The ability to use electronic warfare and conduct operations within the electromagnetic spectrum has since the 20th century gained a prominent role in modern warfare and is today largely viewed as a vital part of it. This view though is based on a field of research which mainly consists of studies lacking a problematizing or critical standpoint. This study therefore undertakes the task to question the consensus of electronic warfare as a vital part of the modern battlefield, to gain an understanding whether this view is only based on theoretical suggestions or due to it also being successful when applied in conflicts. This is done by investigating two cases: The Gulf War and Russia’s war in Georgia, by a qualitative research from a theoretical standpoint off Antoine Bousquet’s theory of military technology and its creation of perception.  The result show that electronic warfare has been mostly successful when applied in conflicts, while demanding to apply with great success. The study opens to a broader field for future studies with questions which remains unanswered. Was its successfulness due to technical developments, tactical applications or an enemy who lacks experience and education to effectively handle it?

Denna uppsats frågeställning tar oss på en resa från kalla krigets kyligaste period med den strategiska kultur som präglade den svenska säkerhetsstrategin till läget idag med de förändringar som skett på vägen.  Genom att fokusera på de försvarspropositioner och svenska marina doktriner eller doktrinliknande dokument som getts ut inom ramen för det tidsfönster som valts, 1980-2020, skapas en förståelse och en relation mellan det auktoritära och det auktoritäras beroenderelation. Beroenderelationen till befolkningen och omvärlden samt spårbarheten av detta i de marina doktrinerna.  Harald Høiback har forskat inom militära doktriner och utvecklat en teori om vikten av balansen mellan de hörnstenar som ingår eller bör ingå i en militärdoktrin, för att doktrinen ska fylla det syfte som avses. Tillsammans med Elizabeth Kiers teori om strategisk kultur skapas ett verktyg som gör att analysen och förståelsen för vad som har varit, det som är och det som kan komma att bli, ökar.  Balansen mellan det auktoritära och militärteori kan inledningsvis tyckas vara självklar men komplexiteten kopplat till säkerhetsstrategi gör att syftet med doktrinen emellanåt varierar, hur har det då sett ut, hur ser det ut idag, och hur kan det tänkas se ut framöver?

Women’s participation in peace processes has become increasingly important as the UN resolution 1325 was adopted in 2000. The resolution encourages women’s participation in peace processes and validates that increased female participation builds sustainable peace. This master thesis provides an in-depth case study of women’s participation in Yemen’s peace process. The purpose of this thesis is to identify and analyze what kinds of Yemeni women are participating in the peace process, and who are not, as well as investigating why there might be a difference in inclusion. Additionally, an interpretation is offered on what these results may say about peace processes in general. To answer the research questions, empirical material in terms of reports, articles, documents, and semi-structured interviews have been gathered and processed through a qualitative content analysis. The empirical data has been analyzed through a theoretical framework consisting of theories on intersectionality and hegemonic femininity. The results of this thesis show that Yemeni women who participate in the higher track levels of the peace process mainly consist of women holding a high level of education and stemming from higher social classes, while women from the countryside, women who have a lower degree of education and stem from lower social classes, are mainly excluded. However, the results also show that the inclusion of women in the peace process is hybrid, as participating women are being excluded from meaningful participation. The thesis also concludes that women are included and excluded according to different specific power dynamics. This thesis finalizes in a discussion on what these results say about peace processes in general, and reflect upon possible continuous research.

The Swedish Armed Forces aim to reflect Swedish society, including its ethnical composition. Despite these ambitions and the fact that non-native Swedes are overrepresented among unemployed Swedes, recruitment is over all slow. Perhaps the Swedish Armed Forces know too little about what motivates this potential group of recruits? And perhaps the recruitment process is discriminating against non-native Swedes? This essay aims to answer what attracts foreign born citizens to join the military and what makes them stay in the service. The research methodology includes interviews and surveys of immigrants. The results of these interviews and surveys are subsequently analysed and viewed through the perspective of military sociologist Fabrizio Battistellis’ theory about soldiers' incentives. According to Battistelli, three types of incentives exist: the paleomodern, the modern and the postmodern. His own study, Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier, determined Italian solders primarily enlisted for postmodern incentives. Swedish scholars has found that the same pattern applies to Swedish military personnel. But how about the non-native Swedes? This study shows that predominantly modern incentives attract non-native Swedes to join the military, and mainly paleomodern incentives make them stay within it.  However, while Swedish soldiers seem to be driven by postmodern incentives, immigrants are not influenced by these in any noticeable way. Instead the study’s results indicate that there are further categories of motives affecting the non-native Swedes, namely contextual and cultural incentives.

The relationship between a country's political decision-making and top military leadership is central, but also debated. Not least whether the military side should take political life into account and to what extent one should become a part of it. This essay aims to increase the understanding of the challenges of the military-political relationship, focusing on the borderland between peace and war that is usually described as a gray zone. Through scenario-based interviews with senior officials and politicians within the Swedish government and government office, it is investigated what impact a gray zone problem can have on the military advice provided. By combining a future scenario with interviews, an empirical material unique to the research field is created. The results show that the gray zone affects the strategic decision-making process, but not really by adding any completely new challenges, but mainly by strengthening and partly developing existing ones. The logic of peace, rather than war, on strategy should therefore form the basis for how the gray zone is viewed from a decision-making process perspective. The gray zone's character of ambiguity creates and reinforces tensions between different actors in the strategy process, which in turn risks delaying strategic decisions. The ambiguities arise mainly in three areas: the view of the strategic problem, the political consequences and the organization that will deal with the gray zone. Some of the ambiguities are amplified by the opponent, while others are more the result of internal factors. In order to reduce the negative effects of the gray zone problem, a much closer integration between the military and politics is proposed than in peacetime: policy-making must take place jointly and traditional boundaries need to be redrawn. The key is spelled relationships and these must be created and maintained in good time before the gray zone enters. / Relationen mellan ett lands politiska beslutsfattning och högsta militärledning är central, men också omdebatterad. Inte minst huruvida den militära sidan ska ta hänsyn till det politiska livet och i vilken grad man själv ska bli en del av detta. Denna uppsats syftar till att öka förståelsen för den militär-politiska relationens utmaningar, med fokus på det gränsland mellan fred och krig som brukar betecknas som en gråzon. Genom scenariobaserade intervjuer med högre tjänstemän och politiker inom Sveriges regering och regeringskansli undersöks vilken påverkan en gråzonsproblematik kan ha på de militära råd som lämnas. Genom att kombinera ett framtidsscenario med intervjuer skapas ett för forskningsfältet unikt empiriskt material. Resultatet visar att gråzonen påverkar den strategiska beslutsprocessen men egentligen inte genom att tillföra några helt nya utmaningar, utan främst genom att förstärka och till del utveckla redan existerande. Fredens, snarare än krigets, logik på strategi bör därför ligga till grund för hur gråzonen betraktas ur ett beslutsprocessperspektiv. Gråzonens karaktär av otydlighet skapar och förstärker spänningar mellan olika aktörer inom strategiprocessen, som i sin tur riskerar att försena strategiska beslut. Otydligheterna uppstår främst inom tre områden: synen på det strategiska problemet, de politiska konsekvenserna och den organisation som ska hantera gråzonen. Vissa av otydligheterna förstärks av motståndaren, medan andra mer är ett resultat av interna faktorer. För att minska gråzonsproblematikens negativa effekter föreslås en betydligt närmare integrering mellan militär och politik än i fredstid: policyskapandet måste ske gemensamt och traditionella gränser behöver dras om. Nyckeln stavas relati-oner och dessa måste skapas och underhållas i god tid innan gråzonen träder in.

I efterbörden av Rysslands annektering av Krim 2014 uppstod diskussioner kring rysk krigskonst och hybridkrigföring. Bland tvetydigheterna som uppstod identifieras bland annat vilka strategier som det samtida Ryssland har för att uppnå strategisk överraskning. Denna studie har syftat till att undersöka rysk militär vilseledning i samband med Rysslands strategiska överraskningsanfall på Krim 2014. Studien har genomförts som en teoriprövande fallstudie varvid såväl västerländska som sovjetiska/ryska vilseledningsteorier prövats på det ryska agerande under annekteringen av Krim 2014. Sammantaget visar studiens resultat på förekomster av ryskt agerande i enlighet med samtliga av studiens prövade teorier varvid det i huvudsak var distraktion, dolda aktiva åtgärder samt desinformation som bidrog till den ryska strategiska överraskningen. Studiens oväntade resultat pekar på ett aktivt deltagande av den ryske presidenten personligen varvid det inte går att underskatta betydelsen av en politisk företrädare som Vladimir Putin. Studiens resultat kan vidare tolkas som att den vilseledning som Ryssland genomförde får ses vilande i huvudsak på tidigare dokumenterade sovjetiska teorier. Vidare visar studiens resultat på en hög rysk förmåga till anpassning där tidigare etablerade sovjetiska/ryska teorier kring vilseledning utvecklats till dagens konfliktmiljöer. Studien visar därmed att äldre sovjetiska/ryska teorier på inget sätt är obsoleta utan i allra högsta grad fortsatt är aktuella i dagens globala världsordning. / In the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea 2014, discussions arose about Russian military art of war and hybrid warfare. Questions were identified regarding strategic surprise and what strategies todays’ modern Russia was using. This study aims to investigate Russian military deception in connection with Russia's strategic surprise attack in Crimea 2014. The study was conducted as a single case study in which Western as well as Soviet/Russian theories of military deception was compared with the Russian activities during the Crimea annexation in 2014.  The result shows Russian activities in accordance with both Western and old Soviet/Russian theories of deception. According to the study Russian main focus was distraction, active measures and disinformation leading to the Russian strategic surprise. The study shows unexpected results regarding the amount of personal activity involving the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. The result shows that the significance of a political representative such as Vladimir Putin cannot be underestimated. Additionally the study also shows that the military deception conducted by Russia in and around the period of the Crimea annexation 2014 mainly extracts from previously documented old Soviet theories. It highlights Russia’s ability to adapt into today's conflict environments by bending and adjusting old theories and doctrines. By that meaning old Soviet/Russian theories are in no way obsolete but instead being very much relevant in today's global world order.