Orientador: Alcides Hector Rodriguez Benoit / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-05T11:11:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_JoseLourencoPereirada_D.pdf: 11699289 bytes, checksum: 7207aef20ff785d66fb9060ffed958c2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 / Resumo: Essa tese examina a ontologia platônica. A hipótese de trabalho é que Platão no Sofista revisa sua teoria das Formas. A influência da teoria do Ser de Parmênides levou Platão a uma teoria das Formas que era demasiadamente austera uma teoria que levou a metafísica de Platão a aporia. O Parmênides mostra essa vulnerabilidade da teoria de Platão. A fim de revisar sua teoria, Platão realiza uma espécie de terapia sobre sua ontologia, revendo uma de suas fontes principais: o eleatismo. Iniciando no Parmênides e continuando no Sofista, Platão critica sua herança eleática para salvar sua doutrina das Formas. É uma conseqüência da concepção eleática do 'ser' e do 'um' a impossibilidade de pensar o não-ser e a multiplicidade sem contradição. Criticando a concepção eleática, Platão revisa a teoria das Formas. Enquanto outrora cada Forma era um ser e uma unidade à maneira parmenideana, a crítica de Platão a Parmênides torna possível às Formas se misturarem - isto é, serem capazes de participação recíproca - em virtude do que cada Forma é una e múltipla ao mesmo tempo / Abstract: This thesis examines platonic ontology. The working hypothesis is that Plato in the Sophist revises his theory of Forms. The influence of Parmenides' theory of Being had led Plato to a theory of the Forms that was too austere, a theory that led Plato's metaphysics to aporia. The Parmenides shows this vulnerability in Plato's theory. In order to revise his theory, Plato perfoms a kind of therapy upon his ontology, by reviewing one of his main sources: the eleatism. Beginning in the Parmenides and continuing in the Sophist, Plato criticizes his eleatic legacy to save his doctrine of Forms. It is a consequence of the eleatic conception of 'being' and 'one' that it is impossible to think of not-being and multiplicity without contradiction. By criticizing the eleatic conception, Plato revises the theory of Forms. Whereas formerly each Form was a being and a unity in parmenidean manner, Plato's critique of Parmenides makes it possible for the Forms to mix-that is, to be capable of reciprocal Participation in virtue of which each Form at once is one and many / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

[pt] Essa dissertação examina uma passagem do diálogo Sofista, de Platão. Nosso objetivo é oferecer uma abordagem da leitura platônica do poema de Parmênides pressuposta pelas aporíai do não-ser na passagem compreendida entre 236e e 241a. Esta passagem inicia-se com uma citação direta de dois versos do fragmento B7 do poema de Parmênides e termina com a célebre passagem do parricídio. Entre estas duas passagens, são expostos e relacionados ao poema de Parmênides cinco argumentos sofísticos. Trata-se, portanto, de uma passagem fundamental para a compreensão da influência de Parmênides de Eléia no desenvolvimento da metafísica platônica. Tradicionalmente, interpreta-se a leitura platônica de Parmênides nesta passagem como uma aceitação da conexão entre as teses parmenídicas e os argumentos contra a noção de imagem e de discurso falso, de modo que o parricídio é visto como uma refutação direta de Parmênides. No entanto, grande parte dos proponentes desta interpretação tradicional parte de um pressuposto metodológico errôneo, que consiste em adotar, exteriormente, uma interpretação independente de Parmênides e então tentar determinar o uso que Platão faz de Parmênides neste diálogo com referência a esta interpretação independente. Sendo assim, tentaremos mostrar, a partir de uma tradução do texto direta do grego e da leitura de estudos recentes sobre o tema, que Platão está imbuído nesta passagem de um duplo objetivo: (i) salvar o legado de Parmênides de certas apropriações sofísticas a que está sujeito e (ii) reiterar e reforçar a sua própria interpretação de Parmênides, sobre a qual se apóiam importantes distinções metafísicas da Teoria das Formas do período médio. / [en] This dissertation examines a passage from Plato s Sophist. Our objective is to offer an account of the platonic reading of the Parmenides Poem presupposed by the aporíai of not-being in the passage that goes from 236e to 441a. This passage begins with a direct quotation of two verses from fragment B7 of Parmenides s Poem and ends with the famous passage of the parricid. Between these two passages, are expounded and related to the Parmenides Poem five sophistic arguments. This passage, therefore, is very important for the understanding of the influence of Parmenides of Elea in the development of platonic metaphysics. Traditionally, this passage is interpreted as an acceptance of the connection between the parmenidean theses and the sophistic arguments against the notion of image and false speech, in a way that the parricide is seen as a direct refutation of Parmenides. However, the proponents of this traditional interpretation start from an erroneous methodological principle, that consists of adopting an external and independent interpretation of Parmenides and then try to determine the use that Plato makes of Parmenides in this dialogue in reference to this independent interpretation. This being thus, we will try to show, by means of a direct translation from the original greek text and the reading of recent studies on the subject, that Plato is engaged in a double mission: (i) to save the legacy of Parmenides from certain sophistic appropriations and (ii) to reiterate and to strengthen his own interpretation of Parmenides, on which important metaphysical decisions of the Theory of Forms of the middle period dialogues are supported.

L'objectif de ce travail est de donner accès aux discours, fragments et témoignages d'Alcidamas d'Élée (IVè s. avant J.-C.), orateur originaire d’Asie mineure, disciple de Gorgias et grand rival d'Isocrate. Cet auteur est une figure méconnue car marginale de l'histoire de la philosophie: l'établissement de ses textes sur de nouveaux frais puis leur analyse fournissent des éléments qui mettent en évidence des éléments conceptuels récurrents dans sa pensée et qui nous permettent, donc, de dessiner les contours d’une cohérence dans la réflexion du penseur. Ce travail comprend une première partie introductive et méthodologique où sont abordés les problèmes posés par la nature du corpus fragmentaire et la nature de la citation, l'état de la recherche et les raisons qui rendent nécessaire la retraduction de l'oeuvre alcidamantéenne. La deuxième partie est la traduction proprement dite: les discours, fragments et témoignages sont édités avec un apparat actualisé, une notice introductive, une traduction ainsi que de nombreuses notes complémentaires. Une étude lexicale synthétique du vocabulaire psychologique est proposée en troisième partie et vise à démontrer l'existence chez Alcidamas de la constitution d'un vocabulaire psychologique philosophiquement dense. Cette étude permettra de montrer en quoi le vocabulaire de la psychologie permet de se forger une idée de la cohérence des apports et de la pensée novatrice d’Alcidamas. / The main purpose of this work is to give access to the discourses, fragments and testimonials of Alcidamas of Elea (4th century BC), a rhetor born in Asia Minor, Gorgias' disciple and Isocrates’ great rival. This author is a relatively unknown figure of the history of philosophy.This work includes a first part introductive and methodological where are treated the problems posed by the very nature of the fragmentary corpus and of the quotation in Ancient Greece, the state of investigation and the motives why it is necessary to retranslate Alcidamas’ works. The second part is the translation itself: the discourses, fragments and testimonials are edited with an updated critical apparatus, an introduction, a translation and numerous complementary notes. A synthetic lexical study of the psychological vocabulary makes up the third part and aims to prove the existence in Alcidamas’ works of a philosophically consistent psychological vocabulary. This study will allow us to show the reason why a psychological vocabulary puts the emphasis on the coherence and innovative view of Alcidamas.

[pt] A harmonia e a beleza expressas pelas obras de arte plásticas gregas elevaram-nas a um patamar modelar ao longo da história da arte. Apesar disso, não foram muitos os intérpretes que se voltaram para a questão das artes plásticas na literatura deste mesmo período histórico. Em Platão, por exemplo, outros temas, como das artes poética e sofística, são notavelmente mais trabalhados pela literatura secundária. Isto provavelmente se deve ao fato das artes plásticas aparecerem timidamente nos diálogos, sendo usadas, na maior parte dos casos, em comparações, analogias ou metáforas. Neste trabalho preferimos o tema marginal e voltamo-nos ao estudo das noções de pintura e escultura no contexto do pensamento de Platão. Com a intenção de obter uma visão alternativa à da República no que diz respeito às artes miméticas, investigamos sobre a questão das artes plásticas no que se costuma considerar como último desenvolvimento do pensamento de Platão. Segundo a interpretação mais difundida, no último livro da República Platão condena e expulsa os artistas de sua cidade ideal. Esta mesma apreciação negativa das artes imitativas seria mantida ou modificada em diálogos posteriores? Partimos de uma leitura das ocorrências das noções de pintura e escultura no Sofista, onde encontramos a distinção das artes miméticas em divina e humana. A partir desta distinção, abordamos as aspectos divinos e humanos das artes plásticas, por meio de uma interpretação de sua presença em dois outros diálogos, a saber, o Timeu e as Leis. No Timeu as artes plásticas são usadas para retratar o trabalho do deus demiurgo do mundo; nas Leis, são as obras produzidas pelos homens que são abordadas, principalmente quanto à sua função na cidade construída pelos personagens. Delineamos a percepção de Platão a respeito destes gêneros artísticos, e buscamos compreender o lugar que as artes plásticas ocupam no seu pensamento. / [en] Greek plastic art s harmony and beauty made it a model throughout history. In spite of that, only a few scholars have researched about these arts in Greek literature. In Plato, for example, other themes such as the poetic and the sophistic arts are usually more approached. This probably occurs because Plato rarely refers to the plastic arts and uses it mostly in comparisons, analogies or metaphors. Even so, in this thesis we have chosen to research the plastic arts in Plato s thought. The main text on mimetic arts in Plato s dialogues is Republic X. In this book the mimetic arts are condemned and banished from the ideal city. With the purpose to obtain an alternative view about these arts from Plato, we ve decided to study some dialogues considered posterior to the Republic, generally considered to represent the ultimate development of Plato s thought. Will this condemnation remain or will his view be modified in his late works? We begin by an analysis of the Sophist, where we find the distinction between two kinds of mimetic art: the divine and the human. According to this distinction, we ve approached the divine and the human aspects of the plastic arts. To do that, we have considered the uses of the arts of painting and sculpture in other two dialogues: the Timaeus and the Laws. In the Timaeus the plastic arts are used to describe the work of the god demiurge who creates the universe; in the Laws, the characters talk about painting and sculpture as men s works, and mostly about their function in the city imagined in the dialogue. According to the passages which we have interpreted, we have outlined Plato s view about these arts, and other than that, we have attempted to understand the place of these arts in Plato s thought in general.

Le présent mémoire décrit le rôle et l’application de la méthode platonicienne des divisions telle que décrite dans le Sophiste, le Politique, le Phèdre et le Philèbe. Il met en relief les différences et les similitudes du rôle et de l’application de la méthode dans ces quatre dialogues, afin d’analyser la possibilité ou bien de postuler l’unité de la doctrine platonicienne, ou bien de retracer les lieux de son évolution. Certains auteurs du siècle dernier affirment qu’il n’est pas possible de retracer quelque évolution que ce soit dans la doctrine, et estiment même que la méthode des divisions est utilisée bien au-delà de ces quatre dialogues, et que son absence des dialogues de jeunesse ne doit en aucun cas être prise pour une absence de la doctrine de l’époque. D’autres sont au contraire convaincus que la méthode des divisions est propre à un stade de la pensée de Platon qui ne peut être que postérieur à l’introduction de la théorie des Formes intelligibles, et que cette méthode incarne même, à toutes fins pratiques, la dialectique platonicienne des dialogues tardifs. / This thesis aims to describe the role and application of Plato's method of divisions as it is seen and described mainly in Sophist, Statesman, Phaedrus, and Philebus. Through analysis of similarities and differences of the method in the different dialogues I intend to describe the possibilities of claiming the unity of Plato's doctrine, or to see in which regards it has evolved. In the last century some authors were convinced that no such evolution could clearly be seen in Plato's thought, and that the method of divisions was to be found in a lot of passages both before and after the four dialogues mentioned above, whereas others argue that the method of divisions is to be seen as specific t the later dialogues, because it cannot possibly be used before the introduction of the theory of the Forms, and further, that it is to be identified with Plato's later method of dialectic.

Il est souvent dit que l’aristotélisme représente un renversement du platonisme. Or, une lecture de Mét. N.2 nous porte à croire qu’il s’agit moins d’un renversement que d’un dépassement. Cette thèse a l’ambition d’étudier ce dépassement selon un point de vue spécifique, celui de l’être en puissance. En effet, dans le deuxième chapitre du livre N de la Métaphysique, Aristote critique les platoniciens pour avoir cru que tous les étants seraient « un » s’ils ne réfutaient pas l’argument de Parménide selon lequel il est impossible de contraindre le non-être à être. Aristote identifie ensuite l’erreur fondamentale des platoniciens comme étant d’avoir dit que le non-être « est » et il suggère à la fin de N.2 que le principe que Platon cherchait était véritablement celui de l’être en puissance. Ainsi, faute d’avoir bien distingué les sens de l’être et du non-être, Platon aurait été incapable de penser la distinction entre être en acte et être en puissance, ce qui, selon Aristote, le condamnerait à rester un penseur de l’être en puissance, voire de l’être matériel. L’analyse portera d’abord sur l’importance du Sophiste pour le projet platonicien, car Aristote soutient que ce dialogue est le lieu où s’enracine l’erreur de son maitre. Ensuite, nous démontrerons l’importance du non-être dans la conception aristotélicienne de l’être en puissance par une lecture des passages pertinents du livre Q de la Métaphysique. Ayant établi que Platon intègre le non-être au sein de l’être dans le Sophiste et que l’être au sein duquel il y a non-être est l’être en puissance pour Aristote, nous serons à même de lire N.2 de près dans notre chapitre central, afin de libérer entièrement la conception aristotélicienne du non-être de celle de Platon. Enfin, notre dernier chapitre mettra en évidence à la fois les raisons pour lesquelles le principe « matériel » de Platon est insuffisant pour Aristote et les raisons pour lesquelles de toute façon, un principe premier ne peut jamais être une matière. Cela nous permettra de conclure que selon Aristote, les idées platoniciennes ne sont que des composés matériels, des êtres en puissance, voire de simples possibles. / It has often been said that Aristotle’s philosophy represents an overturning of Platonism. Yet, a close reading of the second chapter of Book N of the Metaphysics reveals that we call an overturning might be closer to a surpassing. This thesis will explore this surpassing from a specific point of view, that of potential being. Indeed, in the aforementioned second chapter of Book N, Aristotle criticizes Platonists for having believed that all beings would form a single one if they did not refute Parmenides’ argument against the being of non-being. Aristotle then situates the Platonists’ fundamental mistake as having argued that non-being in some way « is ». However, Plato did not need to make non-being « be » he simply needed to think the multiplicity of ways which being can be said. Only then would he have found the principle of multiplicity that he wanted : potential being (dunamei on). Hence, having failed to notice that being is said in many ways, he could never think « matter » through properly. This, according to Aristotle, condemns Plato to a thought of potential being and material being. In order to argue for this position, we will firstly establish the importance of the Sophist in the platonic project, for as we have said, Aristotle places the Platonist mistake squarely in this dialogue. Secondly, we will need to show how Aristotle’s concept of non-being is central to his conception of potential being. We will do this by offering a close reading of the relevant passages of Book Q of the Metaphysics. Having established in the first chapter that Plato does indeed integrate non-being into being in the Sophist and in the second that Aristotle considers being penetrated by non- being to be merely potential being, we can read N.2 with more precise knowledge of the platonic « error » and in turn liberate Aristotle’s conception of non-being from Plato’s ; the topic of our third chapter. Finally, in our fourth chapter we will show why platonic conceptions of matter can never be adequate for Aristotle and explore the consequences of not having properly distinguished actual being from potential being, namely all of Plato’s principles are merely potential principles and not actual ones. Hence, we can conclude that for Aristotle, Plato’s ideas and principles of being are composite potential beings, close to mere possibilities.

本論文以異作為分離相論的轉折這點為主軸，逐段解釋一些相關的段落來看異之相在晚期相論中的作用，主要涉及的對話錄是《哲人篇》與《巴門尼德斯篇》。 本論文的架構是從《巴門尼德斯篇》第一部分開始，看分離相論所會導致的問題，再從第二部分的回應中看到分離以外，假定諸相相互結合作為另外一種可能，以及在第五組假設中所顯現的異之相所具有的存有學上的重要性。而通種論中最高種間彼此的關係、在《哲人篇》中所引入的二分法以及篇中所連帶解決的問題則在二到五章中呈現。並於第五章節總結了異在《哲人篇》及通種論中的地位及作用。首先是異在《哲人篇》中達到了指出有一種虛假的言說存在的目的；並且異的存在解釋了諸相的基本結構，最高種的劃分必也是依據這種基礎，它們必分有「是」而是，分有異而得以相區別，而諸種屬必相連結構成那諸多被區別出的種或類；回返至《哲人篇》前半部和最後一部分所使用的分解法，此方法亦是立基於通種論和異的結構上。通過一個整體的連結能夠有一個包含其下所有類的最高種，其得以作為一個劃分的起點，而類差作為劃分的依據也因同異的存在而是可能的。 / The aim of this thesis is to show how the idea of difference works in Plato’s late theory of Ideas, and it is chiefly concerned with Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist. The theme of the first part of Parmenides is what will be caused by Chorismos, and of the second part might show another possibility from the Chorismos, that is, the communion of genera. And then the fifth hypotheses of the second part of Parmenides might show the importance of the idea of difference in Plato’s late ontology. In Sophist, since the theory of communion of genera might solve the problem of Chorismos, and the idea of difference as one of the greatest genera of the communion of genera, which might be the most important one, I deal with it and the relations between the fives greatest genera. There are also the problems that be solved by the idea of difference in Sophist, and which brings a new method (dialectics) of Plato’s late dialogues, for defining all of them clearly, I analysis those concerned paragraphs.

Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se.

Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se.