The study examines if methods used by MeToo-movement can be justified as civil disobedience, using contract theories formulated by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. The study aims at two things. Firstly, to explore the justification of public accusations in order to give new perspectives on the contemporary debate on the Swedish MeToo-movement. Three cases are examined, all in which profiles names and pictures have been published in media due to accusations of sexual harassments. Secondly, the study aims to examine and evaluate the normative standpoints behind the contractarian approach to civil disobedience from a feminist perspective. By applying feminist critic of contract theory, carried out by Carole Pateman, Susan Moller Okin and Jean Hampton, I hope to contribute to a more sustainable theory on civil disobedience as a tool for fighting structural injustice. The analysis shows that the contractarian way of defining and justifying civil disobedience is founded on assumptions that are unacceptable from a feminist point of view. Amongst other things, I find that Rawls definition of political consciousness ignores the structural subordination and discrimination of women, by paying attention only to the public sphere and its political institutions. As a result of this, although some aspects of the methods used by the MeToo-movement fits in to the contractarian definition of civil disobedience, the theories prove unable to justify our cases. In the conclusion, I argue that the MeToo-movement broadens our understanding of civil disobedience by challenging the boundaries of how injustices are created, defined and remediated.

Baserat på olika vetenskapliga och filosofiska definitioner av vad liberalismen kännetecknas av så åsyftar denna uppsats att ge klarhet i vilken liberalismkonception som tre olika svenska riksdagspartier använder sig av i debatten om religiösa friskolor. Det stora fokuset för uppsatsen är att beskriva hur liberalismen kan se olika ut beroende på hur man väljer att värdera olika liberala begrepp. Begrepp som frihet, jämställdhet och rättvisa visar sig definieras olika av de tre riksdagspartier som granskas, och således landar även partierna olika i sina argument beträffande de religiösa friskolorna i Sverige. Med anledning av liberalismens utveckling i historien så har begreppet liberalism och vad som räknas som liberala begrepp ändrats och formats om så att det idag kan uppfattas som svårt att definiera vad som kan anses vara liberalt. Liberalismen lider av en kluvenhet vilket visar sig när partier som anser sig föra en liberal argumentation ibland lyckas landa i beslut som kan anses vara varandras motsatser. Uppsatsens slutsats är att de tre riksdagspartier som presenterats använder sig av huvudsakligen två liberalismkonceptioner, där den ena konceptionen förespråkar en starkare stat för ökad liberalism, medan den andra konceptionen förespråkar en större frihet för individen att forma sitt eget liv.

At the outset the International Criminal Court (ICC) was heralded as a revolution within international society, but it has since found itself at the centre of much controversy and debate. According to the Rome Statute’s Preamble, a broad aim of the ICC is: “to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice”. However, a review of the critical literature surrounding the ICC uncovered a noticeable lack of discussions applying theoretical understandings of justice to neither the Court’s design nor operations; a gap in the literature that the thesis aims to address. Moreover, the review identified that the primary concerns regarding the ICC’s performance all focussed on stakeholder practices. Combining these two observations, the thesis hypothesised that the controversies and issues facing the ICC emerged because the practice of the Court’s primary stakeholders has been incompatible with the demands of justice. In order to test this hypothesis, the thesis analyses the compatibility of the ICC with what the thesis identifies as the core theoretical demands of justice across three areas: purpose, procedure, and stakeholder practice. It does this by building a theoretical framework from the justice literature which is then used to analyse and critique data relating to the ICC’s purposes, procedures and stakeholder practices gathered from empirical observations, interviews, official documents and speeches. The thesis concludes that, for the most part, it is the practice of ICC stakeholders that have been incompatible with the demands of justice, not the Court’s purposes or procedures.

Este trabalho discute a teoria do direito de Ronald Dworkin, desde sua gênese até seus desenvolvimentos mais recentes, com o objetivo específico de aferir a influência que esta sofreu da filosofia política de John Rawls e de sua concepção de justiça. Essa influência foi especialmente sentida na metodologia inicialmente concebida por Dworkin para responder às tradicionais questões de teoria geral do direito, já que estas teriam sido mal resolvidas pelos positivistas. O que se verifica é que tal método se baseia na idéia de equilíbrio reflexivo de Rawls. Essa intensa convergência que inicialmente se verifica é progressivamente afastada na medida em que Dworkin caminha rumo a um liberalismo abrangente, defendendo uma continuidade entre a moralidade política e a ética, e Rawls reinterpreta sua teoria para defender uma limitação desta ao domínio do político. / This paper will discuss Ronald Dworkins legal theory since its genesis till its most recent studies, aiming specifically assess how this theory was influenced by John Rawls political philosophy and his conception of justice. This influence was specially noticed in the methodology first conceived by Dworkin to respond to the traditional issues of jurisprudence, since these ones had been unresolved by the legal positivism. What can be verified is that such method is based on Rawls idea of reflective equilibrium. This strong convergence, that is initially observed, is gradually deviated insofar as Dworkin moves towards to a comprehensive liberalism, defending continuity between morality and ethics, and Rawls reinterprets his theory to defend a limitation of it to the domain of the political.

“Uma Teoria da Justiça” de John Rawls surgiu como uma proposta renovada para abordar a equidade das instituições. Uma característica que faz o conceito de Rawls distinto é a aplicação de sua teoria a um escopo restrito: instituições que constituem a estrutura básica da sociedade. Além disso, esse conceito de justiça deve ser imparcial em relação às concepções de Bem dos indivíduos. Essa dissertação explora as razões que levaram Rawls e seus seguidores a escolher essa abordagem e sugere possíveis desafios não resolvidos por sua teoria. / “A Theory of Justice” of John Rawls emerges as a renewed proposition to approach the fairness of institutions. A distinctive characteristic of Rawls concept is the application of his theory towards a limited scope: institutions that constitute the basic structure of the society. Moreover, such concept of justice must be impartial in regard to individuals’ conceptions of good. This dissertation explores the reasons that led Rawls and his followers to choose this approach, and suggests possible challenges unsolved by his theory.

Submitted by Rosivalda Pereira (mrs.pereira@ufma.br) on 2017-10-31T20:06:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Rogerio de Pinho Andrade.pdf: 1654192 bytes, checksum: 3e199efb9b53aa93ecdf1a3f53236b90 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-31T20:06:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Rogerio de Pinho Andrade.pdf: 1654192 bytes, checksum: 3e199efb9b53aa93ecdf1a3f53236b90 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-07 / This is a study about the exercise of tolerance against the speech of hate based on John Rawls‟ theory of justice. The paper aims to analyze the Federal Supreme Court decision in the Ellwanger Case under the comprehension of John Rawls‟ political philosophy. For this purpose, freedom of expression, tolerance and the speech of hatred are analyzed. Freedom of expression is discussed as a fundamental right distinguishing it from freedom of thought and information. We describe the idea of tolerance in modern society by identifying its philosophical foundation from the conceptions developed by the modern philosophers John Locke, Voltaire, John Stuart Mill, Noerberto Bobbio e John Rawls. The hate speech is conceptualized and contextualized. The conception of liberty and tolerance according to John Rawls is presented. We discuss freedom of expression, tolerance and hate speech under a legal perspective in both national and interamerican legal systems. Hate speech in Brazil is analyzed under the STF judgment of the Ellwanger case. / Estudo do exercício da tolerância frente ao discurso do ódio com fundamentos na teoria da justiça de John Rawls. O trabalho objetiva analisar a decisão do Supremo Tribunal Federal no Caso Ellwanger sob a compreensão da filosofia política de John Rawls. Para tanto, analisa-se a liberdade de expressão, a tolerância e o discurso do ódio. Descreve-se a ideia de tolerância na sociedade moderna identificando sua fundamentação filosófica a partir das concepções desenvolvidas pelos filósofos modernos John Locke, Voltaire, John Stuart Mill, Norberto Bobbio e John Rawls. Descreve-se a ideia de tolerância na sociedade moderna identificando sua fundamentação filosófica. Conceitua-se e contextualiza-se o discurso do ódio. Apresenta-se a concepção de liberdade e tolerância em John Rawls. Debate-se a liberdade de expressão, a tolerância e o discurso do ódio na perspectiva jurídica no sistema nacional e interamericano de direito. Analisa-se o discurso do ódio no Brasil sob o julgado do STF do caso Ellwanger.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-06-15T14:50:48Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Pércio Davies Schmitz_.pdf: 562620 bytes, checksum: c115ed27d354445d713cfb6eacee7088 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-15T14:50:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pércio Davies Schmitz_.pdf: 562620 bytes, checksum: c115ed27d354445d713cfb6eacee7088 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-04-12 / Nenhuma / A presente dissertação de Mestrado trata da questão da justiça que é tema controverso e aberto desde os primórdios das indagações filosóficas sobre o tema. Nossos dias são marcados por contradições acerca da própria visão de homem e de sociedade, principalmente após termos vivenciado ao mesmo passo as maravilhas do avanço técnico, científico e cultural dos dois últimos séculos, também as atrocidades realizadas contra o homem ferindo os seus direitos mais fundamentais, em especial os fatos históricos do século XX, como as duas grandes guerras. Esse paradoxo entre o enaltecimento das potencialidades humanas e a própria redução utilitária da condição humana leva à busca de uma nova teoria da justiça que seja capaz de repensar o valor do humano e a sua condição natural e que a mesma não seja simplesmente uma condição instrumental e calcada nos princípios de maior satisfação para o maior número de indivíduos, próprios do utilitarismo que se impunha até o momento. O tema proposto visa situar a visão de homem, no interior do contexto da justiça, focando-se especificamente na questão do atomismo social do indivíduo, presente na teoria da justiça como equidade de John Rawls, que o entende uma parte autônoma no interior de uma doutrina contratualista, atomizada portanto, e que se dá, privilegiadamente, em sua teoria, no “momento” ahistórico da posição original. Aqui o enfoque será dado à teoria da justiça de Rawls e se pretende considerar as críticas à questão do atomismo elaboradas por Taylor, no contexto do debate atual entre liberalismo e comunitarismo. / This dissertation is on the issue of justice which is an open and controversial theme since the earliest times of the philosophical questions about the topic. Our time is marked by contradictions about the own vision of man and society, mainly after we have experienced both the wonders of the technical scientific and cultural development of the last two centuries and also carried out the atrocities against man, hurting his most fundamental rights, specially the historical facts of the twentieth century, as the two world wars. This paradox between the enhancement of the human potential and the very utilitarian reduction of the human condition lead us to a search of a new theory of the justice that is able to rethink the value of the human and its natural condition and that it is not only an instrumental condition grounded upon the principles of greater satisfaction for the greatest number of individuals, typical of the utilitarianism that was imposed so far. The proposed debate aims to locate the vision of man within the context of justice focusing specifically on the issue of the individual’ social atomism that is present in the theory of justice as John Ralws fairness that means it as an autonomous part within a contractual doctrine, thus atomized , and which gives, as a privilege in his theory, in the a-historical “moment” of the original position and, on the other hand, the Charles Taylor’s opposed vision that, introducing concepts as the one of interiority, of recognition and of no decomposition of the goods, which are genuinely social, tends to locate his vision of man in an human being located within a broader context than himself. Here the focus is going to be given to Rawls’ justice theory and one intend to consider the criticism to the atomism issue elaborated by Taylor within the context of the current debate between liberalism and communitarians.

John Rawls developed principles of justice to guide the fair allocation of resources in a society. However, his principles did not take into consideration a society’s differing health needs. Norman Daniels attempted to extend Rawlsian principles of justice to apply to the allocation of health resources. In Just Health, Daniels argued that, under certain circumstances, an age-based allocation of health resources can be prudent. He proposed the Prudential Lifespan Account (PLA) to defend age-rationing against claims that it would lead to favoring one age-group over another. In this paper, I analyze Daniels’s PLA and argue that societal aging poses a significant threat to its effectiveness. I then examine and critique alternate theories to extend Rawlsian principles of justice to account for health, specifically those proposed by Dennis McKerlie and Hugh Lazenby.

Communities near nuclear power plants are at potential risk from natural and man-made failures at the nuclear power plants located within those communities. This study explored the concerns and rationalizations of residents of a community who live within a 10-mile evacuation zone of the nuclear power plant located there. Using the general theory of deliberative democracy, the purpose of this qualitative study was to understand and explore why individuals continue to live close to nuclear power plants. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with 15 individuals who live within a 10- mile radius of a nuclear power plant in the western US. These interviews were transcribed, coded, and analyzed using a modified Van Kaam procedure. Findings indicated that members of the community had concerns that natural or man-made disasters could lead to catastrophic failure of the nuclear power plant but rationalized living in proximity. Another key finding was that the community itself was supported by the revenue generated from the plant which led many of the participants to live in the community and this contributed to their rationalizing for why they should live close to the plant. The social change implications of this study included recommendations to mayors, city councils, and regulatory bodies to provide more information about nuclear power plants to communities to help them cope with fear and feelings of helplessness. Residents living near nuclear power plants would benefit from the recommendations made in this study because it would help them understand the risks of living near nuclear power plants.

This thesis is a quantitative study of distributive justice between generations or age groups. It is theoretically informed by a synchronic generation approach and John Rawls’s theory of justice-as-fairness. The empirical part compares the economic positions of, and public spending on, children, adults and the elderly in 16 European countries. The theoretical part is used as a platform for the empirical analysis. In addition to Rawls, a discussion of distributive justice includes the classical theories of Plato and Aristotle and more recent utilitarian, egalitarian and desert-based theories. The synchronic generation approach is presented and compared to diachronic approaches to studies of generational relations. The synchronic approach is theorized by scholars working in the tradition of the social studies of childhood. The chapter on methods identifies children, adults and the old by way of age brackets, it presents indicators of public spending and income, and it points out empirical applications of equality, equal opportunity and the difference principle. The techniques of analyses are presented; descriptive analysis and OLS regression. The explanatory variables vary, but in all cases include economic performance, age structure and a modified version of Esping-Andersen`s classification of welfare states (Social Democratic, Conservative, Liberal and Southern European). Six research questions are answered in the empirical part, using official statistics from Eurostat, OECD and Statistics Norway. Over the past few decades there is an extensive growth on spending on the elderly, but spending on family and children does not decline. Multivariate analyses indicate that the size of old age and family and child benefits vary across welfare regimes. The Social Democratic and Conservative welfare states are more egalitarian and have lower poverty rates compared to the Liberal and Southern European welfare states. These regime variances are also seen in multivariate analyses of child poverty and old age poverty. Risk factors for child poverty are parental unemployment, children living with single parents, young parents, ethnic parents, and low educated parents. A multivariate analysis points to a link between the size of family and child benefits and fertility rates. / Children`s welfare: money, time and space