Cette thèse s’intéresse aux souffrances morales dans la philosophie de Vladimir Jankélévitch, plus particulièrement le remords, l’ennui et la nostalgie. L’analyse suit deux axes, d’abord un axe herméneutique où il s’agit de comprendre la signification de ces souffrances en les replaçant dans une anthropologie philosophique et une ontologie qui leur donne sens. Ensuite un axe thérapeutique qui indique comment ces formes de souffrances peuvent orienter le devenir de manière à vivre plus harmonieusement. Sur ces bases, la thèse élabore une étude en profondeur de la joie chez Jankélévitch, laquelle s’est dessinée en creux dans l’analyse des souffrances. En effet, le remords permet de bien comprendre le lien puissant entre la joie et l’amour. Les analyses de l’ennui et de la nostalgie permettent quant à elles de saisir son ancrage temporel. / This thesis investigate the question of moral suffering in the philosophy of Vladimir Jankélévitch, specifically remorse, boredom and nostalgia. The analysis uses two different perspectives. First of all, a hermeneutic one working on the meaning of these sufferings and showing their roots in a philosophical anthropology and in an ontology. Secondly, a therapeutic point of view showing how these suffering can help becoming more harmoniously. Based on this analysis, this thesis concludes on an analysis of joy. The analysis of remorse permits to seize the fundamental love dynamic at work in joy. The analysis of boredom and nostalgia provide the temporal part of it.

No description available.

For almost a century, Virginia Woolf has enchanted readers all over the world with her novel about the gender fluid and time travelling character Orlando. British director Sally Potter adapted Orlando into film in 1992, and her adaptation has since gained immense fame and a continuous presence in world cinema. Potter's Orlando has been the object of a great deal of scholarly interest. However, previous research has predominantly focused on questions of gender and sexuality. Considerably underdiscussed is the film's fascinating conception of time and space. This thesis therefore sets out to analyze Sally Potter's Orlando in order to demonstrate how time and space is shaped in the film.  Theories developed by George Bluestone and André Bazin form the theoretical framework of this thesis. Through a close reading of the film, this thesis demonstrates that Potter establishes an unconventional temporality and spatiality through constructing a nonlinear, often contradictory temporality conveyed through contrasts between the organic and the fantastic, the real and the fictitious. Furthermore, the analysis finds that spatiality in Potter's Orlando is presented as multidimensional, allowing certain characters the possibility to inhabit a "fluid spatiality". Through presenting the past and the present as fused, Potter's Orlando can be understood through the optics of Bluestone's concept of "the flux of time" and Henri Bergsons la durée réelle. Simultaneously, breaks in the narrative presented through intertitles can be read as representing Bergsons idea of l'étendu, while also establishing a tangible spatiality.

Sob o signo do aprofundamento e da intensificação da consciência de si, o ato filosófico de Pierre Thévenaz se define como uma filosofia radicalizante. E porque não abre mão e nem elide o lócus de resposta do qual seu ato filosófico toma sua consistência própria que é o da tradição protestante pode receber o complemento (protestante). Assim, uma filosofia radicalizante (protestante). Isso porque a secularização da filosofia, a que seu método de radicalização leva de modo conseqüente, já pressupõe a assunção da própria contingência que é consciência de condição. Consciência de que se fala de algum lugar; consciência de que o pensamento se encontra previamente engajado em um específico hic et nunc que, por conta da condição, recebe sua densidade própria e não pode mais ser cotado no trato das formas abstratas do tempo e do espaço. O que já é um dos índices da superação thévenaziana da redução da filosofia à epistemologia, tal como se tem estabelecido após Kant. Nesse sentido, a abertura plena à contingência pela radicalização forçará a mudança do problema do sentido, ligado pela fenomenologia à consciência intencional, para o problema da hermenêutica histórica. Quer dizer, para o da compreensão dos eventos significativos que têm poder de reorganizar em torno de si o movimento da história. Com a epoché do sentido, lançada sobre o núcleo mesmo do que a fenomenologia husserliana descobrira como a atividade própria da consciência intencional, assim, um passo decisivo no movimento de radicalização thévenaziana, só restará à razão filosófica (ao ser humano) tomar o sentido como tarefa por se fazer, inacabada e não garantida. Esse passo negativo, todavia, não recebe, em Pierre Thévenaz, o tom de palavra final, de última palavra. Pois se assim fosse, serviria ainda como álibi para a instauração de uma nova instalação. Desta vez tão segura no negativo quanto o era na ingenuidade otimística do sentido garantido. O qual permanecia na consciência intencional como ainda um último bastião de força e de atração, exercido sobre a consciência ingênua da atitude natural, sem ser superado. Isso porque agora a razão, já tendo alcançado um nível profundo de consciência de sua condição humana, de sua contingência, de sua fraqueza e equívoco sempre possíveis, para continuar sua atividade crítica costumeira, sua vocação mesma, deverá aprender a tirar força de sua fraqueza. A razão terá de se desdivinizar; de parar de tentar falar por Deus, ou pelos olhos de Deus; de parar de postular reduplicações de si como razão juiz ou razão instância não tocada pela crítica. Ela deverá assumir-se como estando em crise: assumir-se como humana, e humana só. Ora, esta possibilidade inusitada que se abre à própria razão pela radicalização, como vemos, não surge do nada. Ela representa, no inverso mesmo, outra possibilidade que à que Hegel estabeleceu na linha do horizonte e cuja atração exercida no interior do pensamento contemporâneo é bem mais sutil e presente do que parece. Por isso, será preciso desvencilhar a metafísica de certos comprometimentos históricos que a têm desacreditado, para se chegar ao seu mais autêntico núcleo afim à radicalização. Pelo que o signo da defesa da especificidade e da singularidade contra as categorias gerais continentes; o signo da defesa das irredutibilidades aos reducionismos, espiritualistas ou materialistas, será o que caracteriza, para Thévenaz, o movimento mais interno à metafísica ocidental. Este signo é o do espaço ontológico que a metafísica, descoberta por Platão, esclarece a necessidade de que seja mantido entre as grandezas em relação. Todavia, para ativar o que esta descoberta, neutralizada sob a lógica auto contida de uma razão autista, poderia auferir em termos de aprofundamento da consciência de condição, será necessário um apoio externo à razão. E este ela o recebe da experiência choque de imputação de loucura sobre ela que a fé cristã primitiva lançou. E não sendo possível à razão avaliar a justeza de tal imputação, pois não se trata de mais um argumento lógico com o qual ela jogar o seu jogo, a razão é levada a verificar por si mesma a pertinência de tal possibilidade. E assim, nessa nova disposição, um campo insuspeito e infinito, sobre o qual ela pode retomar sua atividade crítica, inesperadamente se abre. Só que agora esta atividade já não poderá mais ser exercida sob o selo de sua inconsciência e do seu autismo tradicional, mas sob o novo índice de uma consciência de condição aprofundada que muda o registro do cumprimento de sua vocação para o de uma atividade intelectual responsável no aqui em baixo, neste mundo / The philosophical act ofPierre Thévenaz, that takes the sign of thedeepening and intensification of self-consciousness, it is here defined as a radicalizing philosophy. Because he doesnt abandon and doesnt hides the locus of his answer,of which philosophical act takes its consistence whereas it is the protestant tradition his philosophical act can to receive the following complement: protestant. So, a (protestant) radicalizing philosophy. It is because a secularization of philosophy, for which his method of radicalization leads consequently, alreadypresupposes the accepting of selfcontingence that is consciousness of condition. Consciousness of speakingfrom somewhere; consciousness of the thought has finding prior engaged in a specific hic etnunc. Because of condition receives its characteristic density and so it cant be quoted in the rank of abstract forms of time and space. It is one of the evidences of thévenazian overcoming of reduction of philosophy to the epistemology, as it has been fixed after Kant. This way, the full overture to the contingence by radicalization will compel the change of the problem of sense, connected by phenomenology to the intentional consciousness, to the problem of historical hermeneutic. I mean, to the understanding of meaningful events that have capacity to reorganize around themselfs the movement of the history. Theepoché of sense putson kernel of husserlian phenomenology, it founded as the specific activity of intentional consciousness, so a conclusive step in the motion of thévenazian radicalization, only rest to philosophical raison (namely, the human being) to take a sense as a task to be make unconcluded and no guaranteed. This negative step, however, no receive in Pierre Thévenaz the hue of last word. So this way serve or it would be serve still as an alibi for the setting of a new ideological fixed. This time, such certain on the negative as it were on optimistic naivety of secure sense. This remained in the intentional consciousness as still the last bastion of power and attraction, exerted on the naïve consciousness of natural attitude, that is, without overcoming.This is because now the raison had already reached the deep level of consciousness of its human condition, (its contingence), of its weakness and misunderstanding always possible. Then, for it to continue its usual criticism activity, its calling, it must to learn to take advantage from its weakness. The reason must be undivinize by itself; to stop to try speaks instead eye God; or by Gods eyes. It must be to stop to claim self-reduplications as judge or instance raison never touched by criticism. It must looks like being in the crisis condition; to admit yourself as human, only human. However, this unused possibility that appers the own reason, through radicalization, as we can see, it doesnt emerge from nothing. This typify, in the exact converse, another possibility that Hegel sets up on horizon line whose appeal, inner of the contemporary thought, is more subtle and present than it seems. So, it would be necessary to separate the metaphysic from certain historical commitments that made its discredit, to reach to its more authentic pith related with the radicalization. So, the sign of defense of specificity and singularity against the continent general categories; the sign of defense of no-reductive quality to the reduction, spiritualistic reductions or materialistic reductions, will be the main character, for Pierre Thévenaz, the more internal movement of occidental metaphysic. This sign is from ontological space, that the metaphysic founded by Plato clarifies the need to keep on among the magnitudes in relation. However, to start activing this discovery, which has been neutralized about the self-contained of an autistic reason, it might obtain in terms of deepening of consciousness of condition, will be necessary an external support to the reason. And the reason receives it from shock-experience of imputation of madness on the reason that ancient Christian faith launched. But, it not been possible for the reason to evaluate the right of that imputation, because it wasnt the most logical argument for the reason to play its game. So, the reason is conducted to checking itself the relevance of such possibility. And so, in this new arrangement, an unsuspected field open to the reason, on which the reason can to retake its criticism activity, suddenly open. But, now, people can`t practice this activity anymore about its traditional unconsciousness and its autism. But about the new evidence of a consciousness of conditiondeepening that changes the key of the perform of its calling, now as responsible intellectual practice on the hereunder, in this world

Sob o signo do aprofundamento e da intensificação da consciência de si, o ato filosófico de Pierre Thévenaz se define como uma filosofia radicalizante. E porque não abre mão e nem elide o lócus de resposta do qual seu ato filosófico toma sua consistência própria que é o da tradição protestante pode receber o complemento (protestante). Assim, uma filosofia radicalizante (protestante). Isso porque a secularização da filosofia, a que seu método de radicalização leva de modo conseqüente, já pressupõe a assunção da própria contingência que é consciência de condição. Consciência de que se fala de algum lugar; consciência de que o pensamento se encontra previamente engajado em um específico hic et nunc que, por conta da condição, recebe sua densidade própria e não pode mais ser cotado no trato das formas abstratas do tempo e do espaço. O que já é um dos índices da superação thévenaziana da redução da filosofia à epistemologia, tal como se tem estabelecido após Kant. Nesse sentido, a abertura plena à contingência pela radicalização forçará a mudança do problema do sentido, ligado pela fenomenologia à consciência intencional, para o problema da hermenêutica histórica. Quer dizer, para o da compreensão dos eventos significativos que têm poder de reorganizar em torno de si o movimento da história. Com a epoché do sentido, lançada sobre o núcleo mesmo do que a fenomenologia husserliana descobrira como a atividade própria da consciência intencional, assim, um passo decisivo no movimento de radicalização thévenaziana, só restará à razão filosófica (ao ser humano) tomar o sentido como tarefa por se fazer, inacabada e não garantida. Esse passo negativo, todavia, não recebe, em Pierre Thévenaz, o tom de palavra final, de última palavra. Pois se assim fosse, serviria ainda como álibi para a instauração de uma nova instalação. Desta vez tão segura no negativo quanto o era na ingenuidade otimística do sentido garantido. O qual permanecia na consciência intencional como ainda um último bastião de força e de atração, exercido sobre a consciência ingênua da atitude natural, sem ser superado. Isso porque agora a razão, já tendo alcançado um nível profundo de consciência de sua condição humana, de sua contingência, de sua fraqueza e equívoco sempre possíveis, para continuar sua atividade crítica costumeira, sua vocação mesma, deverá aprender a tirar força de sua fraqueza. A razão terá de se desdivinizar; de parar de tentar falar por Deus, ou pelos olhos de Deus; de parar de postular reduplicações de si como razão juiz ou razão instância não tocada pela crítica. Ela deverá assumir-se como estando em crise: assumir-se como humana, e humana só. Ora, esta possibilidade inusitada que se abre à própria razão pela radicalização, como vemos, não surge do nada. Ela representa, no inverso mesmo, outra possibilidade que à que Hegel estabeleceu na linha do horizonte e cuja atração exercida no interior do pensamento contemporâneo é bem mais sutil e presente do que parece. Por isso, será preciso desvencilhar a metafísica de certos comprometimentos históricos que a têm desacreditado, para se chegar ao seu mais autêntico núcleo afim à radicalização. Pelo que o signo da defesa da especificidade e da singularidade contra as categorias gerais continentes; o signo da defesa das irredutibilidades aos reducionismos, espiritualistas ou materialistas, será o que caracteriza, para Thévenaz, o movimento mais interno à metafísica ocidental. Este signo é o do espaço ontológico que a metafísica, descoberta por Platão, esclarece a necessidade de que seja mantido entre as grandezas em relação. Todavia, para ativar o que esta descoberta, neutralizada sob a lógica auto contida de uma razão autista, poderia auferir em termos de aprofundamento da consciência de condição, será necessário um apoio externo à razão. E este ela o recebe da experiência choque de imputação de loucura sobre ela que a fé cristã primitiva lançou. E não sendo possível à razão avaliar a justeza de tal imputação, pois não se trata de mais um argumento lógico com o qual ela jogar o seu jogo, a razão é levada a verificar por si mesma a pertinência de tal possibilidade. E assim, nessa nova disposição, um campo insuspeito e infinito, sobre o qual ela pode retomar sua atividade crítica, inesperadamente se abre. Só que agora esta atividade já não poderá mais ser exercida sob o selo de sua inconsciência e do seu autismo tradicional, mas sob o novo índice de uma consciência de condição aprofundada que muda o registro do cumprimento de sua vocação para o de uma atividade intelectual responsável no aqui em baixo, neste mundo / The philosophical act ofPierre Thévenaz, that takes the sign of thedeepening and intensification of self-consciousness, it is here defined as a radicalizing philosophy. Because he doesnt abandon and doesnt hides the locus of his answer,of which philosophical act takes its consistence whereas it is the protestant tradition his philosophical act can to receive the following complement: protestant. So, a (protestant) radicalizing philosophy. It is because a secularization of philosophy, for which his method of radicalization leads consequently, alreadypresupposes the accepting of selfcontingence that is consciousness of condition. Consciousness of speakingfrom somewhere; consciousness of the thought has finding prior engaged in a specific hic etnunc. Because of condition receives its characteristic density and so it cant be quoted in the rank of abstract forms of time and space. It is one of the evidences of thévenazian overcoming of reduction of philosophy to the epistemology, as it has been fixed after Kant. This way, the full overture to the contingence by radicalization will compel the change of the problem of sense, connected by phenomenology to the intentional consciousness, to the problem of historical hermeneutic. I mean, to the understanding of meaningful events that have capacity to reorganize around themselfs the movement of the history. Theepoché of sense putson kernel of husserlian phenomenology, it founded as the specific activity of intentional consciousness, so a conclusive step in the motion of thévenazian radicalization, only rest to philosophical raison (namely, the human being) to take a sense as a task to be make unconcluded and no guaranteed. This negative step, however, no receive in Pierre Thévenaz the hue of last word. So this way serve or it would be serve still as an alibi for the setting of a new ideological fixed. This time, such certain on the negative as it were on optimistic naivety of secure sense. This remained in the intentional consciousness as still the last bastion of power and attraction, exerted on the naïve consciousness of natural attitude, that is, without overcoming.This is because now the raison had already reached the deep level of consciousness of its human condition, (its contingence), of its weakness and misunderstanding always possible. Then, for it to continue its usual criticism activity, its calling, it must to learn to take advantage from its weakness. The reason must be undivinize by itself; to stop to try speaks instead eye God; or by Gods eyes. It must be to stop to claim self-reduplications as judge or instance raison never touched by criticism. It must looks like being in the crisis condition; to admit yourself as human, only human. However, this unused possibility that appers the own reason, through radicalization, as we can see, it doesnt emerge from nothing. This typify, in the exact converse, another possibility that Hegel sets up on horizon line whose appeal, inner of the contemporary thought, is more subtle and present than it seems. So, it would be necessary to separate the metaphysic from certain historical commitments that made its discredit, to reach to its more authentic pith related with the radicalization. So, the sign of defense of specificity and singularity against the continent general categories; the sign of defense of no-reductive quality to the reduction, spiritualistic reductions or materialistic reductions, will be the main character, for Pierre Thévenaz, the more internal movement of occidental metaphysic. This sign is from ontological space, that the metaphysic founded by Plato clarifies the need to keep on among the magnitudes in relation. However, to start activing this discovery, which has been neutralized about the self-contained of an autistic reason, it might obtain in terms of deepening of consciousness of condition, will be necessary an external support to the reason. And the reason receives it from shock-experience of imputation of madness on the reason that ancient Christian faith launched. But, it not been possible for the reason to evaluate the right of that imputation, because it wasnt the most logical argument for the reason to play its game. So, the reason is conducted to checking itself the relevance of such possibility. And so, in this new arrangement, an unsuspected field open to the reason, on which the reason can to retake its criticism activity, suddenly open. But, now, people can`t practice this activity anymore about its traditional unconsciousness and its autism. But about the new evidence of a consciousness of conditiondeepening that changes the key of the perform of its calling, now as responsible intellectual practice on the hereunder, in this world

anglicky : Title of the thesis : Humour during the French classes Keywords : Comic, irony, humour, laughter, Henri Bergson, Louis Cazamian, gelotology, gélothérapie, sense of humour, French as a foreign language, school class, word play, joke, riddle, tongue twister, didactical sheet. Abstract : The thesis aims to provide a comprehensive description of possible use of humour in teaching the French language. In the theoretical section, it defines humour as a form of comic, deals with the influence of humour and laughter on health and describes the advantages and difficulties of integrating humour into school teaching. In the practical part, it analyses the humour in French textbooks, proposes a typology of humour in teaching materials and presents finally didactical sheets to teach French at all language levels. These exercises and activities are dedicated to all speech and language skills. They are focused on different themes to captivate the target age category and meet the requirements to be fun for students. The thesis should become aid and inspiration for those teachers, who decide to incorporate humour and laughter in the teaching of French.

No description available.

L'espérance se présente comme l'expérience d'un avenir qui n'a pas été encore vécu et qui se donne comme inobjectivable. Cette intuition a commandé la problématique de cette recherche, qui met au jour les conditions de possibilité d'une espérance véritable dans un monde – le nôtre – où elle ne trouve pas immédiatement sa place. Ce monde ''cassé'', comme l'appelle Gabriel Marcel, est sous l'emprise de la technique. C'est un monde où prime l'exigence du faire et où les questions existentielles sont réduites elles-mêmes à des ''problèmes'' qui doivent trouver leur ''solution'' comme n'importe quel problème relevant de l'ordre de l'avoir. Il y a, en ce sens, un ''problème de l'espérance ». Il se développe dans une philosophie qui s'émancipe de la foi et dont on trouve des illustrations notamment dans le probabilisme de Hume et dans le matérialisme de Bloch. Or Gabriel Marcel fait le pari, par la méthode dite de la ''réflexion seconde'', de placer l'espérance sous le sceau du ''mystère''. Il s'agit alors de comprendre que l'espérance, pensée sur le plan de l'être et non plus de l'avoir, relève d'une expérience qui est toujours en cours de formation, et qui ouvre le chemin que suit une personne que définissent sa capacité d'agir, ses relations avec les autres personnes et son aptitude à la responsabilité. Nous soutenons dans ce sens, avec l'appui de Ricœur, que l'identité du sujet de l'espérance est essentiellement intersubjective et ouverte, selon une exigence de fidélité créatrice.  Nous trouvons plus précisément dans le nous familial, comme l'appelle Marcel, la condition de possibilité d'une expérience concrète de l'espérance, comprise alors comme patience d'un présent éprouvant et confiance en un avenir incertain. Renvoyant dos à dos, pour ce faire, les conceptions essentialiste et constructiviste de la famille, nous appelons vœu créateur ce qui, au sein même de la famille, dont nous proposons une conception élargie, est jaillissement du nouveau et promesse de vie. Ainsi nous affirmons que l'espérance, pour invérifiable qu'elle soit, est, mais selon des formes authentiques ou inauthentiques. L'enjeu de ce travail, en reconnaissant cette différence au cœur même de l'espérance, est de comprendre comment celle-ci, plus que comme un ensemble de moyens, se présente fondamentalement comme une mise en route qui se reçoit d'un appel de ou à l'autre, et qui est constitutive de toute action vouée au temps. La présence de cet autre déborde toute tentative d'objectivation. Elle est le lieu intérieur où se vit in fine l'attente active qu'est l'espérance comme expérience ontologique. / Hope appears as the experience of a future which was not still lived yet and which is given as inobjectivable. This intuition has commanded the problematic of this research, which brings to light the conditions of possibility of a true hope in a world – ours – where it does not immediately find its place. This « broken » world, as Gabriel Marcel calls it, is under the influence of technic. It's a world in which prevail the need to do things, and also where existential questions are reduced to ''problems'' which must find their ''solution'' as any other problem come under the order of the possession. In this way, there is a ''problem of hope''. A philosophy is growing which emancipate itself from faith and which illustrations are found in particular in Hume's probabilism and Bloch's materialism. But Gabriel Marcel, by the method said about ''second reflection », bet to place hope under the seal of ''mystery''. It's all about understanding that hope, thought on the plan of ''the being'' and no more of ''the having'' is an experience still on training and which opens the way that follows a person defined by its ability to act, its relations to others and its aptitude to responsibility. In this sense, we support, with Ricoeur's support, that the subject identity of hope is essentially intersubjective and opened, according to a requirement of creative fidelity. We find more exactly in the « I and you familial» as Marcel calls it, the condition of possibility of a concrete experience of hope, understood as patience of a trying present and trust in an uncertain future. Referring back to back, the essentialist and constructivist conceptions of the family, we call creative vow, what within the family, of which we propose an enlarged conception is springing forth for the new and promise of life. So we assert that hope, however unverifiable as it may be, is, but according to authentic and inauthentic forms. The challenge of this work, recognizing this difference at the very heart of hope, is to understand how it, more than as a set of means, is fundamentally a start-up that is received from a call. From one to other, and which is constitutive of all action devoted to time. The presence of this other overflows any attempt at objectification. It is the inner place where the active expectation of hope as an ontological experience is lived.

La condensation :un outil conceptuel pour la théorie de l’art / Résumé.<p><p>Notre étude sur la condensation tente de montrer l’intérêt d’une voie peu explorée dans le débat sur la nature de l’art, à savoir l’économie sensible des représentations symboliques. Nous donnons tout d’abord consistance au concept de condensation en suivant les écrits de Freud. Freud, un des rares auteurs à avoir thématisé cette notion, fournit dans L’interprétation des rêves les linéaments principaux du concept. Dans l’analyse de cet ouvrage, notre effort se porte sur la distinction entre une approche plastique et une approche symbolique de la condensation, c’est-à-dire l’obtention d’une condensation par composition de différentes figures ou par répétition d’une même représentation. En relation marginale avec la condensation, la méthode d’analyse des rêves nous montre l’importance des thèmes de l’idiosyncrasie et de la totalisation, lesquelles se révéleront en affinité étroite avec celui de la condensation. Nous procédons ensuite à l’analyse du second ouvrage d’importance rapporté à la condensation chez Freud, Le mot d’esprit et sa relation à l’inconscient. L’accent est porté, d’une part, sur la relation entre condensation et économie, et, d’autre part, sur la distinction entre deux états ou attitudes d’esprit révélée par le Witz. <p>Sur base de la thématisation freudienne, nous poursuivons la construction du concept de condensation à partir de l’expérience esthétique ordinaire. Cela comprend, tout d’abord, la simple considération du fonctionnement collégial et simultané de nos différents sens. Nous procédons ensuite à l’analyse de deux modes de représentation, tous deux fondés sur un rapport sensible au réel :la photographie et le cinéma. Par ces analyses, nous tentons de mettre en lumière les caractères élémentaires de la représentation sensible. Avec la photographie nous abordons l’économie sensible de la représentation, c’est-à-dire les transformations quantitatives et qualitatives qui sont au fondement du concept de condensation. Avec l’analyse du cinéma comme mode de représentation, l’effort est porté sur l’explicitation de la tension paradoxale entre présence et représentation dans le droit fil des développements sur le jeu des dimensions sensibles et l’hétérogénéité impliqués dans la représentation photographique. Cette deuxième partie assoit la validité objective du concept de condensation.<p>Dans un troisième temps, nous étayons cette validité objective du concept en la rapportant aux différents intervenants impliqués dans la réalité artistique (principalement, œuvre, créateur, récepteur). Enfin nous confrontons le concept de condensation à deux aspects de la théorie de l’art :un versant spéculatif, l’antinomie du jugement de goût avec les questions de la subjectivité et de l’objectivité, mais aussi et surtout celle de la communicabilité ;un versant plastique, les œuvres atypiques de Marcel Duchamp. Préalablement à l’analyse de ces deux aspects, nous consacrons un chapitre important à une définition du signe tenant compte de la responsabilité du sujet dans la constitution sémiotique. C’est sous le paramètre de la liberté dans notre rapport au symbolique que se rejoignent les deux aspects de la théorie de l’art abordés. <p><p><p><p><p><p>Condensation: A Conceptual Tool for the Theory of Art / Summary.<p><p><p>\ / Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Transdisciplinarity emerged from the urge to grasp the elusive knowledge in the most fertile zone in between and beyond disciplines that escapes even the most elaborate interdisciplinary operations. While interdisciplinary protocol enables experts to operate within foreign disciplines, in the extreme case as diverse as art and science (by inviting artists into scientific departments and vice versa), the production of knowledge remains confined to particular domains. To transcend these confinements and access the knowledge that evades institutionalisation Basarab Nicolescu’s Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity sets up conditions for an open structure to be grown outside the current compartmentalisation into a living knowledge. This thesis imagines a possible evolution of transdisciplinarity into knowledge to be lived internally rather than learnt externally in order to overcome the anxiety in transcending the established culture of disciplinary research. By entering the transdisciplinary zone, the identity of experts-specialists dissolves, even the crudest separation into artists and scientists becomes obsolete. From the illusion of losing control over knowledge arises the fear of a return to archaic, mystic or even shamanic ways of knowing. Far from proposing a return to shamanism in its ancient forms this thesis imagines the way of polyphibianism – an imaginary solution to navigate efficiently the protoplasmic state of knowledge that would be indigenous to culture of disciplinary researchers. With every significant discovery the disciplinary researchers already intuitively trespass into the very zone that the Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity invites them to enter intentionally. From examination of documented introspective inquiries into their act of discovery the thesis infers the necessary sensibilities and adaptabilities of the individuals to cross the borders of their disciplines. Their seemingly lost identity is temporarily restored with the term polyphibian (analogous to amphibian) designating their ability to survive and explore multiple environments. With each change of circumstances in research a polyphibian adapts by swiftly reinventing its instinctive instruments, mutating its organs of knowing, indifferently to conventional habits of thought. Through their introspective writings this thesis investigates the polyphibic aptitude of Henri Poincaré, Henri Bergson and Marcel Duchamp to scout at the periphery of physics, metaphysics and ‘pataphysics, to intuitively anticipate the role of chance, chaos and complexity in both arts and sciences. A threshold of complexity has to be surpassed in order to bring the current apparatus of knowledge to life. Bergson’s insight on laughter and dreams suggests how intellect could transcend itself. The thesis proposes to consider laughter as faculty that could induce self-awareness in the intellectual apparatus while dreams are considered to facilitate self-organisation of intellect on higher orders of awareness. In Deleuzian manner of mutating Bergson’s work into Bergsonism, polyphibianism is a mutation in transcribing the code of Creative Evolution where Bergson insisted on interdependency between the theory of knowledge and the theory of evolution. The scholarly dispute on Bergsonian and anti-Bergsonian tendencies present in Marcel Duchamp’s work is revisited in the thesis by interpreting the higher dimensional Bride as a polyphibic organism of living knowledge with access to higher orders of awareness, able to guide the Bachelor’s apparatus of mechanical production and preservation of knowledge out of its predicament. Informed by peculiar Duchampian experiments that challenged both the domain of art and science the research projects in this thesis consist of an intervention at CERN that tested the impenetrability of institutionalised art-science collaborations and installation of the Interval of Suspended Judgement with high mathematical precision at the threshold between physics and ‘pataphysics. With these projects the problems of categorising researchers into artists and scientists are revealed. As Deleuze suggested, to effectively formulate the problem, to realize it in multiplicity of contexts, a new concept must be invented, a new organism must be conceived. This thesis gave birth to an imaginary organism of living knowledge in order to relieve the unnecessary anxieties and to fully engage in transdisciplinary research.