Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: What does it mean that the violence of aggression could justify the violence of resistance? What does such justification accomplish, and when, and how? What underlies the conditions and limitations of justified violence, as, for example, these have been formulated in western doctrines of "just war"? Most critically, how could one think about the possibility of a resistance to evil that would be effective without itself instituting further violence? The theoretical ground of this investigation is found in a close reading of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, specifically the section of his Otheruiise than Being, or Beyond Essence in which human consciousness is shown to be, from the first, called to justice in responsibility for others. For Levinas, to be a subject is to be always already for-the-other as a substitute or hostage. This is both a persecution and the "glory" of human being. Thus Levinas introduces an enigmatic "good violence" prior to any distinction between aggressive and just violences. The idea of an originary good violence opens up a reconsideration of the evil of aggression and the joyfulness of resistance. This in turn shows the instability or equivocation of just violence: even if it is inspired by goodness - by one's responsibility for the useless suffering of others - it is never finally good enough, and always at risk of slipping into injustice. The responsibility of a "just warrior" is thus not cancelled by the justness of the cause. The justness of the cause indeed demands ever greater responsibility, even for and before one's enemy. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Wat sou dit kon beteken dat die geweld van aggressie die geweld van verset regverdig? Wat word bewerkstellig deur sodanige regverdiging, en wanneer, en . hoe? Waarop berus die voorwaardes en beperkinge van geregverdigde geweld, soos dit byvoorbeeld geformuleer is in Westerse leerstellings oor "regverdige oorlog"? Nog belangriker: hoe kan 'n mens dink oor die moontlikheid van verset teen die bose wat effektief is, maar sonder om self verdere geweld daar te stel? Die teoretiese grondslag van hierdie ondersoek is 'n nougesette bestudering van die werk van Emmanuel Levinas, meer spesifiek die afdeling van sy Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, waarin hy argumenteer dat die menslike bewussyn van meet af aan tot geregtigheid opgeroep word in verantwoordelikheid vir andere. Om 'n subjek te wees is vir Levinas om altyd alreeds vir-dié-ander te wees as 'n plaasvervanger of gyselaar. Dit is sowel 'n vervolging as die "heerlikheid" van menswees. Levinas argumenteer dus ten gunste van 'n "goeie geweld" voorafgaande aan enige onderskeidinge tussen aggressiewe en geregverdigde geweld. Die idee van 'n oorspronklike goeie geweld maak 'n herdenking van die boosheid van agressie en die vreugdevolheid van verset moontlik. Op sy beurt toon dit die onstabiliteit of dubbelsinnigheid van geregverdigde geweld: selfs al word dit geïnspireer deur goedheid - deur 'n mens se verantwoordelikheid vir die nuttelose lyding van ander - is dit nooit goed genoeg nie en loop dit altyd die gevaar om om te slaan in onreg. Die verantwoordelikheid van 'n "regverdige vegter" word daarom nie uitgekanselleer deur die regverdigheid van sy saak nie. Die regverdigheid van die saak eis trouens nog groter verantwoordelikheid, selfs vir en vóór jou vyand.

<p>This study constitutes an attempt to bring the notion of stupidity into relation with ethics and creativity, through a reading of Samuel Beckett's Endgame. Employing Emmanuel Lévinas' theories on ethics - the responsible responsiveness in regard to the Other and the concept of the Face - the objective is to demonstrate how stupidity, conceived as lack of control and knowledge, functions as a precondition for the ethical relation between humans, as well as that of the individual to her creativity.</p>

<p>The aim of this study is to examine if Kenneth, a character in the novel Nyår by Stig Larsson, takes his ethical responsibility for one of the characters that appears in one section of the book, Ann. Nyår has often been related to morality. This study shows that Levinas philosophy of ethics is a supplement to the discussion of morality. According to Levinas, a person that acts in a non-moral way still can act in a righteous ethical way. With this starting point, it is possible to be close to the text and to bring out new perspectives on the novel. Kenneth is a nihilist, but has got the possibility to take his ethical responsibility for Ann. The ethical responsibility for another person, according to Levinas, always comes first. Kenneth, like everybody else, is obligated to this responsibility.</p>

This thesis argues that attitudes of inhospitality operate subtly in our politics, in our religious beliefs and practices, and in our understandings of who we are. Consequently, the question of hospitality - what it is and what it signifies - is an urgent one for us to address. In this thesis I examine and outline the hermeneutics-deconstruction debate over the experience of otherness and what it means to respond to others ethically (or hospitably). In the first two chapters I defend the importance of properly understanding the ethics of both Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. Against the concerns of Paul Ricoeur and Richard Kearney, I maintain that a Levinasian and Derridean insistence on answering to the call of an unconditional hospitality is the best way forward in our attempt to respond with justice to strangers. Next, by engaging Martin Hagglund's objection to an ethical reading of Derridean unconditionality, I give attention to the theme of negotiation in Derrida's later work, a theme which I take to be the central feature of his account of hospitality. I conclude by proposing five theses concerning hospitality. These theses provide an overview of the main themes discussed in this thesis and once more address the various tensions internal to the concept of hospitality.

La présente étude revisite les thèmes récurrents portant sur la situation de l’Afrique d’aujourd’hui à travers la littérature. Notamment dans Allah n’est pas obligé d’Ahmadou Kourouma, Johnny Chien Méchant d’Emmanuel Dongala et dans Les Petits-fils nègres de Vercingétorix d’Alain Mabanckou qui constituent le corpus de base de cette thèse. Les guerres civiles à caractère tribal et les conséquences qui en découlent font l’objet d’une attention particulière desdits travaux de recherche. A cela s’ajoute la question des enfants-soldats – problématique essentielle de l’étude thématique / This study is based on themes related to Africa’s situation nowadays, particularly on « Allah n’est pas obligé » of Ahmadou Kourouma, « Johnny Chien Méchant » of Emmanuel Dongala and « Les Petits-fils nègres de Vercingétorix » of Alain Mabanckou which constitute the corner stone of this thesis. Our attention all along this work is focussed specially on tribal wars and its consequences. Futhermore, one of major problematics of this research is the issue of child-soldiers

La notion de « dramatisation » a été formulée par Gilles Deleuze en 1967 dans Différence et répétition pour être délaissée ensuite. Cette recherche tâche de clarifier le sens de ce concept en distinguant une acception « dramatique » d’une acception « scénique ». Deleuze n’ayant cependant pas énoncé explicitement de théorie de la scène, une partie de l’entreprise vise à déduire, des textes de Deleuze et des auteurs qui lui servent de référence, l’hypothèse de cette définition. La formulation de cette hypothèse s’inscrit dans un environnement problématique déterminé par les ouvrages de Denis Guénoun et Esa Kirkkopelto. La notion prend son sens dans le cadre d’une critique de « la représentation », dont seraient captifs Platon, Aristote, Kant et Hegel, et d’une élaboration du concept de répétition à partir de Kierkegaard et Nietzsche. Une interprétation de la méthode de division platonicienne, de la méthode transcendantale kantienne et de l’éternel retour nietzschéen contribue ainsi à énoncer l’agencement conceptuel du drame, de la scène et de la répétition / The notion of “dramatisation” was formulated by Gilles Deleuze in his 1967 text Difference and Repetition, only later to be abandoned. This piece of research sets out to clarify the meaning of this concept by distinguishing its “dramatic” acceptance from its “scenic” one. Since Deleuze never explicitly expressed his theory of the stage this thesis project intends to determine from Deleuze’s texts, as well as from the authors to whom he himself referred, the hypothesis at work within the philosopher’s definition of this term. The statement of this hypothesis takes place in a problematic conceptual environment, as described in the works of Denis Guénoun and Esa Kirkkopelto. The notion of “dramatisation” derives its meaning through a critique of a particular understanding of “representation” within which Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel are held captive, as well as through a certain construal of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s concept of repetition. Interpretations of Plato’s method of dichotomous division, Kant’s transcendental method and Nietzsche’s eternal return contribute in this thesis to articulating the way in which drama, the stage and repetition combine.

O presente trabalho apresenta uma nova perspectiva para as discussões jurídicas e bioéticas acerca dos direitos da personalidade dos pacientes terminais e encontra em nosso ordenamento jurídico, na afirmação de um direito geral da personalidade, a plenitude da tutela civil dos bens jurídicos personalíssimos do enfermo, sobretudo nas etapas finais da doença, ocasião em que a hipermedicalização do processo de morrer destaca-se como o principal fator gerador de lesões de diversas naturezas a esses bens. No caminho para chegarmos à proteção geral da personalidade, examinamos alguns direitos especiais que emergem ao final da existência humana, como o direito à morte em momento natural. No intuito de recuperar a centralidade da pessoa humana como fim único a que devem servir o Direito e a Medicina, construímos a trajetória do conceito de pessoa em seu desenvolvimento jusfilosófico para afirmar que todo ser humano é pessoa e sujeito de direito (ubi homo sapiens, ibi persona), ainda que não possua capacidade jurídica de fato, e, com isso, demonstrar a impossibilidade de pertença a uma classe de não pessoas independentemente de circunstâncias ou do desenvolvimento biopsíquico humano. Asseveramos, também, que o cuidar e o tratar em pacientes gravemente enfermos e terminais deve relacionar-se, antes, ao homem em sua dignidade e plenitude, em uma concepção biomédica, filosófica e metafísica conjugada da sua existência, e não se reduzir à simples obstinação prognóstica e terapêutica, visão reducionista que relaciona tratar a doença a um investimento no prolongamento estéril da vida humana. Nesse sentido, apresentamos perspectiva jurídica inovadora para a enfermidade e para a vivência dessa condição, do ponto de vista de pacientes terminais, cuidadores e equipes de saúde, à luz do pensamento de Emmanuel Lévinas e à centralidade que ele outorga à figura do Outro, que ilumina nossa hermenêutica do instituto dos direitos da personalidade. Concluímos que se faz necessária uma mudança do paradigma atual de cuidados de saúde em fim de vida também na esfera jurídica, com a aceitação, na escolha terapêutica, da naturalidade do evento morte ao final da existência: da busca da cura, para o cuidar; da quantidade para a qualidade da vida que resta. / The thesis presents a new perspective of the legal and bioethical discussions regarding individual rights of terminal ill patients and finds in our legal system, in the assertion of a general individual right, the plenitude of the protection of the legal rights of the ill, especially at the last stages of the disease, when hipermedicalization of the dying process asserts itself as the major source of the various damages caused to individual rights. On the pathway to achieve the general protection of the personhood, we highlight some special rights which emerge at the end of human existence, as, for instance, the right for a death at a natural moment. To recover the centrality of the human person as the single and only end to which Law and Medicine should serve, we present herein a path of the concept of personhood in its juridical and philosophical development to affirm that every human being is an individual (ubi homo sapiens, ibi persona), even if he/she doesnt have legal capacity and, therewith, demonstrate the impossibility of belonging to a class of non-persons independently of circumstances or the bio-psychic development. We also argue that treating and caring of seriously ill and terminal patients should be related with person in its dignity and fullness, in a biomedical, philosophical and metaphysical conception of existence, irreducible to mere obstinacy in prognosis and treatment, as a result of a reductionist perspective which relates treating a disease to a futile investment of a sterile extension of human life. In this sense, we present a innovative juridical perspective to illness and the experience of this condition, from the point of view of terminal ill patients, caregivers and health care teams in light of the thought of Emmanuel Lévinas and the centrality that he grants to the figure of the Other, which illuminates our interpretation of individual rights. We conclude that a change in the extant paradigm of the end-of-life care in Brazil is imperative also in the legal realm, with the acceptance, in the therapeutic choice, of the natural path of death at the end of our existence: from the search for cure, to care; from quantity to quality of the remaining life.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:54:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 403993.pdf: 310291 bytes, checksum: 2186c7bc59b54962d024cf93baa604c9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-03-06 / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo descrever, a partir do pensamento de Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), a rela??o com o rosto de outrem como ?tica. O fio condutor deste trabalho ? a leitura levinasiana da id?ia de infinito na qual ? vislumbrada a possibilidade de descrever um evento n?o pautado na abertura do ser nem como representa??o do eu transcendental. A descri??o da id?ia do infinito indica a rela??o com algo absolutamente exterior ?quele que o pensa, assim como atesta uma abissal dist?ncia entre o pensador e o pensado. Levinas utiliza-se da estrutura formal desta id?ia para descrever a rela??o com outrem, a concretude da id?ia do infinito produz-se na rela??o social que ? mantida com o rosto de outrem. O delineamento dessa rela??o apresenta o eu como acolhedor deste rosto descrito como absolutamente outro. Apenas a presen?a de outrem interpela o eu, confrontando o seu livre e arbitr?rio movimento de apropria??o e posse. Esta impugna??o da liberdade do eu por outrem ser? chamada de ?tica e afirma a anterioridade da justi?a em rela??o ? liberdade e, destarte, a ?tica como anterior ? ontologia. Os desdobramentos dessa rela??o primeira face a face ser?o discutidos no texto tendo como ponto de partida a hist?ria da filosofia dando ?nfase, principalmente, ? cr?tica a ontologia fundamental proposta por Heidegger. Pretende, com isso, mostrar que a rela??o com o rosto n?o se engloba na abertura do ser e, al?m disso, ? fonte de sentido e capaz de promover a justi?a na humanidade como acolhimento da diferen?a.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:54:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 407021.pdf: 563663 bytes, checksum: e14cdf3a4590b547ff6819d289ac442b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-10-30 / O trabalho aqui apresentado tem por objetivo central estudar a id?ia de temporalidade no ?mbito da est?tica do fil?sofo Emmanuel Levinas. ? estudado, de forma cronol?gica, o per?odo que se extende desde 1948 - ?poca da primeira formula??o, no atigo La r?alit? et son ombre - do que se poderia chamar de uma est?tica levinasiana - at? 1974, ano em que ? publicada aquela por muitos ? considerada a obra de maturidade do autor, Autrement qu ?tre ou au-del? de l essence. De modo a tornar expl?cita a quest?o da temporalidade, o desenvolvimento dos conceitos de sensibilidade e de linguagem, t?o importantes para a teoria levianasiana, ? investigado de modo cuidadoso. Busca-se, por fim, apresentar os diversos lugares que Levinas atribui ao artista e a sua produ??o: desde a obra como sombra da realidade (1948) at? a arte como exposi??o mesma da ess?ncia (1974).

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:54:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 408417.pdf: 495553 bytes, checksum: 2d5f3e92308e261a2fee3501645b78d2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-12-11 / Embora seja poss?vel constatar in?meros avan?os culturais, cient?ficos e principalmente tecnol?gicos, isso n?o significa que se tenha atingido maior dignidade, mais qualidade de vida ou qualidade nas rela??es. As rela??es humanas n?o acompanham essa evolu??o. A humanidade encontra-se mergulhada em uma crise de sentido, pois perdeu in?meros par?metros de refer?ncia. Na tentativa de suprir tais par?metros, recorreu-se ? raz?o para que esta servisse de baliza; por?m, sua efic?cia tamb?m passou a ser questionada por n?o conseguir responder a todas as exig?ncias necess?rias. Assim, a humanidade se encontra ?rf? de sentido, ou de algo que lhe indique um caminho seguro que aponte para um sentido. Interessados em aprofundar essa problem?tica, do sentido do humano, em termos filos?ficos, encontramos no cruzamento de nossas experi?ncias nas ?reas da Psicologia e da Filosofia em Emmanuel Levinas uma proposta audaciosa: a ?tica ? assumida como a filosofia primeira; a responsabilidade precede a liberdade; e, o Tu ? anterior ao Eu. Sua proposta remete a um novo modo de agir e pensar o ser humano que vive em sociedade. A este (ser humano) cabe a tarefa de construir sua identidade e de encontrar um sentido, a qual ? exclusivamente sua; por?m, nessa (tarefa), o Outro assume um papel fundamental: ? no encontro com o Outro, numa atitude de abertura e acolhimento que a ?tica encontra seu espa?o de realiza??o. O Outro se apresenta por meio de um Rosto, o qual ? doador de sentido, na medida em que o eu acolhe sua alteridade.