Este trabalho se fundamenta em uma concepção discursiva da democracia segundo a qual a comunicação pública é um elemento necessário à legitimidade da autoridade política. Segundo esse entendimento, a livre expressão de ideias é parte integral e condição essencial ao exercício das liberdades políticas em termos iguais. Tendo em vista a centralidade dos meios de comunicação na definição dos valores coletivos e na agência política, sustento que a sua estrutura deve ser orientada pelo reconhecimento de todos como pessoas livres e iguais. Uma orientação como essa se baseia na ideia de que às liberdades expressivas deve ser conferido um valor equitativo: isto é, a todos devem ser oferecidas as mesmas oportunidades e condições objetivas de exercer tais liberdades. Esta interpretação funda-se em uma compreensão deste ideal que extrapola os limites dos direitos e liberdades formais, incluindo as condições materiais e as bases sociais do autorrespeito / This work is founded in a discursive conception of democracy according to which public communication is a necessary element for the legitimacy of political authority. According to this understanding, freedom of expression is an integral part and an essential condition to the exercise of political liberties in equal terms. Given the centrality of mass media in the definition of the collective values and in political agency, I maintain the their structure must be oriented toward the acknowledgement of all as free and equal persons. An orientation like this is based on the idea that to the expressive liberties should be assigned a fair value: i.e. everyone is entitled to the same opportunities and objective conditions to exercise such liberties. This interpretation has its basis in a form of understanding such ideal that goes beyond the formal rights and freedoms to include the material conditions and the social basis of self-respect

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-11-14T11:28:30Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Alvaro de Carvalho Pinto Pupo.pdf: 993019 bytes, checksum: 3e483a91d657e2658eb8b6b67b0a96f2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-11-14T11:28:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alvaro de Carvalho Pinto Pupo.pdf: 993019 bytes, checksum: 3e483a91d657e2658eb8b6b67b0a96f2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-10-31 / This study analyzes the concept of intimacy, privacy, free speech and personal data under a brazilian perspective, as well as the protection for each of the itens mentioned. The study makes references to authorities, legislation and case law pertaining to each of the subjects. The study pursues the clarification of what each of these understands as privacy protection and personal data protection, and how these correlates. It also pursues to understand if these understandings are aligned and propose, in the end, some way of uniformization considering the legislative bill proposals being discussed in the Brazilian Congress / O presente trabalho analisa o conceito da intimidade, privacidade, liberdade de expressão e de dados pessoais sob uma perspectiva brasileira, bem como a proteção outorgada a cada um dos itens tratados acima. São analisados os pontos doutrinários, legais e jurisprudenciais associados com cada um deles. A análisa busca averiguar o que cada um desses campos entende como proteção da privacidade e dos dados pessoais e como a privacidade e dados pessoais se relacionam, além verificar se esses entendimentos estão alinhados e propor, ao final, uma forma de uniformização, considerando inclusive propostas legislativas que se encontram em debate no Congresso Nacional

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-12-20T08:44:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernanda Freire dos Santos.pdf: 2446064 bytes, checksum: 7b0bcb2c75aaf557d7a717cfc15175dd (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-12-20T08:44:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernanda Freire dos Santos.pdf: 2446064 bytes, checksum: 7b0bcb2c75aaf557d7a717cfc15175dd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-08 / The aim of this study is to analyse the existence of the so-called "right to be forgotten", characterised as a desire of an individual regarding a fact from the past, published at the time, in a lawful way, not to be remembered in current or even past information (accessed through the Internet) by virtue of the disturbance caused to their life in the present. Not expressly implemented in Brazil, the right to be forgotten has emerged within a tense situation between communicative freedoms and fundamental personality rights, such as private life (not only treated herein as the traditional concept, but a more dynamic and relational definition, involving the control of personal data and information), image and honour. Considering that the absence of contemporaneous information is only one of the factual circumstances to be observed when assessing communicative freedoms and fundamental personality rights, the theory of principles developed by Robert Alexy is adopted as a model for resolving the tensions between fundamental rights. Based on this theoretical assumption, we examine communicative freedoms and fundamental personality rights in Brazil, in order to, in sequence, scrutinise the right to be forgotten from the foreign experience and in Brazilian cases. In addressing the desire to be forgotten in the traditional media and in the digital context, we differentiate its main aspects and its mechanisms of regulation and guardianship. We scrutinise the right to memory and truth, the right to informational self-determination, the storage of old news in digital Press archives and the removal of links from the search results in search engines, so-called de-indexation. Finally, we analyse specific cases submitted to the Judiciary Branch involving the right to be forgotten digitally in Brazil and we apply the rule of proportionality / O presente estudo tem por objetivo analisar a existência do denominado “direito ao esquecimento”, caracterizado como uma pretensão de seu titular não ser relembrado em uma informação atual, ou mesmo pretérita (acessada pela Internet), de um fato do passado, publicizado, à época, de forma lícita, em virtude da perturbação causada à vida presente. Não expressamente positivado no Brasil, o direito ao esquecimento tem se revelado em uma situação de tensão entre as liberdades comunicativas e os direitos fundamentais da personalidade, como a vida privada (aqui não apenas em seu conceito tradicional, mas em uma definição mais dinâmica e relacional, envolvendo o controle de dados e informações pessoais), a imagem e a honra. Considerando que a ausência de contemporaneidade da informação é apenas uma das circunstâncias fáticas a serem observadas quando do sopesamento entre as liberdades comunicativas e os direitos fundamentais da personalidade, adota-se como modelo para resolução das tensões entre os direitos fundamentais a teoria dos princípios desenvolvida por Robert Alexy. Com base neste pressuposto teórico, examinamos as liberdades comunicativas e os direitos fundamentais da personalidade no Brasil, para, na sequência, esmiuçarmos o direito ao esquecimento a partir da experiência estrangeira e dos casos brasileiros. Em abordagem à pretensão ao olvido nas mídias tradicionais e no contexto digital, diferenciamos seus principais aspectos e os seus mecanismos de regulação e tutela. Esquadrinhamos o direito à memória e à verdade, o direito à autodeterminação informativa, a manutenção de notícias antigas em arquivos digitais da imprensa e a remoção de links dos resultados de pesquisa em motores de busca, a chamada desindexação. Ao final, analisamos casos concretos submetidos ao Poder Judiciário envolvendo o direito ao esquecimento digital no Brasil e aplicamos a regra da proporcionalidade

As modern technology continues to affect civilization, the issue of electronic rights grows in a global conversation. The right to be forgotten is a data protection regulation specific to the European Union but its consequences are creating an international stir in the fields of mass communication and law. Freedom of expression and privacy rights are both founding values of the United States which are protected by constitutional amendments written before the internet also changed those fields. In a study that analyzes the legal process of when these two fundamental values collide, this research offers insight into both personal and judicial views of informational priority. This thesis conducts a legal analysis of cases that cite the infamous precedents of Melvin v. Reid and Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., to examine the factors on which U.S. courts of law determinewhether freedom or privacy rules.

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<p>Abstract</p><p>This study will shed light on the meaning of article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code and its</p><p>inconformity with fundamental principles of the European Union and fundamental human</p><p>rights. The trial of Nobel Prize winner, Mr Orhan Pamuk and the killing of Mr Hrant Dink in</p><p>January 2007 have both put focus on the notorious article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code.</p><p>The purpose of the study is to answer the main question; In what way does article 301 of the</p><p>Turkish Penal Code infringe the freedom of expression outlined in article 10 of the European</p><p>Convention on Human Rights and what should the European Union do about it?</p><p>The conclusion is that article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code infringes the right to freedom of</p><p>expression stated in article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It does</p><p>undermine the essence of the right by invoking a wide range of self-censorship, by its</p><p>ambiguous language and by the way it is applied. The restrictions are interpreted broadly and</p><p>leave nothing but an arbitrary article left to apply for the courts. The European Union holds</p><p>the power to influence Turkey and can therefore enforce an abolition of article 301 of the</p><p>Turkish Penal Code. Time will tell if Turkey will fully safeguard freedom of expression as it</p><p>is stated in article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and in the praxis of the</p><p>European Court of Human rights and the European Court of Justice.</p>

<p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p><p><p>About two years after publishing so called Muhammad cartoons in Denmark, the Swedish regional newspaper</p><p><em>Nerikes Allehanda </em>in Orebro published an editorial on self-censorship. A drawing of Prophet Muhammad as a Roundabout dog, drawn by <em>Lars Vilks</em>, was illustrating the article. Publishing of Muhammad drawing was followed by reactions both in Sweden and in some other countries especially in the muslim world. There are many differences and similarities between the publishing in Denmark and Sweden. There are differences and similarities between the two cases even regarding to the reactions in muslim countries. Mass media have certainly played an important role in mediating information about the publishing to people in muslim countries. Which information and how they were mediated are significant for shaping perceptions and thereby the reactions that followed the publishing of Muhammad drawing in Sweden. This essay is investigating how newspapers and online newspapers (web newspapers) in nine muslim countries reported about the publishing of Muhammad drawing. The subjects that newspapers were interesting of and the discourses domination reporting are in focus for this investigation. This essay will also investigate how newspapers and online newspapers in muslim countries covered two issues which were well covered by Swedish media, A threat against <em>Lars Vilks </em>from organization "Islamic State in Iraq" and a statement from the Iranian president Ahmadinejad regarding the Muhammad drawing in <em>Nerikes Allehanda</em>.</p></p></p>

Abstract This study will shed light on the meaning of article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code and its inconformity with fundamental principles of the European Union and fundamental human rights. The trial of Nobel Prize winner, Mr Orhan Pamuk and the killing of Mr Hrant Dink in January 2007 have both put focus on the notorious article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. The purpose of the study is to answer the main question; In what way does article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code infringe the freedom of expression outlined in article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and what should the European Union do about it? The conclusion is that article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code infringes the right to freedom of expression stated in article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It does undermine the essence of the right by invoking a wide range of self-censorship, by its ambiguous language and by the way it is applied. The restrictions are interpreted broadly and leave nothing but an arbitrary article left to apply for the courts. The European Union holds the power to influence Turkey and can therefore enforce an abolition of article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. Time will tell if Turkey will fully safeguard freedom of expression as it is stated in article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and in the praxis of the European Court of Human rights and the European Court of Justice.

Universities have traditionally stood as bastions of academic freedom and forums for open discourse and free expression. In recent years, however, this role has been questioned in instances where university administrators have, either directly or complicity, denied students the opportunity to express certain viewpoints they deem “controversial”. This research paper explores whether a university, or its delegates, should be allowed to deny students access to campus facilities and resources solely on the basis of ideological viewpoint. The relevance of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, statutory human rights provisions, and common law doctrines to the student-university relationship are explored in turn. It is argued that, notwithstanding the fact that universities may be “private” actors to whom the Charter does not directly apply, they are institutions invested with a public interest, and as such ought to be subject to special duties of non-discrimination.

Universities have traditionally stood as bastions of academic freedom and forums for open discourse and free expression. In recent years, however, this role has been questioned in instances where university administrators have, either directly or complicity, denied students the opportunity to express certain viewpoints they deem “controversial”. This research paper explores whether a university, or its delegates, should be allowed to deny students access to campus facilities and resources solely on the basis of ideological viewpoint. The relevance of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, statutory human rights provisions, and common law doctrines to the student-university relationship are explored in turn. It is argued that, notwithstanding the fact that universities may be “private” actors to whom the Charter does not directly apply, they are institutions invested with a public interest, and as such ought to be subject to special duties of non-discrimination.