Au cœur de la phénoménologie gît une thèse métaphysique selon laquelle le flux phénoménal du vécu (Erlebnisstrom) puise son sens et son être en lui-même, plutôt que d’une quelque réalité extérieure ou sous-jacente. En outre, cette thèse de l’autonomie existentielle du flux phénoménal, ou de l’équivalence de l’être et du paraître, ne s’atteste que moyennant une transformation complète de notre rapport au monde, où l’on s’efforce de se mettre à l’écoute des choses, et du mystère qui les enveloppe, plutôt que de les maîtriser. Pris ensemble, cette thèse métaphysique et cette attitude du laisser-être (Seinlassen) constituent les deux piliers de la phénoménologie comme manière de vivre dont la présente thèse se propose de tracer les grandes lignes. Pour ce faire, nous centrons nos recherches sur l’œuvre du fondateur de la phénoménologie, Edmund Husserl, que nous soumettons toutefois à une critique immanente; c’est Husserl qui à la fois dégage l’idée d’une phénoménologie comme manière de vivre et lui pose le plus sérieux obstacle. Cette tension au sein de la pensée husserlienne s’aperçoit à même les deux exigences qui la définissent : celle du « retour aux choses mêmes », d’une part, et celle de la description eidétique, de l’autre. À l’aide de différents interlocuteurs – qui nous permettent d’interroger Husserl rétrospectivement (Pyrrhon), contemporainement (James, Bergson) et prospectivement (Heidegger) –, nous montrons que ces deux exigences sont en fait incompatibles, et proposons afin de résoudre cette contradiction d’éliminer un de ses termes, soit l’exigence de description eidétique. Se fait alors jour la possibilité d’une phénoménologie qui assume pleinement sa vocation existentielle. Enfin, en parallèle à cette critique immanente de Husserl, et afin de l’étayer, nous développons une explication génétique de l’ἐποχή transcendantale, où celle-ci est caractérisée en tant que conversion de l’attitude naturelle à une forme de conscience postréflexive, c’est-à-dire mystique. / At the heart of phenomenology lies a metaphysical claim according to which the phenomenal stream of lived experience (Erlebnisstrom) derives its meaning and its being from itself, rather than from some external or underlying reality. Moreover, this claim of the existential autonomy of the phenomenal stream, or of the equivalence of being and appearing, can only be verified through a complete transformation of our relationship to the world, where we seek to become mindful of things, and of the mystery in which they are steeped, rather than seeking to master them. Taken together, this metaphysical claim and this attitude of letting-be (Seinlassen) constitute the two pillars of phenomenology as a way of life, which the present thesis proposes to describe in broad outline. To do so, we focus our research on the work of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, which we submit however to an internal critique; it is Husserl who both allows us to contemplate the idea of phenomenology as a way of life and at the same time poses the greatest obstacle to it. This tension within Husserlian thought can be seen in the two imperatives that define it: that of the “return to the things themselves”, on the one hand, and that of eidetic description, on the other. With the help of various interlocutors – who allow us to interrogate Husserl retrospectively (Pyrrho), contemporaneously (James, Bergson) and prospectively (Heidegger) – we show that these two imperatives are in fact incompatible, and propose in order to lift this contradiction to eliminate one of its terms, namely the imperative of eidetic description. Thus a path is cleared for a phenomenology that fully commits itself to its existential vocation. Finally, in parallel to this internal critique of Husserl, and to better support it, we develop a genetic explanation of the transcendental ἐποχή, where it is characterized as a conversion from the natural attitude to a post-reflective, that is mystical, form of consciousness.

This dissertation engages a cultural discussion on time concepts that took place between Arab thinkers and creative writers in the aftermath of the June War of 1967 against Israel and the onset of a period of Arab cultural self-critique. It focuses on a set of intellectual projects and examines their propositions on Islamic notions of time and their place in the modernity of Arab thought. Intellectuals such as the Syrian poet Adonis (b. 1930), the Moroccan philosopher Mohammed ʿAbed al-Jabri (1935-2000), and the Lebanese psychologist Mustapha Hijazi (b. 1937) critiqued the alleged Arab “event-based” and “discontinuous” perception of time which lacks the notion of the temporal as a homogenous impersonal medium. Focusing on the example of Sufism, they argued that time in the Islamic worldview is a heterogenous mix of sacred and profane events in an ontology deprived of change. My dissertation debates these findings in two ways. I first draw on the French philosopher Henri Bergson’s concept of “duration” to problematize these thinkers’ discursive ideal of homogenous time which imposes on the heterogeneity of lived temporality the attributes of space and, as such, produces a mechanistic vision of the world. I then focus on the discourse of Ibn ʿArabi (d. 637/1240) and Mulla Sudra (d. 1049/1640) to demonstrate that Sufism advances a view of time as a flux of change internal to the life of the soul and leading to moral self-perfection. Finally, my dissertation focuses on alternative Arabic engagements with Sufi writings on time through the works of the Moroccan ethicist ʿAbdurrahman Taha (b.1944), the Iraqi Marxist Hadi al-ʿAlawi (1933-1998), and the Egyptian novelist Gamal al-Ghitani (1945-2015). I argue that these thinkers and writers draw on the heterogeneity of time in Sufism to critique the semantic neutrality and abstraction of modern time which depends on capitalism as a life form.

Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka Lygia Clarks verk ”Structuring the Self” utifrån begreppet per- formativitet, men det är först i samband med att jag relaterar det performativa till Suely Rolniks idéer om en resonant kropp, och den mer vitalistiska begreppsapparat som detta begrepp relaterar till, som jag tycker att idén om det terapeutiska som en performativ konstnärlig strategi blir intressant och relevant. Tanken är att utvidga idén om det performativa genom att relatera begreppet till den vitalistiska tradition hennes arbete från början grundar sig på, och visa på att dessa två begrepp kan mötas och eventuellt berika varandra just genom den terapeutiska metoden. Den övergripande frågan gäller vår möjlighet att ”bli” någonting som ligger utanför den av samhället konstituerade subjektiverings-processen.  Rolnik talar i sina texter om en ”resonant kropp”, en kropp, en subjektivitet i ständig förvandling, en kropp som är både insida och utsida samtidigt. Min läsning av Lygia Clarks verk ”Structuring the Self” är således att denna specifika ”kroppslighet” möjliggör en alldeles specifik form av performativitet som är knuten till och siktar direkt på kroppens affektiva nivåer. Som jag förstod saken lyckades Lygia Clark aktivera denna resonanta kropp via sina ”terapeutiska” metoder. Det ”terapeutiska” fungerar just precis som en metod för att komma åt detta resonanta tillstånd, och i linje med Suely Rolnik väljer jag att se Lygia Clarks metod som en konstnärlig strategi som i slutändan går utöver både konst och terapi: vi har att göra med ett aktiverande av livets kreativa process i sig själv. Jag anser att Lygia Clarks ”Structuring the Self” visar att det vore relevant att välkomna nya frågeställningar i samband med det performativa. Det behöver inte finnas en konflikt mellan ett performativt tankesätt och ett vitalistiskt synsätt, mellan ”no doer behind the deed”, och ett vitalistiskt synsätt där den kreativa impulsen kommer ”inifrån”.

The study provides a theoretical account for the representation of apartheid in South African fiction. Narrative strategies employed in the post-apartheid novels The innocence of roast chicken (Richards, 1996), The smell of apples (Behr, 1996), All we have left unsaid (Case, 2006) and Thirteen cents (Duiker, 2011) reveal that depictions of the past contribute to narrative structure and the production of meaning. Genettean temporal relations, namely narrative order, duration and frequency are a systematic method to analyse the selected novels, since it enables a contrast between the narrative past as the histoire, and the narrative present as the récit. Retrospective events are constructed as memories, thereby are complemented by Bergson’s psychological and philosophical theory in the analysis and interpretation of the dualistic interaction between the apartheid and post-apartheid temporal centres adopted within the novels. The representation of apartheid may be seen as sub-themes and time as configurations of temporal zones. / Afrikaans & Theory of Literature / M.A. (Theory of Literature)

The study provides a theoretical account for the representation of apartheid in South African fiction. Narrative strategies employed in the post-apartheid novels The innocence of roast chicken (Richards, 1996), The smell of apples (Behr, 1996), All we have left unsaid (Case, 2006) and Thirteen cents (Duiker, 2011) reveal that depictions of the past contribute to narrative structure and the production of meaning. Genettean temporal relations, namely narrative order, duration and frequency are a systematic method to analyse the selected novels, since it enables a contrast between the narrative past as the histoire, and the narrative present as the récit. Retrospective events are constructed as memories, thereby are complemented by Bergson’s psychological and philosophical theory in the analysis and interpretation of the dualistic interaction between the apartheid and post-apartheid temporal centres adopted within the novels. The representation of apartheid may be seen as sub-themes and time as configurations of temporal zones. / Afrikaans and Theory of Literature / M. A. (Theory of Literature)

The aim of this thesis is to arrive at a characterisation of twentieth century poetry and science by means of a detailed study of the work of four poets who engaged extensively with science and whose writing lives spanned the greater part of the period. The study of science in the work of the four chosen poets, Hugh MacDiarmid (1892 – 1978), Judith Wright (1915 – 2000), Edwin Morgan (1920 – 2010), and Miroslav Holub (1923 – 1998), is preceded by a literature survey and an initial theoretical chapter. This initial part of the thesis outlines the interdisciplinary history of the academic subject of poetry and science, addressing, amongst other things, the challenges presented by the episodes known as the ‘two cultures' and the ‘science wars'. Seeking to offer a perspective on poetry and science more aligned to scientific materialism than is typical in the interdiscipline, a systemic challenge to Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) is put forward in the first chapter. Additionally, the founding work of poetry and science, I. A. Richards's Science and Poetry (1926), is assessed both in the context in which it was written, and from a contemporary viewpoint; and, as one way to understand science in poetry, a theory of the creative misreading of science is developed, loosely based on Harold Bloom's The Anxiety of Influence (1973). The detailed study of science in poetry commences in Chapter II with Hugh MacDiarmid's late work in English, dating from his period on the Shetland Island of Whalsay (1933 – 1941). The thesis in this chapter is that this work can be seen as a radical integration of poetry and science; this concept is considered in a variety of ways including through a computational model, originally suggested by Robert Crawford. The Australian poet Judith Wright, the subject of Chapter III, is less well known to poetry and science, but a detailed engagement with physics can be identified, including her use of four-dimensional imagery, which has considerable support from background evidence. Biology in her poetry is also studied in the light of recent work by John Holmes. In Chapter IV, science in the poetry of Edwin Morgan is discussed in terms of its origin and development, from the perspective of the mythologised science in his science fiction poetry, and from the ‘hard' technological perspective of his computer poems. Morgan's work is cast in relief by readings which are against the grain of some but not all of his published comments. The thesis rounds on its theme of materialism with the fifth and final chapter which studies the work of Miroslav Holub, a poet and practising scientist in communist-era Prague. Holub's work, it is argued, represents a rare and important literary expression of scientific materialism. The focus on materialism in the thesis is not mechanistic, nor exclusive of the domain of the imagination; instead it frames the contrast between the original science and the transformed poetic version. The thesis is drawn together in a short conclusion.