Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-11-14T11:28:30Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Alvaro de Carvalho Pinto Pupo.pdf: 993019 bytes, checksum: 3e483a91d657e2658eb8b6b67b0a96f2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-11-14T11:28:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alvaro de Carvalho Pinto Pupo.pdf: 993019 bytes, checksum: 3e483a91d657e2658eb8b6b67b0a96f2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-10-31 / This study analyzes the concept of intimacy, privacy, free speech and personal data under a brazilian perspective, as well as the protection for each of the itens mentioned. The study makes references to authorities, legislation and case law pertaining to each of the subjects. The study pursues the clarification of what each of these understands as privacy protection and personal data protection, and how these correlates. It also pursues to understand if these understandings are aligned and propose, in the end, some way of uniformization considering the legislative bill proposals being discussed in the Brazilian Congress / O presente trabalho analisa o conceito da intimidade, privacidade, liberdade de expressão e de dados pessoais sob uma perspectiva brasileira, bem como a proteção outorgada a cada um dos itens tratados acima. São analisados os pontos doutrinários, legais e jurisprudenciais associados com cada um deles. A análisa busca averiguar o que cada um desses campos entende como proteção da privacidade e dos dados pessoais e como a privacidade e dados pessoais se relacionam, além verificar se esses entendimentos estão alinhados e propor, ao final, uma forma de uniformização, considerando inclusive propostas legislativas que se encontram em debate no Congresso Nacional

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-12-20T08:44:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernanda Freire dos Santos.pdf: 2446064 bytes, checksum: 7b0bcb2c75aaf557d7a717cfc15175dd (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-12-20T08:44:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernanda Freire dos Santos.pdf: 2446064 bytes, checksum: 7b0bcb2c75aaf557d7a717cfc15175dd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-08 / The aim of this study is to analyse the existence of the so-called "right to be forgotten", characterised as a desire of an individual regarding a fact from the past, published at the time, in a lawful way, not to be remembered in current or even past information (accessed through the Internet) by virtue of the disturbance caused to their life in the present. Not expressly implemented in Brazil, the right to be forgotten has emerged within a tense situation between communicative freedoms and fundamental personality rights, such as private life (not only treated herein as the traditional concept, but a more dynamic and relational definition, involving the control of personal data and information), image and honour. Considering that the absence of contemporaneous information is only one of the factual circumstances to be observed when assessing communicative freedoms and fundamental personality rights, the theory of principles developed by Robert Alexy is adopted as a model for resolving the tensions between fundamental rights. Based on this theoretical assumption, we examine communicative freedoms and fundamental personality rights in Brazil, in order to, in sequence, scrutinise the right to be forgotten from the foreign experience and in Brazilian cases. In addressing the desire to be forgotten in the traditional media and in the digital context, we differentiate its main aspects and its mechanisms of regulation and guardianship. We scrutinise the right to memory and truth, the right to informational self-determination, the storage of old news in digital Press archives and the removal of links from the search results in search engines, so-called de-indexation. Finally, we analyse specific cases submitted to the Judiciary Branch involving the right to be forgotten digitally in Brazil and we apply the rule of proportionality / O presente estudo tem por objetivo analisar a existência do denominado “direito ao esquecimento”, caracterizado como uma pretensão de seu titular não ser relembrado em uma informação atual, ou mesmo pretérita (acessada pela Internet), de um fato do passado, publicizado, à época, de forma lícita, em virtude da perturbação causada à vida presente. Não expressamente positivado no Brasil, o direito ao esquecimento tem se revelado em uma situação de tensão entre as liberdades comunicativas e os direitos fundamentais da personalidade, como a vida privada (aqui não apenas em seu conceito tradicional, mas em uma definição mais dinâmica e relacional, envolvendo o controle de dados e informações pessoais), a imagem e a honra. Considerando que a ausência de contemporaneidade da informação é apenas uma das circunstâncias fáticas a serem observadas quando do sopesamento entre as liberdades comunicativas e os direitos fundamentais da personalidade, adota-se como modelo para resolução das tensões entre os direitos fundamentais a teoria dos princípios desenvolvida por Robert Alexy. Com base neste pressuposto teórico, examinamos as liberdades comunicativas e os direitos fundamentais da personalidade no Brasil, para, na sequência, esmiuçarmos o direito ao esquecimento a partir da experiência estrangeira e dos casos brasileiros. Em abordagem à pretensão ao olvido nas mídias tradicionais e no contexto digital, diferenciamos seus principais aspectos e os seus mecanismos de regulação e tutela. Esquadrinhamos o direito à memória e à verdade, o direito à autodeterminação informativa, a manutenção de notícias antigas em arquivos digitais da imprensa e a remoção de links dos resultados de pesquisa em motores de busca, a chamada desindexação. Ao final, analisamos casos concretos submetidos ao Poder Judiciário envolvendo o direito ao esquecimento digital no Brasil e aplicamos a regra da proporcionalidade

As modern technology continues to affect civilization, the issue of electronic rights grows in a global conversation. The right to be forgotten is a data protection regulation specific to the European Union but its consequences are creating an international stir in the fields of mass communication and law. Freedom of expression and privacy rights are both founding values of the United States which are protected by constitutional amendments written before the internet also changed those fields. In a study that analyzes the legal process of when these two fundamental values collide, this research offers insight into both personal and judicial views of informational priority. This thesis conducts a legal analysis of cases that cite the infamous precedents of Melvin v. Reid and Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., to examine the factors on which U.S. courts of law determinewhether freedom or privacy rules.

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<p>Abstract</p><p>This study will shed light on the meaning of article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code and its</p><p>inconformity with fundamental principles of the European Union and fundamental human</p><p>rights. The trial of Nobel Prize winner, Mr Orhan Pamuk and the killing of Mr Hrant Dink in</p><p>January 2007 have both put focus on the notorious article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code.</p><p>The purpose of the study is to answer the main question; In what way does article 301 of the</p><p>Turkish Penal Code infringe the freedom of expression outlined in article 10 of the European</p><p>Convention on Human Rights and what should the European Union do about it?</p><p>The conclusion is that article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code infringes the right to freedom of</p><p>expression stated in article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It does</p><p>undermine the essence of the right by invoking a wide range of self-censorship, by its</p><p>ambiguous language and by the way it is applied. The restrictions are interpreted broadly and</p><p>leave nothing but an arbitrary article left to apply for the courts. The European Union holds</p><p>the power to influence Turkey and can therefore enforce an abolition of article 301 of the</p><p>Turkish Penal Code. Time will tell if Turkey will fully safeguard freedom of expression as it</p><p>is stated in article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and in the praxis of the</p><p>European Court of Human rights and the European Court of Justice.</p>

<p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p><p><p>About two years after publishing so called Muhammad cartoons in Denmark, the Swedish regional newspaper</p><p><em>Nerikes Allehanda </em>in Orebro published an editorial on self-censorship. A drawing of Prophet Muhammad as a Roundabout dog, drawn by <em>Lars Vilks</em>, was illustrating the article. Publishing of Muhammad drawing was followed by reactions both in Sweden and in some other countries especially in the muslim world. There are many differences and similarities between the publishing in Denmark and Sweden. There are differences and similarities between the two cases even regarding to the reactions in muslim countries. Mass media have certainly played an important role in mediating information about the publishing to people in muslim countries. Which information and how they were mediated are significant for shaping perceptions and thereby the reactions that followed the publishing of Muhammad drawing in Sweden. This essay is investigating how newspapers and online newspapers (web newspapers) in nine muslim countries reported about the publishing of Muhammad drawing. The subjects that newspapers were interesting of and the discourses domination reporting are in focus for this investigation. This essay will also investigate how newspapers and online newspapers in muslim countries covered two issues which were well covered by Swedish media, A threat against <em>Lars Vilks </em>from organization "Islamic State in Iraq" and a statement from the Iranian president Ahmadinejad regarding the Muhammad drawing in <em>Nerikes Allehanda</em>.</p></p></p>

Abstract This study will shed light on the meaning of article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code and its inconformity with fundamental principles of the European Union and fundamental human rights. The trial of Nobel Prize winner, Mr Orhan Pamuk and the killing of Mr Hrant Dink in January 2007 have both put focus on the notorious article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. The purpose of the study is to answer the main question; In what way does article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code infringe the freedom of expression outlined in article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and what should the European Union do about it? The conclusion is that article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code infringes the right to freedom of expression stated in article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It does undermine the essence of the right by invoking a wide range of self-censorship, by its ambiguous language and by the way it is applied. The restrictions are interpreted broadly and leave nothing but an arbitrary article left to apply for the courts. The European Union holds the power to influence Turkey and can therefore enforce an abolition of article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. Time will tell if Turkey will fully safeguard freedom of expression as it is stated in article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and in the praxis of the European Court of Human rights and the European Court of Justice.

Universities have traditionally stood as bastions of academic freedom and forums for open discourse and free expression. In recent years, however, this role has been questioned in instances where university administrators have, either directly or complicity, denied students the opportunity to express certain viewpoints they deem “controversial”. This research paper explores whether a university, or its delegates, should be allowed to deny students access to campus facilities and resources solely on the basis of ideological viewpoint. The relevance of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, statutory human rights provisions, and common law doctrines to the student-university relationship are explored in turn. It is argued that, notwithstanding the fact that universities may be “private” actors to whom the Charter does not directly apply, they are institutions invested with a public interest, and as such ought to be subject to special duties of non-discrimination.

Universities have traditionally stood as bastions of academic freedom and forums for open discourse and free expression. In recent years, however, this role has been questioned in instances where university administrators have, either directly or complicity, denied students the opportunity to express certain viewpoints they deem “controversial”. This research paper explores whether a university, or its delegates, should be allowed to deny students access to campus facilities and resources solely on the basis of ideological viewpoint. The relevance of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, statutory human rights provisions, and common law doctrines to the student-university relationship are explored in turn. It is argued that, notwithstanding the fact that universities may be “private” actors to whom the Charter does not directly apply, they are institutions invested with a public interest, and as such ought to be subject to special duties of non-discrimination.

Despite the fact that the issue has been discussed for several decades, there are still no rules in Sweden mandating political parties and candidates to disclose received donations. Because of this lack of transparency, Sweden is not fulfilling some of its international obligations and has fallen behind in the international trend to increase the transparency of election campaign finance. The lack of disclosure rules in Sweden has led to extensive criticism, most notably from the Council of Europe´s group of states against corruption, Greco, who criticized Sweden in light of the guidelines on the subject from the Council of Europe. At this writing, a new proposal for disclosure rules is being prepared at the Department of Justice, DoJ. The proposal is to be presented in spring 2013. For the time being, the only thing that exists regarding transparency of election finance in Sweden is an agreement from 2000, struck between some of the parties in parliament, to voluntarily disclose some of their received donations. In 2004 a government report proposed implementing disclosure rules. The proposal received extensive criticism from the reviewing bodies regarding its compliance with the rights protection in the Swedish Instrument of Government, RF. RF provides absolute protection against the government forcing individuals to disclose their opinions in political matters and absolute protection against the government keeping records of individuals' political opinions. Since these rights are absolute, they can be restricted only by constitutional amendment. It is uncertain if disclosure rules can be considered infringements under these absolute provisions, but even if they are considered infringements, it is likely that the disclosure provisions can be designed so as not to violate the RF absolute protections. Furthermore, RF provides relative protection of the freedom of expression and association. Disclosure rules would probably not infringe the freedom of expression but are likely to be considered infringements of the freedom of association. Restrictions of the freedom of association can only be implemented in the order specified in RF and since the order for restricting the freedom of association is very rigid, it is unlikely that such a restriction would be allowed under the current RF. The DoJ has expressed that the pending proposal will not include a proposal for a constitutional amendment. For Sweden to fulfill its international obligations in regards of transparency in campaign finance, more extensive disclosure rules must be implemented than those included in the agreement between some parties in parliament and those included in the 2004 proposal. The DoJ has expressed, however, that the pending proposal will be modeled upon both the voluntary agreement and the 2004 proposal. It is therefore not entirely unlikely that the pending proposal will be either illegal under the constitution or not far reaching enough, or both. / I Sverige saknas regler som kräver av politiska partier och kandidater att redovisa mottagna donationer (redovisningskrav). Detta trots att frågan diskuterats under flera decennier. Frånvaron av redovisningskrav innebär att Sverige inte uppfyller vissa av sina internationella åtaganden och att Sverige halkat efter i den mycket tydliga internationella trenden att öka transparensen kring valkampanjernas finansiering. Frånvaron har även lett till omfattande kritik, framförallt från Europarådets grupp mot korruption, Greco, som kritiserat bristen utifrån Europarådets riktlinjer i ämnet. I skrivande stund bereds vid Justitiedepartementet ett förslag till redovisningskrav som kommer att presenteras under våren 2013. Tills vidare är det enda som finns avseende transparens i valkampanjfinansieringen en överenskommelse från 2000, mellan några av partierna i Riksdagen om att frivilligt redovisa vissa mottagna bidrag. År 2004 föreslog en offentlig utredning införandet av redovisningskrav. Förslaget mötte omfattande kritik från remissinstanserna gällande dess förenlighet med regeringsformens, RF:s, rättighetsskydd. RF innehåller ett absolut skydd mot att det allmänna tvingar en enskild att tillkännage sin politiska åskådning och ett absolut skydd mot att det allmänna registrerar en enskilds politiska åskådning. Eftersom dessa skydd är absoluta kan de endast inskränkas genom grundlags-ändring. Det är osäkert om redovisningskrav kan anses vara inskränkningar av dessa absoluta skydd. Om redovisningskrav är inskränkningar av dessa absoluta rättigheter torde det ändock vara möjligt att utforma kraven så att de är förenliga med skydden. RF innehåller även relativa skydd för yttrandefrihet och föreningsfrihet. Redovisningskrav skulle förmodligen inte vara en inskränkning av RF:s skydd för yttrandefriheten men troligtvis vara en inskränkning av RF:s skydd för föreningsfrihet. Detta innebär att inskränkningen endast får göras enligt i RF stadgad ordning. Eftersom möjligheterna att inskränka föreningsfriheten enligt RF är mycket små är det tveksamt om en sådan inskränkning är möjlig att införa utan grundlagsändring. Justitiedepartementet har dock uttryckt att det nya förslaget inte kommer att inkludera något förslag till grundlagsändring. För att Sverige ska uppfylla sina internationella åtaganden avseende öppenhet i valfinansieringen måste mer långtgående redovisningskrav införas än de som ingår i den frivilliga överenskommelsen och som föreslogs av utredningen 2004. Justitiedepartementet har dock uttryckt att just utredningen från 2004 och den frivilliga överenskommelsen ska ligga till grund för de nya redovisningskraven. Det är alltså inte helt osannolikt att det kommande förslaget till redovisningskrav kommer att vara antingen oförenlig med regeringsformen eller inte tillräckligt långtgående, eller både och