This paper aims at analyzing the social and economic responsibility of today's business community as an institution responsible for fostering and providing the state with the minimum resources necessary for the realization of fundamental rights in a social democratic bourgeois state responsible for a set of benefits Social relations established by the 1988 Constitution with the aim of providing a dignified life for all. For this purpose, we sought to discuss the concept of corporate social and economic responsibility based on the concept of distributive justice of John Rawls, the theoretical framework of the present study. This work is justified by the need to discuss how the compulsory social function of ownership of free enterprise and competition occurs as a way of preserving the dignity of the human person in a context where it is not accepted that the business society simply aims at profit, Because from the point of view of social responsibility, the company assumes a range of responsibilities that goes far beyond simply generating wealth for the investor and the simple duty to pay taxes. Therefore, in the first chapter we present some concepts that will contribute to the understanding of the meaning of the responsibility of the business society and its social and economic aspects in a capitalist system of liberal perspective, but with state interventionism in the economic domain. In the second chapter, we try to present different concepts of justice and how they are taken up and expanded by values that particularize each time and place. This resumption is made to situate the theory of distributive justice developed by John Rawls and his frame of references. And finally, in the third chapter, we try to make approximations of how corporate responsibilities are shaped in the perspective of Rawlsian justice, especially with respect to the possibility of demanding an action of the corporate societies within an ethical framework of a well-ordered society Which assures the State to develop various social arrangements in favor of the less favored, and it is not reasonable to require more coercively social and economic responsibility of the companies, besides what they deliberately resolve to contribute. / O presente trabalho objetiva analisar a responsabilidade social e econômica da sociedade empresária na atualidade, como instituição responsável por fomentar e prover o Estado de recursos mínimos necessários à concretização dos direitos fundamentais em um Estado Democrático de Direito de viés social, responsável por um elenco de prestações sociais normatizadas pela Constituição de 1988 com o fito de proporcionar uma vida digna a todas às pessoas. Para tal fim, buscou-se discutir o conceito de responsabilidade social e econômica empresária a partir do conceito de justiça distributiva de John Rawls, marco teórico do presente estudo. Este trabalho se justifica pela necessidade de se debater como a obrigatoriedade da função social da propriedade de livre iniciativa e concorrência ocorre como forma de preservar a dignidade da pessoa humana, em um contexto em que não se admite que a sociedade empresária vise simplesmente o lucro, porque do ponto de vista da responsabilidade social, a empresa assume uma gama de responsabilidades que perpassa, em muito, tão somente gerar riqueza ao investidor e o simples dever de pagar impostos. Assim, no primeiro capítulo apresentamos alguns conceitos que vão contribuir para a compreensão do significado da responsabilidade da sociedade empresária e dos seus aspectos social e econômico em um sistema capitalista de perspectiva liberal, mas com intervencionismo estatal no domínio econômico. No segundo capítulo, procuramos apresentar diferentes conceitos de justiça e como eles se retomam e se ampliam em razão de valores que particularizam cada tempo e lugar. Esta retomada é feita para situar a teoria de justiça distributiva desenvolvida por John Rawls e o seu quadro de referências. E por fim, no terceiro capítulo, procuramos fazer aproximações de como se amolda as responsabilidades empresariais na perspectiva de justiça rawlsiana, especialmente no que diz respeito à possibilidade de se exigir uma atuação das sociedades empresárias dentro de um quadro ético de uma sociedade bem-ordenada que assegure ao Estado desenvolver diversos arranjos sociais em favor dos menos favorecidos, não sendo razoável exigir coercitivamente mais responsabilidade social e econômica das empresas, além do que elas deliberadamente resolvem contribuir. / São Cristóvão, SE

There is circumstantial and scientific evidence of nepotism in Europe and USA, and among politicians, judges and other elites. Despite this, an access to positions of power in a liberal democracy is restricted in the sense that occupational following in the offices is subject to public scrutiny. There is a conflict between a personal obligation to promote one's kin and a public obligation to promote liberty. This public duty emerges from a duty to allow access to offices of power to those who have the misfortune of not being born as dynastic followers. It is based on John Rawls's original position which is a thought experiment establishing an impartial environment to detect chief principles adjudicating conflicts of moral doctrines, fairly. In it, the condition of impartiality is achieved by means which are found in this dissertation to be excessive. Its blanked ban on biases immolates even those biases which contribute to fairness, despite their partiality. When nepotism is partly considered an expression of altruism, it shows a capacity to increase cohesion, impede free-driving and improve economy. In order to preserve these virtues, an improved condition of impartiality is offered to enhance Rawls's theory and to classify instances of nepotism according to their effects on improving or hampering...

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ジョン・ロールズの「公正としての正義」は、どのような内実をもつ規範であれ、公正な正当化の条件のもとで合意された規範を公正という意味で正しいとみなす正義の形式的・手続き的構想である。この構想においては、自分の判断を理由に自由に行為する「理性的人格」の観念、自分の判断のもとで理由を構築する理性的人格の「理由の道徳的権利」、そして自分の判断を理由に行為する「自由の道徳的権利」が想定されている。本論文は、これら二つの道徳的権利の尊重という理性的に拒否され得ない義務のもとでロールズの正義の理論を道徳性の形式的・手続き的なカント的理論として再構成し、それを理性的人格の道徳的アイデンティティに根拠づけた。 / John Rawls' "justice as fairness" is the formal or procedural conception of justice that recognizes only norms that could be agreed under fair conditions are just in the sense that they are fair, whatever contents they might have. In this conception, the idea of a reasonable person, the moral right of reasonable persons to construct reasons, and the moral right to act in freedom on these reasons are presumed. I have critically reconstructed Rawls' theory of justice as a formal or procedural Kantian theory of morality on the basis of reasonably unrejectable duty to respect these two moral rights, and grounded it upon the moral identity of reasonable persons. / 博士(哲学) / Doctor of Philosophy / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University

C’est au tournant des années 1990 que Paul Ricœur s’est intéressé à Théorie de la justice de John Rawls. Tout en étant fondamentalement en accord avec la valeur morale, déontologique et politique des principes de justice de Rawls, Ricœur s’oppose à l’approche « purement procédurale » de la justice pour les institutions telle qu’elle se développe à l’aide de l’interprétation rawlsienne de la théorie du contrat social. Si l’approche déontologique de la justice comme équité priorise une conception formelle de la justice pour les institutions, elle ne peut toutefois pas, selon Ricœur, s’affranchir des fondements téléologiques qui justifient la formulation et le choix rationnel des principes rawlsiens. En reprenant l’argumentaire de Théorie de la justice, Ricœur relève la dépendance de la procédure formelle de Rawls à une série de présupposés éthiques fondamentaux qui justifient téléologiquement la rationalité des principes. Ces présuppositions ne mettent pas en ruine la position de Rawls, au contraire, ils relèvent d’une circularité « naturelle » propre à la problématique de la distribution des biens sociaux (justice distributive), indispensable à l’élaboration d’une conception politique de la justice et à l’intelligence démocratique du contrat social. Contre la démonstration empirique de la procédure formelle de la « position originelle » sous le « voile d’ignorance » à partir de laquelle devrait résulter le choix rationnel et unanime des principes de justice, Ricœur propose de rétablir la primauté du sens de la justice pour le sujet de droit/contractant. Sans réfuter la priorité déontologique des principes de justice pour les institutions, Ricœur veut rétablir la valeur éthique de la justice pour les individus à partir d’une herméneutique du soi et d’une anthropologie philosophique qui posent le besoin de l’institution au sein même de la constitution du sujet à « vivre une vie bonne, avec et pour autrui, dans des institutions justes ». / At the turn of the 1990s, Paul Ricœur became interested in John Rawls' Theory of Justice. While fundamentally agreeing with the moral, deontological, and political value of Rawls' principles of justice, Ricœur opposes the "purely procedural" approach to justice for institutions as developed through Rawls' interpretation of social contract theory. If the deontological approach to justice as equity prioritizes a formal conception of justice for institutions, it cannot, however, according to Ricœur, break free from the teleological foundations that justify the formulation and rational choice of Rawlsian principles. Returning to the argument of Theory of Justice, Ricœur identifies the dependence of Rawls' formal procedure based on a series of fundamental ethical presuppositions that teleologically justify the rationality of the principles. These presuppositions do not undermine Rawls' position; on the contrary, they are part of a "natural" circularity specific to the issue of the distribution of social goods (distributive justice), a process which is indispensable in the elaboration of a political conception of justice and in the democratic understanding of the social contract. Against the empirical demonstration of the formal procedure of the "original position" under the "veil of ignorance" from which the rational and unanimous choice of the principles of justice should result, Ricœur proposes to re-establish the primacy of the sense of justice for those subjected to law/contractors. Without refuting the deontological priority of principles of justice for institutions, Ricœur aspires to restore the ethical value of justice for individuals from a hermeneutic of the self and a philosophical anthropology that posits the need for the institution within the very constitution of the subject to "live a good life, with and for others, in just institutions”.

Comment peut-on concilier le respect des droits à la liberté des membres des générations futures et présentes ? Agir en faveur des premiers ne doit pas se faire aux dépens des seconds. Selon nous, la garantie pour tous de pouvoir développer et concevoir une conception spécifique de la vie bonne suppose de privilégier l'objectif d'une justice sociale globale dans le temps présent pour ainsi transmettre à la postérité un monde plus juste. Nous indiquons en premier lieu en quoi les générations qui se succèdent sur Terre ont des devoirs envers celles qui les suivront dans le temps, mais également pourquoi nos actes ne reflètent pas la reconnaissance de tels devoirs. Nous nous interrogeons ensuite sur le contenu du monde à transmettre en conformité avec ces devoirs. Il incombe aux générations de préserver autant que possible l'environnement naturel et d'édifier un environnement politique et social suffisant. Cela requiert la constitution d'une épargne intergénérationnelle au cours d'une phase limitée, suivie d'une phase de croisière dans laquelle l'accumulation doit être stoppée. Mais les efforts pour cette épargne et les ressources générées par celle-ci sont à répartir équitablement au sein et entre les générations : ce point est l'objet de notre troisième partie. Nous montrons que les efforts demandés à chacun au sein de la phase d'accumulation devraient dépendre de l'environnement dont disposent les individus, tandis que les ressources produites sont à redistribuer en priorité aux contemporains les plus démunis. Une telle préférence sociale pour le présent ne va pas à l'encontre des droits des individus futurs : elle permet au contraire de limiter la perpétuation, de génération en génération, des inégalités intragénérationnelles et de favoriser le respect de leurs droits par les individus qui vivent dans le temps présent. / How can we reconcile the respect to liberty rights of members of future and current generations? Act in favour of the former should not be at the expense of the latter. According to us, the guaranty for all to be able to develop and conceive a specific conception of the good life involves favouring the objective of global social justice in the present time, and so transmitting to posterity a fairer world. We show first how the succeeding generations on Earth have duties to those who follow in time, but also why our acts do not reflect the recognition of such duties. Then we wonder about the content of the World to transmit in compliance with these duties. Generations bear the responsibility to preserve as much as possible the natural environment and to edify a sufficient political and social environment. This requires the constitution of an intergenerational savings during a limited phase, followed by a steady-state phase in which the accumulation must be stopped. But efforts to the savings and resources generated by it have to be distributed fairly within and between generations: this is the subject of our third part. We show that efforts required to everyone during the accumulation phase should depend on the environment available to individuals, while produced resources have to be redistributed primarily to the most disadvantaged contemporaries. Such a social time preference does not run counter the rights of future individuals: it allows instead to limit the perpetuation of intra-generational inequalities from generation to generation and to promote the respect of their rights by individuals living at the present time.

This thesis provides a critical examination of John Rawls’s political philosophy as it relates to international justice and human rights, Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness has made an enormous impact on contemporary political and ethical theory, yet it has been criticized by some for failing to address the extra-domestic aspects of social justice, including universal human rights. In Chapter One I describe the theoryof.rights, developed in the social contract tradition and how this theory has influenced the modern discourse of human rights. In Chapter Two I discuss Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, the basic rights and liberties, and the idea of political liberalism. In Chapter Three 1 analyze Rawls’s account of international justice and argue that it fails to uphold the same rigorous principles of justice as found in his account of domestic justice. Finally, in Chapter Four l discuss Rawls’s more recent attempts to theorize international justice and human rights, I conclude that Rawls is not justified in limiting the set of human rights available to persons in different societies, and that this limitation is an unnecessary feature of his theory of justice. In contrast 1 argue for a more cosmopolitan system of social justice that is strongly normative and grounded in Rawlsian ideal theory. / Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

Réalisé en cotutelle avec l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV). / Nos recherches ont pour point de départ le constat d’un manque de dialogue entre trois philosophies politiques du XXe siècle nous provenant des États-Unis alors même que cet État devrait être le chef de file et un modèle d’ouverture en matière de réflexion sur la démocratie libérale. Les trois philosophies politiques en question sont celles de John Rawls, de Richard Rorty et de Leo Strauss. Nous avons donc procédé à l’amorce d’un dialogue en mettant en relation les idées des trois auteurs sur les grands thèmes de la vérité, de l’histoire, des dimensions de l’homme et des principes démocratiques, et avons fait un effort supplémentaire de rapprochement en montrant le rapport de chacun à onze dualismes classiques liés à ces quatre thèmes. Ces dualismes sont des oppositions binaires habituellement vénérables qui classent et divisent deux ordres de réalité. Avec ce langage commun des dualismes classiques, les obstacles aux rapprochements dus aux jeux de langage ou aux vocabulaires trop particuliers des trois auteurs sont tombés. Nous montrons d’abord qu’aucun vainqueur clair ne ressort de notre confrontation, mais qu’il y a moyen de porter un jugement sur les trois auteurs en fonction de critères non controversés (cohérence, complexité ou nuances, capacité à réfuter les deux autres). Ensuite, une confrontation et un dialogue directs des trois positions permettent de les faire s’exprimer sur les mêmes enjeux et de dégager des conclusions d’intérêt général dépassant le débat d’auteurs. Ces conclusions montrent quel genre de compromis peut être trouvé entre les principes de vérité et d’histoire, approuvent le projet de résoudre les tensions dans la vision de l’homme, en particulier entre les sphères publiques et privées, mais rappellent l’importance du point de vue ancien sur les principes repris par la démocratie (liberté, égalité, justice), ne serait-ce que pour faire contrepoids à la tendance générale. Ultimement, nous montrons comment de cette confrontation peut se dégager le programme pour la philosophie politique de vivre dans une tension féconde entre critique (prémoderne) et confiance (moderne), ainsi que la nécessité réaffirmée de poursuivre les efforts de dialogue pour rendre notre pensée digne de l’idée de la démocratie libérale. / Our study stems from the awareness that three twentieth-century political philosophies emanating from the United States have not partaken in any serious dialogue, even though this country should be a leader and model of openness regarding the topic of liberal democracy. The three political philosophies in question are those of John Rawls, Richard Rorty and Leo Strauss. Consequently, we have initiated a dialogue by confronting the ideas of these three thinkers on matters concerning truth, history, the dimensions of man, and democratic principles, having furthered this effort by highlighting the opinion of each on eleven classical dualisms related to these four matters. These dualisms are binary oppositions, generally venerable, which classify and divide two orders of reality. Using the common language of classical dualisms allowed us to overcome the obstacles due to the particular language game or vocabulary of each. In the first place, we show that if no real victor emerges from our confrontation, it is possible to judge each of the thinkers according to non contentious criteria (consistency, complexity or subtlety, capacity to refute the other positions). Then we illustrate that the direct confrontation through dialogue allows each of the three positions to express itself on the same issues and leads one to conclusions regarding matters beyond simple exegetic analysis. These conclusions show what kind of compromise is possible between the principles of truth and history. They support the project of resolving the tensions in our understanding of man, in particular, between the public and private spheres. Finally, they remind us of the importance of the ancient view of democratic principles (freedom, equality, justice), if only to counterbalance the current overwhelming trend. Ultimately, we explain how this confrontation can lead to a program for a political philosophy which balances the claims of (premodern) criticism and (modern) confidence, as well as restates the importance of continuing the dialogue in order that our thought be worthy of the idea of liberal democracy.

What happens to social democracy when the working class declines? The aim of this study is to examine ideological changes in The Swedish Social Democratic Party, in particular the party’s ideological changes regarding liberty. The material consists of 300 government bills equally divided over the parliamentary sessions of 1974, 1990/91 and 2005/06, in all of which The Social Democratic Party held office. Using the theoretical framework Two Concepts of Liberty, I found that an increasingly amount of bills draws on the idea of negative freedom. However, the result also shows that bills that draws on negative freedom subsequently decreases in favour of bills that draws on positive freedom, suggesting that the ideological changes regarding liberty in The Swedish Social Democracy Party are nonlinear rather than moving straightforward.

<p>Debate over Intellectual Property Rights ‘IPRs’ particularly patent and copyrights is mainly on forward-looking industries in computer software. As part of a trade deal reached in 1994, the member nations of the World Trade Organisation must adhere to a global agreement known as TRIPS, for the Trade- Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights.</p><p>This study is to analyse the ethical conception of Intellectual Property Rights and in particular its implications on the developing countries in relation to TRIPS. The approach will be to analyse a broad philosophical theories of property to see if there is any justification for a software program to be treated as private property and also argue base on John Rawls two principles of justice in relation to TRIPS Agreement. Some reflections will be put on the use of open-source software by less developing countries.</p><p>From the study it was asserted that, strong IPRs protection would hinder technological transfer and indigenous learning activities in the early stage of industrialisation when learning takes place through reverse engineering. And policy makers should consider differentiation in terms of the level of economic and industrial development, if protection and enforcement of IPRs is intended to enhance technological development.</p>