本研究之目的在探討國內審計準則公報第二號，對於會計原則變動具重大性的查核報告型態，必須出具保留意見的規範，是否有修訂的必要，並對於我國的審計準則委員會，擬作「得出具無保留意見」之修訂，探討實證上是否予以支持。 本研究以民國81至民國85年的上市公司為樣本，三個議題的研究結果分別如下： 一、探討會計原則變動之資訊內涵 以會計原則變動的種類作區分，分為自願性與強制性兩組，研究結果為：除了營建業的由全部完工法改成完工比例法的樣本有顯著差異的市場反應之外，其他自願性的會計原則變動及強制性會計原則變動和無會計原則變動的樣本相比，並無顯著差異的市場反應。 二、探討投資人對查核報告的市場反應 以查核報告的意見型態作區分，分為保留意見與無保留意見兩組，研究結果為：會計原則變動的保留意見與無保留意見並無顯著差異的市場反應。 三、探討查核報告揭露程度與盈餘資訊品質的關聯 在會計師因強制性會計原則變動而出具保留意見時，將在查核報告中揭露變動金額與否分為兩組，研究結果為：有揭露金額者的盈餘反應係數低於沒有揭露者。 / The purpose of this study is to examine the potential need to modify current R.O.C. Statement of Auditing Standards No.2, which is under revision by R.O.C. Auditing Standards Board. Specifically, our study provides empirical evidence to help ASB members evaluate the impact of cahnges in accounting principles on capital market under the diverse scenarios of different opinions issued by auditors. Accounting changes of TSE (Taiwan Stock Excahgne) listed firms from 1992 to 1996 are included in our sample. Three primary issues investigated and empirical results are summarized as follows. 1. Information content of voluntary vs. mandatory changes. Market(investors) reactions to accounting chagnes, not matter which types of changes, show no significant difference, except that investor react favorably to voluntary accounting changes to percentages of completion method under long-term construction contracts. 2. Market reactions to auditors' opinions of accounting changes. Market reactions to auditor' qualified or unqualified opinions of voluntary and mandatory accounting changes indicate no significant difference. 3. Impact of disclosing amounts of mandatory accounting changes on ERC. Firms disclosing the amounts influenced by mandatory accounting changes inauditors' qualified opinions have lower earnings reponse coefficients(ERCs)than non-disclosure firms.

面對全球性之金融風暴危機對投資人與金融市場帶來劇烈的影響，各界開始呼籲查核報告應提供閱表者更多主要企業經營風險及不確定資訊，而英國為了因應國際審計觀念轉變的趨勢，參考國際審計準則自訂ISA 700 (UK and Ireland)以改善傳統查核報告型態未能揭露足夠查核相關資訊之缺點。新式查核報告中影響層面最廣的部分即為關鍵查核事項(key audit matter)之說明，故本研究以裁量性應計項目與非保守會計師查核意見做為審計品質之代理變數，探討關鍵查核事項與會計師審計品質水準間之關聯性。研究結果顯示，關鍵查核事項之揭露能降低管理者透過裁量性應計項目美化財務報表之可能性，亦即提升審計品質水準；但在非保守會計師查核意見代理變數項下，並未發現增加關鍵查核事項段落能影響會計師出具非保守查核意見之決策；另外，本研究亦未發現關鍵查核事項揭露數量與審計品質水準之正向關聯性。

為探討稅務員最適查稅獎金，以減少其相互勾結，使租稅稽徵更具效率，本文從理論角度出發，以Sanyal模型為基礎，進一步修正其模型，使其更具一般化，並代入數值，分析查核率與舉發率對查稅獎金的影響，最後經由我國數據資料，間接推算適用之獎金制度。 本文的發現主要有以下幾點： （一）查稅獎金是否可簡化為一單純之表示方式，和其是否需賄賂上層稅務員有關。當其所需賄賂的上層稅務員增加，數學推導將越複雜。換言之，實際的稅務員層級眾多，查稅獎金制度很難達到理論上最適條件的要求。 （二）代入數值運算後，可得一確定且收斂之查稅獎金比例值。此數值受舉發率和查核率交互影響。在舉發率小時，第三階查稅獎金隨查核率上升而上升；第二階查稅獎金隨查核率上升而下降；第一階查稅獎金隨查核率上升而下降。但在舉發率高時，第一階查稅獎金反而隨查核率上升而上升，第三階查稅獎金隨查核率上升而下降，只有第二階查稅獎金不受舉發率之影響，仍隨查核率上升而下降。 （三）導入我國實際數據資料可知，欲使我國稅務員誠實舉發不收賄之查稅獎金，應讓第一階稅務員獲得最多之獎金最高，第二階次之，第三階則給予最少之獎金，且第三階之獎金可隨查核率提昇而微幅下降。

2007年，力霸集團掏空案轟動社會，其中，舞弊者掏空友聯產險將近48億元，其所採用之手法即利用房地產評價困難之特性。近二年來，台灣部分地區房地產價格飆漲，情況嚴重。聯想二事，有心人趁此時機再利用房地產進行舞弊可能性不低，不禁令人憂慮。好在查核人員可能可以防堵該舞弊之發生，而其學識背景可能不同。 本研究彙總相關之個案，試圖探討該種舞弊手段，並企圖瞭解對此種手段之了解程度，包括不同學識背景之查核人員了解程度是否不同。本研究以學生代替查核人員，所探討之二種不同學識背景為會計與地政；本研究透過問卷測量會計科系出身之查核人員對房地產評價與以房地產為工具之舞弊了解程度，是否與地政背景之查核人員存在差異。 本研究透過個案研析，找出14項舞弊風險因子，並將其分為四類。在實證結果部分則發現，會計背景之查核人員在以房地產為工具之舞弊風險因子的了解程度上，不如地政背景之查核人員。不過，只有當情境高度涉及地政相關專業時，二種背景之查核人員所評估之該種舞弊風險差異才顯著，一般情境下，二者評估之能力沒有明顯差異。因此，本研究建議會計背景之查核人員應該多了解以房地產為工具之舞弊個案。另外，出於會計背景之查核人員在以房地產為工具之舞弊風險因子的了解程度上，仍有部分較佳；故本研究亦建議實務上如遇處理涉及房地產之案件或查核時，應同時指派地政背景與會計背景之查核人員。 / The case of Rebar Group in 2007 was a serious case in Taiwan. As one part of the case, the fraud in Union Insurance Co. was committed by using real estate as tools, because real estate is difficult in evaluation. In recent two years, there has been a situation that the real estate’s price goes very high in some areas of Taiwan. If we associate these two things, there may be a chance for someone to commit the fraud by using real estate as tools. Fortunately, auditors could prevent the occurrence of this kind of fraud; auditors might have different major. This research summarized all the cases related, discussed about the tricks of this kind of fraud, and tried to know whether the levels of the auditors in different major fields on these tricks are different or not. Trough the poll(which is aimed at students of accounting and land economics departments), the research measured auditors’ level of comprehending the fraud by using real estate as tools, and tried to find out whether the levels are different or not between auditors majoring in accounting and in land economics. Trough the cases, this research found 14 fraud risk factors, and classified them into 4 categories. On the other hand, the empirical results show auditors majoring in accounting are not as good as auditors majoring in land economics on comprehending this kind of fraud’s risk factors. Nevertheless, about the ability to evaluate the risk of this kind of fraud, there is no significant difference between auditors major in accounting and in land economics but in the situation highly involved the specialty of land economics. Thus, this research suggests auditors majoring in accounting should get more comprehending on the fraud cases committed by using real estate as tools. Additionally, due to auditors majoring in accounting perform better than whom majoring in land economics on some part of comprehending this kind of fraud’s risk factors, this research also suggests the one who dealing with the cases related to real estate should appoint auditors majoring in land economics and in accounting at the same time.

人壽保險公司業務人員舞弊不但直接損及保戶權益，同時對於保險公司之形象及財物損失亦有所影響，尤其於清查舞弊過程所投入人力物力，另涵蓋該保單於發單前後所產生之銷售及後續保全服務成本，恐將對保險公司造成該保單呈現虧損狀態，因此如何設計完善之管控作業流程，創造重視法令及尊重客戶權益之企業文化，亦為人壽保險公司經營之重要議題。 本項研究較難取得公開完整資訊，故採以各人壽保險公司之業務人員舞弊個案綜合研究分析及與同業先進進行深入訪談方式進行，個案之篩選則以保險業務人員舞弊手法不同為主要考量。有關訪談對象，原先計畫涵蓋保險業務人員及業務主管，幾經初步與不同業務單位洽談，保險業務人員及業務主管之處理經驗多為單一個案。最後決定選擇以從事人壽保險產業達10年以上工作經歷，主要負責業務以處理業務人事及客戶服務功能等有關方面，包含分公司經理、業務發展主管、客戶服務主管及業務稽核主管等人員進行深入訪談，依其豐富閱歷，與業務人員及客戶直接接觸及較多舞弊個案處理經驗，以歸納較為完整客觀之結論。 由本研究歸納得知，業務人員進行舞弊主要是有機會經手客戶繳交之現金和支票，同時客戶過度信賴業務人員，不但將自己之保險單交付業務人員代為保管，甚或當保險公司通知保戶未繳納保險費時，仍然直接聯繫業務人員並相信其回覆說詞。除了保險公司應當加強建立健全控制制度，增加與客戶直接溝通之渠道，保戶應當多關注自身權益，不定期向保險公司查詢保單狀況。另外執行業務人員作業稽查應由獨立單位負責執行，以落實查控作業而達到查核之目的。 最後，建立紮實的舞弊控制計畫及控制制度，如何成功的防治業務人員舞弊，其關鍵在於有效的溝通。在舞弊控制計畫及控制制度中應明確劃分規範各單位及各人員之權責，然後有效的傳達至內勤人員及業務人員，遍及整個企業，所有人員必須知悉企業對舞弊防治之重視及決心，且保險公司應不斷的持續傳達正確的訊息，什麼行為是被預期的，即為公司可以接受的，反之，那些行為是不被接受的。更重要的是執行管理階層之態度，自身應樹立良好經營理念及行為模範，對於建置作業環境及有效防治業務人員舞弊，有更深遠之影響。 關鍵詞：人壽保險、業務人員、舞弊、控制制度、查核

在高科技之推波助瀾下，新經濟與全球化之競爭模式儼然成形，也使得智慧財產在此競爭中扮演著重要的角色，成為高科技公司逐鹿中原的武器之一。相對地，也迫使高科技公司在全球割喉競爭之壓力下，開始思索如何更快進入戰場，並以智慧財產制敵機先。於是，企業併購策略開始成為高科技公司之經營決策者思考採行之策略。 企業併購（Merger and Acquisition）一詞，並非明確之法律定義，實乃商業管理實務界常用之名詞，因此，與其強加定義，不如從併購之模式加以說明，更為精確。併購模式概可歸納為二大模式：一為「收購」，一為「合併」。收購又可區分為「資產收購」與「股權收購」；而合併則有以吸收合併、新設合併及存續合併為主之「法定合併」類型，與以簡式合併、三角合併、強迫合併及實質合併為主之「特殊合併」類型。 所謂「收購」，係指收購公司以取得資產或經營權之目的，而以現金或債券、股票等有價證券買受目標公司全部或一部資產或股份之行為。而「合併」則係指兩家或兩家以上之公司，訂立合併契約，並經各當事公司之全體股東同意，或股東會之特別決議同意後，結合成一家公司之法律行為。其因合併而消滅之公司之權利義務，由合併後存續或新設立之公司概括承受，毋須再為個別資產或權利義務之移轉。 在企業採行併購策略之動機上，學理與實務上歸納出五種主要之動機，包括：綜效理論假說、多角化經營假說、策略性重組假說、價值低估假說，及代理成本理論與傲慢假說。綜效理論假說主要可歸納出，以追求規模經濟與範疇經濟之「營運綜效」；以風險分散或節稅考量為思考之「財務綜效」；企圖集中市場以形成壟斷之「市場綜效」；及為更精確掌握時機而追求之「起動綜效」。多角化經營則可分別從「複合式多角化」或「中心式多角化」切入討論。而策略性重組假說則著眼於「法規環境改變」或「技術創新改變」致使企業採取併購策略以為因應之面向，加以討論。此外，價值低估價說及代理成本理論與傲慢假說，則與企業經營決策者企圖追求本業之價值極大化無關，卻也經常成為經營決策者採行併購策略之動機。 前述企業併購動機之討論，事實上與美國併購歷史上所發生之五次併購浪潮息息相關，而這五次併購浪潮之興衰則亦與美國經濟發展之歷程有關。第一波併購浪潮發生於一八九七年至一九○四年間，其特色主要為「水平整合形成獨占市場」；第二波併購浪潮發生於一九一六年至一九二九年間，其特色主要為「垂直整合以利強化體質」；第三波併購浪潮發生於一九六五年至一九六九年間，其特色主要為「複合式併購擴大多角化」；第四波併購浪潮發生於一九八一年至一九八九年間，其則係以「金融工具激化敵意併購」為主要特色；時至一九九二年至二○○○年間所發生之第五次併購浪潮，則以「策略重組點燃超級併購」，逐漸將以取得智慧財產為目的之併購動機推上台面。亦即，由於全球化競爭而掀起跨國併購，及高科技產業併購之趨勢日盛，以智慧財產之取得規劃併購策略，成為高科技公司開始思考如何將企業價值極大化之策略之一。 高科技產業之競爭，已進入「超優勢競爭（Hypercompetition）」之態勢，惟有以動態競爭因應，始能勝出。而智慧財產之佈局與運用在動態競爭情境中，扮演著極為重要之角色。因此，透過併購以取得智慧財產，而得達成「控制新資源，加速企業外部成長」、「改變商業模式，大幅躍進新市場」、「動態競爭中，整合或對抗競爭者」，或「併購取得智慧財產權，待價而沽」之成果，已成為許多高科技公司之策略思考方向。 「世上沒有賣不出去的產品，只有賣不出去的價格」。在企業併購的過程中，如何就目標公司之企業價值進行評價往往是決定併購案是否能成功之關鍵。然而，對於企業的營運有重大影響之智慧財產，其「品質」究竟如何，將會對企業未來的營運造成重大的影響。因此，對於高科技產業之併購案，如何透過對於智慧財產進行查核評估（Due Diligence），協助併購交易雙方瞭解目標公司其智慧財產之品質，使雙方得以更正確評估目標公司之價值，並就併購案可能面臨之風險預先進行規劃，即為重要之課題。 換言之，由於企業併購交易之內容複雜且代價高昂，動輒為千萬至百億金額的現金交易或股份交換。雖然在交易過程中，賣方或買方通常會準備相關交易資訊及查核評估報告，以提供對方作為評估之用。但由於交易當事人自行提供之資訊通常過於簡略或可能隱惡揚善，為避免在交易價格之決定與交易後風險之承擔及效益之展現上出現問題，因此交易當事人有自行進行查核評估之必要。此即孫子兵法《謀攻篇》中所述「知己知彼，百戰不殆；不知彼不知己，每戰必敗。」所傳達之精神。 鑑於智慧財產查核評估是一項耗時費力，且所費不貲之工作，企業內部法律顧問或外部律師在進行智慧財產查核評估時，應對於其查核之範圍有所限制。並非所有智慧財產對於買方公司皆有顯著之影響，因此必須從公司之觀點加以檢視，並以其對於公司所可能產生之價值排序其先後。而除了時間、成本與專業人力投入等因素之考量外，「買方公司之策略目標」、「目標公司之核心競爭力」，與「企業併購交易之模式」將影響智慧財產查核評估所欲進行之範圍。 對於高科技公司而言，其企圖藉由併購活動所取得之智慧財產各異，然最主要者，尤其是對於我國公司而言，仍以「專利權」之取得以利企業在全球市場產業價值鏈中之佈局為首要考量。因此本文將就「專利查核」之相關議題，略做探討。而進行專利查核時，除從「專利申請案」、「專利審查歷程」與「法律意見書」等相關文件，進行概略初步審查外，概可聚焦於「目標公司是否確為真正之完整權利擁有者」、「發明之實施是否須依賴業已存在或第三人之權利」、「目標公司之發明是否獲得足夠之保障」、「目標公司之專利是否已為適當之利用」，及「目標公司之專利是否（或可能）涉訟」等面向出發，進行深入探查。 深入探究目標公司是否確為真正之完整權利擁有者之議題上，本論文將從「共同發明」、「受雇人之發明」與「部分讓與」所涉及之問題加以討論；而在發明之實施是否須依賴業已存在或第三人之權利之議題上，關於「技術改良與從屬專利」、「交互授權」及「技術輸入授權」涉及之契約約款（例如：契約存續期間、專屬性、可轉讓性與控制權之變更、轉授權、授權範圍、技術改良與回饋授權、擔保與賠償責任、最惠待遇，與過往侵權免責等）所衍生相關問題將為本論文關心之重點。 此外，在目標公司之發明是否獲得足夠之保障之議題上，本論文將討論關於「發明之檢討與揭露程序」、「專利權之地理範圍」，及「申請專利範圍與專利審查歷程之檢討」等問題；而關於「授權實施」及「專利濫用」將係買方公司查核目標公司之專利是否已為適當之利用時之重點。最後，在目標公司之專利是否（或可能）涉訟此議題之討論中，本論文將從評估目標公司之專利組合是否侵害第三人之專利權所進行之「專利侵權評估」與如涉及專利侵權訴訟時可能之「反訴或抗辯之評估」。 為印證本論文所提高科技公司以併購活動取得智慧財產之策略及所進行之查核評估活動，在結論與建議部分將以一家台灣公司之實際經驗為個案，探討其進行跨國併購時所面臨之問題，並就多數高科技公司所忽略之「競業禁止」問題，以美國法下之經驗，作為高科技公司進行跨國（尤其是美國）併購時，在專利查核之外，亦應注意之建議，以避免研發團隊於併購前後離職或被挖角，對買方公司所造成之傷害。 / A recent survey showed that between two and five emerging technology companies are acquired for every one that does an initial public offering （IPO）. Acquisitions can provide strategic, operating and financial benefits to both emerging technology companies and the company acquiring it. A strategic acquisition can provide emerging technology companies’ shareholders with earlier liquidity than an IPO, with less risk and dilution. It also can provide emerging technology companies with the immediate leverage of Buy Company's established manufacturing or distribution infrastructure, without the dilution, time and risk of internal development. A strategic acquisition can provide Buy Company with the new products and technologies necessary to maintain its competitive advantage, growth rate and profitability. Ill-conceived or badly done acquisitions, however, can result in expense and disruption to both businesses, the discontinuance of good technologies and products, employee dissatisfaction and defection, and poor operating results by the combined company. By understanding the key factors that lead to a successful acquisition, Target Company and Buy Company can improve the probability of achieving one. When considering an M&A transaction, Target Company first step should be to identify the strategic reasons why it wants to be acquired. For example, while Target Company may seek liquidity for its founders and investors, it also may have concluded that its future success requires the synergies of complementary resources and access to the infrastructure of a major corporation. An IPO could provide Target Company’s shareholders with liquidity, but would not immediately address Target Company’s need for product synergy or provide an established infrastructure. Those needs could be better met by finding a strategic buyer for Target Company. Equally important is to identify Buy Company’s strategic objectives in acquiring Target Company. For example, Buy Company may seek to acquire a product line or key technology, gain creative, technical or management talent, or eliminate a competitor. Ultimately, Buy Company will acquire Target Company because it believes M&A transaction is a more effective means of meeting a strategic need and increasing shareholder value than internal development. If Target Company understands its own and Buy Company’s strategic objectives, it can focus on candidates that are most likely to meet its needs and value the assets that it has to offer. While the objectives of individual companies will vary, the following table identifies common strategic objectives that Target Companies and Buy Companies try to achieve through an M&A activity. Target Company Reasons to Be Acquired Buy Company Reasons to Make a M&A Access to complementary products Access to complementary markets Access to working capital Avoid dilution of building own infrastructure Best and fastest return on investment Faster access to established infrastructure Gain critical mass Improve distribution capacity More rapid expansion of customer base Acquire key technology Acquire a new distribution channel Assure a source of supply Eliminate a competitor Expand or add a product line Gain creative talent Gain expertise and entry in a new market Gain a time-to-market advantage Increase earnings per share This study focuses on intellectual property due diligence, especially for the investigation of the benefits and risks associated with the ownership and exploitation of patent right when a company involves in a M&A activity. The increased profile, frequency, and value of intellectual property-related transactions have elevated the need for all legal, financial and managerial professionals and intellectual property owners to have a thorough understanding of the assessment and valuation of these assets and their role in commercial transactions; a detailed assessment of patent right is becoming an increasingly integral part of commercial transactions for the high-technology companies. Acquiring or investing in a business that owns intellectual property assets requires expanding the scope and depth of the due diligence that is usually conducted in such transactions. The process of gathering information and assessing the merits, issues, and risks associated with a business transaction is called “due diligence.” It is a critical exercise in the acquisition and strategic utilization of intellectual property assets. Due diligence is a necessary precursor to funding a new venture, and is critically important in many other business transactions, including mergers, acquisitions, licenses, initial public offerings, and in some instances litigation. In recent years, the commercial importance of patents and other intellectual property has become highly visible. Courts have imposed large damage awards for intellectual property misuse and infringement. Multi-million dollar judgments are no longer a rarity. Courts have also granted significant injunctions to limit the products which a company can market. For instance, Kodak was virtually eliminated from the instant camera market and subject to an extremely high damage award when it was found to infringe patents owned by Polaroid. As a result of these potential events, and the increasing value of intellectual property assets in today’s high technology society, intellectual property matters have become an important aspect of a traditional due diligence study. Intellectual property due diligence can be conducted in preparation for a wide variety of transactions. For example, intellectual property assets should be analyzed in the context of a share purchase or asset transfer, or may require assessment in connection with a capital contribution, in a joint venture or security for a loan, or in preparation of disclosure in connection with an offering of securities. Intellectual property due diligence can also facilitate a company’s thorough internal assessment of its own assets. Such a self-audit can prepare the company for an externally conducted due diligence, such as audited by a buyer company involving in a M&A transaction, and can enhance the company’s own intellectual property planning and management. Intellectual property rights are the product of human thought, born of human needs and aspirations, and manifested by societal values. A thorough intellectual property due diligence also requires consideration of many nonlegal, nonmaterial aspects of the rights involved. The impact of an investment in a specific intellectual property right, and its role and value in a given M&A transaction, can be easily miscalculated if the private and public implications of those rights are not considered. Every intellectual property transaction embodies both individual and societal beliefs and values that can profoundly affect the parties’s strategies and success. The philosophical underpinnings of intellectual property rights are often discussed in academic and philosophical forums. However, these principles deserve reiteration here, in a transaction-specific context. Too often, they are forgotten amidst the binders, cabinets and files full of due diligence documents and analytical reports. In Chapter 4, Patent Due Diligence, it comprises detailed analyses of the key issues to be assessed in the patent investigation. This chapter presents the steps in the legal review that should be undertaken on patents, and reviews the pertinent law pertaining to patent right. This chapter identifies the relevant documents that should be requested, defines the subject right, and analyzes the following substantive questions: Whether Target Company owns the patent right(s); Whether the patent right(s) have been adequately protected; Whether Target Company’s use of the patent right(s) is dependent on third part rights; Whether the scope of patent right(s) is sufficient; Whether the patent right(s) have been properly exploited; and Whether the patent right(s) present a risk of litigation. An investigation of Target Company’s patent assets can require analysis of extensive documentation, as well as knowledge of the specific technical field in which Target Company conducts its business, and of patent law. The circumstances of each particular case will dictate whether specialized patent counsel will need to be retained to assist with the patent due diligence. Buyer Company should be aware that proper preparation of patentability opinions and validity / infringement opinions can require substantial lead time and budget, and should accordingly account for these contingencies. Similarly, a thorough investigation to confirm ownership and assess exploitation of Target Company’s patent portfolio can require discussions regarding contribution of inventive ideas, past and present consultant or employment status of inventors, proper use of assignments, close investigation of the technology, markets, improvement clauses, cross-licenses, and the like. In sum, if Buyer Company specifies Target Company’s patent portfolio as a high priority in the intellectual property due diligence investigation, Buyer Company is well-advised to assign the patent-related investigation tasks to team members and, as applicable, patent experts, early in the due diligence process.

本研究之目的為瞭解投資人對新式查核報告之因應。研究結果顯示關鍵查核事項項目數與股價呈現負相關，說明大部分投資人對關鍵查核事項之回應與關鍵查核事項之揭露呈現負相關。然而，當企業聘請四大會計師事務所或產業專精為期查核財務報告，結果將反轉。確切來說，相較非四大會計師事務所或非產業專精之查核客戶，財務報告經由四大會計師事務所或產業專精查核之企業，其累積異常報酬率較大。此外，本研究亦將產業專精分為三等級：會計師事務所層級、會計師個人層級及同時為事務所層級兼個人層級，以衡量關鍵查核事項與股價之關係。最後於敏感性分析之部分，以關鍵查核事項風險權重作為關鍵查核事項項目數之替代，並且以不同預期模式衡量累積異常報酬，結果都與預期相符。

本研究以公司當年度新增借款觀察會計師查核報告對債權投資人在決定貸款條件之影響。結果發現修正式無保留意見與借款利率具顯著正向關聯，與借款金額具顯著負向關聯，代表債權投資人視修正式無保留意見為一種負面資訊之傳遞。本研究進一步將修正式無保留意見分成重大不確定性、繼續經營假設有疑慮、重編及會計原則變動類型，發現不同的修正式無保留意見類型亦與借款條件有所關聯，其中以繼續經營假設有疑慮意見影響最大。本研究的結論為會計師查核報告對債權投資人於決定貸款合約時有所影響，債權人會依據會計師查核意見及查核報告內容決定其貸款決策。

證期會於民國九十一年十一月十四日公布「公開發行公司公開財務預測資訊處理準則」，該準則中規定已公開財務預測之公開發行公司，於年度終了後一個月內須公告申報預計損益表之達成情形並說明差異原因。而且若與嗣後經會計師查核之稅前損益間之差異超過一定門檻時，亦須一併公告差異金額及原因。 本研究預期，公司為了聲譽、股價、融資受阻及溝通成本等原因，可能不希望自結損益與查核損益差異過大。另外，公司管理當局為了避免上述差異超過門檻，在公告自結損益前可能洽請審計人員進行財務報表初查或過目自結損益表；而審計人員也可能為了避免查核時調整事項過多，造成與客戶間的衝突，亦可能希望客戶在公告自結損益前能先洽請審計人員進行初查或過目自結損益表。因此，實施自結損益規定可能造成審計人員先前涉入公司之自結損益。 本研究以四大會計師事務所之合夥會計師九名及資深審計經理六十六名為對象，採取實驗的方式，探討實施自結損益規定對審計人員審計判斷的影響。並進一步探討審計人員先前涉入公司自結損益的普遍程度，及此一情形對審計人員審計判斷的影響 實驗結果顯示實施自結損益的規定的確會使得審計人員普遍先前涉入公司自結損益；審計人員調整應計損失的幅度比實施前小，尤其在其有先前涉入公司自結損益的情形下，更為明顯；且發現因設有重大差異標準而造成的門檻效果。換言之，依本研究結果推論，實施公告自結損益規定會影響審計人員的專業判斷，壓縮審計人員調整損益的空間。 / This thesis experimentally examines the effects of a regulation on audit judgments. In November 2002, the Securities and Futures Commission announced a new measure requiring listed companies that have made their financial forecast to the public to release within a month after the year end their income statements (hereafter called “pre-announced earnings”) and explain the discrepancy from the forecasted earnings. This new measure requires that the above listed companies release their earnings information earlier than the deadline for filing audited financial statements (hereafter called “audited earnings”) by three months, aiming to ask the listed companies to provide more timely information to investors. It also sets some threshold beyond which the companies and auditors are required to explain the discrepancy. The threshold dictates, among others, that the differences between the pre-announced earnings and audited earnings cannot exceed 20 percent of pre-announced earnings. The current study predicts that due to the consideration of reputation, communication costs, and stock price reaction, companies will have incentives to keep the difference, if any, between the pre-announced earnings and audited earnings within the limit. The auditors will also have similar incentives to do so to avoid the loss of clients, and communication costs. In doing so, the companies will ask auditors to involve in the process prior to pre-announcing earnings (hereafter called “pre-announcement process”), which will help narrow down the difference between pre-announced earnings and audited earnings. This study recruits 66 senior managers and nine partners from Big 4 firms to participate in an experiment in which they make audit judgment as to the adjustment required for a client’s allowance for bad debts. They are also required to generalize the client’s case to the listed companies as a whole and make similar judgments. Their perception on the extent to which auditors’ involvement in the pre-announcement process is also solicited. The data based on the experiment are used to examine the following hypotheses: H1: The adjustments required by auditors will be smaller after this new regulation than before the new regulation. H2: The degree to which auditors are involved in the pre-announcement process will be high. H3: The adjustment required by auditors will be smaller when auditors are involved in the pre-announcement process than when they are not. The results show that the adjustment required by auditors is smaller after the new regulation than before the new regulation. But the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.133). When generalizing the client’s case to the listed companies as a whole, the difference becomes marginally significant (p = 0.074). Thus, H1 is not supported. The auditors perceive that the extent to which auditors will be involved in the process prior to pre-announcement is significantly higher than 7 on a 1-9 scale (p = 0.002), supporting H2. The results also indicate that auditor’s prior involvement in the pre-announcement process has a significant effect on the required adjustment no matter it is a specific or general case (p < 0.001). Thus H3 is supported. Combining these findings suggests that the new regulation has an effect on constraining auditors in requiring adjustments to their client’s accounting estimates to the extent that the threshold permits. This new regulation therefore poses a trade off between relevance (timeliness) and reliability (representational faithfulness) of accounting information. Meanwhile, the role of auditors in attesting financial statements may also be adversely affected.

在新國際貿易理論的討論中，強調政府應扮演主動積極的角色以提升福利水準，然而這部份的探討大多忽略了廠商的逃漏稅行為。我們不禁要想，在加入廠商逃漏稅後，政府是否仍可扮演其主動積極之角色，採取稽查以降低廠商逃漏稅行為，或藉由調整關稅以降低廠商逃漏稅行為。本文建立一貿易模型，分別以簡單的廠商逃漏稅模型及政府查核的廠商逃漏稅模型做探討，研究結果發現，由於在逃漏稅經濟體系下，利潤稅制仍具有中立性，因此最適關稅決策不會改變；另外，由分析結果知，關稅的存在無法影響本國廠商逃漏稅行為，即貿易自由化無法改善地下經濟規模問題。