Après plusieurs décennies de monopartisme, caractérisées par l’emprise des médias par l’État et le parti unique, les États africains subsahariens ont choisi la voie de la démocratie pluraliste, à l’issue des « forums » dits, conférences nationales souveraines des années 90. Ces États firent le choix des régimes libéraux avec comme garanties les libertés fondamentales. Parmi les libertés instaurées, il y a celle de la presse qui est au cœur de tout système démocratique. L’exercice de cette liberté doit être exempt d’abus. C’est ainsi que, pour éviter de tels actes dans l’exercice de la liberté de communication, les textes constitutionnel, législatif et réglementaire ont institué des autorités de régulation des médias. Ces autorités font partie du confort des démocraties africaines comme des institutions « singulières ». Elles sont des autorités administratives et indépendantes de l’ordre organique unique tiré des pouvoirs législatif, exécutif et judiciaire. Par ailleurs, mener une étude juridique sur ces autorités oblige à s’intéresser aux questions essentiellement d’ordre pratique notamment des autorités de régulation comme alibi du pouvoir ou protectrice des libertés. Ainsi, l’on se propose de confronter les fondements juridiques et les faits afin de porter une analyse critique globale et des propositions de réformes. / After decades of monopartism, which was characterized by the influence of the media by the state and the single party, Sub-Saharan African states have chosen the path of pluralistic democracy. It followed the national sovereign conferences in the 90s. These states made the choice of the liberal regime with fundamental freedoms as its guarantees. Freedom of the press, the heart of democracy, is among the recognized freedoms.The exercise of this freedom is to be free of abuse. Thus, to prevent such an abuse, constitutional, law-level and regulatory texts created authorities responsible for the regulation of media. These authorities are part of facilitating tools for the African democracies as "singular" institutions. They are administrative and independent of the unique organic order that flows from the legislative, executive and judicial branches of power. Moreover, to make a legal research on these authorities obliges to focus essentially on practical issues, including media regulatory authorities as an alibi of power or protection of freedoms. Therefore, the thesis is intended to explore the legal grounds and facts in order to make a global critical analysis and proposals for further reforms

L’avocat plaide à l’audience ou prend la parole en dehors du prétoire pour ladéfense d’un accusé qui a contrevenu aux lois essentielles d’une société. Face à lui un pouvoircentral qui a pour mission de punir celui qui a porté atteinte aux normes sociales et qui tentede protéger son autorité. L’avocat apparaît alors comme un contre-pouvoir qui remet en causeune prérogative régalienne, celle de punir. Ainsi, de 1789 à 1830, l’avocat attire la méfiancedes différentes formes de pouvoir qui se succèdent, mais aussi de l’opinion publique avide derépression. Malgré des circonstances peu favorables à la parole de l’avocat, ce dernierparvient à imposer la nécessité des droits de la défense et le respect des libertésfondamentales. Par son éloquence, l’avocat se révèle un acteur politique incontournable. Laliberté de sa parole se trouve alors au service de la défense mais participe aussi à l’élaborationd’une société plus démocratique. / The lawyer pleads in court or speaks outside the courtroom in defense of adefendant who broke the essential laws of society. He faces a central power whose mission isto punish the one who undermined the social norms and which intends to protect its authority.So the lawyer challenges the established authority and questions a kingly prerogative, the oneto punish. Thus from 1789 to 1830, the lawyer aroused the suspicion of the differentsuccessive forms of power, but also the public opinion’s, eager for repression. Despite theseunfavourable circumstances to the word of the lawyer, the latter managed to impose thenecessity of the rights of the defense and the respect of fundamental liberties. Thanks to hiseloquence, the lawyer turned out to be a main political stakeholder. The liberty of his wordwas then at the service of the defense but also partook in a more democratic society.

[pt] Atualmente, no direito brasileiro, a liberdade de expressão corre perigo e a censura judicial é exercida de diversas maneiras. Dentre elas, figura a condenação de jornalistas e demais cidadãos que, sob o pretexto de violação da honra das pessoas afetadas pela expressão do pensamento, se vêem obrigados ao pagamento de indenizações indevidas e excessivas mesmo quando em debate assuntos de interesse público. As pessoas afetadas, geralmente políticos, empresários e outros poderosos, se valem do poder judiciário para silenciar o pensamento e gerar autocensura. O Superior Tribunal de Justiça convalida este meio indevido de restrição da liberdade de expressão na medida em que adota, em sua jurisprudência, um critério de posição preferencial da honra quando em conflito com a liberdade de expressão. Esta tese busca uma solução para este problema. A doutrina da malícia real, desenvolvida no direito norte-americano a partir do julgamento do caso New York Times v. Sullivan pela Suprema Corte em 1964, consiste em poderoso mecanismo de proteção da liberdade de expressão nos Estados Unidos, conferindo a ela a posição preferencial quando em questão assuntos de interesse público. A partir da análise da doutrina da malícia real, seus critérios deproteção da liberdade de expressão foram identificados e transpostos para um sistemaromano-germânico de responsabilidade civil como o brasileiro. A tese propõe uma reforma legal no direito brasileiro, apresentando um anteprojeto de lei da proteção da liberdade de expressão elaborado com base na doutrina da malícia real. A tese também convoca o Supremo Tribunal Federal a exercer o seu papel de guardião das normas constitucionais de proteção da liberdade de expressão e sugere, por fim, que todos os juízes e tribunais brasileiros considerem a adoção dos critérios de proteção da liberdade de expressão elaborados pela jurisprudência da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos. / [en] Nowadays, in the Brazilian legal system, freedom of expression is in danger and judicial censorship is imposed in many different ways. Among them, the presumed and punitive damages awarded over journalists and other citizens for violating someone s reputation on the basis of mere negligence even when speech about public affairs is at stake. Powerful people, politicians, and corporations go to court to silence the criticism and generate self-censorship. The Brazilian Superior Court of Justice does not oppose this restriction on freedom of expression as far as its jurisprudence assumes that reputation has a preferred position in the Brazilian law. This dissertation seeks a solution for that issue. The real malice doctrine, construed in the American law since the Supreme Court s ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964, is a powerful device to protect the freedom of expression in the United States, granting the speech a preferred position when public measures are at stake. The dissertation tries to identify the tools and mechanisms adopted by the real malice doctrine and make them work in a civil law jurisdiction as the Brazilian legal system. It proposes a legal reform in the Brazilian law by submitting a new statute containing legal rules to protect the freedom of expression based on the real malice doctrine. The thesis also exhorts the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court to exercise its constitutional powers to grant effective protection to the freedom of expression and makes to all Brazilian judges and courts a suggestion to consider the adoption of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on freedom of speech, and of the press.

L'éducation d'aujourd'hui en Chine est une oeuvre tant individuelle qu'étatique. Elle rattache strictement le développement de l'individu et l'avenir de l'État. Après une trentaine années du développement depuis la politique d'ouverture et de réforme en 1978, le système éducatif chinois est modernisé et complété. L'État, débiteur du droit à l'éducation, prend enfin en charge son devoir d'organiser l'enseignement public et de surveiller l'enseignement privé, ce dernier étant auparavant interdit dans l'histoire chinoise. L'enseigné chinois bénéficient alors le droit à l'éducation et la liberté d'enseignement. Pour autant, dans la notion de communauté éducative qui se construit, les enseignants-chercheurs apparaissent aussi indispensables pour réaliser les missions de l'éducation. Comment garantir leurs droits et libertés dans leurs vies professionnelles ? C'est une question aussi primordiale. L'indépendance de leur statut, par rapport à l'établissement d'enseignement et aux autres administrations est sans aucune doute une garantie importante. Les enseignants chinois, disposent-ils d'un tel statut ? Et, dans leurs activités d'enseignement et de recherche, jouissent-ils pleinement de la liberté d'expression ? Si ces droits et libertés de l'éducation ne sont pas encore protégés de manière parfaite, c'est parce que la Chine peine à construire un État de droit et une société démocratique. L'adoption d'une législation suffisante et cohérente est un atout considérable dans ce processus de développement. Quelles mesures doit-on prendre pour mettre un terme aux sources de désordre, et, trop souvent d'inégalité ? / Today's education in China is an individual as well as a State's undertaking. It combines the strictly individual development and the future of the State. After thirty years of development since the opening and reform policy in 1978, China's education system was modernized and expanded. The State, as a debtor of the right to education, finally takes charge of this duty to organize public education and supervise private education, previously banned in Chinese history. People taught in China got right to education and freedom of education. However, to achieve this notion of educational community, the teachers and/or researchers must be mainly associated in performing this broad function of education. How to ensure their rights and freedoms in their career? It is also a key issue. Undoubtedly, independence of their professional status with respect to the institution and to other jurisdictions is a fundamental guarantee. Do Chinese teachers have such a status? And, in their teaching and researching activities, have they a complete freedom of expression? If these rights and freedoms of education are not yet fully protected, China struggling to find common ground between rule of law and democratic society, adoption of an adequate and consistent legislation will be a major asset to identify a real development process. What measures need to be taken to put an end to educational disorders, and, too often, inequalities?

Submitted by Biblioteca Central (biblioteca@unicap.br) on 2018-01-08T17:39:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Raul_Diegues_Serva_Neto.pdf: 1093625 bytes, checksum: 60b2dba33a3e0f4aaa9b2d6c194c5957 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-01-08T17:39:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Raul_Diegues_Serva_Neto.pdf: 1093625 bytes, checksum: 60b2dba33a3e0f4aaa9b2d6c194c5957 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-18 / The purpose of this study was to identify, throughout the historicity of the interpretative practices, evaluation criteria for a legal decision analysis, using ADPF 187 (marijuana gait) as the application criterion for the elaborated construction. The starting question was: what makes it possible to make relevant statements about the Law? It was observed as the dissertation hypothesis, if the judicial decision presents transgressions of validity allowing for an interpretative discretion, then it may reveal a greater propensity to be an activist. In order to answer the initial question, the study was based on the following methodology: from the contribution of the hermeneutical turn in the approach to the analysis of the ADPF 187 decision, which makes it an activist legal decision; from the Heideggerian phenomenological method, by developing a three-step approach: (1) the phenomenological reduction, which promotes the shift from the perspective of the being towards the being; 2) the deconstruction of traditional concepts, which promotes masks in phenomena; 3) and construction, which shows itself as an appropriation of what has been forgotten, in which the access to the being is sequenced and the definition of its modes of being from the being. After the development of the methodology, the development of the Dworkin aesthetic hypothesis was elaborated from the Schools of Legal Hermeneutics, in which, throughout the historicity of this discussion, the first criterion resided in the will of the legislator, although this is a body disempowered; the will of the law is also not enough, because the law has no will, and it can be attributed to it; the legally protected interest can be considered a criterion of validity, which depends more on the conflicting reading of Law than on Law itself; normativism assigns either a policy decision or a recognition rule the interpretation validity, which, in a way, seeks outside the Law a criterion of validity for interpretations, or because it resides within a metaphysically conceived frame based on a hypothetical norm, or based on the recognition of all; finally, the dependence on the recognition of a legal proposal by the courts was added. None of these validity criteria is conceived from the Law itself, they generally attribute the validity of interpretations to facts. Next, the view is taken that the contributions on the Law validity unfold in the debate on the interpretative positions of the constitutional courts. Such an appeal is made for the purpose of avoiding moral or political correctness of the law. It discusses the multiple concepts of judicial activism, considering it as a contested and highly controversial concept, and then analyzes the assumptions of such concepts. Therefore, a study of the validity of the reading assumptions that support the comprehension of the validity of the reading of freedom of expression in its instrumental or constitutive bias was sought, based on the study of ADPF 187 (marijuana march) decision. This theoretical research constituted a critique of uncritical legal interpretation. He presented as a means of showing the forgetfulness of being-thus, the means of knowing the foundation and meaning of this being-thus. / Este trabalho teve como objetivo identificar, ao longo da historicidade das práticas interpretativas, critérios de avaliação para análise de uma decisão jurídica, utilizando como critério de aplicação da construção elaborada a ADPF 187 (marcha da maconha). A pergunta de partida foi: o que torna possível realizar afirmações relevantes sobre o Direito? Observou-se como hipótese da dissertação, se a decisão judicial apresenta transgressões de validade possibilitadoras de uma discricionariedade interpretativa, então ela pode revelar uma maior propensão de ser ativista. Para responder a pergunta de partida, o estudo valeu-se da seguinte metodologia: a partir do contributo do giro hermenêutico na abordagem da análise da decisão da ADPF 187, o que faz ser uma decisão jurídica ativista; a partir do método fenomenológico Heideggeriano, desenvolvendo-se uma abordagem em três passos, sendo: 1) a redução fenomenológica, que promove o deslocamento da perspectiva do ente em direção ao ser; 2) a desconstrução dos conceitos tradicionais, que promove encobrimentos nos fenômenos; 3) e a construção, que se mostra como uma apropriação do que ficou esquecido, em que se sequencia o acesso ao ser e a definição dos seus modos de ser a partir do ente. Após o desenvolvimento da metodologia, elaborou-se, a partir das Escolas de Hermenêutica Jurídica, o desenvolvimento da hipótese estética de Dworkin, na qual, ao longo da historicidade desta discussão, o primeiro critério residiu na vontade do legislador, embora seja este um ente despersonificado; a vontade da lei também não é suficiente, pois a lei não tem vontade, podendo-se atribuir vontades a ela; o interesse juridicamente protegido pode ser considerado um critério de validade, que mais depende da leitura conflitiva do Direito do que propriamente no Direito; o normativismo atribui ora a uma decisão de política ou a uma regra de reconhecimento a validade de uma interpretação, o que, de certa forma, busca fora do Direito um critério de validade para interpretações, ora porque reside dentro de uma moldura metafisicamente concebida baseada em uma norma hipotética, ora com base no reconhecimento de todos; acrescentou-se por último a dependência do reconhecimento de uma proposição jurídica pelos tribunais. Nenhum desses critérios de validade é concebido a partir do próprio Direito, geralmente atribuem a fatos a validade das interpretações. Em seguida, defende-se o ponto de vista de que os contributos sobre a validade do direito desdobram-se no debate sobre as posturas interpretativas das cortes constitucionais. Tal apelo é feito com a finalidade de evitar a correção moral ou política do direito. Discutem-se os múltiplos conceitos sobre ativismo judicial, considerando-o como um conceito contestado e altamente controverso, e logo se analisam os pressupostos de tais conceitos. Para tanto, se buscou, a partir do estudo da decisão da ADPF 187 (marcha da maconha), realizar um estudo da validade dos pressupostos de leitura que sustentam a compreensão da validade da leitura da liberdade de expressão em seu viés instrumental ou constitutivo. Esta pesquisa de base teórica constituiu uma crítica à interpretação jurídica acrítica. Apresentou como meio de mostrar o esquecimento do ser-assim, o meio de conhecer o fundamento e o sentido deste ser-assim.

Submitted by Biblioteca Central (biblioteca@unicap.br) on 2018-02-22T18:58:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 nara_fonseca_santa_cruz_oliveira.pdf: 759775 bytes, checksum: e4be24ff2de1542aa85720e34494f350 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-02-22T18:58:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 nara_fonseca_santa_cruz_oliveira.pdf: 759775 bytes, checksum: e4be24ff2de1542aa85720e34494f350 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-06 / With the development of new technologies, we are currently experiencing a revolution in the information society. The Internet has provided greater global integration and has completely altered the recall process, given that the facts posted on the web tend to be timeless and it is not subject to the common biological process of forgetting. In this context, some conflicts were brought to the Judiciary, involving, on the one hand, the supposed "right to forget" (linked to the rights of the personality) and, on the other, the right to freedom of expression and communication. In this work, two cases involving the so-called "right to oblivion" ("Chacina da Candelária" and "Aída Curi") will be studied, both judged on the same day, by STJ, under the report of Minister Luis Felipe Salomão. The factual context of the cases in question was analyzed separately, but the grounds of the decisions were dealt with together, since the High Court used the same arguments to make both decisions, although the solutions pointed out were different: in the case "Chacina da Candelária" (REsp. No. 1,334,097 / RJ), the STJ first applied the right to forgetfulness, since the "Aída Curi" Case (REsp. No. 1,335,153 / RJ) was considered an unforgettable one. In this work, we will analyze the position adopted by the Supreme Court in these cases, discussing whether the way the right to forgetfulness was conceived represents a threat to the right to freedom of expression and communication and the right to collective memory. In order to elucidate the problem, the general aspects involving personality rights, the right to freedom of expression and the collision of fundamental rights will be observed. The institute of collective memory will also be studied. / Com o desenvolvimento das novas tecnologias, experimentamos, atualmente, uma revolução na sociedade de informação. A Internet proporcionou uma maior integração global e alterou completamente o processo de lembrança, tendo em vista que os fatos divulgados na rede tendem a ser eternos e ela não se sujeita ao processo biológico comum de esquecimento. Nesse contexto, alguns conflitos foram levados ao Poder Judiciário, envolvendo, de um lado, o suposto “direito ao esquecimento” (ligado aos direitos da personalidade) e, do outro, o direito à liberdade de expressão e comunicação. Neste trabalho, será feito o estudo de dois casos envolvendo o chamado “direito ao esquecimento” (“Chacina da Candelária” e “Aída Curi”), ambos julgados no mesmo dia, pelo STJ, sob a relatoria do Ministro Luís Felipe Salomão. O contexto fático dos casos em questão foi analisado em separado, mas os fundamentos das decisões foram tratados em conjunto, tendo em vista que o Superior Tribunal utilizou os mesmos argumentos para proferir ambas as decisões, muito embora as soluções apontadas tenham sido diferentes: no caso “Chacina da Candelária” (REsp. nº. 1.334.097/RJ), o STJ aplicou pela primeira vez o direito ao esquecimento, já o Caso “Aída Curi” (REsp. nº 1.335.153/RJ) foi considerado inesquecível. Neste trabalho, será analisado o posicionamento adotado pelo STJ nos referidos casos, discutindo-se se a forma como o direito ao esquecimento foi concebido representa uma ameaça ao direito à liberdade de expressão e comunicação e ao direito à memória coletiva. Para elucidar o problema, serão observados os aspectos gerais que envolvem os direitos da personalidade, o direito à liberdade de expressão e a colisão entre direitos fundamentais. Será estudado também o instituto da memória coletiva.

Cette thèse propose une lecture juridique, politique et sociale de l’application de la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 dans le plus grand pays musulman du monde, l’Indonésie. Plusieurs controverses sont apparues ces dernières années concernant la nature de la loi sur le blasphème dans la vie religieuse de la société démocratique indonésienne ; cette loi correspond-elle à la prévention des abus en matière de religion et/ou de blasphème, comme il est mentionné explicitement dans son titre, ou bien concernerait-elle plutôt la restriction de la liberté de religion et d’expression en matière religieuse ? En avril 2010, après le procès contrôlant la constitutionnalité de cette loi, une décision de la Cour constitutionnelle indonésienne a établi que la loi examinée ne correspondait pas à cette seconde lecture. Si cette loi a bien pour objectif de restreindre la liberté de religion ou d’expression en matière religieuse, selon la Cour, cela ne signifie pas que cette forme de restriction est inconstitutionnelle dès lors que la Constitution de 1945 en vigueur s’accompagne d’une restriction légale au respect ou à la sauvegarde des valeurs religieuses en particulier, à côté de la moralité, de la sécurité et de l’ordre public. Toutefois, les débats et les tensions au sein de la société concernant l’application de cette loi perdurent sans relâche. Les défenseurs des droits de l’homme maintiennent que l’existence d’une telle loi anti-blasphème est contraire à l’esprit de la démocratie. En revanche, les défenseurs de la censure religieuse s’obstinent à affirmer que cette loi est nécessaire pour éviter les conflits religieux. À travers une analyse de son contenu juridique et de sa mise en application, nous considérons que la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 a visé en premier lieu à entraver le déploiement des courants de croyance spirituelle locale ou des courants mystiques javanais qui, dans une certaine mesure, sont considérés par les musulmans en particulier comme une menace pour les religions existantes et pour la désintégration du pays. Dans un second temps, nous verrons que l’existence de ladite loi est davantage destinée à restreindre le nombre des religions reconnues par l’État d’une part, et à réprimer les courants religieux « dissidents » ou « hétérodoxes » d’autre part. Si les actes jugés comme blasphématoires, parmi lesquels figure la diffusion d’interprétation religieuse « déviantes » de l’orthodoxie, sont des infractions sanctionnées, ce n’est pas la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 qui sert de référence, mais l’article 156a du Code pénal qui trouve son origine dans ladite loi. Ainsi, la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 est plutôt utilisée pour restreindre la liberté de religion et de conviction au sens large, alors que l’article 156a du Code pénal est chargé de limiter la liberté d’expression en matière religieuse. En Indonésie comme ailleurs, le renforcement de l’application de la loi anti-blasphème va de pair avec l’émergence des groupes religieux radicaux qui veulent voir triompher leur conception totalitaire d’une liberté d’expression bridée par le respect de la foi religieuse. Ces derniers utilisent de cette loi non seulement à des fins religieuses, mais également à des fins politiques, notamment celle déstabiliser un régime « laïque » ou bien d’étendre leur influence. L’objectif de cette thèse est non seulement d’analyser la nature de la loi anti-blasphème de 1965, mais aussi de proposer une perspective alternative pour aborder les conflits juridiques en Indonésie concernant les deux droits fondamentaux, à savoir le droit à la liberté de religion et le droit d’expression. La thèse vise alors la prévention des conflits juridiques en la matière et ainsi qu’à trouver un équilibre entre les libertés concernées. / This thesis proposes a legal, political and social reading of the application of the blasphemy law in the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia. Several controversies have emerged in recent years regarding the nature of the blasphemy law in the religious life of the Indonesian democratic society. For instance, disagreement remains with regards to the intent of this law, i.e., whether it really aims at preventing misuse of religion and/or acts of blasphemy, as explicitly mentioned in its title, or whether it intends to restrict the freedom of religion and religious expression. In April 2010, after the examination of the constitutionality of this law, the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruled out the second possibility. The court further argues that even if the law has an unintended effect of restricting the freedom of religion or religious expression, it is not against the constitution since the 1945 Constitution is accompanied by a legal restriction to respect or preserve religious values in particular, as well as morality, security and public order. However, the debates and tensions within society regarding the implementation of this law continue unabated. On the one hand, human rights defenders persist in saying that the existing anti-blasphemy law is contrary to the spirit of democracy. On the other, defenders of religious censorship persist in resisting that this law is necessary to avoid religious conflicts. Through an analysis of legal content and its implementation, I argue that the blasphemy law of 1965 initially aims to hinder the development of the local spiritual belief stream or Javanese mystical groups, which to some extent are considered by Muslims in particular as a threat to existing religions and a source of disintegration of the country. Further, I maintain that the existence of the above-mentioned law has the tendency to restrict the number of religions officially acknowledged by the State and to repress “dissident” or “heterodox” religious movements. If acts considered blasphemous, including the "deviant" religious interpretation of orthodoxy, are punishable offenses, it is not the anti-blasphemy law of 1965 that serves as a reference, but the article 156a of the Penal Code, which has its origin in that blasphemy law does. As a consequence, the blasphemy law of the 1965 is rather used to restrict the freedom of religion and belief in the broad sense, while article 156a of the Penal Code is applied to limit the freedom of religious expression. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, the strengthening of the application of the blasphemy law goes hand in hand with the emergence of radical religious groups intend to promote their totalitarian concept of freedom of expression restrained by respect for the religious faith. The latter make use of this law not only for religious reasons, but also for political reasons, including destabilizing a secular regime or extending their influence. The thesis does not only aim to analyze the nature of the blasphemy law of 1965, but also to propose an alternative perspective in understanding and solving the problem of the legal conflicts in Indonesia pertaining to the two fundamental rights, namely the right to freedom of religion and expression. The thesis also seeks to find a balance between two freedoms and to propose preventive measures that can be adopted in the aforementioned legal conflicts.

This thesis explores if and how states can regain control over large social media platforms like Facebook, and by doing so ensuring that individuals on those platforms can de facto enjoy their human rights, as enshrined in international treaties. Today, the platforms are crucial facilitators of human rights but at the same time facilitators of threats towards the enjoyment of the same rights. Behind this duality hides three gaps, namely between individuals’ de jure enshrined human rights and their de facto possibilities to enjoy them on social media, states extensive de jure obligations to ensure those rights on social media and their limited de facto possibilities to actually do so, and lastly between the platforms limited de jure responsibilities to respect human rights and their extensive de facto influence over human rights. The reason that these gaps have arisen is essentially that public international law – mainly its strict horizontal character and its definition of jurisdiction as something exclusively tied to a delimited physical territory – is inadequate to tackle the virtual, cross-border, and non-state activity that the platforms are pursuing. To find what could be done to lessen these gaps, this thesis turns to theories in analytical jurisprudence and public international law: the identity of systems, legal pluralism and international legal subjectivity. The first suggests that this issue cannot be solved due to different legal systems having different identities and thus cannot be bridged. The second also suggests that the issue cannot be solved not because of differing identities of systems but because the platforms should be regarded as autonomous legal systems, not subordinate to state law. Finally, the third alternative suggests an actual solution: making the platforms subject directly to international law and universal jurisdiction. Even though this is a legally sound solution it is, however, not as simple a solution as it might appear.

The diploma thesis deals with media freedom in the Visegrád Group countries (Czechia, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary) from the perspective of professional journalists. It aims to map how journalists in these four countries perceive freedom in relation to their profession - how they understand the concept of freedom of expression, what threatens freedom of expression or freedom of the media according to them, how free they feel in their profession and what is the trend regarding media freedom in the coming years in their opinion. The theoretical part thoroughly captures the historical development of freedom of expression, its legal protection in constitutional documents and international conventions, the limits of freedom of expression as well as forms of its restriction. It also introduces the most important non-governmental non- profit organizations monitoring media freedom in the world and presents the media environment in each country. The theoretical part also pursues the perception and approach of professional journalists to freedom of expression, media freedom and other journalistic concepts and values. The analytical part then follows a journalistic professional discourse in the form of a qualitative analysis based on semi-structured in-depth interviews with active journalists from the Visegrád...

El tema de investigación es la autocensura dentro de la libertad de expresión en las plataformas de Twitter. La elección del tema fue dada porque supone un panorama constantemente ignorado por los usuarios dentro de las plataformas digitales. Las redes sociales se convirtieron en el megáfono de las personas que desean expresarse libremente. Lamentablemente, con el pasar de los años ese discurso fue desvaneciéndose para convertirse en un dialogo en el que se busca aceptación antes que la expresión. Los resultados de la investigación conducirán a la mejora de la compresión del comportamiento humano ante tal problemática, pues se adentrará en el pensamiento psicológico del usuario como también en una comprensión global del contexto en la cual se encuentra. Se cree que el público interesado será tanto los usuarios de plataformas digitales como también profesionales en comunicación, ya que abre una puerta a la compresión de sucesos que se desarrollan en la mencionada red social tercera persona. / The research topic is self-censorship within the freedom of expression on Twitter platforms. The choice of the topic was given because it supposes a panorama constantly ignored by users within digital platforms. Social networks became the megaphone for people who want to express themselves freely. Unfortunately, with the passing of the years, that discourse faded to become a dialogue in which acceptance is sought rather than expression. The results of the research will lead to the improvement of the understanding of human behavior, since it will delve into the psychological thinking of the user as well as a global understanding of the context in which it is found. It’s believed that the interested public will be both users of digital platforms as well as communication professionals, since it opens a door to the understanding of events that take place in the aforementioned third-person social network. / Trabajo de investigación