In Paper [I] we use data on Swedish public procurement auctions for internal regularcleaning service contracts to provide novel empirical evidence regarding green publicprocurement (GPP) and its effect on the potential suppliers’ decision to submit a bid andtheir probability of being qualified for supplier selection. We find only a weak effect onsupplier behavior which suggests that GPP does not live up to its political expectations.However, several environmental criteria appear to be associated with increased complexity,as indicated by the reduced probability of a bid being qualified in the postqualificationprocess. As such, GPP appears to have limited or no potential to function as an environmentalpolicy instrument. In Paper [II] the observation is made that empirical evaluations of the effect of policiestransmitted through public procurements on bid sizes are made using linear regressionsor by more involved non-linear structural models. The aspiration is typically to determinea marginal effect. Here, I compare marginal effects generated under both types ofspecifications. I study how a political initiative to make firms less environmentally damagingimplemented through public procurement influences Swedish firms’ behavior. Thecollected evidence brings about a statistically as well as economically significant effect onfirms’ bids and costs. Paper [III] embarks by noting that auction theory suggests that as the number of bidders(competition) increases, the sizes of the participants’ bids decrease. An issue in theempirical literature on auctions is which measurement(s) of competition to use. Utilizinga dataset on public procurements containing measurements on both the actual and potentialnumber of bidders I find that a workhorse model of public procurements is bestfitted to data using only actual bidders as measurement for competition. Acknowledgingthat all measurements of competition may be erroneous, I propose an instrumental variableestimator that (given my data) brings about a competition effect bounded by thosegenerated by specifications using the actual and potential number of bidders, respectively.Also, some asymptotic results are provided for non-linear least squares estimatorsobtained from a dependent variable transformation model. Paper [VI] introduces a novel method to measure bidders’ costs (valuations) in descending(ascending) auctions. Based on two bounded rationality constraints bidders’costs (valuations) are given an imperfect measurements interpretation robust to behavioraldeviations from traditional rationality assumptions. Theory provides no guidanceas to the shape of the cost (valuation) distributions while empirical evidence suggeststhem to be positively skew. Consequently, a flexible distribution is employed in an imperfectmeasurements framework. An illustration of the proposed method on Swedishpublic procurement data is provided along with a comparison to a traditional BayesianNash Equilibrium approach.

D’inspiration anglo-saxonne et plébiscités par la Commission européenne, les partenariatspublic-privé, s’ils semblaient exister en diverses formes de montages contractuels complexes,ont fait leur entrée remarquée dans le paysage des contrats administratifs français parl’ordonnance du 17 juin 2004 relative aux contrats de partenariat. Ceux-ci, ayant fait l’objet deplusieurs réformes en 2008 et en 2009, sont, tour à tour, loués, critiqués ou décriés en ce qu’ilsnourrissent ou affectent les mécanismes de droit commun de la commande publique en droitinterne tout en exploitant des interprétations ambiguës quant à leur capacité d’assurer desmissions de service public.Le caractère tant innovant du contrat de partenariat, par ses spécificités relatives au partagedes risques associé à des objectifs de performance, que dérogatoire par une possibilitéd’utilisation conditionnée, plusieurs fois réaffirmé par le Conseil constitutionnel, font de cenouveau mode contractuel un contrat public singulier.A défaut d’existence de toute définition juridique des partenariats public-privé, cette recherche apour objet d’une part, d’analyser en quoi le partage des risques, pilier de cette singularité, estun vecteur de développement du contrat de partenariat et d’autre part, à s’interroger en quoi cedernier est susceptible de constituer un outil de réforme de l’Etat en ses mécanismes decontractualisation. / Private public partnership has noticeably been introduced in the French public law ofgovernment contract by the Act of 17 June of 2004 relative to Partnership contract. Largelyinspired from the Anglo-Saxon system and approved unanimously by the EuropeanCommission, it is noteworthy that prior to the Act private public partnership techniques wereofficiously already in used through different type of complex contractual settings. Subject toseveral reforms in 2008 and 2009, they were successively praised and criticized. Indeed, PPPhas been decried as affecting the national public procurement law and particularly because itsimplementation has been facilitated by different ambiguous construction regarding its capacityto fulfill public service missions.PPP innovates both by its contractual specificity with regards to the sharing of risk arising duringthe performance of contractual obligations and by its derogatory character due to the rule, whichhas frequently been reaffirmed by the Constitutional Court, that the use of PPP is subject tostrict conditions. The two aforementioned distinguishing features made this new contractualengineering a particular public contract law.Notwithstanding the lack of any legal definition of PPP, this research aims firstly to ascertainhow risk sharing, which is the pillar of this instrument, is the driving force behind thedevelopment of partnership contract. This research also aims to determine how PPP, throughits contractual technicalities, can be a tool in the reform of the State.

The main aim of this diploma thesis is to provide a comprehensive analysis of selected institutes related to the tender price in the award procedures of public contracts in the light of the new Act No. 134/2016 Coll., on public procurement, with its main focus on evaluation of impacts of the new legislation and identification of its potential risks, while its partial focus lies in comparison with previous legislation, i.e. Act No. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended, and assessment of usage of up to now decision practice of the Office for the Protection of Competition and case law of administrative courts. The first chapter deals with a brief overview of the public procurement legislation, its aims and purposes and identification of elementary characteristics of the award procedures of public contracts. The subject of the second chapter is to analyze preliminary market consultation from the general point of view and simultaneously to provide an analysis with a focus on its application, practical execution, benefits and drawbacks related thereto and its influence on the procurement procedures. The third chapter deals with the estimated value of public contracts, rules of its calculation, the issue of division of public contracts and its influence on tender prices. The fourth chapter...

La question du traitement de l’aléa affectant les contrats publics semble opposer de façon « incommensurable » les droits anglais et français. Si le droit français est doté de règles de droit objectif permettant, dans l’intérêt général, le traitement de l’aléa affectant les contrats publics sans accord des parties, rien de tel n’existe en droit anglais ou la règle de la force obligatoire commande l’intangibilité de l’accord initial. La comparaison anglo-française permet, grâce à cet antagonisme, de mettre en exergue les ressorts profonds du traitement de l’aléa affectant les contrats publics au travers de l’opposition théorique entre force obligatoire et intérêt public. Dans cette perspective, les règles générales permettant, en droit français, le traitement de l’aléa sans accord des parties apparaissent comme étant fondées sur une conception économique et téléologique du contrat et de sa force obligatoire, que l’on peut également identifier dans certains aspects du droit anglais des contrats. En outre, le mode de traitement de l’aléa priviligié en Angleterre aussi bien qu’en France est l’accord de volontés – initial ou subséquent. Néanmoins, les possibilités de modification du contrat en cours d’exécution sont drastiquement limitées par le droit de l’Union européenne. A l’inverse, les stipulations initiales qui tendent à ériger, du fait de la généralisation des clauses standardisées, un régime contractuel autonome de traitement de l’aléa, apparaissent désormais comme le mode incontournable d’adaptation des contrats publics en cours d’exécution. / The question of the treatment of uncertain/unforeseen events affecting public contracts seems to oppose in an immeasurable way English and French laws. While, in French law, general rules provide, in the public interest, the treatment of uncertain/unforeseen events affecting public contracts without the consent of the contractors, no such provisions exist in English law, where the sanctity and intangibility of contract prevails. Thank to this antagonism, the proposed comparison enables to highlight the deep motivations of the treatment of uncertain/unforeseen events affecting public contracts, through the theoretical opposition between sanctity of contract and public interest. In this respect, the general rules allowing, in French law, the treatment of the uncertain/unforeseen events without the consent of the parties appear to be based on an economic and teleological approach of the contract and its biding force. Surprisingly, the latter approach can also be noticed, in some respects, in the English law of contracts. Moreover, the priviledged mean to treat uncertain/unforeseen events in England as well as in France is the agreement of the parties – whether ex ante or ex post. Nonetheless, the possibilities of variating the contract in the course of its performance have been drastically limited by the European Union law. By contrast, the intial terms which tends to erect an autonomous regime of treatment of uncertain/unforeseen events through the spreading of standard terms appear to be the major and indispensable mean of adaptation of public contracts in the course of their performance.

Les marchés publics au Congo ont été longtemps encadrés par le décret colonial du 9 mars 1959. Rédigée dans un contexte historique particulier, cette règlementation s’est avérée éloignée des réalités socio-économiques du Congo à la suite de l’indépendance proclamée le 15 août 1960. Institué pour accompagner le pays vers son développement dans un environnement économique libéral, ce décret colonial a été, dans la pratique, complètement écarté au profit des règles édictées par le Parti unique et l’idéologie marxiste à partir de l’année 1964. En 1982, une nouvelle réglementation des marchés publics devant servir de fondement à la politique contractuelle de développement économique du pays a été définie par les autorités congolaises de l’époque. Cette nouvelle réglementation des marchés publics, mise en place par le décret du 22 avril 1982, a le mérite d’avoir créé les autorités de gestion des marchés publics et fixé un cadre de passation des marchés et contrats de l’État. Toutefois, elle a aussitôt montré ses limites et ses insuffisances au regard de la configuration socio-politique du pays. Plusieurs facteurs participent à l’inefficacité du dispositif de 1982 : le monopartisme, l’endettement des entreprises publiques et de l’État, la corruption dans la passation des marchés publics, le recours excessif au gré à gré et l’instabilité institutionnelle. Avec l’avènement dans les années 1990-1991 de la démocratie, même fragilisée par les guerres civiles, un vent de réformes importantes souffle sur le Congo. C’est ainsi que, dans la perspective de la reconstruction institutionnelle et économique du pays, avec l’appui des organisations financières internationales, les autorités congolaises ont engagé une série de réformes, parmi lesquelles s’inscrit la réforme portant codification des marchés publics. Mis en place par le décret du 20 mai 2009, le Code des marchés publics constitue une réponse à plusieurs objectifs : la transparence, la bonne gouvernance, la lutte contre la corruption et le développement économique du Congo. Dès lors, un état des lieux de la réglementation des marchés publics au Congo, de son accession à l’indépendance en 1960 à nos jours, semblait nécessaire pour dégager des perspectives nouvelles. Pour que les marchés publics deviennent un outil au service du développement économique du pays, quelques préalables s’imposent : la lutte contre la pauvreté, le renforcement du rôle de la justice, l’égalité entre les candidats aux marchés, la prise en considération des exigences sociales et environnementales locales. / Procurement in the Congo has long been framed by the colonial decree of March 9th, 1959. Written in a particular historical context, this regulation has proven to be far from the socio-economic realities of the Congo as a result of the independence proclaimed on August 15th, 1960. Established with the view of leading the country towards its development in a liberal economic environment, this colonial decree was, in practice, completely sidelined in favor of the rules issued by the Single Party and the Marxist ideology from the year 1964. In 1982, new procurement rules to serve as a basis for the contractual policy of economic development has been defined by the Congolese authorities of the time. This new procurement regulation, established by a Decree of April 22nd, 1982, is credited with having created the management authorities of public contracts and having set a framework for procurement and government contracts. However, it soon showed its limits and shortcomings with regard to the socio-political configuration of the country. Several factors contributed to the inefficiency of the device in 1982: the party system, the State debt and that of public enterprises, corruption in public procurement, the excessive use of OTC over the counter negotiations and institutional instability. In the years 1990-1991, with the advent of democracy, even though weakened by civil wars, a significant wind of change blew across the Congo. Thus, in view of the institutional and economic reconstruction of the country, with the support of the international financial organizations, the Congolese authorities have undertaken a series of reforms, including the reform codifying procurement. Established by the Decree of May 20th, 2009, the Procurement Code aims at several objectives: transparency, good governance, the fight against corruption and economic development of the Congo. Therefore, an overview of the procurement rules from the Congo's independence in 1960 until today seemed necessary to identify new prospects. For public procurement to become a tool of economic development, there are some prerequisites: fighting against poverty, strengthening the role of justice, granting candidates equal access markets, taking into consideration local social and environmental requirements.

In the Czech Republic, half of the infrastructure network is still missing. Moreover, in the past, Dutch and Czech road infrastructure projects have been delivered over-budget and rarely on schedule. Despite a weak fiscal position in the Czech Republic there is still a need for infrastructure investments. Solution for mentioned issues can become the realization of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. The features (for instance the payment mechanism) of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects not only make these investments possible but also solve other problems mentioned. Both the Netherlands (NL) and the Czech Republic (CR) have already established an environment enabling PPP implementation (e.g. established PPP Units, methodologies, dealing with legislation); But despite many PPP projects being carried out on the municipality level, there is not even one PPP project being implemented on the national level in the CR. This is in contrast to the NL, where there is already a developed PPP market, and there is investment in several new national projects every year. How can the CR improve its PPP implementation policy? The answer to this question provides the final recommendations based on the Dutch PPP practice within this Master's thesis. Learning from mistakes of the other countries, in this case it is the Netherlands, may provide for higher effectiveness in the PPP implementation and in the faster adaptation or improvement of the current partnerships. To elaborate the thesis it has been used interviews, questionnaire and several primary and secondary sources, that have been available in czech, dutch and english languages. The main contributors to the development of this thesis have been the experts from the Dutch PPP Unit at Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment and the experts from the UNECE, who commented on the results and enabled application of the UN National PPP Readiness Self-Assessment tool to enhance the quality of the thesis. Other contributors are experts from PPP Centre at Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic, PPP Association, Czech Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Finance. The tools, recommendations, as well as the PPP maturity Pyramid occurring within the Master's thesis can be applied not only for the further development of the PPP implementation in the Czech Republic, but also in other Eastern European countries. General recommendations arose by comparing practices of both the CR and the NL with respect to the UNECE's criteria. The all recommendations have been shown for clarity in terms of political, practical and procurement level. This comparison has practically enabled to point out the strengths and weaknesses of PPP projects in the CR and NL. Dutch experience has served as a source of considerable information that can make the practical implementation of Czech PPP projects much easier. As a part of the final conclusions of the thesis can be considered a PPP Maturity Pyramid, which schematically describes the current position of both countries due to the successful use of PPP projects. Basically, both countries have already passed "Bad" experience with PPP projects, have produced suitable environment and conditions for their use, but the next step is very important for the successful implementation of PPP projects in the CR. Based on the political support (considered as an essential factor), it is necessary to learn from the past mistakes and start with the practical realization of simple projects (from the beginning) that can be the basis for a standardization and a practical application of PPP projects in the future.

Por meio deste estudo, avaliou-se o impacto da adoção da Agenda Ambiental da Administração Pública (A3P) nos editais de licitação, na modalidade “pregão”, em dois municípios localizados na região Sul e Sudoeste de Minas Gerais, Varginha e Três Corações. O propósito foi identificar as diferenças, se é que existem, na descrição dos produtos licitados pelos dois municípios, ressaltando que, diferente de Varginha, Três Corações integra a Agenda Ambiental (A3P) desde o ano de 2013. Registre-se que a mencionada Agenda Ambiental é um programa que visa a implementar a gestão socioambiental sustentável nas atividades administrativas e operacionais do Governo. Assim, buscou-se verificar se as características dos produtos licitados se modificam conforme o município participe ou não da Agenda Ambiental da Administração Pública (A3P). A partir da análise dos editais de licitação na modalidade pregão do ano de 2015, de ambos os municípios envolvidos, identificou-se que a descrição dos produtos licitados não englobou, salvo pequenas exceções, critérios relativos à sustentabilidade. De posse dessa informação, entendeu-se cabível a elaboração de um plano de melhorias dos processos licitatórios, de modo a conciliar o sistema de licitações municipais ao eixo temático das compras públicas sustentáveis, um dos seis eixos estruturais da Agenda Ambiental da Administração Pública. / This study evaluated the impact of the adoption of the Public Administration Environmental Agenda (A3P) in the bidding documents, in the "pregão" modality, in two municipalities located in the South of Minas Gerais, Três Corações and Varginha. The purpose was to identify the differences, if any, in the description of the products tendered by the two municipalities, noting that, unlike Varginha, Três Corações is part of the Environmental Agenda (A3P) since 2013. It should be noted that the mentioned Environmental Agenda is a program that aims to implement sustainable socio-environmental management in the administrative and operational activities of the Government. Thus, it was sought to verify whether the characteristics of the products tendered change depending on whether the municipality participates or not in the A3P Environmental Agenda. Based on the analysis of the bidding documents in the negotiation modality of the year 2015, of both municipalities involved, it was identified that the description of the products tendered did not include, with minor exceptions, criteria related to sustainability. With this information, it was considered feasible to draw up a plan to improve the bidding processes, in order to reconcile the municipal bidding system with the thematic axis of sustainable public procurement, one of the six structural axes of the Public Administration Environmental Agenda.

Submitted by Jorge Silva (jorgelmsilva@ufrrj.br) on 2018-08-23T20:48:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2017 - Vanessa Schottz.pdf: 2466655 bytes, checksum: 43c66ef0b42bc287ab8efa3280adf6b2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-23T20:48:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2017 - Vanessa Schottz.pdf: 2466655 bytes, checksum: 43c66ef0b42bc287ab8efa3280adf6b2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-07-31 / CAPES / Since 2003, the National School Feeding Program (PNAE) has been going through changes that involve the reformulation of its goals, principles and guidelines, as well as its operational design from the intersectoral perspective of Food and Nutritional Security (FNS). The legal framework for the program, endorsed in 2009, aims to establish a link between the supply of healthy food in the school, the educational process of learning and family-based agriculture, recognizing school meals as a human right. In accordance with some principles of FNS, innovations in the operating mode of the program are being introduced, principally with respect to the dynamics of public acquisition of food, by making the allocation of at least 30% of the funds for the direct purchase of products of family-based agriculture a compulsory measure, with exemption from public bids. This thesis proposes to analyze PNAE's historical trajectory and recent reformulation from an angle yet not much explored in public policies analysis: its instruments. It aimed to understand, based on an approach that focuses on the Instrumentation of Public Action (IAP), the following questions: i) how the choosing process of instruments to operationalize food acquisition from family-based agriculture took place; ii) which principles from FNS Security were incorporated to the instruments; iii) which actors participated on the process and which interaction were established between them; iv) which public controversies were present. The study has pointed out that that the context of strengthening of the dynamics of social-estate interfaces and the greater permeability of the Estate to public policies reorientation proposals in the light of FNS's principles has created opportunities for actors coalitions (governmental mand non-governmental) that were linked to the defense of FNS causes and family-based agriculture to articulate themselves around that new legal framework. There was an effort both to reorient the guidelines of PNAE and to participate on the choosing of instruments by these actors. The introduction of new acquisition mechanisms in the PNAE involved the conformation of new field of controversies, because the changes affect the interface between public and market action. The mapping process done within the PNAE Managing Committee and Advisory Group (formal spaces aiming at the program's regulaion) has pointed out that the main controversies revolved around the following questions: i) the choosing of the operationalization modality to purchase from family-base agriculture; ii) the adoption of selection criteria bounded to the guidelines of PNAE substituting the purchasing processes that were linked to low-prices; iii) the definition of the price methodology; iv) the definition of a selling limit in a year; v) the connection between the Food Acquisition Program (PAA) and the PNAE. When we investigate the ... / Desde 2003, o Programa Nacional de Alimenta??o Escolar (PNAE) vem passando por mudan?as que envolvem a reformula??o de seus objetivos, princ?pios e diretrizes e desenho operacional a partir da perspectiva intersetorial de Seguran?a Alimentar e Nutricional (SAN). O marco legal do Programa, aprovado em 2009, estabelece um elo entre a oferta de alimentos saud?veis na escola, o processo de ensino-aprendizagem e a agricultura familiar, reconhecendo a alimenta??o escolar como um direito humano. Em conson?ncia com alguns princ?pios de SAN, foram introduzidas inova??es no modus operandi do programa, principalmente no que se refere ?s din?micas de aquisi??o p?blicas de alimentos, ao tornar obrigat?ria a destina??o de no m?nimo trinta por cento dos recursos para a compra direta da agricultura familiar, com dispensa de licita??o. Essa tese se prop?s a analisar a trajet?ria hist?rica e o processo recente de reformula??o do PNAE a partir de um ?ngulo ainda pouco explorado nas an?lises de pol?ticas p?blicas, os seus instrumentos. Buscou-se compreender, a partir da abordagem da Instrumenta??o da A??o P?blica (IAP), as seguintes quest?es: i) como se sucedeu a escolha dos instrumentos para operacionalizar a aquisi??o de alimentos da agricultura familiar; ii) quais foram os princ?pios de SAN incorporados aos instrumentos; iii) quais foram os atores que incidiram sobre esse processo e quais as din?micas de intera??o estabelecidas entre eles; iv) que controv?rsias estiveram presentes. O estudo apontou que o contexto de fortalecimento das interfaces socioestatais e de maior permeabilidade do Estado ? reorienta??o das pol?ticas p?blicas, ? luz dos princ?pios de SAN, criou oportunidades para que coaliz?es de atores (governamentais e n?o governamentais), vinculados ? defesa das causas da SAN e da agricultura familiar, se articulassem em torno desse novo marco legal. Houve, por parte destes atores, tanto um esfor?o por reorientar as diretrizes do PNAE, quanto por incidir sobre a escolha dos instrumentos. A introdu??o de novos mecanismos de compra no ?mbito do PNAE envolveu a conforma??o de um campo de controv?rsias, j? que as mudan?as incidem na interface entre a a??o p?blica e um mercado bem estabilizado. O mapeamento efetuado no ?mbito do Comit? Gestor e do Grupo Consultivo do PNAE (espa?os formais voltados para a regulamenta??o do programa) apontou que as principais controv?rsias giraram em torno das seguintes quest?es: i) a escolha da modalidade de operacionaliza??o de compra da agricultura familiar; ii) a ado??o de crit?rios de sele??o vinculados ?s diretrizes do PNAE em substitui??o ? compra pelo menor pre?o; iii) a defini??o da metodologia de pre?os; iv) o estabelecimento do limite de venda por ano; v) a conex?o entre o Programa de Aquisi??o de Alimentos (PAA) e o PNAE. Ao colocar uma lente sobre a instrumenta??o, buscamos evidenciar que as din?micas associadas ? constru??o desses dispositivos s?o t?o importantes quanto os princ?pios e os objetivos que orientam as pol?ticas p?blicas, particularmente quando se trata de abordagens inovadoras e de car?ter intersetorial como a SAN.

<p>Som en följd av Sveriges medlemskap i EU har offentliga upphandlingar kommit att få allt större betydelse eftersom de nu kan ske inom ett betydligt större geografiskt område än tidigare. En konsekvens av detta är att konkurrensen blivit allt hårdare och nya regler införs i takt med den snabba utvecklingen. Ett av resultaten av den hårda konkurrensen på upphandlingsmarknaden har visat sig vara att en del leverantörer lämnar anbud med onormalt låga priser för att vinna upphandlingskontraktet. Förekomsten av onormalt låga anbud i offentliga upphandlingar medför allvarliga negativa konsekvenser såsom att konkurrensen snedvrids, effektiviteten minskar och kostnaderna ökar. Detta påverkar både den upphandlande enheten, leverantören som bjudit onormalt lågt, de leverantörer som slagits ut samt konsumenterna. Att det saknas ett förbud i upphandlingslagstiftningen mot att anta onormalt låga anbud är därför allvarligt. Syftet med denna framställning är att undersöka innebörden av begreppet onormalt lågt anbud i offentliga upphandlingar, belysa problemet med och konsekvenserna av att lagstiftning och regelverk inte i tillräcklig utsträckning uppmärksammar de risker som kan vara förenade med antagandet av onormalt låga anbud samt försöka finna en lösning på problemet.</p> / <p>As a result of Sweden’s membership of the European Union, public procurement has gained more importance, mainly due to the larger geographic territory available. As a consequence of this, competition has become more aggressive and new rules are being incorporated into Swedish law in step with the fast development. One of the results of the tough competition in the public procurement market is that companies may be forced into potentially unsustainable under-bidding in order to win contracts. The presence of these abnormally low tenders in public procurement may have serious negative consequences such as distortion of competition and reduced efficiency, potentially causing delays and waste of resources in the procurement process. This will affect both the contracting authority, the tenderer that has won on an abnormally low bid, the other unsuccessful tenderers, and the ultimately consumers. The fact that public procurement law does not prohibit authorities from accepting abnormally low tenders is therefore potentially very serious. The main objective of this dissertation is to examine the significance of the concept of abnormally low tender, to illuminate the issues surrounding and consequences of the legislative lack of attention to the risks associated with accepting abnormally low tenders, and finally to propose solutions to these issues.</p>

Som en följd av Sveriges medlemskap i EU har offentliga upphandlingar kommit att få allt större betydelse eftersom de nu kan ske inom ett betydligt större geografiskt område än tidigare. En konsekvens av detta är att konkurrensen blivit allt hårdare och nya regler införs i takt med den snabba utvecklingen. Ett av resultaten av den hårda konkurrensen på upphandlingsmarknaden har visat sig vara att en del leverantörer lämnar anbud med onormalt låga priser för att vinna upphandlingskontraktet. Förekomsten av onormalt låga anbud i offentliga upphandlingar medför allvarliga negativa konsekvenser såsom att konkurrensen snedvrids, effektiviteten minskar och kostnaderna ökar. Detta påverkar både den upphandlande enheten, leverantören som bjudit onormalt lågt, de leverantörer som slagits ut samt konsumenterna. Att det saknas ett förbud i upphandlingslagstiftningen mot att anta onormalt låga anbud är därför allvarligt. Syftet med denna framställning är att undersöka innebörden av begreppet onormalt lågt anbud i offentliga upphandlingar, belysa problemet med och konsekvenserna av att lagstiftning och regelverk inte i tillräcklig utsträckning uppmärksammar de risker som kan vara förenade med antagandet av onormalt låga anbud samt försöka finna en lösning på problemet. / As a result of Sweden’s membership of the European Union, public procurement has gained more importance, mainly due to the larger geographic territory available. As a consequence of this, competition has become more aggressive and new rules are being incorporated into Swedish law in step with the fast development. One of the results of the tough competition in the public procurement market is that companies may be forced into potentially unsustainable under-bidding in order to win contracts. The presence of these abnormally low tenders in public procurement may have serious negative consequences such as distortion of competition and reduced efficiency, potentially causing delays and waste of resources in the procurement process. This will affect both the contracting authority, the tenderer that has won on an abnormally low bid, the other unsuccessful tenderers, and the ultimately consumers. The fact that public procurement law does not prohibit authorities from accepting abnormally low tenders is therefore potentially very serious. The main objective of this dissertation is to examine the significance of the concept of abnormally low tender, to illuminate the issues surrounding and consequences of the legislative lack of attention to the risks associated with accepting abnormally low tenders, and finally to propose solutions to these issues.