The purpose of this essay is to discuss the base of sociology from an existentialistic perspective. The discussion takes it's position in the debate on the crisis of sociology, and aligns with Alvin Gouldner's understanding of the crisis. Gouldner believed that the crisis of sociology was mirrored in a sociological method that failed to describe the social reality that it meant to describe; a lack in self-criticism and self-reflexivity, a lack in self-containment in relation to state interests and a lack in moral engagement. This raises a number of questions, which I discuss in the essay. What is the role of sociology in our society? How shall we form a method that responds to the social reality that we sociologists aim to describe? How can we make sociology more moral? Existentialism offers a starting point to describe these questions. I argue that the existentialistic description of man as essence carries implications for the social science. By constituting a critique of a computable moral, existentialism points at the necessity of a standing self-criticism and dialogue. An existentialistic description of man as non-essence carries implications for the theory and method of sociology. Man's possibility of radical exceeding of himself means the impossibility to reach theories that describe reality as it is. At the same time, method and theory are necessary to create knowledge about social phenomenon. I read existentialism as an imperative for a sociology that is reflexive in the sense a) a reflexivity in relation to the basic presumptions (value philosophical and ontological) that effect our sociological examinations b) a self-reflexivity that amount to an understanding of the scientists own role relation to his study and the object being studied. Furthermore, I read existentialism as an imperative for a radicalization of dialogue as method.

The 1988 Federal Constitution adopted a guarantor criminal model, which is based on the rule of law, which lists fundamental rights, ensuring the individualization of punishment and establishing limits to the state's punitive power, situations in which guilt plays an important role in maintaining constitutional essence. Regardless of the importance of guilt, it has been suffering a serious crisis generated by the tension between the political-criminal function and the need to determine the proportionality of the penalty applied. The analysis of guilt is now faced not as a constitutional guarantee limiting abuses from the punitive power of the state, but as an obstacle to the application of more severe sentences, giving space to the social need to ward off violence from the social sphere, regardless of the means therefore. In this sense, the satisfaction of the popular clamor for justice gains a prominent place in the criminal jurisdiction, being also adopted as a parameter of efficiency by the Judicial Power. In this context, the concept of justice expected by society is now confused with the maximum application of criminal law, even without compliance with constitutional guarantees. In view of such a scenario, encouraged and propagated by the media, the decisions handed down by the Judiciary Branch are, notably after Criminal Action no. 470/MG, judged by the Federal Supreme Court to follow a new paradigm, utilitarian and with a greater bias corruption and violence aimed at pacification and social welfare, less important if effective mitigation of compliance with the guarantees provided in the constitutional order. A new model of criminal law has been drawn up by the jurisprudence of the STF, which, in order to meet the social anxieties influenced and reverberated by the mass media, makes populist decisions, many in disharmony with the constitutional norm, leaving aside their observance. Constitutional interpretation becomes essential for the maintenance of the constitutional guarantor base, provided it is made according to its essence, rescuing the analysis of guilt, individualizing the sentence, ensuring a subjective judgment of imputation. / A Constituição Federal de 1988 adotou um modelo penal garantista, próprio de um Estado de Direito, elencando rol de direitos fundamentais, assegurando a individualização da pena e estabelecendo limites ao avanço do poder punitivo estatal, situações nas quais a culpabilidade exerce importante papel na manutenção da essência constitucional garantista. Em que pese tal importância da culpabilidade, a mesma vem sofrendo séria crise gerada pela tensão existente entre a função político-criminal e a necessidade de determinação da proporcionalidade da pena aplicada. A análise da culpabilidade passa a ser enfrentada não como uma garantia constitucional limitadora de abusos provenientes do poder punitivo estatal, mas como obstáculo à aplicação de penas mais severas, cedendo espaço à necessidade social de se afastar a violência do seio social, não importando os meios para tanto. Nesse sentido, a satisfação do clamor popular por justiça ganha lugar de destaque na jurisdição criminal, sendo também adotado como parâmetro de eficiência pelo Poder Judiciário. Nesse contexto, o conceito de justiça esperado pela sociedade passa a ser confundido com a aplicação máxima do direito penal, ainda que sem a observância das garantias constitucionais. Diante de tal panorama, incentivado e propagado pelos meios de comunicação, as decisões proferidas pelo Poder Judiciário caminham, destacadamente a partir da Ação Penal nº 470/MG, julgada pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal, a seguir novo paradigma, utilitarista e com viés maior de combate à corrupção e à violência, visando atender à pacificação e ao bem-estar social, não importando se efetiva a mitigação da observância das garantias previstas na ordem constitucional. Um novo modelo de direito penal vem sendo desenhado pela jurisprudência do STF, que, visando atender os anseios sociais influenciados e reverberados pelos meios de comunicação, profere decisões populistas, muitas em desarmonia com a norma constitucional, deixando de lado a sua observância. A interpretação constitucional torna-se essencial para a manutenção da base garantista constitucional, desde que seja feita de acordo com a sua essência, resgatando-se a análise da culpabilidade, individualizando-se a pena, garantindo um juízo subjetivo de imputação. / São Cristóvão, SE

The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it makes a normative idea analysis concerning organ donation, by comparing the perspectives of utilitarianism and classical liberalism. Secondly, it applies these perspectives on the Swedish legislation, in order to understand it in a political philosophical view. As a theoretical framework, the paper uses the two perspectives´ overarching ethical standpoints, but also try to discern their views on four - for the topic -appropriate concepts, these being the concepts of liberty, consent and self-ownership. These are then bundled together into two so-called ”ideal types”, to use for making normative statements about what the most morally right legislation would be concerning organ donation. In utilitarianism, an agent-neutral overall happiness is at the forefront, which leads it to prioritize an increase in donations over the autonomy of the individual. This makes the case for a conscription of organs or the softer notion of an opt-out system. Classical liberalism focus more on the right to self-ownership and negative liberty, and therefore argue for an opt-in system, which requires the explicit consent of the individual. Lastly, the paper makes the claim that the Swedish legislation falls in a category inbetween the normative judgements of the two perspectives, as it prescribes an opt-out system, but reserves the right of the family to refuse a donation, in case the deceased had not made a choice ante mortem.

Humanitär intervention är ett begrepp inom internationella relationer som väcker många känslor och frågor. Trots att idén om att använda våld för att stoppa brott mot de mänskli-ga rättigheter kan verka attraktivt från ett moraliskt perspektiv, vilket man i århundraden har gjort, har denna praktik varit synnerligen oregelbunden. Detta i hög grad beroende på den ambivalens som finns inför de internationella normer som skall reglera staters använ-dande av militärt våld. Synen på humanitära interventioner har ändrats i överensstämmelse med de förändringar som skett inom det internationella systemet. Dessa ändringar har, till viss del, medfört en förändrad syn på de normer som legitimerar användandet av våld inom det internationella samfundet. Humanitära interventioner som begrepp och praktik innehåller många dilemman i vår tid. Detta eftersom det berör traditionella normer av suveränitet och ickeintervention, som är de främsta byggstenarna för det moderna internationella systemet, tillika del av Förenta Na-tionernas (FN) stadgar. Stater är i dag förbjudna att använda militärt våld som ett instru-ment i deras utrikespolitik, förutom i fall av självförsvar eller i kollektiva säkerhetsåtgärder, beslutade av FN:s säkerhetsråd. Det handlar även om att det finns traditionella normer som förbjuder intervention i andra staters interna angelägenheter. Dessutom ska allt militärt våld auktorernas av säkerhetsrådet, som har till uppgift att upprätthålla internationell fred och säkerhet. Med detta perspektiv för ögonen, är användandet av våld för att genomdriva internationella humanitära normer, mycket begränsad enligt internationell lag. Detta har i många situatio-ner skapat ett svart hål när det kommer till att stoppa allvarliga förbrytelser mot de mänsk-liga rättigheter, genom internationellt ingripande. Ovanstående har lett till att man börjat diskutera och ifrågasätta traditionella principer som har varit ledande för det internationella samarbetet, vilket i sin tur skulle kunna öppna vägen för vissa interventioner med humani-tära syften. Denna diskussion handlar om suveränitet, internationella lag och det handlar om moraliska ställningstaganden. Realismen har under lång tid varit den ledande skolan i internationella relationer och därmed lagt grunden för hur man ska tolka internationella konflikter, krigs-föring och interventioner. På senare tid har Realismen utmanats av andra teoretiska skolor och ställningstaganden som ifrågasätter Realismens förmåga att förklara händelser på den internationella arenan. Genom att jämföra Realismens ståndpunkter, gentemot humanitära interventioner, med Utilitarismen och den Kosmopolitiska skolan, har uppsatsen kunnat presentera olika bilder av den problematik som humanitära interventioner idag står inför och därmed måste för-hålla sig till. Igenom att granska konflikten i Rwanda 1994 och Kosovo 1999 har problema-tiken runt humanitära interventioner ytterligare kunnat belysas och diskuteras. Detta har skett genom en kvalitativ textanalys. Nyckelord: Humanitär Intervention, Suveränitet, Icke-intervention, Internationell lag, Rea-lism, Kosmopolitanism, Utilitarism, Moral / Humanitarian intervention is a concept within international relations that provoke many diverse feelings and questions. Although the idée too use force in the name of ending crimes against human rights may seem attractive from a moral perspective, its practise has been highly irregular. This is much due to the norms that regulate states use of military force. The view on humanitarian interventions has changed in unity with the changes that have appeared within the international system. These changes have, to some extent, brought on a transformation in how we look upon the norms that regulate the use of force within the international community. Humanitarian intervention is also a concept and practises that creates many dilemmas in our time. This because it touches and concerns traditional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, that is not only fundamental building stones for the modern international system, but also a immense part of the structure of the United Nations (UN). States today, are forbidden to use military force as an integrated part of their foreign policy, except in cases of self-defence or collective security measures authorised by the UN Security Council. It is also about customary norms, which declare that states should not interfere in other states internal affaires. In the company of the above stated, the use of force to implement humanitarian norms is fairly limited according to international law. This has repeatedly created a gap when it comes to stop serious violations against human rights through international interference. The above stated has led to an intense discussion concerning how traditional principals may have to chance in ways that better can guide international cooperation’s in these matters. This discussion may in turn lead to an opening for some sort of interventions with humanitarian purposes. This discussion, furthermore, concerns sovereignty, international law, and it is about morality. Realism has for a long period of time been the leading school in international relations and has laid the ground for how we should interpret international conflicts, war and intervention. Recently, this school has been forced too respond to opposition from some other theoretical schools; questioning Realisms ability to explain activities on the international arena. By comparing Realism opinion toward humanitarian interventions, with the Utilitarian and Cosmopolitan school, this thesis has been able to present different pictures describe the complexity of humanitarian interventions. Through analyse of the conflicts taking place in Rwanda 1994 and in Kosovo 1999, the issue of humanitarian intervention has been further scrutinised and discussed. This has been done through a qualitative text analyse. Keywords: Humanitarian Intervention, Sovereignty, Non-intervention, International law, Realism, Cosmopolitanism, Utilitarianism, Morality

Denna uppsats belyser förutsättningar för samarbete om en gemensamt ägd resurs mellan traditionellt sett egoistiska vinstmaximerande aktörer. Handlingar som motiveras utifrån egoistisk vinstmaximerande rationalitet vid utnyttjandet av en gemensamt ägd resurs är kontraproduktivt och ohållbart för resursens bevarande på lång sikt. Därför måste aktörerna ändra sitt beteende kring utnyttjandet av resursen. Här belyses de förutsättningar, processer, handlingsmotiv och verktyg som krävs för att gemensam handling mellan egoister kan ingås, etableras och bevaras. Samarbete som utformas enligt modellen som beskrivs i denna uppsats ger individerna högre nyttoavkastning samtidigt som resursen kan bevaras på ett långsiktigt hållbart sätt. Egoistiska, eller självintresserade, konkurrerande aktörer gör långsiktiga nyttovinster på att samarbeta. Som exempel används två imaginära vinstdrivande företag på en konkurrensutsatt marknad. Företagen får nyttovinster i form av ökad produktivitet och kostnadsminskningar genom att samarbeta om en gemensamt ägd inköpsavdelning, jämfört med individuellt agerande. Ett företag fungerar i denna uppsats som representant för urtypen av en vinstmaximerande självdriven egoist. Inköpsavdelningar har traditionellt sett varit drivna som en privat ägd resurs. Här belyses att nyttovinster kan göras genom att ombilda flera privat ägda inköpsavdelningar till en gemensamt ägd resurs. Men detta kräver att aktörerna omformulerar sina nyttofunktionella motiv till handling. Uppsatsen beskriver hur detta kan gå till, vilka svårigheter samarbete kan innebära och hur aktörerna kan överkomma svårigheterna. ”Mind-Map” modellerna i avsnitten 5.2 och 5.3 har visst sammanfattande värde. De visar hur uppsatsens teorier bygger på varandra. ”Mind-Map” modellerna visar följderna från egoistisk och liberal-utilitaristisk rationalitet som motiv till handling vid utnyttjandet av en gemensamt ägd resurs. För att en gemensam handling ska komma till stånd kan aktörerna inte motivera sina handlingar från egoistisk vinstmaximering, utan snarare liberal-utilitaristisk ”satisficing”. Uppsatsens antaganden är uppbyggda som så att avsnitten 2, 3 och 4 utgör grundantagandena. Hur de antagandena appliceras introduceras i avsnitt 5. I avsnitt 6 kommer ytterligare antaganden allt eftersom modellen anpassar sig efter en inköpssituation.

The normative political theory problem of dirty hands (DH) concerns the troubling possibility that political leaders, from a (mostly) consequentialist perspective, might sometimes be morally required to make exceptions from sensitive rules like prohibitions of extremely harmful practices (e.g. torture) in order to avert catastrophic threats and crises, while such rules are still considered so important and such crises so rare that one nonetheless feels inclined to deem dirty exceptions categorically wrong so as to prevent their unnecessary proliferation through a slippery-slope type development.  How can we conceptualize such a problematic necessity? A latent but insufficiently explored idea in the DH literature is that the normatively preferrable approach to such a wicked problem might be to not try to conceptualize it at all, or at least not in our public work as academics. In this thesis, I introduce the straightforward suggestion that if the DH problem cannot be discussed without risking slippery-slope demoralization of the partaking deliberators and/or audience, we seem to be morally required to content ourselves with terming it an unspeakable, taboo subject in non-crisis times, as a meta-level ersatz solution to the core-level political problem conventionally centered in the DH literature.  I also discuss to what extent the mainstream, weak rule utilitarian (WRU) DH literature can themselves be understood as intentionally testing the limits of consequentialist reasoning in a search for a 'higher' moral truth than what their ethical position might entail at first glance.