A regulação contra a discriminação de minorias pelos meios de comunicação de massa está normalmente restrita na maioria dos países (incluindo o Brasil) ao direito penal e a algumas sanções administrativas. Menor atenção é dada ao esfera civil. O a imagem minorias pode reforçar estereótipos, limitados à estigmatização de grupo e, claramente, provocar danos para cada membro dessa minoria. Eu diria que, embora o direito à própria imagem seja reconhecido como um direito pessoal, ele tem tanto aspectos individuais, quanto coletivos. Além disso, defendo que a estigmatização grupal acarretaria danos muito maiores para minorias, e que merece proteção jurídica. No entanto, desenhar os remédios legais capazes de garantir esta proteção não é uma tarefa fácil, e pode exigir uma nova doutrina legal. Na verdade, tal desenho deve reconciliar a reparação por danos individuais e coletivos, contra a exigência de um desempenho específico que exige a restauração da imagem do grupo e, acima disso, lidar com a regulação das concessões de TV e de rádio e com matérias de censura. Defendo o uso de direitos de resposta ou de retificação como uma medida possível para fazer valer os direitos das minorias. Ao forçar os violadores a produzirem e transmitirem as respostas das minorias para retrato injusto, estamos dando a devida voz e compensação para elas. / The legal discipline for prejudicial depict of minorities by mass media vehicles is usually restricted in most countries (including Brazil) to criminal law and some administrative sanctions. Much less attention is paid to civil litigation. The portrayal of those minorities could reinforce stereotypes to the limit of group stigmatization, and clearly give rise to damages to each member of this minority. I would argue that, although the right to ones own image is acknowledged as a personal right, it has both individual and collective aspects. Furthermore, I claim the damages a prejudicial characterization could entail would be far greater for minorities, and deserves legal protection. However, to design the legal remedies able to assure this protection is not an easy task, and may require a new legal doctrine. Indeed, such approach should reconcile individual and collective reparation for damages, tradeoff the payment of such damages against the demand for a specific performance requiring the restoration of the group image and, on top of that, deal with public regulation of TV and Radio concessions and censorship concerns. I personally advocate the use of the rights of reply or correction as one possible measure to enforce minority rights. By forcing violators to produce and broadcast the answers of minorities to unfair portrait, we are giving appropriate voice and compensation to them.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-08-08T11:31:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Túlio Felipe de Paiva.pdf: 900453 bytes, checksum: 648ca677483bcc275ee42a409fc9063a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-08T11:31:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Túlio Felipe de Paiva.pdf: 900453 bytes, checksum: 648ca677483bcc275ee42a409fc9063a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-25 / Fundação São Paulo - FUNDASP / The following work presents the analyses made about the parrhesia, or free speech, from Eph 6:18-20. The research speaks in a first plan the very first events of this term, that occurred in the roman-greek world, which was the understanding about the subject and what were your purposes. Once Paul was inserted in this same historical period, it analyses, in a brief outline, the presence of parrhesia in the Apostle´s life. Therefore, it is presented an exergetic analysis of the pericope chosen (Eph 6:18-20), and from this discourse about the presence of the parrhesia in Paul. Lastly, based on the previous topics, it analyzes the relationships of the parrhesia with the Spirit, the christian discipleship and the Church, as the Body of Christ / O presente trabalho visa apresentar a análise feita sobre a parresía, ou linguagem franca a partir de Ef 6,18-20. A pesquisa aborda num primeiro plano as primeiras ocorrências do termo, no mundo greco-romano, e qual era a compreensão acerca do tema e quais as finalidades que possuía. Uma vez que Paulo estava inserido neste mesmo período histórico, se analisa, num breve esboço, a presença da parresía na vida do Apóstolo. Por conseguinte, apresenta-se uma análise exegética da perícope escolhida (Ef 6,18-20), e a partir desta discorre-se a respeito da presença da parresía em Paulo. Por fim, com base nos resultados dos tópicos anteriores, analisa-se as relações da parresía com o Espírito, com o discipulado cristão e com a Igreja, enquanto Corpo de Cristo

Apesar de ser considerada há muito tempo e por inúmeras nações e organizações internacionais como um valor fundamental, a liberdade de expressão é, até hoje, objeto de muitas incertezas e indefinições, especialmente quanto à sua aplicação prática em um cenário em que outros direitos e valores constitucionais estão envolvidos. O presente estudo parte da análise da estrutura do ato comunicativo, especificamente da análise da identidade dos sujeitos da comunicação, do fator temporal e do conteúdo ou mensagem, para aferir se a valoração jurídica da expressão do pensamento é condicionada por esses elementos. A partir disso, o presente trabalho propõe critérios para que a interpretação e a aplicação da liberdade de expressão sejam imbuídas de segurança jurídica, de modo a garantir própria efetividade dessa liberdade que se configura como um valor tão caro às sociedades democráticas. / Despite being considered as a fundamental value for several centuries and by many nations and international organizations, freedom of speech is, until present time, the object of much uncertainty, especially regarding its practical application when other rights and constitutional values are involved. The present study analyses the structure of the communicative act, specifically the identity of interlocutors, the time factor and the content or message, to assess if the legal value of the expression of thought is conditioned by these elements. From that, the present work proposes criteria to a rational and secure interpretation and application of freedom of speech, so as to guarantee the effectiveness itself of this liberty, that is so dear to democratic societies.

A regulação contra a discriminação de minorias pelos meios de comunicação de massa está normalmente restrita na maioria dos países (incluindo o Brasil) ao direito penal e a algumas sanções administrativas. Menor atenção é dada ao esfera civil. O a imagem minorias pode reforçar estereótipos, limitados à estigmatização de grupo e, claramente, provocar danos para cada membro dessa minoria. Eu diria que, embora o direito à própria imagem seja reconhecido como um direito pessoal, ele tem tanto aspectos individuais, quanto coletivos. Além disso, defendo que a estigmatização grupal acarretaria danos muito maiores para minorias, e que merece proteção jurídica. No entanto, desenhar os remédios legais capazes de garantir esta proteção não é uma tarefa fácil, e pode exigir uma nova doutrina legal. Na verdade, tal desenho deve reconciliar a reparação por danos individuais e coletivos, contra a exigência de um desempenho específico que exige a restauração da imagem do grupo e, acima disso, lidar com a regulação das concessões de TV e de rádio e com matérias de censura. Defendo o uso de direitos de resposta ou de retificação como uma medida possível para fazer valer os direitos das minorias. Ao forçar os violadores a produzirem e transmitirem as respostas das minorias para retrato injusto, estamos dando a devida voz e compensação para elas. / The legal discipline for prejudicial depict of minorities by mass media vehicles is usually restricted in most countries (including Brazil) to criminal law and some administrative sanctions. Much less attention is paid to civil litigation. The portrayal of those minorities could reinforce stereotypes to the limit of group stigmatization, and clearly give rise to damages to each member of this minority. I would argue that, although the right to ones own image is acknowledged as a personal right, it has both individual and collective aspects. Furthermore, I claim the damages a prejudicial characterization could entail would be far greater for minorities, and deserves legal protection. However, to design the legal remedies able to assure this protection is not an easy task, and may require a new legal doctrine. Indeed, such approach should reconcile individual and collective reparation for damages, tradeoff the payment of such damages against the demand for a specific performance requiring the restoration of the group image and, on top of that, deal with public regulation of TV and Radio concessions and censorship concerns. I personally advocate the use of the rights of reply or correction as one possible measure to enforce minority rights. By forcing violators to produce and broadcast the answers of minorities to unfair portrait, we are giving appropriate voice and compensation to them.

Apesar de ser considerada há muito tempo e por inúmeras nações e organizações internacionais como um valor fundamental, a liberdade de expressão é, até hoje, objeto de muitas incertezas e indefinições, especialmente quanto à sua aplicação prática em um cenário em que outros direitos e valores constitucionais estão envolvidos. O presente estudo parte da análise da estrutura do ato comunicativo, especificamente da análise da identidade dos sujeitos da comunicação, do fator temporal e do conteúdo ou mensagem, para aferir se a valoração jurídica da expressão do pensamento é condicionada por esses elementos. A partir disso, o presente trabalho propõe critérios para que a interpretação e a aplicação da liberdade de expressão sejam imbuídas de segurança jurídica, de modo a garantir própria efetividade dessa liberdade que se configura como um valor tão caro às sociedades democráticas. / Despite being considered as a fundamental value for several centuries and by many nations and international organizations, freedom of speech is, until present time, the object of much uncertainty, especially regarding its practical application when other rights and constitutional values are involved. The present study analyses the structure of the communicative act, specifically the identity of interlocutors, the time factor and the content or message, to assess if the legal value of the expression of thought is conditioned by these elements. From that, the present work proposes criteria to a rational and secure interpretation and application of freedom of speech, so as to guarantee the effectiveness itself of this liberty, that is so dear to democratic societies.

In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, the Supreme Court ruled that students have speech rights in the school environment unless the speech causes or is likely to cause 1) a substantial disruption, or 2) interferes with the rights of others. The Supreme Court has yet to hear a case involving school officials' authority to regulate electronically-delivered derogatory student speech, and no uniform standard currently exists for determining when school authorities can discipline students for such speech when it occurs off campus without violating students' First Amendment rights. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine 19 federal and state court decisions in which school authorities were sued for disciplining students for electronically delivered, derogatory speech. Eighteen of these cases involved student speech that demeaned or defamed school teachers or administrators. Only one involved speech that demeaned another student. Each case was analyzed to identify significant factors in court holdings to provide a basis for the construction of a uniform legal standard for determining when school authorities can discipline students for this type of speech. The full application of Tinker's first and second prongs will provide school officials the authority needed to address this growing problem while still protecting legitimate off-campus student cyber expression. Predictions of future court holdings and policy recommendations are included.

This thesis focuses on chapter 3 articles 8 and 12 of the Ordinance Act, whichdeal with local ordinances issued by the municipalities. It was Vellinge municipality's local ordinances on the prohibition of begging that triggered an extensivedebate about preconditions for local ordinances and the relationship between themunicipal self-government and the normative power. In addition, it raises thequestions of whether local regulations on the prohibition of begging restrict freedom of expression and whether they are discriminatory. Vellinge's local ordinances were submitted to the Supreme Administrative Court (HFD) to decidethe case as the highest instance.HFD states in the case 2018 ref. 75 that local ordinances issued by the municipalities take into account the principle of municipal self-government. This statement has been criticized on the ground that local ordinances should not be considered as a municipal activity. The principle of municipal self-government therefore should not be actualized in local ordinances. But HFDs statement is compatible with the bill to the law, which states that with regard to municipal selfgovernment, the authority to issue local ordinances are given to the municipalitiesand not to the county administrative board. However the county administrativeboard should be able to review all the prerequisites for adopting local regulations.Furthermore, HFD has not dealt with this issue whether local ordinances onthe prohibition of begging conflict with regulations of a higher value or apply toissues that must be regulated by law. HFD has thus not dealt with whether theban on begging restricts freedom of expression and whether it is discriminatory. Begging can be considered as an expression in the Form of Government (RF)and is protected by freedom of expression. The ban on begging therefore violatesfreedom of speech and it must, however, be regulated by law and not by localregulations.Furthermore, given that the ECHR is considered a law in Sweden and theEuropean Court of Human Rights refers to the US judicial precedent on freedomof expression, the American law on freedom of speech and begging has also beenstudied in this thesis in the comparative method.According to the widespread case law in the United States, begging is protected by freedom of expression and regulations prohibiting begging violate beggar’s freedom of expression. There is also no legitimate ground to ban beggingon the streets. The ban on begging can also be considered discriminatory, as it is the peoplefrom Romania and Bulgaria who make up the majority of the beggars in Swedenand it is them who are disadvantaged by these rules.

Cette thèse examine, depuis une perspective durkheimienne, le conflit politique en Allemagne sur le multiculturalisme, l’immigration, et l’identité nationale. L’analyse se fait dans la période entre le début de la crise des réfugiés en 2015 et l’élection fédérale allemande de septembre 2017. J’identifie quatre idéaux moraux, soit des visions idéales de la communauté allemande qui motivent les acteurs politique : l’idéal des Autonomen qui rejettent tout forme de pouvoir et de domination, l’idéal du Verfassungspatriotismus (le patriotisme constitutionnel) de la SPD (et une partie de la CDU), l’idéal de la nation (ethno)culturelle de la plupart de l’AfD (et la CSU et la WerteUnion), et l’idéal de la nation biologique de l’extrême droite. Au cœur de chaque idéal est un objet sacré qui sert d’autorité morale qui légitimant des prescriptions morales et qui amène à une série de vérités morales et de jugements moraux, la totalité duquel Émile Durkheim identifie comme un fait moral. Pour les Autonomen et les adhérents du Verfassungspatriotismus, l’objet sacré est l’individu conçu à travers le concept de la dignité humaine. Pour les autres, l’objet sacré est la nation allemande, conçue en termes (ethno)culturels ou en termes biologiques. Cette thèse argumente que ces idéaux moraux sont intrinsèquement profanatoires, dans le sens que les prescriptions morales d’un objet sacré (la dignité humaine) violent directement l’objet sacré de l’autre (la nation), et vice-versa. Ces idéaux sont tous en concurrence pour le pouvoir et l’influence, avec comme but d’avoir accès au pouvoir étatique allemand. Le résultat est un conflit politique qui traduit essentiellement un conflit moral. Ces conflits ont lieu dans le domaine légal, au sein des partis politique, et à travers la violence politique. Ces conflits touchent un nombre de sujets clés comme la liberté d’expression, le multiculturalisme, et l’extrémisme politique. La présente thèse cherche à comprendre ces conflits à travers le prisme du concept durkheimien du fait moral, et développe une sociologie du conflit moral durkheimien. Cette thèse s’inspire également de la théorie de conflit de Randall Collins, qui s’inspire elle aussi de l’œuvre de Durkheim. / This dissertation examines, from a Durkheimian perspective, political conflict in Germany around the issues of multiculturalism, immigration, and national identity within the context of the Refugee Crisis beginning in 2015 and ending roughly with the German Federal Election in September 2017. It identifies four moral ideals, or ideal visions of the German community, that motivated political actors during this period: the Autonomen ideal that rejects all forms of power and domination; the ideal of Verfassungspatriotismus (Constitutional Patriotism) of the SPD (and parts of the CDU); the ideal of the cultural or ethnocultural nation of much of the AfD (and the CSU and WerteUnion); and the ideal of the biological nation on the far-right. At the heart of each moral ideal is a sacred object that serves as a moral authority that legitimates certain moral prescriptions, and leads to a set of moral truths and moral judgments, the totality of which Émile Durkheim identifies as a moral fact. For the Autonomen and adherents of Verfassungspatriotismus the sacred object is the individual understood through the concept of human dignity. For others the sacred object is the German nation, understood either in an (ethno)cultural sense or a biological sense. As the dissertation argues, these different moral ideals are inherently profanatory to each other, such that the moral prescriptions inspired by one sacred object (human dignity) directly violate the sacred object of the other (the nation), and vice-versa. These ideals all compete with each other for power and influence within the German political sphere as a means to gain access to (or to dismantle) state power. The result is political conflict that takes place essentially within a moral framework. These conflicts occur in the legal domain, in battles over party leadership and membership, and through political violence; they touch on a number of key issues such as free speech, multiculturalism, and political extremism. This dissertation seeks to understand these conflicts through the prism of Durkheim’s concept of the moral fact and to develop a Durkheimian sociology of moral conflict. In this analysis, the dissertation draws on Randall Collins’ conflict theory, which Durkheim’s work also largely inspires.

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