities are the main explanations for armed group impunity. The findings do not support amnesties as a cause of armed group impunity for sexual violence. Moreover, additional findings suggest that accountability for sexual violence is triggered by dependency on civilian support, while impunity is facilitated by an armed group’s ability to secure recruits, material and other resources without the help of local communities.

Hybridity, as it is currently understood in the Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) and International Relations (IR) literature, is defined by the complex interactions between ‘the liberal peace' and ‘the local'. However, under this theoretical liberal-local rubric, the ways in which power is practiced has already been determined; how resistance is expressed and the forms it assumes have already been established. While it has yielded numerous important insights into how power circulates and resistance manifests in peacebuilding operations, the theoretical approach conceals other significant dynamics which escape detection by ‘the liberal peace' and ‘the local'. However, these undetected dimensions of hybridity comprise the very processes that emerge in ways which destabilise the boundaries between ‘the liberal peace' and ‘the local' and reshape the contours of the emerging post-liberal peace. Instead of accepting the liberal-local distinction which defines this theoretical hybridity, this thesis advances an alternative methodological approach to exploring the tensions at play in peacebuilding projects. Rather than deploying theoretical distinctions in order to explain or understand complex hybrid processes, this thesis develops a methodological strategy for exploring the tensions between how actors design a peacebuilding project and how that project changes as actors work to translate that project into complex, everyday living sites (Callon, 1986; Law, 1997; Akrich, 1992). This tension is expressed as practical hybridity. The process of practical hybridity unfolds as the concrete material changes, modifications, and adaptations that emerge as actors appropriate and contingently translate organised practices in new ways and for different purposes. Through an ongoing process of practical hybridity, the boundaries and distinction which define the distinction between ‘the liberal peace' and ‘the local' become increasingly unstable. Amidst this instability, the practices which characterised ‘the liberal peace' are becoming stretched into a post-liberal peace. Drawing on the work of Richmond (2011a; Richmond & Mitchell, 2012), Latour (1987b; 1988; 2004), and Schatzki (2002), and based on over five months of field research, this this thesis traces the process of practical hybridity at play during the implementation and evaluation of a peacebuilding project in Liberia. I participated as a research assistant on a Randomised Control Trial (RCT), implemented by a small research team under the auspices of the Oxford University's Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE). The team was assessing the impact of a legal empowerment programme managed by The Carter Center: the Community Justice Advisor (CJA) programme. As the CSAE's evaluation of the CJA programme unfolded, many dynamics associated with theoretical liberal-local hybridity surfaced; however, it also became apparent that this theoretical formulation obscured important dimensions which were reshaping what peacebuilding practice is in the process of becoming in the emerging post-liberal world.

Reconciliation is important for reducing the likelihood of future conflict between groups but can be particularly difficult to achieve. This remains true within divided societies as the result of frozen conflict. This thesis asks why do some individuals, in the context of divided societies engaged in frozen conflict, have more positive reconciliatory attitudes than others? The approach of community center peacebuilding organizations (CCPB) was identified as one possible solution to this question. The hypothesis suggests that individuals who engage in such organizations will have more positive reconciliatory attitudes compared to the average community member. This is based on a theoretical framework that relies on contact theory, suggesting that the CCPB model establishes the necessary conditions for nurturing more reconciliatory attitudes in individuals. It is suggested to achieve this through positive intergroup contact that is generalizable to the outgroup as a whole.  A quantitative study based on 101 cases from original survey data is used to test this hypothesis. Using a logistic regression, support is found that establishes a significant positive correlation between engagement in CCPB and reconciliatory attitudes.   Key Words: reconciliation, contact theory, peacebuilding, community center, shared space, frozen conflict, divided societies, Cyprus

Since the end of the Cold War peacebuilding and conflict prevention became an important part of the international agenda in the processes of achieving peace. Nowadays there is an acknowledgment that civil society is an important actor that shares responsibility with the state, international actors, and contributes to rebuilding of states and societies after violent conflicts. However, there is a lack of contemporary research on the role and involvement of civil society in conflict prevention. This abductive study is addressing a problem of the undiscovered potential of civil society’s role in conflict prevention.  The objective of the study is to contribute to a discussion on the importance of inclusion of civil society actors in peacebuilding and conflict prevention by investigating the contribution of local NGOs to sustainable peace in Ukraine. The Southern region of Ukraine serves as a case study in which primary data was gathered through qualitative semi-structured interviews with NGOs and donor representatives. The research objectives are reached through the analysis of the activities of local NGOs by applying an analytical framework for peacebuilding functions by Paffenholz and Spurk and then by interpreting the functions through a conflict prevention concept, using a toolbox for conflict prevention actions developed by SIPRI. The results of the study based on the case of the Southern region of Ukraine demonstrate that the functions of civil society in peacebuilding, as outlined by the analytical framework, may not just be applied to the post-conflict stage of peacebuilding. In fact, they may be applied during different cycles of the conflict as part of the conflict prevention set of actions.  Local NGOs are contributing to conflict prevention and performing all seven peacebuilding functions as defined in the analytical framework. However, the main challenge is that these NGOs do not completely realize their role in peacebuilding and conflict prevention due to limited capacities and knowledge. That leads back to the problem of the undiscovered potential of civil society in conflict prevention. One possible solution, resulting from the suggestions of this study’s respondents, is the need for development of local knowledge and expertise in order to make the peace process sustainable.

Comment les intervenants internationaux peuvent-ils (re)construire des institutions légitimes après un conflit intra-étatique ? En d’autres termes, quels facteurs déterminent le résultat du statebuilding post-conflit ? D’un côté, l’approche dominante, dite « technique », soutient que des ressources significatives (financières, humaines, politiques) permettent aux intervenants internationaux de construire les institutions voulues. Au Kosovo, les acteurs internationaux ont établi une administration internationale dotée de pouvoirs exécutifs et des ressources étendues et maintenues tout au long du processus. Or, le bilan du statebuilding est mitigé. D’un autre côté, le paradigme de la « paix libérale » affirme que la libéralisation (politique et économique) contribue au résultat limité des opérations post-conflit car elle est mal appliquée, illégitime voir dangereuse pour les sociétés sortant de conflits violents. Cette approche néglige aussi bien les facteurs internes que les variations dans les intentions internationales et se base, comme l’approche technique, sur un postulat implicite (erroné) de l’asymétrie porteuse de rapports de pouvoir qui favoriseraient les intervenants internationaux. En conséquence, ces approches ignorent la manière dont les acteurs locaux peuvent résister aux normes et objectifs internationaux.Pour expliquer les variations du résultat du statebuilding international, nous proposons un modèle théorique alternatif en modélisant une approche multicausale et séquentielle d’un jeu à deux niveaux. Notre thèse est la suivante. Les variations dans l’issue du statebuilding sont fonction des interactions stratégiques, elles-mêmes déterminées par les changements dans les préférences et les relations de puissance entre les intervenants internationaux et les élites politiques locales. Le statebuilding est étudié comme un processus interactif, mettant en relation potentiellement trois acteurs clés qui dominent le paysage politique post-conflit. Dans ces conditions, le statebuilding est un succès uniquement si les réformes internationales ne menacent pas le pouvoir politique des élites locales – pouvoir qui s’appuie sur deux piliers, le nationalisme et les pratiques informelles – et que les acteurs internationaux ont mobilisé suffisamment de ressources pour amener les élites locales à adopter et appliquer les réformes désirées.Or, le cas du Kosovo montre que les préférences des acteurs ne s’alignent que très rarement. Le statebuilding international a été instrumentalisé et miné par les préférences divergentes et contradictoires entre les principaux acteurs clés. Les acteurs internationaux ont voulu créer un Etat démocratique et multinational, mais ont privilégié la stabilité car ils ont été confrontés à des élites politiques locales – kosovar-albanaises et kosovar-serbes – préoccupées par le pouvoir et la domination de leur groupe sur autrui et par le maintien du leadership à l’intérieur de leur propre groupe. Entraînant ainsi une multiplication des autorités et à une fragmentation de la légitimité : deux systèmes politiques et sociaux persistent et empêchent la cohésion et le caractère multinational de l’Etat. L’intervention de l’UE a permis de changer le jeu en contribuant à apaiser la situation sur le terrain. Mais des tensions persistent, confortant le compromis. / How can international actors build legitimate institutions following intra-state conflict? In other words, what factors determine the outcome of post-conflict statebuilding? On the one hand, the dominant approach, termed "technical", argues that significant resources (financial, human and political) allow international actors to build the required institutions. In Kosovo, international actors have established an international administration with executive powers, extending and sustaining resources throughout process. However, the success of statebuilding generally is mixed. On the other hand, the so-called "liberal peace" paradigm affirms that liberalization (political and economic) is a contributing factor to the limited success of post-conflict operations because it is either misapplied, illegitimate or even dangerous for societies emerging from violent conflicts. The liberal peace approach neglects these facts and ignores variations in international intentions. It is based, as is the technical approach, on an implicit (erroneous) assumption of an asymmetry in power relationships in favor of international actors. The result is that, these approaches fail to acknowledge the possibility of local actors resisting international standards and objectives.To explain variations in the success of statebuilding, we present an alternative theoretical model where a multi-level, sequential approach is modeled to a two-level game. Our thesis is as follows: variations in the statebuilding success are the function of strategic interactions, themselves determined by changes both in preferences and the power relationships between international actors and domestic political elites. Statebuilding is seen here as an interactive process, potentially linking three key actors who dominate any post-conflict political landscape. In unique conditions, no statebuilding process or international reforms need pose a threat to the political power of local elites - power derived from two pillars, i.e. nationalism and informal practices. Rather, international actors mobilise sufficient resources to induce local elites to adopt and implement the desired reforms.However, the preferences of the actors are very rarely aligned. In the case of Kosovo, it has been shown that international statebuilding has been instrumentalized and undermined by divergent and contradictory preferences among key actors. The international actors’ desire was to create a democratic and multinational state, but they opted for stability instead because they had to deal with local political elites - Kosovar-Albanian and Kosovar-Serb. The latter were concerned about maintaining their power over, and domination of, their group over others as well as maintaining leadership within their own group. This has led to a multiplication of authorities and a fragmentation of legitimacy: two distinct political and social systems persist, preventing the development of a cohesive and multinational state. While EU intervention has brought about a game change and helped to calm the situation on the ground, tensions persist, reaffirming the compromise that has taken place.

Le rapport de pouvoir qui régit les relations entre homme et femme engendre des inégalités qui sont la non-effectivité des droits des femmes, les stéréotypes ciblant souvent les femmes et les violences à l’égard des femmes. Ces inégalités notables en période normale ou de paix s’aggravent durant les crises sociopolitiques et de conflits armés où la violence sexospécifique est désormais érigée en arme de guerre pour détruire l’adversaire, son identité et son peuple. L’objectif de ces recherches est de relever les impacts, les enjeux du genre et de la réalité identitaire dans les crises et conflits tout comme dans le processus d’édification de la paix. A travers la vie sociopolitique du Togo et de la Côte d’Ivoire pris pour cas d’espèce, il s’agit d’observer la situation de crises et de conflits armés dans un pays, l’impact des appartenances identitaires et l’aggravation de l’inégalité du genre, puis relever les conséquences des crises et l’importance des femmes dont la négligence participe à l’échec des processus de paix, enfin viser la prise en compte des identités et du genre dans les processus de recherches de la paix. / The power dynamics that govern the relationship between man and woman creates inequalities that are the non-effectiveness of the rights of women, the stereotypes often associated to women as well as violence against them. These significant inequalities in normal times or peace times, worsen during the sociopolitical crises and armed conflicts where gender based violence (GBV) is now established as a weapon of war to destroy the opponent, its identity and its people. The objective of this research is to address the impacts, issues of gender and identity during crises and conflicts as well as during peacebuilding processes. Using the socio-political life of Togo and Côte d'Ivoire as case studies, the research seeks to observe the situation of crisis and armed conflict in a country, the impact of belonging to an identity, and the worsening of gender inequality and addresses the consequences of the crises and the importance of women whose negligence contributes to the failure of peace processes, and finally aims at the inclusion of identity and gender as important considerations in peacebuilding process.

A critical re-examination of the liberal peace is conducted to explore the ways in which certain ideas around peace have come to dominate and to be regarded as “common sense”. The foundation of my critique comes in the personalisation of peacebuilding through the stories of people who are the intended beneficiaries of its actions. This thesis seeks to open up and challenge the current measures of success and the location of power by introducing voices and experiences of Mende people located in the Southern and Eastern provinces of Sierra Leone. I have attempted to open up a reflexive space where simple questions can be re-examined and the location of recovery can be seen as a space influenced, shaped and performed in the context of diverse influences. I draw on my personal experience living in Bo, Sierra Leone for two months in 2014 and local level actors' subjective reflections on individual and communal notions of recovery, post-conflict. My findings are reflected in “building blocks” that uncover a partial story of personal perspectives on recovery. The story suggests a de-centred and complex “local” within the existing context and realigns the understanding of subject and agency within peacebuilding. This collection of experiences, stories and encounters reshapes the notion of peace as an everyday activity with the aim of improving well-being on a personal level. It is also a part of the peacebuilding process that exists outside of the traditional organisational lens. My main contribution has been in allowing alternative space(s) of peacebuilding and peace-shaping to have a platform that is not restricted by the confined epistemic “expert” community toward an understanding of “progress” as an experiential and subjective process of recovery. This approach sought to challenge the current site of legitimacy, power and knowledge, and in order to achieve this aim I drew on a new methodological toolkit and the absorption of key concepts from other disciplines such as managerialism and the sociological concept of the “stranger”. My research offers an opportunity to observe and utilise information sourced from the creativity and spontaneity of the everyday lived experiences of Sierra Leoneans and ordinary phenomena connected with this.

Cette thèse s’intéresse aux politiques de relations communautaires, community relations [CR], conçues et mises en place par les autorités publiques dans le contexte du conflit nord-irlandais entre 1969 et 1998. Elle s’interroge sur la filiation entre les dispositifs de 1969 et 1987-1990 et sur la cohésion de ces programmes dans la période étudiée. Elle insère les politiques de CR dans une démarche globale de construction de la paix, peacebuilding, parfois adoptée par les autorités publiques dans le contexte du conflit nordirlandais. La thèse décrit les caractéristiques de cette démarche et les met en relation avec les développements ayant lieu au sein du secteur associatif nord-irlandais. Malgré une première impression de discontinuité dans les politiques de CR, ce travail doctoral met progressivement en exergue la permanence de schémas de pensée et d’action au sein des autorités publiques entre 1969 et 1998, desquels émergent les programmes de CR étudiés. / This study focuses on community relations policies followed by public bodies in Northern Ireland during the Troubles [1969-1998]. The author compares the first plan, which lasted from 1969 to 1974, with the second series of measures taken from 1987. She also examines policies set up during the intervening thirteen years [1974-1987] when the issue of CR remained dormant. This examination shows that the consistency of government policies in the field of community relations is questionable. Community relations programmes have been looked at alongside peacebuilding initiatives involving public bodies as well as community activists. Despite an initial assumption that there has been no continuity in community relations policies between 1969 and 1998, it appears from the research that, throughout the Troubles, such policies have emanated from modes of thinking and acting which are well established among decision makers.