The main goal of this disertation is to map American pespectives on the position of Central Europe in American foreign policy after the Cold War. Its ambition is to systematize the particular area of American foreign policy thought that deals with Central Europe and, more precisely, with U.S. relations with the region. The goal is to contribute to a better understanding of how have the individual camps and traditions represented in the American foreign policy debate approached this particular issue. To achieve these goals, this disertation employs two existing typologies of American foreign policy thought and, subsequently, attempts to create a new, original typology that would better suit the aim of mapping the whole spectrum of relevant American perspectives on Central Europe. This disertation does not describe what has really happened in Central European-American relations, but rather aims at understanding better the U.S. foreign policy thought or, better said, one specific part of it: Opinions on U.S.-Central European relations and the position of Central Erope in international politics. Analysing the American post-Cold War discourse on Central Europe is the instrument to achieve this goal. This disertation, however, does not pressupose a direct causal link between the discourse and the...

This thesis examines the policies, positions, and perspectives of developing countries on the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention after the Cold War, focusing on the period between 1991 and 2001. In doing so, it questions the role of opposition that conventional wisdom has allotted to them as parochial defenders of sovereignty. Instead, the thesis reveals variation and complexity, which militates against defining the South, or the issues that humanitarian intervention raises, in simplistic either-or terms. Part I draws on insights about ‘sovereignty as what states make of it’ to break the classic pluralism-solidarism impasse that has otherwise stymied the conversation on humanitarian intervention and confined the South as a whole to a ‘black box’ labelled rejectionism. It reconstructs the empirical record of developing countries at large on six cases of military intervention (northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and East Timor), revealing variation that defies easy categorization. It also charts a cumulative and dynamic trend within the South towards a grey area between pluralism and solidarism that shows how these were not diametrically opposed positions. Following from that, Part II looks in-depth at India and Argentina. Whereas Argentina accepted the idea of humanitarian intervention, India remained reluctant to countenance it and persistently objected to the development of a new rule in its favour. Part II argues that the level of congruence between the emerging norm and the two countries’ prevailing values, aspirations, and historically constructed ways of thinking played a key role in determining the different levels of acceptance that the idea found with them. Part III delves deeper into the substance of their views. It shows how neither country constructed mutually exclusive choices between pluralism and solidarism, sovereignty and human rights, and intervention and non-intervention. Rather, both exhibited an acute awareness of the dilemmas of protecting human rights in a society of states, and a wariness of yes-no answers. Cumulatively, this thesis thus points away from thinking about the South itself as a given category with clear, shared or pre-determined ideas, and towards a more nuanced and inclusive conversation on humanitarian intervention.

Si, durant la Guerre Froide, les dépenses militaires américaines colossales étaient justifiées par une menace existentielle contre les États-Unis et leurs alliés, l'effondrement du camp et de l'idéologie communistes, suivi de la désintégration de l'Union soviétique, devrait inciter à une révision à la baisse de ces budgets militaires ou, à tout le moins, à les ramener à des niveaux proportionnels aux exigences du nouveau paysage sécuritaire international. Cette étude qui s'insère dans le cadre théorique de l'Economie de la Défense, est axée sur une exploration de la nature et des fondements réels des dépenses militaires américaines post-Guerre Froide. Elle suggère qu'elles semblent servir des finalités autres que la fonction constitutionnelle (besoin) de la défense de la nation américaine, qui sont celles de la préservation des intérêts politiques et matériels des élites politiques, économiques et militaires (une alliance d'intérêts créant une situation de dépendance chronique irréversible de l'économie américaine vis-à-vis des dépenses de défense). Ainsi, ces dépenses sont axées sur la projection de la puissance militaire à l'extérieur, servent à réaliser une hégémonie géopolitique et géoéconomique globales et non pas à pourvoir «la défense commune». / If, during the Cold War, the colossal U.S military expenditures were justified by an existential threat against the United States and their allies, the collapse of the communist camp and ideology, followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, should have pushed to revising downward those spending or, at least, brought them down to proportional levels, commensurate with the new international security landscape. This study, which falls within the scope of Defense Economics and which is centered on exploring the genuine rationales and determinants of the U.S. post-Cold War military spending, suggests that they seem serving purposes (needs) other than the constitutional function of defending the American Nation, which are those linked to preserving the interests of the political, economic and military elites (an alliance of interest creating a state of chronic and irreversible dependency of the U.S. economy on the Defense spending). Henceforth, those spending are articulated, in our own point of view, on the projection of the military power abroad, serving to achieve a global geopolitical and geo-economic hegemony and not the “common defense”.

Ocorreram amplas transformações nos sistemas militares de diversos países no período pós- Guerra Fria. No Brasil, o Exército replanejou sua força militar terrestre após a guerra das Malvinas mediante a implantação de um sistema de planejamento estruturado. Atualizações constantes foram feitas, mas as suas linhas principais podem ainda serem encontradas na remodelagem das unidades, missões e estrutura. Mesmo com a criação do Ministério da Defesa, o elemento político de direção nacional pouco interferiu. Essa reestruturação não tem correspondência direta com o modelo do pós-modernismo militar estruturado por Charles Moskos e que sugeria a transformação de grandes exércitos de conscritos em pequenos exércitos tecnologizados, cumprindo missões diferentes das tradicionais guerras inter-estatais. O desafio dos estruturadores da força terrestre foi de administrar poucos recursos com muita criatividade, especializando número crescente de profissionais de guerra terrestre, alargando o escopo das missões sem abrir mão das tradicionais, tornando algumas organizações militares mais operacionais, produzindo um salto de qualidade, ainda que tudo isso se desse sem interesse e sem direcionamento político. A ausência de clara direção política das forças armadas produz imprecisões na formulação de estratégias e de missões criando, por exemplo, sobreposição de missões auto-atribuídas com as de outros órgãos de segurança do Estado. / Broad transformations occurred in the military systems of many countries after the Cold War period. In Brazil , the Army re-dimensioned its military land forces after the Malvinas War when a planning system was structured and implemented. Despite of the continual changes the main lines can be found in the units remodeling, missions and structures. Even with the creation of the Ministry of Defense, the political elements interfered minimally. This restructuring has no direct connection with the post-modernist military model structured by Charles Moskos, which indicates the transformation of the big armies of recruited into the small technological armies with missions different from the traditional inter-state wars. The challenge for those involved in structuring the land forces was to creatively administrate the scarce resources to specialize land warfare professionals, broaden the number of missions without abandoning traditional missions and make military organizational even more operational attaining one leap of quality regardless of any political interest or guidance. The absence of clear political guidance of the armed forces can produce failures in the strategies and missions designs and this can produce, for example, overlaps of their own missions with those of other security organs of the State.

朝鮮半島由於地理位置特殊，在戰略上極具重要性，長久以來一直為列強覬覦爭奪之地。第二次世界大戰之後，朝鮮半島亦籠罩在兩極對峙的氣氛裡，首先是南北韓的分裂，而韓戰的發生，使美蘇在東亞地區的對抗局面更為激化，冷戰時期的朝鮮半島遂成為東亞地區內兩極對峙氣氛最為明顯的「火藥庫」，因而獲得「東方的巴爾幹」的稱號。隨著東歐變天、蘇聯瓦解，雖然冷戰時期的兩極對峙局面已不復見，國際瀰漫一片和解氣氛，然而東亞地區並未因此脫離冷戰的陰影，尤其是朝鮮半島的南北對抗依然持續、北韓引發的核武危機更使東亞地區陷入隨時可能爆發衝突的臨界點。由於朝鮮半島的局勢不僅攸關區域安全，亦與東亞列強間的權力平衡息息相關，後冷戰時期朝鮮半島已然成為國際關注的焦點，不論是區域傳統強權──美國與俄羅斯，抑或東亞新興的力量──中共與日本，皆極力爭取在朝鮮半島事務的發言權，一方面確保自身國家利益，另一方面更意圖在區域內發揮影響力，提升國際地位。 綜觀諸強權對朝鮮半島的政策，以美國最為大眾所知，各種期刊與學者論著足以證明美國影響之深度與廣度。中共與日本的參與和影響，亦有諸多學者研究，然而關於俄羅斯與朝鮮半島關係之研究卻少之又少。事實上俄羅斯在冷戰前後對於朝鮮半島的政策有相當幅度的變化，也是朝鮮半島穩定局勢的重大變數之一。從冷戰時期為與美國制衡、確保區域強權地位，極力與北韓維持密切關係，並刻意斷絕與南韓的接觸，到八０年代為求內部經濟發展，極力塑造周邊環境的穩定，開始與南韓接觸，乃至蘇聯解體後為求取經濟資源向南韓一面倒、以及1996年之後為維持在朝鮮半島的影響力而採取「等距離外交」，皆對朝鮮半島局勢產生相當程度的影響。基於意識型態與國家利益，對朝鮮半島所採取的政策因時而異，筆者欲就後冷戰時期俄羅斯的朝鮮半島政策作一番通盤整理，將莫斯科在朝鮮半島政策上的變化加以分析。 本文主要目標係探討後冷戰時期俄羅斯對朝鮮半島的政策，因此對於冷戰時期蘇聯對兩韓的政策著墨不多，僅以少部分篇幅對戈巴契夫主政前各蘇聯領導人的朝鮮半島政策作一番概述，提供讀者了解莫斯科當局在決定對兩韓政策時的歷史背景。筆者除了對葉爾欽時期俄羅斯對朝鮮半島的政策詳細加以整理與歸納之外，由於朝鮮半島的安全穩定攸關東亞區域的安全，並涉及周邊列強的國家利益，筆者認為在探究俄羅斯朝鮮半島政策時，亦須對美國、中共、日本的朝鮮半島政策有基本認知，因此亦以一個章節來討論列強在此地的競逐與制衡。俄羅斯長期以來為維持周邊環境的穩定，推動亞太安全不遺餘力，而朝鮮半島事務是當前俄羅斯最能發揮區域影響力的議題，本文亦將探討俄羅斯朝鮮半島政策對亞太安全的影響，諸如兩韓統一、核武問題皆在研究範圍之內。 本文共分七章，第一章為緒論，第二章先概述冷戰時期朝鮮半島的地緣政治與蘇聯的關係，並以蘇聯領導人作為區隔，就戈巴契夫主政前蘇聯與兩韓的關係加以探討。第三章分析戈巴契夫新思維對蘇聯亞太政策產生的衝擊，並分析朝鮮半島在戈氏新思維當中扮演的角色，此外更詳述戈巴契夫時期對朝鮮半島政策的調整。第四章為本論文的主要章節，筆者先就俄羅斯內部自蘇聯解體後持續進行的對外政策激辯過程加以概述，分析俄羅斯對外政策的重大變化，並探究朝鮮半島政策受到的影響，以及俄羅斯與南北韓關係的發展；其次筆者就俄羅斯1996年之後對朝鮮半島政策的調整過程加以分析，「等距離外交」的執行與障礙亦為研究重點。第五章係討論有關朝鮮半島周邊列強在此地的競逐與制衡，筆者分別就美國、中共與日本的朝鮮半島政策加以論述。第六章俄羅斯對兩韓統一與核武問題的立場有詳細說明，此外讀者亦可自本章得知俄羅斯朝鮮半島政策與亞太安全的關聯，第七章為結論。 第一章　　緒論 第一節 研究動機與目的..................................1 第二節 研究方法與限制..................................2 第三節 論文架構........................................3 第二章 冷戰時期蘇聯的朝鮮半島政策 第一節 二次大戰結束後的東亞局勢與韓國的處境...............5 第二節 蘇聯的東亞政策與朝鮮半島地緣政治...................6 第三節 第二次世界大戰結束後蘇聯與南北韓的關係............11 第三章 戈巴契夫時期蘇聯的朝鮮半島政策 第一節 戈巴契夫「新思維」與俄羅斯外交政策之轉變..........33 第二節 戈巴契夫初期蘇聯對朝鮮半島的政策..................42 第三節 蘇聯對兩韓政策之轉變..............................45 第四章 葉爾欽時期的朝鮮半島政策 第一節 蘇聯解體與俄羅斯對外政策大辯論.................69 第二節 「新東方政策」與朝鮮半島..........................74 第三節 俄國對兩韓的等距離外交............................96 第五章 朝鮮半島周邊其他列強之角逐 第一節 美國朝鮮半島政策……………………………………..131 第二節 中共朝鮮半島政策……………………………………..145 第三節 日本朝鮮半島政策……………………………………..161 第六章 俄羅斯朝鮮半島政策與亞太安全 第一節 俄羅斯對兩韓統一之看法………………………………175 第二節 俄羅斯對核武問題之立場………………………………182 第三節 俄國朝鮮半島政策對亞太安全之意義………………..192 第七章 結論…………………………………………………………..213 參考書目……………………………………………………………………217 / Summary Based on the specialty of its location, the Korean Peninsula has been extremely important on strategy, and the surrounding major powers have fought for it for a long time. After the World War II, the Korean Peninsula was also under the atmosphere of confrontation like other regions and the Korean War made the confronting situation more irrigated. Although the international society has been filled with reconciliation since the sudden change of Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, East Asia didn’t get rid of the shadow of the Cold War. The situation of confrontation between North and South on the Korean Peninsula has still existed, and the nuclear crisis caused by DPRK made the East Asia Region involved in a critical point, at which various of conflicts would burst out at any time. The situation of the Korean Peninsula not only affects the regional security, but also concerns about the balance of power among the East Asian major powers. In the post-Cold War Era the Korean Peninsula has been an international focus, concerned by both the traditional regional powers, such as U.S.A. and Russian, and the new powers, such as PRC and Japan. All the surrounding nations are trying to have the floor in the Korean Peninsula affairs, not only to secure their own national interests, but also to produce a marked effect in the region and promote national status. The intent of the thesis is trying to study Russia’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula in the post-Cold War Era. In order to introduce the historical background of Moscow’s policy making toward Korea, the thesis is classified into several parts according to various Kremlin leaderships. After a series of arrangement and analysis, we can find that Moscow’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula since 1945 has been influenced by the changes of the international environment, but also by the development of domestic politics and economy in Russia. In addition, the latter affects Moscow’s foreign policy in the post- Cold War Era much more than the former. Based on the need of democratic policy and economic reform after the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991, Russia decided to approach the West to get political and economic support. Therefore, getting along with ROK, which has democratic experience and strong economic capability, while cutting original ties with DPRK gradually, is the best choice for Moscow. As for ROK, Russia’s influence on DPRK can promote direct dialog between the two sides, and then secure the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Under the consideration of economy and politics, Russia and ROK accordingly established formal diplomatic relations on September 30, 1991, and the bilateral relationships has been developed smoothly. On the other hand, based on the differences of political structure and economic system, Russia and DPRK have departed for a long distance. Although Moscow insisted to develop full-scale relations with ROK without regarding to the objection of DPRK, the achievement of developing relations with ROK couldn’t fit the expectation of Russian people. The bare economic situation hadn’t been improved, and at the same time, Russians felt be treated as a debtor by ROK. Based on the poor economy and the declining nation status in the international society, Russia had been filled with a conservative atmosphere since 1993. The extreme complaint about the domestic and external affairs provoked the Communism and Nationalism, and the foreign policy inclining to the West suffered from fierce critics. Judging from the distribution of the Duma in 1993 and 1995, we can easily find the dramatic change of Russian domestic politics. To preserve national interest and dignity, Kremlin decided to change its policy toward the Korean Peninsula in 1996. The former policy inclining to ROK has been given up, and Moscow makes efforts to regain close relationships with DPRK while developing normal ties with ROK to maintain Russia’s importance and floor not only on the Korean Peninsula, but also in East Asia affairs. In addition, keeping in touch with DPRK and providing any possible assistance will prevent the sudden collapse of Pyongyang Government, which might result in dramatic turbulent in the region. In short, maintaining close ties with North and South at the same time not only promote peace and stability in the region, but also fit Russia’s national interests.

At the start of the George H.W. Bush administration, American involvement in El Salvador‘s civil war, one of the last Cold War battlegrounds, had disappeared from the foreign policy agenda. However, two events in November 1989 shattered the bipartisan consensus on US policy toward El Salvador: the failure of the FMLN‘s largest military offensive of the war and the murder of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter by the Salvadoran military, the FAES. Despite more than one billion dollars in US military assistance, the war had stalemated, promoting both sides to seek a negotiated political settlement mediated by the United Nations. The Jesuit murders demonstrated the failure of the policy of promoting respect for democracy and human rights and revived the debate in Congress over US aid to El Salvador. This thesis argues that the Bush administration sought to remove the burden of El Salvador from its foreign policy agenda by actively pushing for the investigation and prosecution of the Jesuit case and fully supporting the UN-mediated peace process. Using recently declassified government documents from the George Bush Presidential Library, this thesis will examine how the Bush administration fundamentally changed US policy toward El Salvador. Administration officials carried out an unprecedented campaign to pressure the FAES to investigate the Jesuit murders and bring the killers to justice while simultaneously attempting to prevent Congress from cutting American military assistance. The Bush administration changed the objective of its El Salvador policy from military victory over the guerrillas to a negotiated political settlement. The US facilitated the peace process by pressuring the Salvadoran government and the FMLN to negotiate in good faith and accept compromises. When both sides signed a comprehensive peace agreement on January 16, 1992, the burden of El Salvador was lifted.

強制外交（coercive diplomacy）的概念在一九七０年代由學者Alexander L. George首度提出，主張強制外交應屬於防守型的危機管理（defensive crisis management），亦有別於一般所謂的嚇阻（deterrence）與壓制（compellence）等策略。施行強制外交時，相關決策者透過威脅使用武力，或使用有限度的武力，以勸說對手停止或放棄現正從事的行動，並防止危機情勢的升高，及避免戰爭的發生。冷戰期間，美、蘇兩國的領導人對於該一策略的運用極為廣泛與普遍，甘迺迪政府對於古巴飛彈危機的處理便是著名的案例。冷戰結束，國際關係進入所謂的後冷戰時期，面對區域衝突、人道危機和恐怖主義威脅等問題，強制外交更常被相關決策者和國際組織所施行、採用，亦多次在國際間重大的衝突與危機處理過程中扮演著關鍵的角色，並展現其重要性和多元化的一面。因此，鑑於強制外交對於後冷戰時期之國際危機處理和衝突解決的重要性和必要性，本研究旨在透過強制外交相關理論的介紹與整理，以及後冷戰時期強制外交相關個案的研究分析，總結歷史的經驗與教訓，深入探討其施行現況與成效，並提出具體之研究發現與政策建議。期盼所得之研究成果能使吾人對於該策略有更深一層的認識與了解。 關鍵詞：強制外交、壓制、危機管理、後冷戰時期、區域衝突、人道干涉、反恐行動 / In the 1970s, Alexander L. George first introduced and defined the concept of coercive diplomacy. According to George, he claims that coercive diplomacy is a strategy of defensive crisis management. Besides, coercive diplomacy is also different from the strategy of deterrence or compellence. When policymakers and political elites decide to manipulate coercive diplomacy, they should employ threats and / or limited force to persuade opponents to call off or undo adverse actions, which are thought aggressive. Furthermore, the purpose of using coercive diplomacy is to prevent crisis situation from escalating or causing wars. During the Cold War era, leaders of United States and Soviet Union used this strategy intensively. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 can also be thought as a famous case of successful coercive diplomacy. When international relations enters into the post-Cold War era, coercive diplomacy still plays as important role in crisis management and conflict resolution. Policymakers of countries and international organizations, like the United Nations and the NATO, prefer to use coercive diplomacy to deal with regional conflicts, humanitarian intervention, and counterterrorism. Coercive diplomacy also demonstrates its necessity and significance of solving these problems. In order to give us a comprehensive understanding of coercive diplomacy, this thesis focuses on theories of coercive diplomacy and case studies, especially the experiences after the Cold War. Then, in final chapter of this thesis, the author generalizes lessons and experiences come from the cases analyzed and studied. In addition, the author also tries to make conclusions about the efficacy of coercive diplomacy and thus tries to offer some guidelines for policymakers. Keywords: coercive diplomacy, compellence, crisis management, post-Cold War era, regional conflicts, humanitarian intervention, counterterrorism

Ocorreram amplas transformações nos sistemas militares de diversos países no período pós- Guerra Fria. No Brasil, o Exército replanejou sua força militar terrestre após a guerra das Malvinas mediante a implantação de um sistema de planejamento estruturado. Atualizações constantes foram feitas, mas as suas linhas principais podem ainda serem encontradas na remodelagem das unidades, missões e estrutura. Mesmo com a criação do Ministério da Defesa, o elemento político de direção nacional pouco interferiu. Essa reestruturação não tem correspondência direta com o modelo do pós-modernismo militar estruturado por Charles Moskos e que sugeria a transformação de grandes exércitos de conscritos em pequenos exércitos tecnologizados, cumprindo missões diferentes das tradicionais guerras inter-estatais. O desafio dos estruturadores da força terrestre foi de administrar poucos recursos com muita criatividade, especializando número crescente de profissionais de guerra terrestre, alargando o escopo das missões sem abrir mão das tradicionais, tornando algumas organizações militares mais operacionais, produzindo um salto de qualidade, ainda que tudo isso se desse sem interesse e sem direcionamento político. A ausência de clara direção política das forças armadas produz imprecisões na formulação de estratégias e de missões criando, por exemplo, sobreposição de missões auto-atribuídas com as de outros órgãos de segurança do Estado. / Broad transformations occurred in the military systems of many countries after the Cold War period. In Brazil , the Army re-dimensioned its military land forces after the Malvinas War when a planning system was structured and implemented. Despite of the continual changes the main lines can be found in the units remodeling, missions and structures. Even with the creation of the Ministry of Defense, the political elements interfered minimally. This restructuring has no direct connection with the post-modernist military model structured by Charles Moskos, which indicates the transformation of the big armies of recruited into the small technological armies with missions different from the traditional inter-state wars. The challenge for those involved in structuring the land forces was to creatively administrate the scarce resources to specialize land warfare professionals, broaden the number of missions without abandoning traditional missions and make military organizational even more operational attaining one leap of quality regardless of any political interest or guidance. The absence of clear political guidance of the armed forces can produce failures in the strategies and missions designs and this can produce, for example, overlaps of their own missions with those of other security organs of the State.

The aim of this study is to investigate and analyse the military involvement of the USA in the security of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) during the era of the Clinton administration (1993-2001). The study is based on the assumption that the US did not have that much interest in the security of SSA during the Clinton era and that it did not want to become militarily involved in SSA. Its position as the only remaining superpower in the post-Cold War era, however placed a responsibility on the US to be militarily involved in the creation of a more secure SSA. The study relies on two theoretical constructs. On the one hand the changing nature of security in the post-Cold War world in general, but specifically in SSA, serves as a theoretical starting point. This is, on the other hand, supported by a theoretical focus on the nature of military involvement globally, but also specifically in SSA in the era after the Cold War. The latter is to a large extent related to the changing nature of military force and the use thereof in the post-Cold War era. The military involvement of the US in the management of the security of SSA during the Clinton era is analysed against the background of the US interests, policy, and strategy – specifically its security strategy – in SSA. The reality of the absence of concrete US interests in SSA is highlighted. This lack of interest led to a situation whereby SSA could not be a priority in US foreign policy. The US policy objectives in SSA were nevertheless aimed at the promotion of democracy, the improvement of the security situation and the support of economic progress. The reluctance of the US to deploy military forces in SSA underpins its security strategy and military involvement in SSA. The security strategy of the US was in essence preventive in nature since it aimed at preventing the manifestation of threats from SSA against the US by promoting the stability of SSA. However, the US was still militarily involved in SSA in a variety of ways, from the provision of military training and the conduct of military exercises to military operations. Military involvement centred around the empowerment of armed forces in SSA. It was argued that the capacity of the armed forces of SSA should be developed to support democratic governance and economic progress. The capacity building programmes of the US armed forces in SSA concentrated on defence reform, military professionalism, the creation of indigenous conflict resolution and peace support capabilities, the provision of equipment, and the improvement of health and environmental conditions. / Dissertation (MA (Security Studies))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Political Sciences / unrestricted