The aim of this thesis is to describe and defend ‘The Constraint-Based View’, which is a particular conception of the nature of, and relationship between, ideal and non-ideal theories of justice. Traditionally, ideal theory is characterised by the assumption of ‘full compliance’, while non-ideal theory is characterised by the assumption of ‘partial compliance’. In other words, ideal theories assume that those for whom the theory is meant to apply will be entirely willing and able to comply with the theory’s requirements, while non-ideal theories do not. In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I describe and assess this original conception as well as several alternative accounts of ideal and non-ideal theory, in order to offer a broad survey of the existing literature, and to identify the various ways that these conceptions fail to capture fully the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory. In Chapter 2, I draw a distinction between two different approaches to theorising about justice. ‘Axiological’ or ‘A-Type’ approaches are characterised by the fact that they include almost no assumptions as inputs to the theory, and that they are not intended to provide action-guiding recommendations as part of the outputs of the theory. In contrast, ‘Practical’ or ‘P-Type’ approaches include additional assumptions as part of their inputs and are intended to form part of a process that ultimately produces action-guiding recommendations. In Chapter 3, I describe and defend my preferred conception of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory – the ‘Constraint-Based View’ (CBV). According to the CBV, there is a spectrum of theoretical approaches that can be more or less ideal, depending on the extent to which they include ‘soft constraints’ as part of the inputs to the theory. Soft constraints are facts about the world that can be changed, in contrast to hard constraints, which are facts about the world that cannot. I argue that this way of thinking about the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory is more useful than the alternative conceptions considered in Chapter 1. In Chapter 4, I examine the roles that feasibility considerations should play in ideal and non-ideal theory, from the perspective of the CBV and in Chapter 5, I explain the implications of adopting the CBV for what I call ‘transitional theory’, which is concerned with the transition from the status quo towards a more ideal state of affairs. In Chapter 6, I offer an example of the CBV in action, by considering its implications for the debate over duties of justice towards future generations.

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o papel da religião em sociedades democráticas liberais. Inicialmente, descrevo os principais elementos das teorias exclusivas e inclusivas da religião. Os argumentos de tais teorias dizem respeito à (in)validez da justificação de razões religiosas para leis estatais de caráter coercitivo. Após apresentar estas linhas gerais, trago ao debate duas posições liberais a respeito da tolerância religiosa: primeiro, a de Ronald Dworkin, depois a de John Rawls com o intuito de defender uma concepção liberal igualitária de tolerância religiosa. Embora Rawls esteja normalmente situado entre os teóricos ditos exclusivistas, pretendo lançar mão de alguns elementos de sua teoria que sugerem, no entanto, a presença de uma certa visão inclusiva em seu argumento, ou ao menos uma visão menos restritiva de sua ideia / ideal de razão pública. Por fim, avalio os limites da teoria normativa rawlsiana ante as formulações de Jürgen Habermas a respeito dos desafios que a religião suscita em sociedades pós-seculares. / This work has the main goal of analyzing the role of religion in liberal democratic societies. First, I describe the main tenets of the exclusive and inclusive theories of religion. These theories concern the (in) validity of religious reasons to justify state laws of a coercive nature. After presenting the general outlines of the debate, I discuss how two different liberal theories, the Ronald Dworkins normative framework and then the rawlsian one, are both able to offer a liberal-egalitarian defense for a conception of religious tolerance. Although normally located among theories called exclusive I intend to use some elements of John Rawls theory that suggest, nonetheless, the presence of a certain inclusive vision in his argument, or at least a less restrictive view of his idea/ideal of public reason. Finally, I take up Jürgen Habermas assumptions on the place of religion in post-secular societies in order to test some normative limits which the theory of John Rawls must face.

Thesis advisor: David Rasmussen / When is political power legitimate? Public reasons liberals argue that political power is legitimate only when it is supported by reasons drawn from principles of justice that each citizen could endorse. The most well known model for identifying whether a principle satisfies this requirement is John Rawls’ idea of an overlapping consensus. Typical interpretations of the idea of overlapping consensus hold that it expresses a necessary conceptual condition of any reasonable conception of justice. Against this ahistorical view, my analysis shows that Rawls’ mature account of overlapping consensus rests on a particular historicist thesis that liberal institutions are necessary for social cooperation given the presumption of moral and religious pluralism. The authority of public reasoning ultimately rests on a widespread consensus about the necessity of liberal institutions, rather than on a consensus on any particular conception of justice. The limits of public reason, on my analysis, are fixed first and foremost by liberal institutions. Given the prominent historical role of classical liberalism in specifying and defending liberal institutions, one might suppose that classical liberal conceptions of justice would have a central place in any consensus that defines the boundaries of public reasoning. I argue that this appearance is misleading. The work of scholars in disability studies show that conceptions of justice must be sufficiently sensitive to the unique needs and interests of citizens with disabilities. I argue that applying these insights to the idea of public reason shows that classical liberalism can satisfy the requirements of public reason only by unjustly ignoring the perspective of disabled citizens I show that Rawls’ model of public reason rests on a nuanced and historically grounded view of the consensus circumscribing public reason. Further, it shows that a historically conditioned concept of public reason and political legitimacy need not imply a drastic retreat from central egalitarian commitments, despite initial appearances to the contrary. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

The thesis revolves around the transformation of liberal citizenship to a higher degree of conditionality in the face of pluralist challenges revolving around achieving a shared common good. John Rawls’ Political Liberalism serves as the theoretical foundation for the argumentative analysis conducted, utilizing specific civic integration policies of Sweden and Denmark. The normative policy analysis reveals that the “civic integrationist turn” in itself is largely compatible with Rawls’ liberal principles of justice and equality. However, the problematic component lies in the de facto implementation of those measures which can have exclusionary and discriminatory effects i.e. the formulation of citizenship test questions and the portrayal of particular comprehensive doctrines of minority groups as incompatible with national liberal values. The most substantial challenge for a liberal pluralist society remains achieving “overlapping consensus” in the political sphere and guaranteeing safeguards for citizen’s personal comprehensive doctrines in the private sphere.

John Rawls defines civil disobediance as a ”public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government.” (Rawls, 1999:320). Rawls has developed a theory of civil disobediance that has been widely discussed (Månsson, 2004:153). His theory explains when one can break the law and what has to be taken into consideration (Rawls, 1996:345-346). The theory is designed only for the special case of a nearly just society where the members of the community are rational beings. Rawls has a democratic and constitutional perspective that cares for a stable state power. The theory has been criticized by philosophers such as Kimberley Browlee and Tomas Månsson that claim that it is too narrow (Månsson, 2004:157-159, Brownlee 2012:2). The Swedish legal system does not regulate civil disobediance in any particulary law, rather it is the criminal acts that are connected to the civil disobediance that are prohibited. A dilemma for the criminal law is the amount of tolerance that should be allowed for criminal acts that we morally can understand (Asp & Ulväng, 2019:13). In common practice there has been a very low acceptence of civil disobediance. There has not been any case of discharge and the court has expressed a concern in judging these acts too light (NJA 1982 s. 376).

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Um dos principais problemas apresentados pela concepção tradicional de democracia, caracterizada pela mera competição política entre interesses ou preferências, é sua insuficiência na avaliação dos resultados políticos. Em contraposição, a idéia de uma democracia deliberativa pretende, dentre outros objetivos, fornecer uma reflexão epistêmica, na medida em que se propõe a ir além do mérito dos procedimentos democráticos, com vistas a apresentar boas razões para as escolhas públicas. Ela requer uma justificação pública que se faça por meio da argumentação pública de todos os concernidos. Essa abordagem, contudo, é comprometida por falhas relacionadas a sua postura excessivamente idealista caso entendamos os procedimentos deliberativos como discussões políticas efetivas voltadas para o consenso ou à eventual vagueza de seus parâmetros epistêmicos. Procuro defender, em sentido contrário, que critérios adequados à justificação pública podem ser encontrados na concepção política de justiça presente no liberalismo político de John Rawls. Sua proposta deve ser interpretada, em discordância com críticas correntes, como defensora da democracia e plenamente compatível com a deliberação democrática. / One of the major problems that beset the traditional conception of democracy, marked by a mere political contention of interests or preferences, is the absence of a due appraisal of political outcomes. Contrarily, the idea of deliberative democracy intends inter alia to provide an epistemic account so far as it goes beyond procedural values in order to find good reasons for a public choice. It claims a public justification by way of a public reasoning among all those concerned. This account reveals, however, shortcomings for being either too idealist if its deliberative procedures mean a public discussion whose aim is consensus or too vague whether one considers those procedures as epistemic standards. I sustain otherwise that appropriate criteria for public justification can be found in a political conception of justice supported by John Rawls political liberalism. This account is to be shown in opposition to common objections - as encouraging democracy and not inimical to democratic deliberation.

A presente dissertação busca realizar uma discussão pormenorizada de dois grandes teóricos da justiça distributiva: John Rawls e Ronald Dworkin. O objetivo é verificar como a meritocracia e a responsabilidade individual são acomodadas, de forma normativamente apropriada, nessas diferentes interpretações do igualitarismo, ressaltando suas justificativas para a existência de desigualdades socioeconômicas, isto é, sob que condições estas poderiam ser consideradas legítimas. Além disso, verificar-se-á que tipo de políticas públicas o Estado estaria autorizado a adotar, se levar em consideração as implicações de cada uma dessas concepções de justiça. / This dissertation seeks to accomplish a detailed discussion of two major theorists of distributive justice: John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. The aim is to check how meritocracy and individual responsibility are accommodated, in normatively appropriate way, in these different interpretations of egalitarianism, highlighting the justifications for the existence of socioeconomic inequalities, that is, under what conditions these could be considered legitimate. Furthermore, this study will verify what kind of policies the state would be authorized to adopt, taking into account the implications of each of these conceptions of justice.

Ce mémoire explore la question des conséquences de l’interprétation rawlsienne du pluralisme éthique pour la légitimité de l’autonomie individuelle comme objectif d’éducation publique. Rawls (1993, 2003) soutient que seuls des objectifs éducatifs strictement politiques peuvent guider l’élaboration des politiques publiques en matière d’éducation obligatoire et justifier une intervention étatique dans l’éducation des enfants. Or, puisque Rawls définit l’autonomie individuelle comme un idéal éthique privé, il conclut qu’elle n’est pas un objectif légitime d’éducation publique. La thèse principale qui est défendue dans le cadre de ce mémoire est que Rawls est aveugle aux implications réelles de sa propre théorie politique en matière d’éducation commune, qui, contrairement à ce qu’il soutient, exigent précisément la promotion de l’autonomie individuelle comme idéal éthique (et non politique). Cette thèse remet en question le principe de neutralité de l’État envers toutes les doctrines éthiques, y compris l’idéal d’autonomie individuelle, qui caractérise et distingue la théorie rawlsienne des versions classiques du libéralisme. La deuxième partie de cette étude considère une stratégie possible pour sauver la neutralité du libéralisme politique, qui consiste à définir le concept d’autonomie individuelle de manière procédurale et éthiquement neutre. Ce chapitre montre que, indépendamment de la plausibilité strictement conceptuelle d’une telle caractérisation de l’autonomie individuelle, elle n’est pas appropriée au projet éducatif rawlsien, parce que celui-ci demande la valorisation de la pensée critique, et comporte donc un élément éthique incontournable. Enfin, la troisième partie de cette étude explore la problématique des moyens de promotion de l’autonomie individuelle et, plus spécifiquement, de la légitimité des écoles séparées religieuses. Elle soutient, d’un côté que l’école religieuse peut avoir une importante valeur instrumentale vis-à-vis du développement de l’autonomie individuelle, mais de l’autre côté, que l’école commune est nécessaire à un certain stade de développement. / This study explores the consequences of the rawlsian interpretation of ethical pluralism for the legitimacy of individual autonomy as a goal of public educational policies. Rawls (1993, 2003) affirms that the only educational goals that can legitimately justify public policies and the state’s intervention in children’s education are strictly political goals. Now, Rawls defines personal autonomy as a private ethical ideal. Therefore, he concludes that personal autonomy is not a legitimate goal of public education. The main thesis defended in this study is that Rawls fails to realize the implications of his own political theory for educational policies. His ideal of citizenship demands in fact a public promotion of individual autonomy. One effect of this thesis is to challenge the principle of the state’s neutrality towards all ethical doctrines, which characterizes and distinguishes Rawls’ theory from the classical versions of liberalism. The second part of the study considers an alternative strategy that aims at defending the principle of neutrality by redefining the very concept of personal autonomy in procedural and non-ethical terms. However, this study shows that, independently of its conceptual plausibility, a purely procedural notion of personal autonomy is not appropriate in the context of the rawlsian educational project. Rawls’ political theory demands in fact the valorization of the practice of autonomy and involves thereby an unavoidable ethical partiality for certain ways of life. Finally, the third part of this study explores the normative debate about the means needed for the promotion of personal autonomy in public education. More specifically, it focuses on the question of the legitimacy of religious schools. It argues, on the one hand, that religious schools can play an important instrumental role for the development of personal autonomy, but that, on the other hand, common schooling is, at the certain stage, necessary for a full development of children’s personal autonomy within a pluralistic society.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This dissertation aims to show that the criticism of John Raws to utilitarianism and the proposition of his Theory of Justice, especially the difference principle, offer an alternative to utilitarianism as a normative basis for the welfare economics, by providing a safe way to arbitrate social and economic inequalities. According to the philosopher, by making the utility as the supreme good, utilitarianism concerns only with maximizing the total happiness, and disregards the way it is distribute among different individuals. When interpersonal utility comparisons were criticized for being considered normative, welfare economy found on the principle of efficiency considered one scientific way to assess the well-being and at the same time, keeping alive the utilitarian tradition. This principle, however, is also criticized by the author, since selects various positions as equally effective, and among which some people can live in abundance while others live in extreme poverty. In this sense, John Rawls proposes a theory of justice in an attempt to offer an alternative to utilitarian perspective. In this theory, individuals are driven to put in a hypothetical situation, called original position, which must decide on the principles that will govern the institutions of their society. The author states that the principles to be chosen in the original position would be, briefly, the principle of equal liberty and the principle of difference. According to the first principle, which has priority over the second, ensures an equal system of basic freedoms for all individuals and, according to the difference principle, social and economic inequalities are allowed only if they occur in favor of individuals less fortunate in society. It is argued that the Rawlsian theory, and especially the principle of difference, is an alternative to utilitarianism as a normative basis of welfare economics. This is because this principle ensures the well-being for all individuals in society, and not only that contribute most to the total satisfaction to increase, as proposed by utilitarianism. In this sense, if taken into account, these contributions would allow the welfare economy fill the gap left by the distributive utilitarianism, and to assess the well-being of individuals in order to guarantee them not only economic efficiency but also distributive justice. / A presente dissertação objetiva demonstrar que a crítica de John Raws ao utilitarismo e a proposição de sua Teoria da Justiça, sobretudo o princípio da diferença, oferecem uma alternativa ao utilitarismo enquanto base normativa da economia do bem-estar, ao proporcionar uma forma segura para arbitrar as desigualdades sociais e econômicas. De acordo com o filósofo, ao condicionar a utilidade como bem supremo, o utilitarismo importa-se apenas com a maximização da felicidade total, e desconsidera a forma pela qual ela é distribuída entre os diferentes indivíduos. Quando as comparações interpessoais de utilidade foram criticadas por serem consideradas normativas, a economia do bem-estar encontrou no princípio da eficiência uma forma considerada científica para avaliar o bem-estar e, ao mesmo tempo, manter viva a tradição utilitarista. Este princípio, porém, também é criticado pelo autor, uma vez que seleciona várias posições como igualmente eficientes, e dentre as quais algumas pessoas podem viver em grande abundância enquanto outras vivem na extrema miséria. Neste sentido, John Rawls propõe uma teoria da justiça, na tentativa de oferecer uma alternativa à perspectiva utilitarista. Nesta teoria, os indivíduos são levados a colocar-se em uma situação hipotética, denominada posição original, na qual devem deliberar sobre os princípios que irão regular as instituições de sua sociedade. O autor afirma que os princípios a serem escolhidos na posição original seriam, de forma sucinta, o princípio da liberdade igual e o princípio da diferença. De acordo com o primeiro princípio, que possui prioridade sobre o segundo, garante-se um igual sistema de liberdades básicas para todos os indivíduos e, de acordo com o princípio da diferença, as desigualdades econômicas e sociais são permitidas somente se ocorrerem em prol dos indivíduos menos favorecidos na sociedade. Argumenta-se que a teoria rawlsiana, e de modo especial o seu princípio da diferença, representam uma alternativa ao utilitarismo como base normativa da economia do bem-estar. Isto ocorre porque este princípio assegura o bem-estar a todos os indivíduos da sociedade, e não apenas aos que mais contribuem para aumentar a satisfação total, como proposto pelo utilitarismo. Neste sentido, se levadas em consideração, estas contribuições permitiriam que a economia do bem-estar preenchesse a lacuna distributiva deixada pelo utilitarismo, e avaliasse o bem-estar dos indivíduos de forma a lhes garantir não apenas a eficiência econômica, mas também a justiça distributiva.