Skollagen reglerar inte hur dokumentation av extra anpassningar genomförs. Detta beslut fattas av rektor eller skolhuvudman på varje enskild skola. Denna valfrihet kan leda till skillnader i hur dokumentationen utförs vilket i slutänden kan påverka likvärdigheten för elever. Skolinspektionens granskning av skolans arbete med extra anpassningar visar att det finns svårigheter att dokumentera på ett ändamålsenligt sätt (Skolinspektionen, 2016). Syftet med den här studien var att skapa kunskap om hur dokumentation av extra anpassningar kan påverka likvärdigheten för elever genom att studera hur några skolor arbetar med att dokumentera extra anpassningar. Med en kvantitativ metodansats och ett målstyrt urval genomfördes en webbaserad enkätundersökning i fyra grundskolor i två kommuner. Enkätsvaren sammanställdes med hjälp av ett digitalt enkätverktyg. Resultatet analyserades med stöd i Rawls teori om rättvisa och tidigare forskning inom området. En slutsats som dragits är att dokumentationen av extra anpassningar inte utförs likvärdigt. Studien visar även på att riktlinjer och rutiner gällande dokumentation av extra anpassningar fortfarande behöver utvecklas för att säkra likvärdigheten för eleverna.

La hipótesis que ha guiado toda la investigación es que el concepto de utopía ha ido evolucionando a lo largo de su historia, desde una inicial hostilidad ante ciertas instituciones que caracterizan al Derecho, especialmente la figura de los abogados litigantes, hasta una cierta complementariedad. Si bien ese progreso no carece de excepciones, se nota un mayor grado de apertura a las instituciones jurídicas, como consecuencia de la necesidad de organización de la vida social compleja ante el hecho de la escasez de recursos y el altruismo limitado que están en la base de ambos conceptos. Dicha complementariedad se ve reforzada con el auge de teorías que van más allá de los postulados positivistas que buscaban separar completamente el Derecho de la esfera valorativa, o aquellos planteos neoconstitucionalistas que buscan disolverlo en ella. Hoy algunas concepciones reconocen que los valores juegan un rol importante en la comprensión de la práctica social que llamamos Derecho y se considera que un cierto grado de utopismo, en tanto que reconocimiento y persecución de ideales razonables, es legítimo y hasta necesario para comprender esa práctica.

Ever since Rawls published The Theory of Justice (1971/2009), the theory itself, along with many of its components, have been subject to intense debate. Both the "original position" and the "veil of ignorance" have been argued to be too unrealistic since the restriction on information makes it impossible to apply in the real world. Furthermore, it is argued that this restriction is too extensive, in that it excludes information that is necessary for making a just decision, and thus, that it contravenes fundamental egalitarian principles, making it less just than it should be. However, there still seems to be something appealing about the concept of the veil of ignorance and results from various experiments that have used it have shown results that indicate it has an effect, which implies that the concept might have some use after all. In this paper, I will argue for a modified version of Rawls' veil of ignorance that, while limited in its available applications, might both serve a practical use in society to increase justice and have a low risk of obtaining inegalitarian results. I will do this by first summarizing Rawls' theory of justice with a focus on his veil of ignorance. Second, I will present and discuss the critiques from various philosophers. Third, I will discuss the implications of several experiments that make use of the veil of ignorance, including the issue that these experiments are 'one-shot', or single iteration, experiments. Finally, I will detail my version of the veil of ignorance and explain why it both meets the critiques of the original veil of ignorance and could potentially serve a practical use in society.

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This essay presents and discusses John Rawls’s ‘The Law of Peoples’ and it’s ability to be used in practice. The theory’s ability to judge right and wrongful actions in liberal intervention is tested when applied to the current conflict in Syria, and is used to evaluate the actions made by the liberal state France, during its involvement in the crisis. The essay will discuss shortcomings in the theory, and possible solutions to these and will also come to discuss central ideas in the theory and the liberal ism. Other writers such as Michael Doyle and Simon Caney are discussed and presented more briefly. The essay will argue that the theory in The Law of Peoples is not sufficient to alone evaluate the conflict it is applied upon, and therefore not comprehensive enough to be used in practice without adjustments.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Ce mémoire traite de la critique communautarienne du libéralisme et se donne deux projets. D’abord, il s’agit de formuler une position de synthèse à partir des travaux des philosophes Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre et Michael Walzer. Cette synthèse s’articule autour de trois axes, soit ontologique, sociale et méthodologique. Le deuxième projet est d’évaluer cette position pour statuer sur son rapport au libéralisme, et, plus précisément, pour déterminer si elle est seulement une critique, une alternative, ou encore une variante à l’intérieur du libéralisme. Il est conclu que le communautarisme est réconciliable avec une certaine forme de libéralisme et que sa critique permet même de l’améliorer. / In this essay about the communitarian critique of liberalism I seek to reach two goals. First, it is to form a synthesis from the works of philosophers Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer. This synthesis is articulated through three axes: ontologicial, social and methodological. Building on this, my second objective is to assess its relation to liberalism. More specifically, I seek to determine whether communitarianism is merely a critique, an alternative or a variant of liberalism. My conclusion is that communitarianism is reconciliable with a certain form of liberalism and that its critique allows to improve it.

Pour de nombreux architectes du libéralisme politique contemporain, la neutralité constitue une caractéristique définitionnelle du libéralisme politique. Il est pourtant clair que ces nouvelles formulations du libéralisme ne sont pas exemptes de tout présupposé substantiel. Le libéralisme politique de Rawls, par exemple, accorde de la valeur aux notions de liberté, d'égalité et d'équité. Comment la présence de tels présupposés substantiels est-elle conciliable avec la prétention à la neutralité ? Tel est le problème qui est à l'origine de ce travail de recherche. Pour le résoudre, un vaste travail d'explicitation des présupposés du libéralisme, et plus particulièrement du libéralisme politique de John Rawls, ainsi qu'une étude critique du terme « neutralité » ont été réalisés. Avec Rawls, contre une conception procédurale de la neutralité, je défends la neutralité des justifications et démontre qu'elle constitue la conception de la neutralité la plus plausible. Une justification neutre est définie comme justification fondée sur des conceptions communes, c'est-à-dire partagées. Se pose alors la question de la justification de ces présupposés substantiels tenus pour communs. J'indique comment, chez Rawls, la question de la justification reçoit une réponse conceptuelle. Rawls résout cette question en soutenant une conception cohérentiste de la justification et en développant un certain nombre de concepts innovants, au premier rang desquels l'équilibre réfléchi, dont je défends une conception extensive. Si puissants que soient ces outils conceptuels, dans la mesure où les présupposés du libéralisme sont considérés comme étant implicites dans la culture politique publique, ces présupposés semblent néanmoins appeler une autre forme de justification : une justification herméneutique. Si les présupposés du libéralisme sont le résultat d'une interprétation, il faut être capable de rendre raison de cette interprétation. La deuxième partie de ce travail se met en quête d'une telle justification herméneutique, en se fondant sur l'hypothèse qu'elle est disponible dans les travaux que Rawls consacre à l'histoire de la philosophie : les Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy et les Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. Pour de nombreux architectes du libéralisme politique contemporain, la neutralité constitue une caractéristique définitionnelle du libéralisme politique. Il est pourtant clair que ces nouvelles formulations du libéralisme ne sont pas exemptes de tout présupposé substantiel. Le libéralisme politique de Rawls, par exemple, accorde de la valeur aux notions de liberté, d'égalité et d'équité. Comment la présence de tels présupposés substantiels est-elle conciliable avec la prétention à la neutralité ? Tel est le problème qui est à l'origine de ce travail de recherche. Pour le résoudre, un vaste travail d'explicitation des présupposés du libéralisme, et plus particulièrement du libéralisme politique de John Rawls, ainsi qu'une étude critique du terme « neutralité » ont été réalisés. Avec Rawls, contre une conception procédurale de la neutralité, je défends la neutralité des justifications et démontre qu'elle constitue la conception de la neutralité la plus plausible. Une justification neutre est définie comme justification fondée sur des conceptions communes, c'est-à-dire partagées. Se pose alors la question de la justification de ces présupposés substantiels tenus pour communs. J'indique comment, chez Rawls, la question de la justification reçoit une réponse conceptuelle. Rawls résout cette question en soutenant une conception cohérentiste de la justification et en développant un certain nombre de concepts innovants, au premier rang desquels l'équilibre réfléchi, dont je défends une conception extensive. Si puissants que soient ces outils conceptuels, dans la mesure où les présupposés / Many supporters of political liberalism consider that neutrality is part of the definition of liberalism. Yet, it is obvious that these new forms of liberalism are not free from substantive presuppositions. Rawls's political liberalism, as an example, values freedom, equality and fairness. But how can such substantive commitments be compatible with the claim for neutrality?This problem is the starting point of this thesis. To solve it, I work to make the presuppositions of liberalism explicit, especially those of Rawls's political liberalism, and I carry out a critical study of the word “neutrality”. With Rawls and against a procedural conception of neutrality, I support a conception of neutrality as justificatory neutrality, which I consider the most believable conception of neutrality. A neutral justification is defined as a justification which is based on shared conceptions. So, the question to be answered is the question of the justification of these substantive presuppositions, which are taken for shared. I study how Rawls gives a conceptual answer to the question of justification. Rawls answers this question supporting a coherentist conception of justification and developing innovative concepts, such as the concept of reflective equilibrium, of which I support an extensive conception. However convincing these concepts may be and because Rawls considers that the liberal presuppositions are implicit in the public political culture, it seems to me that these presuppositions call for another form of justification: a hermeneutic justification. If the presuppositions are the final result of an interpretation, this interpretation has to be justified. The second part of this thesis looks for such a hermeneutic justification. Its main assumption is that such a justification can be found in Rawls's works on the history of philosophy: the Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy and the Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: David M. Rasmussen / Following the idea that human rights are anchored in many cultures and find their support in many traditions, the contemporary human rights corpus is a fruit of a long history whose roots can be traced back to different societies in addressing the universal questions of injustice. If one adopts such a historical evolution of human rights, their universality might be affirmed on the assumption that they are coexistent to every human society. This view is, however, challenged by scholars who claim that the current human rights regime does not owe anything to other cultures, since they are essentially Western. The consequence of such an understanding touches the heart of the human rights’ perennial question concerning their universality, and it is the source of the Third World’s critiques. Indeed, if conceptually, culturally and historically, human rights are Western, how do they become universal? This question was first raised by the American Anthropological Association in its now well-known 1947 statement, even before the existing human rights instruments were framed. Today, it has been taken up by some Third World critics. For them, human right movement is an imperialistic swirl of Western liberalism upon other societies under the banner of United States of America that has replaced the former European imperialistic powers such as France and United Kingdom. According to these critics, there is no other area where human rights are imperialistically used by the West than in the so-called humanitarian intervention. Usually evoked as an urgent need to protect human rights, humanitarian intervention is seen as another name for the neo-colonialism in the Third World, as it is carried out by Western Powers against states in the Third World. Two challenges arise from these views. On the one hand, because of their Western origin, human rights are decried as Western and, therefore, they should not be imposed on other cultures. On the other hand, their imperialistic use by the West is an acute difficulty stemming from the global political context after the fall of Communism as a competing ideology with liberalism in 1990s. These challenges affect the theoretical justification as well as the implementation of human rights. For, according to the critics, human rights are purposely framed in liberal terms because they have to pursue and advance the Western project of conquering the whole world. Therefore, they claim, the actual spread of Western liberalism under human rights label is neither incidental nor accidental; it is a continuation of the Western imperialism which started long ago with economic exploitation, slavery and colonization of the rest of the world. Human rights is only a neutral term to translate the same reality. To those who reply that the contemporary human rights regime, starting with Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is a fruit of an international group with a diverse background, the critics respond that all of them were trained in the Western culture. And if one presents the role of the local human rights activists in the non-Western world, the critics consider them as Western mercenaries in local colors. That is why, while it springs from the cultural critique, the imperialistic challenge to human rights is a serious one because it attacks the human rights regime in its purpose and in its practice. It does not reject human rights only because they are extrinsic to the non-Western culture –cultural relativism—; rather, human rights are rejected because they are channels of oppression and exploitation as was and has always been the Western imperialism. The question now is: what do human rights become in this case? Is it possible to rescue them from both the cultural critics and imperialistic crusaders? Such a project would aim at maintaining and affirming their historicity as Western, yet showing that they are open to the possibility of being practiced in other cultures and other contexts. That it is the goal of this dissertation whose thesis is that, by domesticating human rights we retrieve the purpose of human rights of protecting and enhancing human dignity and, at the same time, it becomes possible to satisfactorily address the cultural and imperialistic challenges. Indeed, instead of thinking that people adopt and use human rights discourse because they like their individualistic side, the domestication of human rights pays attention to the process through which human rights as moral norms are incorporated in local cultures. Relying on the anthropological works that focus on the way human rights norms are integrated in different cultural contexts, this project endeavors to build a normative account of human rights based on these local practices. Philosophically speaking, domestication of human rights takes up Beitz’s insight of human rights as an emerging practice, and brings it to the beneficiaries of human rights purpose, instead of remaining at the legal level where only states are accepted as credible interlocutors, while they are the most suspected violators of human rights. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.