This thesis is concerned with philosophical perspectives on the stigma of mental illness, with each chapter exploring different philosophical issues. Chapter one delineates the central concept around which the rest of the work revolves: the stigma of mental illness. It provides an outline of the stigma mechanism, how it applies to mental illness, why it is such a large public health concern and what has been done so far to combat it. Chapter two is concerned with the application of recent literature in the philosophy of implicit bias to the topic of mental illness. It suggests that we have hitherto been preoccupied with explicit formulations of the stigma mechanism, but argues that there are distinctive issues involved in combatting forms of discrimination in which the participants are not cognisant of their attitudes or actions, and that anti-stigma initiatives for mental illness should take note. Chapter three applies the philosophical literature concerning the ethics of our epistemic practices to the stigma of mental illness. It contains an analysis of how epistemic injustice- primarily in the forms of testimonial injustice and stereotype threat- affects those with mental illnesses. The fourth chapter brings in issues in the philosophy of science (particularly the philosophy of psychiatry) to explore the possibility of intervening on the stigma process to halt the stigma of mental illness. The first candidate (preventing labelling) is discounted, and the second (combatting stereotype) is tentatively endorsed. The fifth chapter is concerned with how language facilitates the stigma of mental illness. It suggests that using generics to talk about mental illness (whether the knowledge structure conveyed is inaccurate or accurate) is deeply problematic. In the former, it conveys insidious forms of social stereotyping. In the latter, it propagates misinformation by presenting the category as a quintessential one.

Cette thèse explore le phénomène de whistleblowing et comment il a été encadré, principalement du point de vue anglo-saxon, à travers des lectures proches de récits culturels et une vue critique sur l'érudition existante sur whistleblowing. À travers des lectures rapprochées d'une sélection de cas, la poursuite, l'importance et l'impact de la vérité apparaîtront comme le thème central dans les récits culturelles explorées, mais aussi les moments où la vérité est rendu impuissante, en raison de sa nature coercitive comme factualité. L'impuissance de la vérité vécue par les lanceurs d'alerte ("les whistleblowers") est ce qui relie d'autre part les récits culturels à l'art tragique. Les diseurs de vérité ne sont pas reconnus, et ils entrent dans un conflit tragique parce qu'elles révèlent des vérités qui ne sont pas pratiques pour les gens au pouvoir. En d'autres termes, les whistleblowers, en disant la vérité, cherchent à élargir l'espace épistémique dans la sphère publique et à tenir les gens et le pouvoir responsables. Cependant, ils sont continuellement négativement encadrés avec des métaphores conceptuelles qui obstruent la perception d'eux en tant que conteurs de la vérité. / This dissertation posits that whistleblowing is factual truth-telling, or truthful public denunciation. In scholarship, media, and in the popular perception of whistleblowing, the truth-claim is often overlooked, and in many occasions hampered by the dominant ways it is framed (e.g. as leak, which is explored among other frames as a problematic conceptual metaphor). Interestingly, the representation of the whistleblower is different in cultural narratives. Through close readings of a selection of cases, the pursuit, importance, and impact of truth will appear as the central theme in the explored plots, but also the moments where truth becomes impotent, due to its coercive nature as factuality - a process that furthermore connects whistleblowing with the idea of the tragic. Put differently, the special literary interest of narratives of whistleblowing is to turn ignorance into knowledge, knowledge into telling, and how the unraveling of truth becomes a reversal of fortune for the truth-teller who enters a particular tragic conflict. As frame, as narrative, and as a modern phenomenon of truthful public denunciation, whistleblowing offers particular moments of truth, often about moments of falsehood, and ultimately seeks to be a moment of impetus: for the public to restore justice, and for readerships and audience of narrative and dramatic configurations to choose or to distance themselves from multiple proposals of justice emplotted - not only ethical justice, but also epistemic, hermeneutical, and testimonial justice. In other words, whistleblowers, by telling the truth, seek to expand the epistemic space in the public sphere and hold people and power accountable.

Drawing on the theoretical influences of Mad and Disability Studies; philosophical conceptualizations of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007), ethical loneliness (Stauffer, 2015), and psycho-emotional disablism (Reeve, 2012; Thomas, 1999; 2007); disability/service user/feminist ethics; a decade of Mad Movement community organizing; as well as autobiographical illustrations and empirical data from two collaborative research projects, this thesis describes my efforts to live a Mad politics in the community, academy, and social work education. Central to this politics, and to the overall contribution of the thesis, is its focus on (1) the recognition and redress of affective-epistemic harms that are often ignored by legislative/social welfare approaches to in/justice; and (2) the generation and refinement of Mad knowledge/ways of knowing that respond to our own priorities as Mad people, rather than those of mental health systems. It contributes to these areas of Mad Studies theory in several ways: First, by recognizing and politicizing the often ignored affective-epistemic effects of abandonment and neglect Mad people experience from society, including loneliness, anger, resentment, distrust, low expectations of others and lack of confidence. Second, by seeking new conceptualizations (such as epistemic loneliness) and contributing to existing ones (like expectations of just treatment, psycho-emotional disablism) in order to more adequately interpret and attest to these harms and call for their redress. Third, by affirming emergent Mad moral and epistemological frameworks, especially those that manifest in the aftermath of harm and account for ontologies of knowing. Fourth, by developing Survivor/Service User Research approaches to analysis (listening for resonance, everyday forms of service user resistance, and ‘quiet’ data) that value affective engagements with data and perceive and respond to Mad onto-ethico-epistemologies in and on their own terms. Ultimately, this work calls for greater relational justice, and an expansion of what we owe each other. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis contributes to Mad theory by recording some of the things I learned while trying to survive in the world, community organizing, the academy, and social work education as a Mad person. To do so, I reflect on the existential and ethical questions I brought to my doctoral studies, the people, texts, and concepts that I found particularly good company during this time, and my Mad methods of living/doing/knowing. Three separate but interconnected articles then follow. These are about (1) moving with loneliness as a Mad student; (2) resisting unmet expectations as service user ethics, and (3) how pedagogical partnerships between students and faculty/staff can cultivate marginalized students’ confidence in their knowledge. The thesis ends with a discussion of its overall contributions to how we conceptualize the psycho-emotional harms produced through sanism/disablism and the ways we understand what Mad knowledge is and how it is generated.

L’invalidation de leur expérience par les professionnel·le·s de la santé est partagée par un grand nombre de personnes vivant avec de la douleur chronique. Elle correspond au fait de ne pas prendre au sérieux ce que l’autre personne communique ou de discréditer ses émotions. Le témoignage des personnes qui vivent de la douleur n’est donc pas perçu comme égal et compétent. Les injustices épistémiques, soit la disqualification d’une personne comme agente de savoir, sont une forme d’invalidation. Ce cadre théorique a été mobilisé dans la littérature dans le contexte de la relation médicale afin de comprendre l’invalidation de la douleur chronique. Cependant, ces études, très théoriques, tendent elles-mêmes à reproduire des injustices épistémiques en ne donnant pas la voix aux personnes directement concernées par ces injustices. Les mécanismes ciblés comme favorisant les injustices épistémiques et les conséquences découlant de celles-ci sont donc identifiés de façon théorique, sans égard au vécu réel des patient·e·s. Similairement, les avenues proposées pour favoriser la justice épistémique ne tiennent pas compte des besoins et préférences de réel·le·s patient·e·s. Ce projet de recherche vise à mieux comprendre les injustices épistémiques de façon globale et intégrative dans la relation médicale au moyen d’entretiens qualitatifs narratifs conduits auprès de dix-sept personnes vivant avec de la douleur chronique. Il vise à identifier les mécanismes sous-jacents aux injustices épistémiques et leurs conséquences individuelles, politiques et structurelles. Les avenues pour favoriser la justice épistémique sont également recensées dans la littérature, comparées et analysées à la lumière du témoignage de réel·le·s patient·e·s. Une avenue intégrative, le partenariat patient, est identifiée. / Experiences of chronic pain invalidation by healthcare practitioners are shared by many people living with chronic pain. Invalidation can include not taking seriously someone’s testimony, imposing one's thoughts, or discrediting someone’s emotions. In those cases, the testimony is not perceived as equal and competent. Epistemic injustices, that is, the disqualification of a person as a knower, are a form of invalidation. This theoretical framework has been used in the context of the medical relationship, and to understand the invalidation of chronic pain. However, these studies are theoretical, and tend to reproduce epistemic injustices by not giving a voice to the people directly impacted by these injustices. The mechanisms underlying epistemic injustices and the consequences resulting from them are therefore identified theoretically, without regard to the actual experience of patients. Similarly, the avenues proposed to promote epistemic justice do not consider the needs and preferences of real patients. This research project aims at better understanding epistemic injustices in a global and integrative way in the medical relationship by means of qualitative narrative interviews conducted with seventeen people living with chronic pain. It aims at identifying the mechanisms underlying the epistemic injustices and their individual, political and structural consequences. Avenues for promoting epistemic justice are also identified in the literature, compared, and analyzed though patients’ testimonies. An integrative avenue, patient partnership, is identified.

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People who are racialized in Sweden as ‘Asian’—a panethnic category—come from different countries or ethnic backgrounds and yet, often face similar, gender-specific forms of discrimination which have a significant impact on their whole lives. This thesis centres women who are racialized as 'Asian', focusing on how their racialization affects, and is shaped by, their social, professional and intimate relationships, and their interactions with others—in particular, with white majority Swedes, but also other ethnic minorities. Against a broader context encompassing discourses concerning ‘Asians’ within Swedish media, art and culture, Swedish ‘non-racist’ exceptionalism and gender equality politics, the narratives of nine women are analysed through the lenses of the racializing processes of visuality and coercive mimeticism, and epistemic injustice.

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