This thesis analyzes how Latinas on Instagram actively resist social and cultural conventions of sexuality, propriety and femininity through the adornment and arrangement of their bodies. Taking into account expectations of women's behavior in public spaces, I examine the ways social media as a digital public sphere reliant upon user-generated visual content creates opportunities for rejecting mutually exclusive understandings of womanhood. The Latina users in this study employ raunch aesthetics and the performance of productive perversity, as theorized by Jillian Hernandez (2014) and Celine Parreñas Shimizu (2007) respectively, via accessories and nonverbal behavior to problematize racialized and classed representations of gender.

This thesis investigates D.H. Lawrence’s idea of the “great background” in the context of Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure and how it reappears in a transformed way in Lawrence’s novels Sons and Lovers, The Rainbow, and Women in Love. Through examining the perverse effects of modernism on these novels’ characters, this thesis argues that the “great background” is something that gradually moves inward––from the old, traditional “State” to an internal, inscrutable yet attainable reality.

A cultura ocidental contemporânea trouxe para a história do homem novas modalidades de crime e novos tipos de criminosos. A magnitude da destruição do outro alcançou cifras e situações sem precedentes. Embora Freud pensasse que, em princípio, os homens acertassem seus conflitos por meio da violência, nosso estudo foca um tipo específico de sofrimento infligido ao outro: aquela destruição da alteridade que traz consigo aspectos da ordem do excesso, onde não se encontra explicação para tal ação, denominada coloquialmente de maldade gratuita. Ao longo do trabalho tornou-se cada vez mais evidente que esse fenômeno não poderia nem ser examinado somente à luz da Psicanálise, nem ser desarticulado de seu contexto social, histórico e político. Abrimos, assim, o diálogo com a Filosofia e a História. Levantamos a hipótese de que o papel destrutivo do(s) algoz(es) pode ser vivido de duas formas diferentes: 1) a que pensa um malfeitor implicado em um cenário propiciador de prazer; 2) a que fala de um opressor que atua com total indiferença. Deixando de lado a violência do plano da cena sexual, focamos nosso estudo em circunstâncias não sexuais, strictu sensu. No campo da Filosofia, a contribuição de Hannah Arendt sobre a questão da banalidade do mal e sua retomada do conceito kantiano de mal radical pareceu-nos importante. Isso nos permitiu questionar a possibilidade da existência do mal fora da psicopatologia, como proposto pelos autores que acompanharam Arendt nesse capítulo. Chegamos à conclusão de que não existe maldade de fato gratuita porque para o opressor há sempre um sentido prévio que o leva a passar ao ato. Do ponto de vista da Psicanálise, no entanto, não há lugar para que pessoas banais no sentido arendtiano do termo - transformem-se em criminosos. Falamos assim da perversidade e do fenômeno da massa para pensar que tipo de moral está por trás dos massacres, tais como o Holocausto, Ruanda e Balkans, entre outros / The contemporary occidental culture brought to mans history new modalities of crimes and new types of criminals. The magnitude of destruction of the other reached unprecedented numbers and situations. Though Freud thought that, in principle, men settle their conflicts through violence, our study focus on a specific type of suffering inflicted to the other: that destruction of otherness that brings with it aspects of the order of the excess, where no explanation is found for such action, denominated colloquially gratuitous evil. Throughout the work it became more and more evident that this phenomenon could not be examined only in the light of Psychoanalysis, nor be disarticulated from its social, historical and political context. We opened thus the dialog with Philosophy and History. We raised the hypothesis that the destructive role of the executioner(s) can be lived in two different ways: 1) the one that sees the oppressor implicated in a scenario that generates pleasure; 2) the one that tells about a murderer who acts with total indifference. Leaving aside the violence of the sexual scene strictu sensu, we focused our study on non-sexual circumstances. In the field of Philosophy, the contribution of Hannah Arendt on the subject of the banality of evil and its return to the Kantian concept of radical evil seemed important to us. This allowed us to question the possibility of existence of evil outside psychopathology, as suggested by the authors who followed Arendt in this chapter. We came to the conclusion that there is no evil in fact gratuitous because for the oppressor there is always a previous sense that leads him/(her) to action. In the Psychoanalysis point of view, nevertheless, there is no place for banal people in the Arendtian sense of the word to transform themselves into criminals. We then speak of perversity and the mass phenomenon to think about what type of moral is behind of the massacres, such as the Holocaust, Rwanda and the Balkans, among others

A cultura ocidental contemporânea trouxe para a história do homem novas modalidades de crime e novos tipos de criminosos. A magnitude da destruição do outro alcançou cifras e situações sem precedentes. Embora Freud pensasse que, em princípio, os homens acertassem seus conflitos por meio da violência, nosso estudo foca um tipo específico de sofrimento infligido ao outro: aquela destruição da alteridade que traz consigo aspectos da ordem do excesso, onde não se encontra explicação para tal ação, denominada coloquialmente de maldade gratuita. Ao longo do trabalho tornou-se cada vez mais evidente que esse fenômeno não poderia nem ser examinado somente à luz da Psicanálise, nem ser desarticulado de seu contexto social, histórico e político. Abrimos, assim, o diálogo com a Filosofia e a História. Levantamos a hipótese de que o papel destrutivo do(s) algoz(es) pode ser vivido de duas formas diferentes: 1) a que pensa um malfeitor implicado em um cenário propiciador de prazer; 2) a que fala de um opressor que atua com total indiferença. Deixando de lado a violência do plano da cena sexual, focamos nosso estudo em circunstâncias não sexuais, strictu sensu. No campo da Filosofia, a contribuição de Hannah Arendt sobre a questão da banalidade do mal e sua retomada do conceito kantiano de mal radical pareceu-nos importante. Isso nos permitiu questionar a possibilidade da existência do mal fora da psicopatologia, como proposto pelos autores que acompanharam Arendt nesse capítulo. Chegamos à conclusão de que não existe maldade de fato gratuita porque para o opressor há sempre um sentido prévio que o leva a passar ao ato. Do ponto de vista da Psicanálise, no entanto, não há lugar para que pessoas banais no sentido arendtiano do termo - transformem-se em criminosos. Falamos assim da perversidade e do fenômeno da massa para pensar que tipo de moral está por trás dos massacres, tais como o Holocausto, Ruanda e Balkans, entre outros / The contemporary occidental culture brought to mans history new modalities of crimes and new types of criminals. The magnitude of destruction of the other reached unprecedented numbers and situations. Though Freud thought that, in principle, men settle their conflicts through violence, our study focus on a specific type of suffering inflicted to the other: that destruction of otherness that brings with it aspects of the order of the excess, where no explanation is found for such action, denominated colloquially gratuitous evil. Throughout the work it became more and more evident that this phenomenon could not be examined only in the light of Psychoanalysis, nor be disarticulated from its social, historical and political context. We opened thus the dialog with Philosophy and History. We raised the hypothesis that the destructive role of the executioner(s) can be lived in two different ways: 1) the one that sees the oppressor implicated in a scenario that generates pleasure; 2) the one that tells about a murderer who acts with total indifference. Leaving aside the violence of the sexual scene strictu sensu, we focused our study on non-sexual circumstances. In the field of Philosophy, the contribution of Hannah Arendt on the subject of the banality of evil and its return to the Kantian concept of radical evil seemed important to us. This allowed us to question the possibility of existence of evil outside psychopathology, as suggested by the authors who followed Arendt in this chapter. We came to the conclusion that there is no evil in fact gratuitous because for the oppressor there is always a previous sense that leads him/(her) to action. In the Psychoanalysis point of view, nevertheless, there is no place for banal people in the Arendtian sense of the word to transform themselves into criminals. We then speak of perversity and the mass phenomenon to think about what type of moral is behind of the massacres, such as the Holocaust, Rwanda and the Balkans, among others

By implementing Albert O. Hirschman’s theory about reactions, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the arguments against carbon offsetting presented in Swedish media. More specifically, I will structure and analyse the counter-arguments I find in the articles about carbon offsetting presented by the Swedish paper Dagens Nyheter between October 2019 and January 2020. Hirschman’s theory of the reactionary rhetoric is based on the notion that every social action is followed by a reaction. To illustrate this, Hirschman introduces three types of theses –arguments -deployed by those who oppose a new idea or reform. The three principal arguments Hirschman identifies is the futility thesis, the perversity thesis and the jeopardy thesis. The futility thesis suggests that an action aiming to improve the society in any way won’t have any effect, the perversity thesis claims that the action will result in the opposite outcome of what was intended and the jeopardy thesis implies that the action will result in intolerable consequences in other areas. Hirschman suggests that a debate where any of these theses are present both is a danger for democracy and is likely to result in suffering in other ways as well. In that way, his theory provides a tool for identifying dangerous arguments in order to take a step towards a more democracy friendly discussion. By analysing 85 arguments against carbon offsetting I find that 51 of them easily can be categorized as either one of the theses, while 22 can’t be categorized at all. The remaining 12 arguments can either partly or in full be placed in the model. The majority of the 51 arguments fitting in Hirschman’s model are futility theses, which implies that the Swedish debate in this area largely consists of arguments claiming that carbon offsetting doesn’t make any difference. My conclusion based on Hirschman’s theory and the analysis of the arguments is that the Swedish debate about carbon offsetting unarguably contains signs of the polarized discussion Hirschman claims to be a democratic danger and that both the debate itself and the climate overall probably would benefit from a more nuanced and balanced debate.

[pt] Investiga-se os elementos da fantasia que influenciam a percepção e as reações sociais e subjetivas aos crimes sexuais, e seus efeitos na teorização das perversões, desde sua origem na Medicina Legal do Século XIX. A abordagem é orientada à elucidação das moções pulsionais que determinam as características dos discursos que delimitam o perverso como uma entidade nosográfica. / [en] This thesis investigates fantasy elements that influence the perception and the social and subjective reactions to sexual crimes, and their effect on the theorization of perversions, from its origins in nineteenth century s Legal Medicine. The approach is focused on elucidating the impulses which determine the characteristics of the discourses that define perversion as a nosographic entity.

Jacques Derrida n’a écrit qu’un seul ouvrage sur Baudelaire : Donner le temps I. La fausse monnaie (1991). Dans cette étude, il s’agit de préciser, notamment autour de la question de la perversité, les liens unissant le poète au philosophe en accordant une attention particulière aux textes « Le mauvais vitrier » (Baudelaire), « The Imp of the Perverse » (Edgar Poe), « La fausse monnaie » (Baudelaire) et Mémoires d’aveugle (Derrida). Imbriquées dans une logique de l’événement, les deux notions de perversité et de don peuvent s’éclairer mutuellement et ont des répercussions jusque dans les textes et pour la littérature elle-même. / Jacques Derrida only wrote one book on Baudelaire, entitled Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money (1991). With special focus on a number of other texts, including “The Bad Glazier” (Baudelaire), The Imp of the Perverse (Edgar Allan Poe), “Counterfeit Money” (Baudelaire) and Memoirs of the Blind (Derrida), this analysis clarifies the relations linking the poet to the philosopher, particularly with regard to the question of perversity, or rather, in Poe’s words, perverseness. Bound up in event logic, the two notions of perversity and gift can explain one another and their repercussions are far-reaching both in the texts and in literature itself.

Jacques Derrida n’a écrit qu’un seul ouvrage sur Baudelaire : Donner le temps I. La fausse monnaie (1991). Dans cette étude, il s’agit de préciser, notamment autour de la question de la perversité, les liens unissant le poète au philosophe en accordant une attention particulière aux textes « Le mauvais vitrier » (Baudelaire), « The Imp of the Perverse » (Edgar Poe), « La fausse monnaie » (Baudelaire) et Mémoires d’aveugle (Derrida). Imbriquées dans une logique de l’événement, les deux notions de perversité et de don peuvent s’éclairer mutuellement et ont des répercussions jusque dans les textes et pour la littérature elle-même. / Jacques Derrida only wrote one book on Baudelaire, entitled Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money (1991). With special focus on a number of other texts, including “The Bad Glazier” (Baudelaire), The Imp of the Perverse (Edgar Allan Poe), “Counterfeit Money” (Baudelaire) and Memoirs of the Blind (Derrida), this analysis clarifies the relations linking the poet to the philosopher, particularly with regard to the question of perversity, or rather, in Poe’s words, perverseness. Bound up in event logic, the two notions of perversity and gift can explain one another and their repercussions are far-reaching both in the texts and in literature itself.

Bien qu’elle n’ait jamais été abordée de front par Jacques Derrida, la question du pervertible se conçoit à maintes reprises dans son œuvre sous l’angle de paradoxes et par le biais de questions comme celles de l’hospitalité ou de la promesse. Cette thèse explore ainsi les limites et la portée de la notion protéiforme de pervertibilité, ses enjeux et ses manifestations, de même que son rapport au langage et au sens. Pluridisciplinaire, elle se penche sur les concepts philosophiques et sur les dispositifs textuels et littéraires témoignant de cette pervertibilité en acte dans l’ensemble du corpus derridien. / Although Jacques Derrida never addressed it head-on, the problem of pervertibility is often conceptualized in his work by way of paradoxes and questions, such as those of hospitality and the promise. This doctoral thesis explores the limits and scope of the protean notion of pervertibility, its stakes and its manifestations, as well as its relationship with language and meaning. Multidisciplinary in nature, it simultaneously focuses on philosophical concepts and on the textual and literary devices that bespeak this pervertibility, operative throughout Derrida’s entire body of work.

Le mal est par sa nature un scandale car il se définit par ce qui ne devrait pas être à l’opposé du bien qui se présente comme ce qui doit être. Cette affirmation, qui relève de la tautologie, marque la réalité éprouvée face au mal. Il a d’abord été une évidence criante : comment réagir face aux maux de l’existence humaine ? Ainsi le mal est inscrit dans l’histoire de la pensée et commence pour notre travail avec le platonisme. Avant la conceptualisation platonicienne, le mal est une donnée factuelle de la vie avec laquelle il faut composer. Les figures divines sont ambivalentes à l’image des hommes et alternent vices et vertus. Platon postule une entité divine unique, omnisciente, omnipotente et bienveillante. Ce dieu devient intelligence, calcul et raison : le monde devient une création parfaite, belle et ordonnée et non plus le théâtre d’un affrontement entre les diverses passions des dieux. Le mal se transforme alors en un enjeu métaphysique : comment concilier cette perfection avec l’émergence du mal ? Il faut désormais expliquer et tenter de justifier la violence et les crimes. S’il est possible de proposer une théodicée qui rende le mal physique et métaphysique nécessaire, légitimer la méchanceté se révèle plus ardu. Les penseurs du platonisme, du néoplatonisme et du stoïcisme vont tenter d’apporter une première réponse au mal moral. Dans leur sillage, une rupture conceptuelle advient et révolutionne le concept : le christianisme invente le péché. En devenant péché, le mal se retrouve désormais sous la responsabilité de l’homme coupable. Le mal entre dans le giron de la liberté : il est voulu, consenti. A la suite des penseurs chrétiens, certains philosophes continueront ce travail d’élucidation de la volonté du mal. L’objectif est de retracer l’histoire de ces systèmes conceptuels qui s’entremêlent et se répondent les uns aux autres. Le mal moral se construit dans cette progression qui a des conséquences anthropologiques importantes : l’homme se pense à travers le mal. La méchanceté n’est donc pas seulement un problème à résoudre, elle devient le paradigme à travers lequel définir l’homme. Notre problématique est de montrer comment la question de la méchanceté est à la base du problème de la morale et comment elle conditionne notre représentation de la nature de la volonté humaine. Cette évolution s’est nouée lors d’étapes clés de la pensée philosophique. En effet, si dans toute philosophie morale, le concept du mal est évoqué, il n’est pas en général le centre de l’argumentaire. Le premier moment est celui de la pensée antique. Platon fait naître Dieu et le monde dans l’histoire des concepts puis se retrouve face l’énigme de nos crimes. La théodicée mise en place et qui sera reprise par Plotin et les Stoïciens ne cessera de nier l’existence d’un instinct pervers. Le mal voulu est une absurdité. L’irruption de la faute chrétienne bouleverse la donne. Saint Augustin en sera le théoricien le plus investi affectivement. Ayant expérimenté une double conversion dans sa vie spirituelle, il théorise une méchanceté issue de notre faiblesse, de notre faute première. Le mal est voulu car il n’est plus possible de vouloir autre chose. Saint Anselme reprend également le dogme de la chute mais lui apporte une dimension logique et sémantique en proposant une méchanceté égoïste. Le mal est certes voulu mais par dédain du bien. Notre dernière étape est kantienne. Le mal radical est le concept qui permet enfin de penser une volonté normale qui voudrait le mal simplement parce qu’elle a en elle cette possibilité et la liberté fondamentale de le choisir. Nous pourrons donc constater le chemin parcouru entre notre point de départ et notre point d’arrivée et comment cette problématisation du mal fait apparaître une généalogie de la volonté. Au fil de la pensée, elle passe de l’ombre à la lumière, n’étant jamais aussi présente que quand elle se retrouve confrontée aux obstacles. Penser le mal moral c’est faire l’archéologie de la volonté. / Evil provokes scandal by nature because it is what it should not be unlike good which is what it has to be. This tautological assertion expresses our feelings toward evil. It was first perfectly obvious : how must we face human pain ? Evil is a part of thinking’s history : our study starts with Platonism. Before his work, evil is just a fact of life you have to live with. The gods of Antiquity are like men : good or bad. The God of Plato is the one, omniscient, all-powerful and kindly. God is just intelligence, calculation and reason : the world he created is beautiful, ordered and perfect and it is no longer the place for the vices of ancient gods. Evils turns into a metaphysical issue : how can be the world perfect despite evil ? We have now to explain, to justify violence and crimes. Theodicy can justify pain and illness. It does not work with wickedness. Platonism, Neo-Platonism and Stoicism tried to answer this question. Following them, a conceptual break happens : Christendom invented sin. When evil became sin, man became liable and guilty. It is now a matter of liberty : man wants evil. After them, some philosophers will keep to work on the subject of the bad will. Our purpose is to find the story of these concepts and to connect thoughts between themselves. Evil has been made by this story and brings many anthropological consequences : man understands himself through evil. Wickedness is not just a matter to solve, wickedness becomes a way to define mankind. We want to show that wickedness issue is the foundations of morality and how it makes us see and think human will. Several stages occurred in this philosophical evolution. Every ethic deals with evil, not all put it at the heart of their system. Our first stage is Antiquity. Plato brings the ideas of God and perfect world in philosophy but faces the riddle of our crimes. His theodicy adopted by Plotinus and Stoics will always refuse pervert instinct in man. A man who want evil is nonsense. Christian sin appearance changes everything. Augustine will be his strongest defender. By living a double spiritual conversion, he understands wickedness as weakness due to original sin. Man want evil because he is no longer able to will something else. Anselmus follows the dogma of the fall but puts logical and semantic dimension in it and presents a self-interested wickedness. Man wants evil not for itself, man does not want enough good. Our last stage is Kant. Radical will is the first concept which allows to conceive a normal bad will which would evil just because it is one of his options and it has the liberty to do so. We can see the difference between our starting point and our arrival. We see now how the concept of will has grew up and changed. Little by little, will comes from darkness to light. The more will faces obstacles, the more it is obvious. Thinking on evil is the archaeology of the will.