L’étude des ouvrages de physique publiés au 18e siècle montre que l’évolution depuis le 17e siècle est loin de se limiter à l’approfondissement des seules découvertes de Newton, comme on a souvent tendance à le présenter aujourd’hui. La physique mécaniste de Descartes, attaquée par Newton, va continuer de se développer avec l’aide de nombreux savants, en particulier de l’Académie des Sciences parisienne. Les débats entre cartésiens et newtoniens ne sont toujours pas éteints dans les années 1740. Ce véritable duel scientifique de plus d’un demi-siècle est au cœur d’une réflexion plus large sur la physique et s’exerce sur plusieurs plans : Mathématisation, Concepts, définitions, lois, rôle de l’expérience et des hypothéses, Problèmes philosophiques : les principes, la recherche des causes, les problèmes théologiques. L'objet de cette thèse est de montrer que la diversité des approches et des méthodes tout au long du premier 18e siècle va permettre l’émergence d’une nouvelle conception de la physique. Cette diversité se manifeste dans les écrits d’auteurs nombreux, les savants eux-mêmes, mais aussi ceux qu’on a appelés les transmetteurs, dont le rôle fut très important. / The study of books on physics published in the 18th century shows that the evolution since the 17th century is much more than just a furthering of the discoveries of Newton, as we often tend to present it these days. Descartes’s mechanistic physics, severely criticized by Newton, was to develop with help from many scientists, particularly from the Academy of Sciences in Paris. The discussions between Cartesians and Newtonians did not end in the 1740’s. This real scientific duel, which lasted over half a century, was the heart of a broader way of thinking about physics which operated on several levels: Mathématization, Concepts, définitions, laws, the role of experimentation and hypotheses, Philosophical problems: principles, the search of the causes, theological problems. The aim of this thesis is to show that the variety of the approaches and the methods throughout the early 18th century was to allow the creation of a new conception of physics. This variety appears in the works of many authors, who were either scientists themselves, or transmitters of science, who played a very important role, too.

Pour Nietzsche, les Grecs interprètent le monde en fonction d’une représentation enrichissante, qui permet ainsi à la volonté de se déployer sous le prisme du concept de force, comme détermination absolue tant de l’homme que des dieux. Leur vie s’y manifeste dans ce cas à partir du pessimisme de la force. Par contre, l’optimisme rationaliste qui recherche une interprétation intelligible ou idéaliste du monde aboutit à un fondement théorique, logique et moral de la vie, représentation appauvrissante, qui lui donne plutôt une forme décadente, rabougrie. Ainsi, le rationalisme finit par se transformer en nihilisme, configurant alors le « pessimisme du monde vrai ». Nietzsche va donc lui opposer le pessimisme dionysiaque, signifiant la recherche d’une nouvelle forme plus moderne d’enrichissement du monde et de la vie, à travers leur rencontre, leur implication l’un dans l’autre qui est supposée créer la joie, la légèreté. Le but nietzschéen est en fait de définir les conditions de possibilité qui permettront de passer de la maladie à la santé, qui impliquera en même temps l’illusion, l’apparence et les forces de l’inconscient ; et ce à partir de la critique, et surtout de la généalogie, comme méthode authentique de lutte contre les symptômes de rabougrissement / For Nietzsche, the Greeks interpreted the world in terms of meaningful representation, which allows the will to unfold through the prism of the concept of force as an absolute determination of both the man whom the gods. Their life is manifested in this case from the pessimism of strength. For cons, the rationalist optimism seeking an interpretation intelligible or idealistic world leads to a theoretical basis, logic and moral life, impoverishing representation, which gives it a shape rather decadent stunted. Thus, rationalism eventually turns into nihilism, then configuring the “pessimism of real world”. Nietzsche is therefore to oppose the Dionysian pessimism, meaning the search for a new more modern form of enrichment of the world and life, through their meeting, their involvement in one another that is supposed to create joy, lightness. The Nietzschean goal is actually to define the conditions of possibility that will pass the disease to health, which involve the same time the illusion, appearance and the forces of the unconscious, and that from the critical philosophy, and especially the genealogy as a method of authentic fight against the symptoms of stunting

À très peu de philosophes l’histoire de la pensée occidentale a accordé une place aussi significative qu’à Socrate : nous apprenons tout naturellement à l’édifier comme héros de la rationalité et à reconnaître en lui la figure même du philosophe critique. À plusieurs égards, cette représentation élogieuse nous paraît justifiée, bien que, d’un autre point de vue, elle puisse nous faire sombrer dans la confusion, dès lors que notre regard porte simultanément, et comme pour produire un contraste, sur l’image d’un Socrate se soumettant au daimonion, son étrange signe divin. Comment pouvons-nous justifier, à partir du corpus platonicien, à la fois l’engagement de Socrate vis-à-vis de la rationalité et sa soumission à un phénomène en apparence irrationnel ? De cette question troublante est née la présente étude qui se consacre donc au problème de l’articulation entre le rapport de Socrate aux dieux et son rapport à la raison critique. Plus précisément, nous avons cherché à déterminer s’il existait, sur le plan épistémologique, une hiérarchie entre le daimonion et la méthode d’investigation rationnelle propre à Socrate, l’elenchos. Une telle étude exégétique nécessitait, dans un premier temps, une analyse systématique et approfondie des quelques passages sur le signe divin. Nous avons ensuite exposé deux solutions paradigmatiques au problème du double engagement contradictoire de Socrate, celle de G. Vlastos ainsi que celle de T.C. Brickhouse et N.D. Smith. Enfin, nous avons augmenté cette seconde partie d’un examen spécifique du Phèdre et du Timée, de même que d’un survol des modes de divination pour satisfaire un triple objectif : situer le signe divin en regard de la mantique traditionnelle, déterminer le rôle attribué par Platon à la raison dans le processus divinatoire, et être ainsi en mesure de trancher notre question principale. / To very few philosophers the history of the Western thought granted a place as significant as to Socrates: we quite naturally learn how to identify him as a hero of rationality and to recognize in him the very figure of the critical philosopher. In several respects, this representation of praise appears justified to us, although, from another point of view, it can make us sink in confusion, since our glance carries simultaneously, and like producing a contrast, on the image of Socrates obeying to the daimonion, his uncanny divine sign. How can we justify, starting from the Platonic corpus, both the engagement of Socrates with respect to rationality and his subordination to a seemingly irrational phenomenon? From this disconcerting question was born the present study which is thus devoted to the problem of the articulation between the relation of Socrates to the gods and his relation to the critical reason. More precisely, we sought to determine if there existed, on the epistemological level, a hierarchy between the daimonion and the method of rational investigation peculiar to Socrates, the elenchos. Such an exegetic study required, initially, a systematic and thorough analysis of the few passages related to the divine sign. We then adduced two paradigmatic solutions, that of G. Vlastos as well as that of T.C. Brickhouse and N.D. Smith. Lastly, we added to this second part besides a specific examination of Phaedrus and Timaeus, also a broad survey of the modes of divination, satisfying a triple aim: to make sense of the divine sign in comparison with the traditional art of mantic, to determine the role allotted by Plato to the reason in the divinatory process, and thus to be able to solve our principal question.

La présente thèse se propose d’aborder l’intelligence singulière de Marguerite Duras et pour ce faire, elle retient l’ensemble des écrits : romans, textes de théâtre, écrits journalistiques, scénarios, textes divers. Elle prend en compte le difficile héritage de la Shoah et du stalinisme, et à partir de l'extrême déshumanisation qui a marqué le XXe siècle, elle s’interroge sur le nihilisme propre à la modernité, plus particulièrement sur la manière dont le nihilisme est susceptible de gagner la littérature puisqu’il appert qu’il entre fortement en résonance avec l’univers durassien. La réflexion ne saurait s’en tenir à la sphère historique et elle investit nécessairement le champ philosophique. Le plus important néanmoins n’est peut-être pas tant de révéler le phénomène que de chercher à saisir comment l’œuvre se débat face au néant qui la guette et par conséquent résiste. Dès lors se fait jour un anti-nihilisme au sein de la littérature et la notion de sensible devient par là-même centrale. C’est en effet à une déperdition du sensible que l’on assiste quand le nihilisme se manifeste ; mais le sensible ne se borne pas à jouer le rôle d’un indicateur ; il est bien plus le principe permettant de combattre le néant. Par lui, le cogito brusquement se tait et l’empiétement, figure que notre analyse emprunte à Merleau-Ponty, advient ; par lui, l’intelligence se dérobe à l’intelligible, admet la contradiction et prend le large ; par lui, le désir, expression d’« un plus fort que », se trouve établi au fondement de l’homme, garant de son humanité ; par lui enfin la transcendance est ramenée vers l’immanence de façon qu’il devient possible d’envisager la métaphysique à partir de la chair. / The present thesis aims to examine the unique intelligence emerging in Marguerite Duras's works, and to showcase this, it encompasses a range of her writings including novels, plays, newspaper articles, scenarios and other essays. It takes into account the difficult heritage of the Shoah and Stalinism, and from the extreme dehumanisation that marked the 20th century, it questions itself on nihilism in relation to modernity, specifically the manner in which nihilism is likely to influence literature as it would appear that it is very much present in the Duras universe. The reflection doesn't just cover the historical aspect, it expands fundamentally into a philosophical dimension. The most important thing, however, is probably not so much to reveal the phenomenon but to try and understand how the works struggle to face the coming emptiness and therefore resists. From then on, anti-nihilism rises within literature and as a result, sensitivity becomes central. Indeed, a loss of sensitivity is observed when nihilism manifests itself, however, sensitivity is not just an indicator; it is rather the enabling principle to combat emptiness. With it, the cogito disappears suddenly and the encroachment, thought borrowed from Merleau-Ponty, appears. With it, intelligence shies away from the intelligible, admits contradiction and takes off. With it, desire, the expression of something beyond our control, establishes itself as the foundation of the human being, guaranteeing his humanity. With it finally, transcendence returns to immanence so that it becomes possible to consider metaphysics from the flesh.

Est-il encore possible de vivre et d’habiter l’espace aménagé et construit en particulier, quant à considérer le déluge technoscientifique et industriel qui détermine et influence le domaine de l’architecture moderne ? Le rationalisme et le fonctionnalisme d’une certaine tendance de l’architecture moderne en intégrant les progrès technoscientifiques et industriels dans le monde de la maison, semble condamner l’expérience d’habiter à une crise irréversible. L’activité architecturale se voulant conforme aux progrès scientifiques et techno-industriels, elle impose à l’expérience pratique de la maison et préscientifique des lieux de vie, des normes de vie découlant de la seule raison. C’est en général une architecture et un urbanisme modernes abstraits et fonctionnalistes qui se développent en suivant la voie de l’objectivité rationnelle ouverte par Galilée et Descartes, ils maîtrisent, administrent et esthétisent le tout du monde ainsi que toutes les expériences humaines à l’espace en les dépouillant des considérations poétiques, mythologiques et affectives. Ainsi, la construction des institutions humaines d’habitation devient dans l’identification de la crise d’habiter, un « processus technologique prosaïque dérivant directement de la raison mathématique, d’un diagramme fonctionnel, ou d’une règle de combinaisons formelles » au désavantage de l’expérience concrète d’habiter. Mais si l’architecture n’a pas affaire qu’à elle-même, si elle n’est pas une pratique qui trouve sa fin en elle-même puisqu’elle s’ouvre vers l’autre, comment peut-on philosophiquement toujours espérer habiter authentiquement, originairement et poétiquement le monde et l’espace de la maison en particulier ? La philosophie, par l’approche phénoménologique et herméneutique à partir de Gaston Bachelard et Merleau-Ponty, présente pour l'expérience moderne d'habiter, des voies significatives originales qui permettent de répondre à la crise qu’elle connait. En renouvelant autrement que par la seule connaissance rationnelle les relations de l'homme à l'espace, elle se présente comme une voie remarquable de ré-compréhension, de relecture et de ré-enchantement de l’expérience originaire d’habiter le monde, la ville et l’espace de la maison. / Is it still possible to inhabitate and live the laid out and constructed space in particular, as for considering the techno and industrial flood that determines and influences the field of modern architecture? Rationalism and functionalism of a given trend of modern architecture by incorporating techno and industrial progress in the world of home, seems to condemn the experience of living in an irreversible crisis. The architectural activity wanting to meet scientific and techno-industrial progress, it requires practical experience in home and prescientific places of life, of living standards arising from the only reason. It is a general an architecture and a modern, abstract and functionalist urbanism that develop along the path of rational objectivity initiated by Galileo and Descartes, they control , manage and aestheticize the whole world and all human experience to space by stripping poetic , mythological and emotional considerations. Thus, the construction of human institutions housing becomes in identifying the crisis of living a «prosaic and technological process deriving directly from the mathematical reason, a functional diagram, or a rule of formal suits «in drawback of the concrete experience of living. But if the architecture does not matter to itself, if it is not a practice that is an end in itself because it opens to another, how can we still philosophically hope to authentically, originally and poetically live the world and the space of the house in particular? Philosophy, by phenomenological and hermeneutic approach inheritated from Gaston Bachelard and Merleau-Ponty presents to the modern experience of living, original significant ways that respond to the crisis it faces. Renewing differently more than the only purely rational knowledge the relations of man to the space, it presents itself as a remarkable way of re- understanding, rereading and re-enchantment of the original experience of inhabitating the world , the city and the space of the house.

L'étude des ouvrages de physique publiés au 18e siècle montre que l'évolution depuis le 17e siècle est loin de se limiter à l'approfondissement des seules découvertes de Newton, comme on a souvent tendance à le présenter aujourd'hui. La physique mécaniste de Descartes, attaquée par Newton, va continuer de se développer avec l'aide de nombreux savants, en particulier de l'Académie des Sciences parisienne. Les débats entre cartésiens et newtoniens ne sont toujours pas éteints dans les années 1740. Ce véritable duel scientifique de plus d'un demi-siècle est au cœur d'une réflexion plus large sur la physique et s'exerce sur plusieurs plans : Mathématisation, Concepts, définitions, lois, rôle de l'expérience et des hypothéses, Problèmes philosophiques : les principes, la recherche des causes, les problèmes théologiques. L'objet de cette thèse est de montrer que la diversité des approches et des méthodes tout au long du premier 18e siècle va permettre l'émergence d'une nouvelle conception de la physique. Cette diversité se manifeste dans les écrits d'auteurs nombreux, les savants eux-mêmes, mais aussi ceux qu'on a appelés les transmetteurs, dont le rôle fut très important.

À très peu de philosophes l’histoire de la pensée occidentale a accordé une place aussi significative qu’à Socrate : nous apprenons tout naturellement à l’édifier comme héros de la rationalité et à reconnaître en lui la figure même du philosophe critique. À plusieurs égards, cette représentation élogieuse nous paraît justifiée, bien que, d’un autre point de vue, elle puisse nous faire sombrer dans la confusion, dès lors que notre regard porte simultanément, et comme pour produire un contraste, sur l’image d’un Socrate se soumettant au daimonion, son étrange signe divin. Comment pouvons-nous justifier, à partir du corpus platonicien, à la fois l’engagement de Socrate vis-à-vis de la rationalité et sa soumission à un phénomène en apparence irrationnel ? De cette question troublante est née la présente étude qui se consacre donc au problème de l’articulation entre le rapport de Socrate aux dieux et son rapport à la raison critique. Plus précisément, nous avons cherché à déterminer s’il existait, sur le plan épistémologique, une hiérarchie entre le daimonion et la méthode d’investigation rationnelle propre à Socrate, l’elenchos. Une telle étude exégétique nécessitait, dans un premier temps, une analyse systématique et approfondie des quelques passages sur le signe divin. Nous avons ensuite exposé deux solutions paradigmatiques au problème du double engagement contradictoire de Socrate, celle de G. Vlastos ainsi que celle de T.C. Brickhouse et N.D. Smith. Enfin, nous avons augmenté cette seconde partie d’un examen spécifique du Phèdre et du Timée, de même que d’un survol des modes de divination pour satisfaire un triple objectif : situer le signe divin en regard de la mantique traditionnelle, déterminer le rôle attribué par Platon à la raison dans le processus divinatoire, et être ainsi en mesure de trancher notre question principale. / To very few philosophers the history of the Western thought granted a place as significant as to Socrates: we quite naturally learn how to identify him as a hero of rationality and to recognize in him the very figure of the critical philosopher. In several respects, this representation of praise appears justified to us, although, from another point of view, it can make us sink in confusion, since our glance carries simultaneously, and like producing a contrast, on the image of Socrates obeying to the daimonion, his uncanny divine sign. How can we justify, starting from the Platonic corpus, both the engagement of Socrates with respect to rationality and his subordination to a seemingly irrational phenomenon? From this disconcerting question was born the present study which is thus devoted to the problem of the articulation between the relation of Socrates to the gods and his relation to the critical reason. More precisely, we sought to determine if there existed, on the epistemological level, a hierarchy between the daimonion and the method of rational investigation peculiar to Socrates, the elenchos. Such an exegetic study required, initially, a systematic and thorough analysis of the few passages related to the divine sign. We then adduced two paradigmatic solutions, that of G. Vlastos as well as that of T.C. Brickhouse and N.D. Smith. Lastly, we added to this second part besides a specific examination of Phaedrus and Timaeus, also a broad survey of the modes of divination, satisfying a triple aim: to make sense of the divine sign in comparison with the traditional art of mantic, to determine the role allotted by Plato to the reason in the divinatory process, and thus to be able to solve our principal question.

La réflexion morale de Theodor Adorno est manifestement traversée par une tension : l’exigence paradoxale d’enraciner pleinement la morale à la fois dans les impulsions les plus vives et dans la raison la plus lucide. Plus qu’une excentricité parmi d’autres de la figure de proue de l’École de Francfort, le présent mémoire donne à penser que ce problème pourrait être une des principales charnières de son éthique. L’objectif de ma recherche est de dégager une voie pour articuler conjointement, «sans sacrifice aucun», ces deux exigences. Pour ce faire, je tenterai d’étayer l’hypothèse suivante : l’analyse du problème de la liberté et de la non-liberté que développe le premier des trois «modèles» de Dialectique négative permet de comprendre à la fois le lien et l’écart entre la dimension impulsive et rationnelle de l’éthique d’Adorno. L’argument qui sera déployé se penchera d’abord sur le problème de la non-liberté et son incarnation à travers le phénomène concret de l’antisémitisme ainsi que de la peur et de la rage animale dans lesquelles il s’enracine, pour ensuite examiner la conception adornienne de la liberté dans ses deux dimensions de «pleine conscience théorique» et «d’impulsion spontanée», et pour finalement tenter d’apprécier la portée plus générale pour la compréhension de l’éthique d’Adorno de cette interprétation du problème de la liberté en tentant de comprendre sur cette base son «nouvel impératif catégorique». / Throughout Theodor Adorno’s moral thought runs a paradoxical demand : that morality should be fully rooted in both the liveliest impulses and the keenest reasonings. More than a quirk among Adorno’s many, this essay suggests that this problem plays a pivotal role in his ethics. The current research seeks to develop a strategy to conjointly articulate these two demands. To this end, I will try to expound the following hypothesis : the analysis of the problem of freedom and unfreedom set forth by the first of the ‘models’ in Negative Dialectics enables making sense of both the bond and the disparity between the impulsive and rational constituents of adornian ethics. This study will first focus on the problem of unfreedom and its embodiment in the concrete phenomena of anti-Semitism as well as the animal fear and rage that it builds upon. It will then go on to examine Adorno’s conception of freedom in its two facets : «full theoretical consciousness» and «spontaneous impulse». It will finally try to ascertain the more general relevance of this interpretation of the problem of freedom for making sense of Adorno’s ethics, by trying to make sense on that basis of his «new categorical imperative».

À partir d'une étude philologique attentive de l'Esprit géométrique, je montre l'évolution épistémologique de Pascal qui, découvrant la corruption naturelle d'un langage humain impuissant à assurer ses propres fondements, quitte ses positions cartésiennes. Par contrecoup, la prétention de la raison à formuler des principes universels est anéantie : toute connaissance rationnelle se fonde sur un socle autoritaire. Je souligne alors l'importance actuelle de l'œuvre mathématique pascalienne par sa mise en perspective dans la crise moderne des fondements. En lui appliquant les méthodes de la poétique aristotélicienne, je la caractérise par sa sensibilité figurative, qui s'étend à l'œuvre non scientifique et en révèle l'unité esthétique. Je montre ensuite l'originalité philosophique de Pascal qui sort du scepticisme en recherchant de nouveaux usages de la langue propres à communiquer la certitude. Je reprends le débat sur le chantier des Pensées pour en distinguer les éditions objectives, qui restituent le seul classement dont nous disposons effectivement, des éditions apologétiques qui le recomposent à partir de certaines des indications laissées par l'auteur. La grande originalité des Pensées classées est de proposer une recherche du bonheur sans a priori religieux. Elles établissent les contrariétés de la condition humaine, que philosophies et sciences humaines sont impuissantes à décrire ou résoudre car elles refusent, par principe, la contradiction. L'Écriture chrétienne entre alors en scène pour présenter le seul langage capable de faire aboutir la recherche, parce qu'acceptant et faisant signifier la contradiction. La double nouveauté est ici d'introduire la Bible dans le champ de l'existence par nécessité, et comme un simple livre, dont il s'agit de décrire le pouvoir cognitif. Structuré par la narration et par la figure (typologique), ce modèle biblique élargit la connaissance rationnelle et son référentiel spatio-temporel restreint. Il ouvre ainsi à son lecteur un horizon d'existence et lui montre un chemin pour réparer ses ses contrariétés. On voit là chez Pascal un profond renouveau de la pensée figurative et de l'approche littéraire de la Bible. / A thorough philological study of l'Esprit géométrique shows an evolution in Pascal's epistemology. Discovering a form of natural corruption in the incapacity of self foundation of the human langage, he leaves his former Cartesian positions. As a consequence, Reason's pretention to formulate universal principles is erased : every rational knowledge is based on a form of authority. This reveals the importance of Pascal's scientific work as regards to the crisis of fundation in modern Science. Using Aristotle's Poetic's methods, I show that Augustinian notion of figuration both applies to mathematics and Biblic litterature, and gives the aesthetic unity of the whole Pascal’s work . Its originality in philosophy is to get rid of scepticism by searching new languages capable of certitude. I reopen a long debate on the unaccomplished Pensées. I propose to distinguish between objective and apologetic editions. The latter are based on some of the author's indications on his intentions, the former use the only classification available. The thorough originality of what I call Les Pensées classées is to propose a quest for happiness with no religious a priori. After having established the contrarieties of humain condition which no philosophy or human science can describe or resolve because they reject contradiction, as a principle, this classification introduces the Christian Scripture as it carries the only language capable of accepting contradiction and giving a meaning to it. There are two new approaches here : introducing the Bible in the field of existence by necessity, and as a simple book with cognitive power. Structured by narration and figuration (typology), this Biblical model extends rational knowledge by extending its restricted space-time referential. It enlarges the horizon of existence of the reader and shows a path for repairing their contrarieties. Pascal deeply renews the classic figurative thought and the poetic approach of the Bible.

General Introduction<p><p>The process of the institutionalisation of law that started at the end of the 18th century was followed by a general wave of codification throughout Europe. The French codification of 1804 was exemplary for all the others. The “law in books” was complete, certain, clear, and undisputable. From then on, the law in books had priority over the “law in action”. Law in books was a critique of law in action that preceded the French Revolution. Judicial activism was proscribed, and judges were called to apply the rules issued by the legislator.<p><p>This ideal of the French Revolution is still framing our pattern of legal thinking. It is dominant throughout the 19th century with the école de l’exégèse in France, Begriffjurisprudenz in Germany, and analytical jurisprudence in Anglo-American legal systems. Legal formalism or the deductive application of rules is the only form of judicial reasoning that is allowed. The science of law, as a consequence, was confined to a theoretical support and elaboration of this judge-centred approach to law.<p><p>This view on law and legal science persisted throughout the last century. It started being criticized in the late 1960s, a critique that paved the path for a more active role of the judge. New theories of interpretation were proposed so as to supplement the law in books with theoretically justified methodologies to determine its meaning.<p><p>The findings of legal theory are still, to a large extent, premised on the central role of the judge in the legal system. Although this evolution may be applauded for having contributed to a more dynamic attitude towards the law, the role of the legislator remains largely underexposed. Legal theory takes the law as “just there”, and limits its theoretical undertakings to law as it is. Law, so it is said, is the result of political decision-making. Once it comes into being however, it is separated from politics. Politics, that is, is thought of as impure, at least when compared to the methods of legal reasoning and decision-making. <p><p>This brings us to the theme of this book. Some of the questions I propose to explore are: Where does the law come from? What are the premises of a theory that considers law separated from politics? What does it mean for a legislator to be bound to the rules of a constitution throughout the process of legislation? Does the constitution consist of rules to be followed by the legislator or is its role merely confined to be a political programme?<p><p>These and other questions frame the main problem this book proposes to deal with. They are triggered by the fact of the exponential growth of today’s legal systems. Complaints about both the increasing volume of legislation and its decreasing quality in most European countries have raised the question as to whether collaboration between legislators and legal theory can help to articulate and to solve that problem.<p><p>As a matter of fact, although the complaints are made with an ever-stronger voice, solutions are by no means obvious. Legislation as a matter of politics is not rational. Politics is a power game, resulting in compromises that are framed into a legislative or statutory structure. This power game seems to have its own logic, the results of which most of the time outweigh any other form of logic.<p><p> Legal theory for its part is considered, from the perspective of politics at least, to be a “theoretical” approach to legal problems. It contributes to the description and systematisation of existing valid law. It shows up, like Minerva’s owl, after the sunset of legislative activity. From that perspective, there is not much hope that legal theory can usefully intervene in the process of legislation or regulation, i.e. before or during the creation of rules. Legal theory then is confined to “legal science” or “legal dogmatics”.<p><p>I propose to consider the problem of legislation from another angle. The premises of the problem are that, although legislation and regulation is the result of a political process, they can be the object of a theoretical study. Using an approach analogous to e.g. Hans Kelsen in legal theory ,the main idea is not to primarily focus on the content of rules and concepts, but rather on the structure and function of legal systems. <p><p>In the approach of this book, the focal point is on problems that are common to most legal systems and not on the characteristics, viz. the content of concepts that are specific for one or more legal systems. The creation of law, so is my claim, has become a problem. <p><p>Kelsen’s approach leaves legislation and regulation – apart from their formal validity aspects – outside the scope of study. The creation of rules relies on value judgments that are according to him not fit for theoretical study. In short, the creation of legal rules is a matter of politics and politics is not fit for scientific study.<p><p>This position is an understandable one, though it is only partially acceptable. Rule creation is a matter of choice. The legitimation of this choice is found in the democratic character of the regulating process and not in some science of values. In other words, would one try to mould legislation into the frame of a science, we would face something like “scientific politics”, as Marxism propagated, and which is, for several reasons, unacceptable.<p><p>A different standpoint is to study legislative problems from the angle of legal theory. This approach I propose to call legisprudence. The object of study of legisprudence is the rational creation of legislation and regulation. As to its method, it makes use of the theoretical insights and tools of current legal theory. Whereas the latter has been dealing most of the time dealing with problems of the application of law by the judge, legisprudence explores the possibilities of the enlargement of the field of study as to include the creation of law by the legislator.<p><p>Within this new approach, a variety of new question and problems – e.g. the validity of norms, their meaning, the structure of the legal system, etc. - are raised. They are traditionally dealt with from the perspective of the judge or are taken for granted by classical legal theory. However, when shifting our attention from the judge to the legislator, the same questions arise: In what sense does the legislator have to take the systematicity of the legal order into account? What counts as a valid norm? What meanings can be created and how? to mention but a few.<p><p>Traditional legal science or legal dogmatics covers many of these questions with the cloak of sovereignty. Legislators are sovereign, they decide what will count as a valid norm, and its meaning. Whether and how a rule and its meaning fit with the legal system, is then a matter of interpretation – and this is the task of the judge and the legal scientist.<p><p>On this view, the process of legislation seems to be inappropriate for theoretical inquiry. After long decades of legalism in legal reasoning, it can be said that the dominant views in legal theory resulting from that, have precisely barred the way for inquiring into the position of the legislator. Everything happens behind the veil of sovereignty as far as legislation properly so called is concerned, and behind the veil of legality when it comes to the execution of legislative acts. These veils conceal a great part of ignorance related to the possibilities of an alternative theoretical reflection on rule making. Sovereignty itself, so one can say, creates silence about this alternative, so that it becomes “sovereignty in silence” .<p><p>Sovereignty of the ruler prevents his rules from being questioned in any other than binary terms. Validity is a good example of that. The only question that is worthwhile putting is: Is this propositional content a valid rule yes or no? As a consequence, questions on its efficacy, effectivity, efficiency, or acceptability are not in order.<p><p>The claim of legisprudence is that these questions, like others, are important ones, and that they can be analysed with the help of legal theory.<p><p>The book is divided into three parts.<p><p>In the first part, I propose to explore the three basic tenets of the Modern philosophical project as Descartes inaugurated it. These three tenets are: rationality, the individuality of the subject, and freedom. A brief sketch of what is meant by them is offered in the first chapter.<p>Rationality as it is dealt with in the Modern philosophical project means that what is rational is self-evident. Self-evidence is certainty and certainty is the mark of truth. The question for whom something is certain is however left out of view. The subject, that is, has himself immediate access to reason and truth upon the use of his rational capacities. The latter are presumed to be identical in and for all. The subject’s reflection on himself leads to the true insight that he is a res cogitans.<p><p>The subject thinks of himself as an ”I”, that is, as an individual. Others are not thought of as others, but rather as representations or ideas. The subject as an individual is a product of thought, that is, upon the Modern approach of rationality, a theoretical idea. <p><p>As a result of rationality as self-evidence and the subject as an individual, practical reason is confined to free will. Freedom as the third basic tenet of the Modern philosophical project is limited to following the commands of God and the rules of the country. These commands and rules are found “out there”, without questioning either their origin or their purpose.<p><p>The main critique of the Modern philosophical project as it is briefly set out in the first chapter is that it is based on the so-called "scholastic fallacy”. This fallacy involves that rationality is presupposed identical in everyone’s head. On the supposition that all subjects are ontologically rational as Descartes suggests, their use of their rational capacities would result in an identical outcome that is truth. The universality of reason is, however, a hidden premise of the Modern philosophical project. It unfolds from a “view from nowhere”. This view of rationality is challenged as an unreflected one, and the methodological device of this book is to avoid this type of fallacies.<p><p>Chapter 2 focuses on the idea of science as it comes up with the Modern philosophical project. The infinite universe is substituted for the Aristotelian closed world. Mathematics becomes the appropriate method of the scientia nova that Descartes and Galileï initiate. As Descartes’ method aims at being a mathesis universalis it is believed to include the aptitude to deal with any problem, theoretical as well as practical. <p><p>The subsequent epistemologization of philosophy tacitly presupposes that mathematics belongs to the very nature of reality. From there, it follows that philosophy is thought of as a theory of reality. On an alternative view, mainly advocated by, e.g. Heidegger, it is claimed that mathematics as a method of science is a matter of choice. If the method is a matter of choice, the scientia nova can be articulated as a liberation from the shackles of ecclesiastical authority, and hence as a matter of freedom. Another consequence is that the scientia nova can articulate true propositions about reality, without having direct access to it. The distinction between a theory of reality and a theory about reality is illustrated with the help of the conflict between Galileï and the Church.<p><p>Chapter 3 concentrates on the subject and rationality. Both the subject and rationality are put in context, that is, a context of participation. With this approach, I propose to challenge the self-evidentiary character of rationality as well as the idea of the isolated and ontologically anchored Cartesian subject. Relying on George Herbert Mead’s theory of the subject, I argue that the subject is first and foremost an “intersubject”. <p><p>The subject, it is argued, is a social subject whose self emerges through interaction with others. The substitution of a subject of meaning for a subject of truth concretises the critique of the Cartesian subject in the first chapter. Both the subject and meaning, so it is argued, emerge from interaction in a context of participation. The subject’s self includes a social as well as an individual pole. These two poles and the interaction between them have been neglected throughout the Modern philosophical project. By articulating them, an attempt is made to take the subject qua subject seriously.<p><p>A similar contextualisation is operated with rationality. Rationality, even in its rationalistic appearance, is not self-revealing. The idealisation of rationality in the Modern philosophical project, that is, its decontextualisation, obscures the fact that it is historically situated. This situatedness refers to its emergence and operation in a specific context. This recontextualisation shows it as one conception of rationality among others. The Modern philosophical project held its conception of rationality to be a reflection of reality, upon its belief in the direct access to the latter.<p><p>The distinction between conceptions on the one hand and a concept on the other is the methodological device that serves to further articulate the concept of freedom. This is the theme of chapter 4. Freedom is related to the emergence of science in the 17th century. While the subject and rationality were connected to a context of participation in the foregoing chapters, attention will be drawn to the characteristics of the concept of freedom in this chapter. <p><p>The basic premise of the theory of freedom proposed in this chapter comes to saying that in the absence of any external limitation, subjects are free to act as they please. If they want to act, however, freedom unlimited as it is called must be determined. This means that from the infinite range of possibilities, a choice has to be made. Without a choice, everything remains possible though no action can occur. To make a choice implies that the concept of freedom is concretised. This concretisation is called a conception. Action is possible, so it is argued further, on two types of conceptions. One is a conception of freedom, the other a conception about freedom. A conception of freedom is a conception of the subject himself; a conception about freedom on the contrary is a conception of someone else.<p><p>On the basic premise of the theory of freedom advocated throughout the book, freedom is unlimited. This includes a priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom. Therefore, his acting on conceptions about freedom must be justified. This requirement of justification is connected to the idea of freedom as principium. A principium has a twofold meaning. The first is a starting point; the second is that a principle is also a leitmotiv. <p><p>Freedom unlimited is the starting point of political philosophy as it is found in Hobbes and Rousseau. They will be our main discussion partners throughout the book. Their theory of the social contract as the basis of the construction of political space is premised by the idea of freedom unlimited. They do neglect though the second aspect of freedom as principium, that is, freedom as the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. This aspect is briefly elaborated in chapter 4 where Hobbes’ theory is diagnosed as a theory about freedom, while it purports to be a theory of freedom.<p><p>Freedom as principium and the priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom that it involves is identified as the basic principle of legisprudence. It holds, summarizing, that law can only be legitimate if it is legitimated to operate as an alternative for failing social interaction. The idea of freedom as principium will be elaborated in chapter 8 where I proceed to the identification of the principles of legisprudence.<p><p>The second part of the book is dedicated to the problem of legalism and legitimation.<p><p>Chapter 5 explores the reason for the absence of a theory of legislation until now. The main reason is that law, from the very beginning of the Modern philosophical project, is unfolded as a reflection of reality. The obscuration of the embedment of law in the realm of politics is explained as a strategy of practical reason. This strategy is at the basis of what is identified as strong legalism. Strong legalism is the dominant pattern of thought in legal thinking. It holds that normativity is a matter of rule following, irrespective of where the rules come from. It easily fits the idea of the provisional morality Descartes has sketched, but that never came to a real end.<p><p>The main characteristics of strong legalism are pointed from a reading of Hobbes and Rousseau. The characteristics identified are: representationalism, universality or the neglect of the time dimension, concealed instrumentalism, and etatism. These characteristics of the legalistic thought pattern are supported and corroborated by a type of legal science that finds its roots in the Modern philosophical project.<p><p>Over against this form of legalism that is labelled “strong legalism” chapter 6 explores the contours of a different brand of legalism that I propose to mark as “weak legalism”. <p><p>Weak legalism or “legalism with a human face” comprises a critique of strong legalism in that the latter neglects the position of the subject qua subject. As it will be discussed in the first part of the book, the Modern philosophical project makes the subject the preponderant actor in reality. He is, however, an actor in a play written in advance by others and not an auctor or an agent.<p><p>To take the subject qua subject seriously, as weak legalism purports, entails placing him in a context with others. This part of chapter 6 joins the insights articulated in the first part of the book, more specifically in chapter 2. Others, and not just “otherness” as a representation of the subject, belong to the subject’s context. If it is in this context that the self and meaning emerge, this process is not necessarily conflict-free. Hobbes and Rousseau conclude from this fact that social interaction leads to war. It provides them with an argument to substitute interaction based on legal rules from social interaction based on conceptions of freedom. The former are issued by the sovereign and can be qualified as conceptions about freedom.<p><p>Hobbes and Rousseau hold that this substitution is ipso facto legitimate. On the theory of freedom that was sketched out in chapter 4, this substitution however needs to be legitimated.<p><p>Chapter 7 deals with the issue of legitimation. I distinguish to begin with between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories of legitimation. On the former, law is legitimated if it corresponds to at least one transcendent true norm. On the latter, no transcendent content is available. This is proper to a democratic theory of legitimation upon which the demos determines the ends of action as well as the means to realise them.<p><p>Apart from this difference between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation process they embrace is the same. This dynamic refers to the direction of the legitimation chain. In jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation chain runs from a transcendent norm to a rule of the sovereign. In non-jusnaturalistic theories exemplified by Hobbes and Rousseau the dynamics of the chain runs from an initial consent to the social contract to the set of rules issued by the sovereign.<p><p>The dynamic of the chain in both type of theories, so it is argued, is irreversible. The operationalisation of political space ensuing from the social contract is what legislation is about according to the Modern philosophical project. Taken as it stands, the initial consent of the subjects to the social contract or their proxy to the sovereign is an action on a conception of freedom. They do give, though, a proxy to the sovereign to issue subsequent limitations of their freedom that are yet unknown when subscribing the contract .From the “moment” of the contract, the sovereign is legitimated in substituting conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom. The initial proxy contained in the contract covers any of his limitations of freedom. As both Hobbes and Rousseau argue, the rules of the sovereign are always morally correct. As a consequence, they cannot be criticized for whatever reason. Would this be possible then the chain of legitimation initiated by the social contract would be reversed. <p><p>On strong legalism, however the chain is unidirectional. The sovereign transforms any propositional content into a true norm, which allows for the qualification of sovereignty as a black box.<p><p>Chapter 7 ends with the articulation of some possibilities of reversing the chain of legitimation in what is called the proxy model. On this idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain, a more general approach is initiated. This approach leads to the claim that a legislator’s limitations of freedom are to be justified. They are deemed legitimate and legitimated on a general proxy. The latter however affects he reflexive character of freedom of the subject. On the idea of a general proxy, any of his conceptions of freedom can a priori be replaced by conceptions about freedom. The general approach to the idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain comes to say that this substitution must be justified. Sovereigns, that is, should give reasons for their rules.<p><p>This is basically what legisprudence as a theory of rational legislation comes to. Its more concrete articulation is the topic of the third part of the book.<p><p>Chapter 8 starts with the exploration of an alternative for the proxy model of legitimation that was investigated in the previous chapters. The alternative is labelled the trade-off model. On this model, the subjects trade off conceptions of freedom for conceptions about freedom. This comes to saying that the substitution of conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom must be justified. No rule can be held legitimate if this justification or legitimation is lacking.<p><p>The trade off model is based on freedom as principium in its twofold meaning. Freedom unlimited as was argued in chapter 4 is both the starting point and the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. It follows from there that subjects are primarily to act on conceptions of freedom. A substitution of a conception about freedom for conceptions of freedom can only be legitimate if it is legitimated or justified as an alternative for failing social interaction. This is the first principle of legisprudence that is called the “principle of alternativity”. The second principle is the principle of necessity of the normative density. Rules should not automatically contain sanctions. If sanctions are included, this requires a specific justification. Rules with a sanction embrace a double reduction of freedom. First, the pattern of behaviour is imposed and second its realisation is enforced. Before realising a rule with the help of force alternative means of achievement of its goals are to be outweighed.<p><p>The third principle of legisprudence is the principle of temporality. The limitation of freedom on a conception about freedom must be justified as “on time”. Any justification is embedded in a context. This means that if it is successful it will only be temporarily so. The principle of temporality then requires a justification over time, and not only on the moment that a rule is issued.<p><p>The principle of coherence is the fourth principle of legisprudence. It requires that rules, both judicial and legislative make sense as a whole. The principle of coherence thus identified is elaborated in a theory that I propose to call the “level theory of coherence”, and that makes part of legisprudence.<p><p>At the end of the chapter, the principles of legisprudence are focused on from the position of the legislator before they are further explored in chapter 9. This chapter concretises the operationalisation of the principles of legisprudence. The principles of legisprudence, so it is argued, are to be read within the context of one another. Upon weighing and balancing their relative weight in the process of legislation, the ruling of the sovereign can be said to be legisprudentially optimal.<p><p>Legisprudential optimality on its turn is further concretised in chapter 10. The sovereign has to discharge of his duties throughout the legislative process while taking the circumstances of legislation into account. These circumstances are the fact that subjects interact with each other on the basis of conceptions of freedom. These circumstances result from the theory of freedom that was set out in chapter 4 and further elaborated in the subsequent chapters. <p><p>The duties of the sovereign throughout the process of legislation amount to a duty of fact finding, problem formulation, weighing and balancing of alternatives, prognosis, retrospection, taking future circumstances into account and finally a duty to correction.<p><p>Finally, a brief sketch is offered of the concept of validity according to legisprudence. Apart from the necessity of formal validity, both efficacy and axiological validity are briefly commented upon. From the diagnosis of some theories of validity that mainly focus on only one of the aspects of validity, the concept of validity according to legisprudence is called “network validity”.<p><p>Projects like this book would never begin, let alone come to an end, without the help of a large number of people. I will not enter into a detailed description of their contribution. Suffice to mention their names with the hope that they will recognize some of their thoughts, reflections, critiques and encouragements somewhere in the book.<p><p>The persons that come to my mind are Aulis Aarnio, Maurice Adams, Manuel Atienza, John Bell, Samantha Besson, Guido Calabresi, Tom Campbell, Carine Caunes, Emilios Christodoulidis, Wochiech and Aga Cyrul, Martine de Clerq, Pieter Dehon, Erwin Depue, Johan Desmet, David Dhooge, Guillaume Drago, Hugues Dumont, Philip Eijlander, Michiel Elst, René Foqué, Benoit Frydman, Tito Gallas, Philippe Gérard, René Gonzalez, Guy Haarscher, Mark Hunyadi, Sheldon Leader, Maria-Isabelle Köpke-Tinturé, Neil MacCormick, Francesco Laporte, Luzius Mader, Frank Michelman, Charles-Albert Morand, Dwight Newman, François Ost, Juliane Ottmann, Richard Parker, Trinie Parker, Aleksander Peczenik, Chaïm Perelman, Vlad Perju, Kauko Pietillä, Juha Pöhöynen, Daniel Priel, Pekka Riekinen, Thomas Roberts, Eric Rossiaux, Geoffrey Samuel, Jerzy Stelmach, Andreas Takis, Benoît Timmermans, Philippe Thion, Hannu Tolonen, Michel Troper, François Tulkens, Stamatios Tzitzis, François Vallançon, Koen Van Aeken, Wibren Van der Burg, Mark Van Hoecke, Michiel Vandekerckhove, Frederik Vandendriesche, Rob van Gestel, Scott Veatch, Roger Vergauwen, Amaryllis Verhoeven, Michel Villey, Jeremy Waldron, Kenneth Winston, Willem Witteveen, Wochiech Zadurski and Marek Zyrk-Zadurski.<p><p>Thomas Roberts helped me with the linguistic corrections of the text.<p><p>I have a special debt to Mark Van Bellingen and Lilly De Vooght for their views on the context of participation, the idea of a hermeneutical point of view and their critique on the “view from nowhere”.<p> <p><p> <p>1\ / Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished