Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marilene Araujo.pdf: 1589024 bytes, checksum: 861d05eaf6a7cbf03b7ba21908afd89a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-01-26 / Summary: No pluralism there is no effective exercise of the right to freedom of expression, being the regular law such freedom via constitutional system. The law, communication and human sociality are inextricably linked. Humanity without communicational interactions can not exist. The very human dignity is only possible with the preservation of freedom and communication, and freedom of expression appears as power to act human. In social terms the various networks of conversations where emerging culture means that there is a plurality of opinion, cultures. The more free speech, more plurality and the more plurality, more freedom of expression. It is a circular and complex way. Freedom of expression currently understood is a construct and not a given post. Greece was the right to speak in the Agora. A revolution of the media does this freedom go through the emergence of the press and the revolutions of the eighteenth century. The result is positivization this freedom through international and constitutional documents. A second revolution is the technology of electromagnetic waves and the emergence of radio and television, once again the law regulates via grants system and the public service institute. Constitutions and American, French and German jurisprudence buildings bring notions of freedom of expression from the perspective of pluralism. Similarly, the European and American human rights protection system does. The Brazil supported in its constitution and in international treaties have a protection system which includes the freedom of expression and pluralism, but still faces problems for the realization of this right. The challenges are many, because now comes a third revolution of the medium with the arrival of the internet, the market players. But any proposal must pass the non divisibility of social and individual sphere. The law can regulate and carry out increasingly setting such freedom, punishing, rewarding and offering subsidies for realization of freedom of expression / Sem pluralismo não há efetivo exercício do direito a liberdade de expressão, cabendo ao Direito regular tal liberdade via sistema constitucional. O Direito, a comunicação e a socialidade humana são indissociável. A humanidade sem interações comunicacionais não pode existir. A própria dignidade humana só é possível com a preservação da liberdade e da comunicação, sendo que a liberdade de expressão aparece como potência de agir do humano. No plano social as várias redes de conversações onde emergem a cultura faz com que haja a pluralidade de opinião, culturas. Quanto mais liberdade de expressão, mais pluralidade e quanto mais pluralidade, mais liberdade de expressão. É um caminho circular e complexo. A liberdade de expressão atualmente entendida é um construir e não um dado posto. Na Grécia era o direito à palavra na Ágora. A revolução dos meios de comunicação faz essa liberdade passar pelo surgimento da imprensa escrita e as revoluções do século XVIII. O resultado é a positivação desta liberdade por meio de documentos internacionais e constitucionais. Uma segunda revolução é a tecnologia das ondas eletromagnética e o surgimento do rádio e a televisão, mais uma vez o Direito regula via sistema de outorgas e o instituto do serviço público. Constituições e construções jurisprudências americana, francesa e alemã trazem noções da liberdade de expressão sob a perspectiva do pluralismo. Na mesma linha, o sistema de proteção de direitos humanos europeu e americano o faz. O Brasil apoiado em sua constituição e em tratados internacionais tem um sistema de proteção que contempla a liberdade de expressão e o pluralismo, porém ainda convive com problemáticas para a efetivação deste direito. Os desafios são muitos, porque agora surge uma terceira revolução do meio com a chegada da internet, os agentes do mercado. Mas qualquer proposta deve passar pela não divisibilidade da esfera social e individual. O Direito pode regular e efetivar cada vez mais tal liberdade configurando, sancionando, premiando e ofertando subsídios para efetivação da liberdade de expressão

Le blasphème est, depuis ses origines, un concept politique qui n’intéresse le religieux que marginalement. Jérusalem, Athènes, Rome, les morts fondatrices de Socrate et de Jésus-Christ, tous deux condamnés à la peine capitale, le premier pour impiété, le second pour blasphème, ainsi que la Torah, l’Évangile et le Coran témoignent que l’histoire de l’interdiction du blasphème est avant tout celle de sa fonction politique, qui est d’éliminer celui qui nuit à la communauté. Avec l’apparition de la modernité, l’invention de la tolérance et la proclamation de la liberté d’expression comme droit fondamental, le blasphème aurait dû disparaître. Il s’est en fait transformé. De Salman Rushdie à Charlie Hebdo, il est même devenu l’enjeu de crises planétaires répétées. Dans le monde musulman, son interdiction est aujourd’hui un outil redoutable de répression des minorités au niveau national et d’accélération de choc des civilisations au niveau international. À ce défi, l’Europe prétend répondre par la liberté d’expression, bien que la majorité des pays occidentaux continue à condamner le blasphème, compris non plus comme une offense à Dieu, mais aux croyants, signe d’une sécularisation dévoyée. C’est particulièrement le cas en France où la prolifération des lois venant limiter la liberté d’expression a fini par réinstaurer un délit de blasphème tout en multipliant les délits d’opinion. / Blasphemy is since the beginning of its recorded history not only a religious but also a political concept. Jerusalem, Athens, Rome, the founding deaths of Socrates and Jesus Christ, both sentenced to death, the first for impiety, the second for blasphemy, but also the Torah, the Gospel and the Quran show that the prohibition of blasphemy has above all a political function, which is to eliminate whoever harms the community. With modernity, the invention of tolerance and the proclamation of freedom of expression as a fundamental right, blasphemy should have disappeared. Instead, it metamorphosed. From Salman Rushdie to Charlie Hebdo, it became a worldwide issue. In the Muslim world, its prohibition has become a fearsome tool of repression of religious minorities on a national level and of acceleration of a clash of civilizations on an international level. To face this challenge, Europe pretends to answer with freedom of expression, but the majority of European countries still forbid blasphemy, understood no more as an offense to God but an offense to the believers, which is the sign of a rogue secularization. This is especially true in France where the proliferation of laws limiting freedom of expression ended up in a re-introduction of the prohibition of blasphemy and more generally of crimes of opinion.

As the title indicates, this three-essay dissertation explores the relations between value pluralism and liberal democracy. The first essay, “Negative versus Positive Freedom: Making Sense of the Dichotomy,” starts with the puzzling appeal of the negative-versus-positive-freedom dichotomy. Why has this distinction, despite forceful criticisms against it, continued to dominate mainstream discourses on freedom in contemporary political theory? Does it grasp something fundamental about the phenomenology of freedom? In this essay I examine four main approaches to making sense of the appeal of this dichotomy, and the challenges they each face. Both the conventional, naive contrast between “freedom from” and “freedom to,” and the revisionist strategy to distinguish between the “opportunity-concept” and the “exercise-concept” of freedom, upon close scrutiny, fail to survive MacCallum’s triadic argument against all dichotomous views on the concept of freedom. The third account, which reduce the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom to the divide between “phenomenal” and “nounemal” conceptions of the self, or of the range of preventing conditions, is both interpretively misleading and conceptually uninformative, as I illustrate by using Berlin’s discussion on self-abnegation as an example. In the fourth place, I analyze why both the historical bifurcation account that take the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom as merely genealogical, on the one hand, and the republican critique of it based on the presumably sublating conception of non-domination, on the other hand, are unsatisfying. Finally, I argue that grounding the negative/positive dichotomy of freedom on the idea of value pluralism avoids the pitfalls of those approaches examined. According to this account, the dichotomized instantiation of freedom is necessary insofar as we live not in isolation but with other moral agents. The “negative” freedom instantiated in the access to an extensive sphere of permissible choices and actions, and the “positive” freedom instantiated in the access to collective decision-making and democratic self-government, reflect two equally genuine yet incommensurable modes of freedom as a basic value. Many believe that value pluralism and liberalism are ultimately incompatible, however, since liberalism implies the prioritization of liberal values over other basic values, which is contradictory to the value pluralist idea that all basic values are equally genuine and incommensurable. The next two essays take up this challenge, arguing on the contrary that a persuasively elaborated version of value pluralism is not only compatible with liberal commitments, but can also provide distinctive grounds for liberal democracy and have significant political implications. In the second essay, “Value Pluralism and Its Compatibility with Liberalism,” I explain the methodology of my argument, elaborate three key concepts underlying value pluralism – value objectivity, value incompatibility, and value incommensurability – and then develop an account of modal heterogeneity of value instantiation, as opposed to valuative hierarchy. Whereas valuative hierarchy is in tension with value incommensurability, the idea of modal heterogeneity allows that different values have different modes of instantiation that warrant differentiated prioritization of certain values in relevant practical contexts, without implying anything about the comparative moral worth of relevant values. I use a mathematical analogy to illustrate the modal heterogeneity of value instantiation, as well as how we may accord freedom a special institutional role on the basis of its modal specialty vis-à-vis other basic values, rendering liberalism compatible with value pluralism. The argument is completed in the third essay, “Value Pluralism, Liberal Democracy, and Political Judgment,” where I compare my account based on the idea of modal heterogeneity, developed in the second essay, with three existing versions of liberal pluralism. Whereas Berlin’s argument from choice, Crowder’s proposal of pluralist virtues, and Galston’s presumption of expressive liberty all fail to pass either the Jump Test or the Trump Test, my modal account overcomes these two basic difficulties faced by liberal pluralism. The rest of the essay discusses three main political implications of the modal account of liberal pluralism. First, it helps us better understand the nature of demarcating and overstepping the so-called “frontiers” of a “negative” area of permissible choices and actions free from interference, or put another way, of balancing the protection of civil liberties and rights, on the one hand, with the procurement of certain important social goods through policies, on the other hand. Second, the modal account entails the dichotomization argument for democracy, and as a consequence supports not only liberalism, but liberal democracy. Recognizing the tension between negative and positive modes of freedom as immanent to the dynamic of liberal democracy, value pluralists nonetheless have reason to cherish, rather than to decry, such dynamic. Third, the modal account also suggests we appreciate the contentious yet indispensible role of political judgment in democratic life, and attend to the normative theorizing of its implications. On the one hand, it recommends institutional designs that diversify forms of political decision-making, such as by introducing adequate mechanisms of checks and balances and establishing relevant sites of expertise. On the other hand, it calls for the appreciation of the ideal of statespersonship, even in a liberal democratic society.

Avaliar a forma como interagem o chamado poder diretivo do empregador e a liberdade de expressão do empregado é o desafio que se empreende neste trabalho. Em certa medida, a eleição do tema já revela a adesão deste mestrando à corrente doutrinária que concebe existência de direitos fundamentais trabalhistas, específicos e inespecíficos, no âmbito e no universo das relações de trabalho, no caso do presente estudo, na relação de emprego. Para atingir o escopo proposto quando da escolha do tema, optamos pelo desenvolvimento de um trabalho em 6 capítulos, com análises e estudos, alguns de menor extensão, dado o caráter de coadjuvância com o tema principal, outros de maior extensão, dada a centralidade com a tarefa abraçada. Iniciamos nosso estudo com breves considerações históricas acerca do fenômeno do poder, cuidando do enquadramento conceitual e com abordagem de sua evolução a partir da antiguidade até o sistema capitalista, berço do direito do trabalho (1º Capítulo). Superada a abordagem do poder, genericamente considerado, debruçamos nossa atenção para a análise do poder diretivo de modo mais particular. E aqui tratamos das questões do conceito, fundamento legal e doutrinário, formas de expressão e limitações incidentes (2º Capítulo). O trabalho prossegue e com o propósito de estabelecer uma conexão com o trecho anterior do estudo, dirigimos a análise para a verificação dos direitos e deveres de empregado e empregador para que assim se evidencie potencialidades e limites tanto do poder diretivo do empregador, quanto dos direitos fundamentais do empregado, dentre os quais a liberdade de expressão (3º Capítulo). A sequencia do trabalho contém os esforços para o correto posicionamento da liberdade de expressão dentro do universo dos direitos humanos ou do homem, direitos fundamentais e direitos da personalidade. E com o intuito de melhor posicionar a liberdade de expressão, fazemos uma avaliação dentro do contexto do direito nacional e internacional, bem como abordamos, ainda que com pouca profundidade, a questão das gerações ou dimensões dos direitos fundamentais (4º Capítulo). O trato da liberdade de expressão tematiza o penúltimo capitulo e nele envidamos esforços para localizar em que esfera da existência do trabalhador subordinado, íntima, privada ou pessoal, ou no âmbito de todas estas, está a liberdade de expressão. Neste mesmo capítulo, devotamos nossa análise para a questão do plano de eficácia do direito fundamental à liberdade de expressão inclusive com o debate com a abordagem das formas, objeções, limites da liberdade de expressão e sobretudo com uma análise do direito em debate no contexto da relação de emprego, inclusive no que toca ao chamado direito de crítica. Encerramos esse capitulo com considerações acerca de medidas de proteção em caso de dispensa discriminatória. Na conclusão registramos nossas ponderações. / Assess how named steering power of the employer interacts and the employee\'s freedom of expression is the challenge that this work is undertaken. To some extent, the election theme already reveals the accession of the current Master\'s doctrinal conceives existence of fundamental labor, specific and nonspecific, and within the universe of labor relations in the case of this study, the employment relationship. To achieve the proposed scope when choosing the theme, we opted for the development of a work in 6 chapters, with analyzes and studies, some less extensive, given the character of co-acting with the main subject, other larger extent, given the centrality and embraced the task. We begin our study with brief historical considerations about the phenomenon of power, taking care of the conceptual framework and approach of its evolution from antiquity to the capitalist system, the cradle of labor law (Chapter 1). Approach to overcome the power, generally considered, worked through our attention to the analysis of power steering more particular. And here we treat the issues of concept, doctrinal and legal basis, forms of expression and limitations incidents (Chapter 2). The work continues in order to establish a connection with the earliest part of the study, headed analysis to verify the rights and duties of employee and employer so that if evidence of both potential and limits of the directive power of the employer, as rights key employee, among which the freedom of expression (Chapter 3). The sequence of this work includes efforts to the correct positioning of freedom of expression within the universe of human rights or of man, fundamental rights and personality rights. And in order to better position the freedom of speech, we make an assessment within the context of national and international law, as well as approach, albeit with little depth, the issue of generational dimensions or fundamental rights (Chapter 4). The tract of freedom of expression lead the penultimate chapter and we strive to find it in that sphere of existence of subordinate worker, intimate, private or personal, or under all these, is the freedom of expression. In this same chapter, we devote our analysis to the question of plan effectiveness of the fundamental right to freedom of expression and ended the debate with the approach of the ways, objections, limits of freedom of expression and especially the analysis of law in the context of the debate employment relationship, including with regard to the so-called right of criticism. In conclusion we recorded our weightings.

Under the auspices of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights the right to freedom of expression is said to be held by everyone and to include the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority, subject to the limitation clauses outlined in Article 10(2). Whilst the text of Article 10 therefore makes no explicit reference to specifically artistic expression, the European Court of Human Rights has, in its interpretation of ‘information and ideas’, nevertheless accepted that artistic expression does indeed fall within the ambit of Article 10’s protection of freedom of expression. However, despite the Court recognising artistic expression as a form of expression within the framework of Article 10, conclusions reached in the early case law concerning the issue of controversial artworks would appear to suggest the judicial creation of an implicit hierarchy of expression under which artistic expression is seen to enjoy a relatively low level of protection. Given the non-differentiated articulation of the right to freedom of expression enounced in the text of Article 10, the creation of such a hierarchy of expression is therefore a cause for doctrinal concern. In seeking to assess this misnomer the thesis’ analysis of the treatment of artistic expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights may be distilled in to two component parts. Firstly, a theoretical basis will be established from which artistic expression may be located within the context of the discourse pertaining to freedom of expression more generally. Having confirmed that, whilst of a distinctive, sui generis nature, artistic expression may indeed constitute ‘expression’ for the purposes of freedom of expression doctrine the second part of the thesis will examine the particular question of artistic expression’s treatment under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Submitted by Rosivalda Pereira (mrs.pereira@ufma.br) on 2017-10-31T20:06:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Rogerio de Pinho Andrade.pdf: 1654192 bytes, checksum: 3e199efb9b53aa93ecdf1a3f53236b90 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-31T20:06:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Rogerio de Pinho Andrade.pdf: 1654192 bytes, checksum: 3e199efb9b53aa93ecdf1a3f53236b90 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-07 / This is a study about the exercise of tolerance against the speech of hate based on John Rawls‟ theory of justice. The paper aims to analyze the Federal Supreme Court decision in the Ellwanger Case under the comprehension of John Rawls‟ political philosophy. For this purpose, freedom of expression, tolerance and the speech of hatred are analyzed. Freedom of expression is discussed as a fundamental right distinguishing it from freedom of thought and information. We describe the idea of tolerance in modern society by identifying its philosophical foundation from the conceptions developed by the modern philosophers John Locke, Voltaire, John Stuart Mill, Noerberto Bobbio e John Rawls. The hate speech is conceptualized and contextualized. The conception of liberty and tolerance according to John Rawls is presented. We discuss freedom of expression, tolerance and hate speech under a legal perspective in both national and interamerican legal systems. Hate speech in Brazil is analyzed under the STF judgment of the Ellwanger case. / Estudo do exercício da tolerância frente ao discurso do ódio com fundamentos na teoria da justiça de John Rawls. O trabalho objetiva analisar a decisão do Supremo Tribunal Federal no Caso Ellwanger sob a compreensão da filosofia política de John Rawls. Para tanto, analisa-se a liberdade de expressão, a tolerância e o discurso do ódio. Descreve-se a ideia de tolerância na sociedade moderna identificando sua fundamentação filosófica a partir das concepções desenvolvidas pelos filósofos modernos John Locke, Voltaire, John Stuart Mill, Norberto Bobbio e John Rawls. Descreve-se a ideia de tolerância na sociedade moderna identificando sua fundamentação filosófica. Conceitua-se e contextualiza-se o discurso do ódio. Apresenta-se a concepção de liberdade e tolerância em John Rawls. Debate-se a liberdade de expressão, a tolerância e o discurso do ódio na perspectiva jurídica no sistema nacional e interamericano de direito. Analisa-se o discurso do ódio no Brasil sob o julgado do STF do caso Ellwanger.

Partant du postulat selon lequel la principale justification de la répression de formes d’expressions réside dans leur nocivité supposée, nous tentons de répondre à la question suivante : comment définir des limites claires et cohérentes à la liberté d’expression ? L’analyse des controverses relatives à la pornographie, et en particulier de la manière dont les notions de liberté d’expression et de nuisance ont été articulées, contribue à répondre à cette question générale. À travers l’analyse des débats portant sur la restriction des représentations sexuelles, nous tentons de montrer que les parties en présence ne sont pas parvenues à définir la notion de « nuisance » de manière claire et satisfaisante, et ne permettent pas, dès lors, de définir avec précision les limites légitimes de la liberté d’expression. Les deux voies théoriques alternatives que nous avons identifiées, les conceptions instrumentales et déontologiques de la liberté d’expression, ne se révèlent pas plus convaincantes. Nous montrons néanmoins qu’il est possible de préciser le principe de non-nuisance en y intégrant deux éléments auparavant négligés : la subjectivité du récepteur, et les rapports d’autorité qui existent entre le locuteur et le récepteur. Nous défendons ainsi l’idée que le principe de non-nuisance reste l’instrument le plus clair et le plus cohérent pour fonder les limites de la liberté d’expression, à condition de l’amender et de le compléter. / Acknowledging the fact that the main justification to restrict some forms of expression lies in the harm they may cause to others, this thesis aims at answering the following question: how do we define clear and coherent limits of the freedom of expression? The study of the controversies regarding pornography, and particularly the way in which the concepts of freedom of expression and harm are closely linked together, is an important contribution in order to answer this vast subject. Through the analysis of debates with regard to sexual representations, this thesis aims at gaining a deeper understanding on how the authors were unsuccessful in defining the notion of « harm » in a clear and convincing way, and fail at allowing to set precisely the legitimate limits of freedom of expression. The two alternative theoretical approaches that were identified and established - the instrumental and deontological conceptions of freedom of expression – were not proven to be more satisfactory either. However, this research confirms that the harm principle can be clarified if two previously neglected aspects are included in the analysis: the receiver’s subjectivity, and the authority relationship established between the speaker and the viewer. Thus, it is argued that the harm principle, given that it is modified and completed, remains the most effective and adequate tool in order to ground the limits of freedom of expression.

[pt] Este trabalho tem como objeto o direito à comunicação abordando, especificamente, seu exercício através da radiodifusão televisiva. Assume-se a premissa de que a concretização dos direitos e garantias tais como estabelecidos no capítulo V do título VIII da Constituição brasileira demandam a atuação de agentes reguladores, tendo sido buscados fundamentos teóricos e normativos para legitimar essa demanda. A pesquisa perfaz um breve histórico da implantação do sistema de televisão no Brasil, em paralelo com o desenvolvimento dos instrumentos legislativos que disciplinaram sua atividade. Para demonstrar a natureza democrática da regulação da comunicação televisiva, é feito um resumo dos principais instrumentos e agências internacionais que atuam no setor da radiodifusão. Complementando o estudo, foi realizada uma pesquisa bibliográfica sobre o tema da comunicação como capital e poder político, com autores contemporâneos tais como Manuel Castells, John B. Thompson, Franco Berardi, Antonio Negri e Michael Hardt. / [en] This work is about communication rights and its main focus is on television broadcast regulation.It assumes that the manifestation of the rights and guaranties of chapter V of the Brazilian Constitution demands the participation of regulatory agencies, and in this work is shown bases for it application in the norms, doctrine and theories. This work makes a brief history of the television broadcasting in Brazil, and also talks about its legal forms and norms. In order to demonstrate the democratic nature of broadcast regulationis shown a list of some communication regulation agencies and policies around the world.Complementing this research was made a bibliography on the political aspects of communication, with authors such as Manuel Castells, John B. Thompson, Franco Berardi, Antonio Negri e Michael Hardt.

The paper discusses the scientific and policy debate as to whether access to the Internet can be considered so fundamental for human interaction as to deserve a special legal protection. In particular, it examines the impact of computer-mediated communication on the realization of individual’s rights and freedoms as well as on democratization processes. It then considers how Internet content governance is posing regulatory issues directly related to the growing importance of an equitable access to digital information. In this regard, the paper looks at conflicts arising within the systems of rights and obligations attached to communication (and especially content provision) over the Internet. The paper finally concludes by identifying emerging tensions and drawing out the implications for the nature and definitions of rights (e.g. of communication and access, but also of intellectual property ownership) and for regulations and actions taken to protect, promote or qualify those rights. All these points are illustrated by a series of recent examples.

This thesis uses our lived experience of speech online to analyse the most common justification for freedom of speech: the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor. It opens with an account of a conversation in the feminist blogosphere that explicitly addressed the operation of social power in discussion. The lessons of that conversation is compared to accounts of the marketplace of ideas metaphor offered by theorists like Sunstein, Fiss, and Boyd White, as well as more internet-oriented theorists like Lessig, Benkler and Balkin. From that, and building on the insights of critics like Fraser and Mansbridge, the thesis argues that we ought to reject the "liberal-economic" paradigm of the function of speech and deliberation in a democracy, and proposes that we replace the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor with that of a "critical democratic culture." The thesis concludes by illustrating the usefulness of that new metaphor through the example of hate speech.