No / The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of constraints in the theory of relativity and, in particular, what philosophical work they do for Einstein's views on the laws of physics. Einstein presents a view of local ``structure laws'' which he characterizes as the most appropriate form of physical laws. Einstein was committed to a view of science, which presents a synthesis between rational and empirical elements as its hallmark. If scientific constructs are free inventions of the human mind, as Einstein, held, the question arises how such rational constructs, including the symbolic formulation of the laws of physics, can represent physical reality. Representation in turn raises the question of realism. Einstein uses a number of constraints in the theory of relativity to show that by imposing constraints on the rational elements a certain ``fit'' between theory and reality can be achieved. Fit is to be understood as satisfaction of constraint. His emphasis on reference frames in the STR and more general coordinate systems in the GTR, as well as his emphasis on the symmetries of the theory of relativity suggests that Einstein's realism is akin to a certain form of structural realism. His version of structural realism follows from the theory of relativity and is independent of any current philosophical debates about structural realism.

Thomas Hobbes está preocupado com as consequências do desacordo moral que, segundo ele, impedem as sociedades de viverem em paz, a qual é condição necessária para a garantia uma vida confortável a todos. Para apresentar uma solução a esse problema, o autor começa estudando a condição natural dos humanos, que, sem um poder soberano, vivem em condição de guerra. Depois de alcançar essa conclusão, Hobbes nos mostra como é possível constituir corretamente uma república. Apesar de apresentar o argumento do estado de natureza como sendo o ponto de partida para a instituição da soberania, ele está focado principalmente no seu significado para a estabilidade da república. Hobbes afirma, assim, estar consciente de que as pessoas sempre desejam viver juntas e de que elas têm vivido assim desde sempre. Seu principal interesse está, na verdade, em demonstrar como as pessoas podem viver juntas em paz ao longo do tempo. Hobbes mostra aos seus leitores que a paz só é possível quando os cidadãos conhecem as leis de natureza e estão corretamente motivados a segui-las. Essa tese tem dois objetivos principais: (i) discutir como Hobbes desenvolve sua teoria moral, e como ele conecta essa teoria à lei civil, e (ii) debater sua teoria sobre a natureza humana e a possibilidade de ensinar os cidadãos sobre a necessidade de obedecer ao soberano. Os principais tópicos discutidos e as contribuições que essa tese pode proporcionar estão relacionados à questão da normatividade das leis de natureza e ao impacto que ela pode ter no restante da teoria política de Hobbes, com particular destaque à relação, em uma república, entre moralidade e educação, pois a segunda motiva os cidadãos a seguirem a primeira. / Thomas Hobbes is concerned with the consequences of moral disagreement as, according to him, they prevent societies from living in peace, which is a necessary condition to guarantee a comfortable life to everyone. In order to present a solution to this problem, Hobbes starts studying the natural condition of humans, who, in the absence of a sovereign power, live in a state of war. After reaching this conclusion, Hobbes shows us how it is possible to correctly institute a commonwealth. Despite presenting the argument concerning the state of nature as a starting point to the institution of the sovereignty, he is focused mainly on the state of nature’s meaning to the stability of the commonwealth. Hobbes hence asserts that he is aware that people always desire to live together and have always lived like that. His main interest is actually to demonstrate how people can live together in peace over time. Hobbes shows his readers that peace is only possible when citizens know the laws of nature and are correctly motivated to follow them. This paper has two main aims (i) to discuss how Hobbes advances his moral theory and how he connects it to the civil law, and (ii) to reflect his theory about human nature and the possibility of teaching citizens about the need of obeying the sovereign. The main topics discussed and the contributions this paper may make concern the normativity of the laws of nature and the impact it may have on the rest of Hobbes’s political theory, with particular emphasis on the relation, in a commonwealth, between morality and education, as the latter motivates citizens to follow the former.

Thomas Hobbes está preocupado com as consequências do desacordo moral que, segundo ele, impedem as sociedades de viverem em paz, a qual é condição necessária para a garantia uma vida confortável a todos. Para apresentar uma solução a esse problema, o autor começa estudando a condição natural dos humanos, que, sem um poder soberano, vivem em condição de guerra. Depois de alcançar essa conclusão, Hobbes nos mostra como é possível constituir corretamente uma república. Apesar de apresentar o argumento do estado de natureza como sendo o ponto de partida para a instituição da soberania, ele está focado principalmente no seu significado para a estabilidade da república. Hobbes afirma, assim, estar consciente de que as pessoas sempre desejam viver juntas e de que elas têm vivido assim desde sempre. Seu principal interesse está, na verdade, em demonstrar como as pessoas podem viver juntas em paz ao longo do tempo. Hobbes mostra aos seus leitores que a paz só é possível quando os cidadãos conhecem as leis de natureza e estão corretamente motivados a segui-las. Essa tese tem dois objetivos principais: (i) discutir como Hobbes desenvolve sua teoria moral, e como ele conecta essa teoria à lei civil, e (ii) debater sua teoria sobre a natureza humana e a possibilidade de ensinar os cidadãos sobre a necessidade de obedecer ao soberano. Os principais tópicos discutidos e as contribuições que essa tese pode proporcionar estão relacionados à questão da normatividade das leis de natureza e ao impacto que ela pode ter no restante da teoria política de Hobbes, com particular destaque à relação, em uma república, entre moralidade e educação, pois a segunda motiva os cidadãos a seguirem a primeira. / Thomas Hobbes is concerned with the consequences of moral disagreement as, according to him, they prevent societies from living in peace, which is a necessary condition to guarantee a comfortable life to everyone. In order to present a solution to this problem, Hobbes starts studying the natural condition of humans, who, in the absence of a sovereign power, live in a state of war. After reaching this conclusion, Hobbes shows us how it is possible to correctly institute a commonwealth. Despite presenting the argument concerning the state of nature as a starting point to the institution of the sovereignty, he is focused mainly on the state of nature’s meaning to the stability of the commonwealth. Hobbes hence asserts that he is aware that people always desire to live together and have always lived like that. His main interest is actually to demonstrate how people can live together in peace over time. Hobbes shows his readers that peace is only possible when citizens know the laws of nature and are correctly motivated to follow them. This paper has two main aims (i) to discuss how Hobbes advances his moral theory and how he connects it to the civil law, and (ii) to reflect his theory about human nature and the possibility of teaching citizens about the need of obeying the sovereign. The main topics discussed and the contributions this paper may make concern the normativity of the laws of nature and the impact it may have on the rest of Hobbes’s political theory, with particular emphasis on the relation, in a commonwealth, between morality and education, as the latter motivates citizens to follow the former.

Thomas Hobbes está preocupado com as consequências do desacordo moral que, segundo ele, impedem as sociedades de viverem em paz, a qual é condição necessária para a garantia uma vida confortável a todos. Para apresentar uma solução a esse problema, o autor começa estudando a condição natural dos humanos, que, sem um poder soberano, vivem em condição de guerra. Depois de alcançar essa conclusão, Hobbes nos mostra como é possível constituir corretamente uma república. Apesar de apresentar o argumento do estado de natureza como sendo o ponto de partida para a instituição da soberania, ele está focado principalmente no seu significado para a estabilidade da república. Hobbes afirma, assim, estar consciente de que as pessoas sempre desejam viver juntas e de que elas têm vivido assim desde sempre. Seu principal interesse está, na verdade, em demonstrar como as pessoas podem viver juntas em paz ao longo do tempo. Hobbes mostra aos seus leitores que a paz só é possível quando os cidadãos conhecem as leis de natureza e estão corretamente motivados a segui-las. Essa tese tem dois objetivos principais: (i) discutir como Hobbes desenvolve sua teoria moral, e como ele conecta essa teoria à lei civil, e (ii) debater sua teoria sobre a natureza humana e a possibilidade de ensinar os cidadãos sobre a necessidade de obedecer ao soberano. Os principais tópicos discutidos e as contribuições que essa tese pode proporcionar estão relacionados à questão da normatividade das leis de natureza e ao impacto que ela pode ter no restante da teoria política de Hobbes, com particular destaque à relação, em uma república, entre moralidade e educação, pois a segunda motiva os cidadãos a seguirem a primeira. / Thomas Hobbes is concerned with the consequences of moral disagreement as, according to him, they prevent societies from living in peace, which is a necessary condition to guarantee a comfortable life to everyone. In order to present a solution to this problem, Hobbes starts studying the natural condition of humans, who, in the absence of a sovereign power, live in a state of war. After reaching this conclusion, Hobbes shows us how it is possible to correctly institute a commonwealth. Despite presenting the argument concerning the state of nature as a starting point to the institution of the sovereignty, he is focused mainly on the state of nature’s meaning to the stability of the commonwealth. Hobbes hence asserts that he is aware that people always desire to live together and have always lived like that. His main interest is actually to demonstrate how people can live together in peace over time. Hobbes shows his readers that peace is only possible when citizens know the laws of nature and are correctly motivated to follow them. This paper has two main aims (i) to discuss how Hobbes advances his moral theory and how he connects it to the civil law, and (ii) to reflect his theory about human nature and the possibility of teaching citizens about the need of obeying the sovereign. The main topics discussed and the contributions this paper may make concern the normativity of the laws of nature and the impact it may have on the rest of Hobbes’s political theory, with particular emphasis on the relation, in a commonwealth, between morality and education, as the latter motivates citizens to follow the former.

<p>There is longstanding interpretive dispute between commentators over Spinoza’s commitment to <i>necessitarianism</i>, the doctrine that all things are metaphysically necessary and none are contingent. Those who affirm Spinoza’s commitment to the doctrine adhere to <i>the necessitarian interpretation</i> whereas those who deny it adhere to what I call <i>the semi-necessitarian interpretation</i>. As things stand, the disagreement between commentators appears to have reached an impasse. Notwithstanding, there seems to be no disagreement among commentators on the question of necessitarianism’s philosophical plausibility as a metaphysical view: the doctrine is wildly untenable. This consensus view is more relevant to the interpretive debate than few have recognized, since leading semi-necessitarian commentators take the doctrine’s alleged absurdity to be one of the most compelling reasons (if not <i>the</i> most compelling reason) to prefer their reading over the necessitarian interpretation: for, as a matter of methodological principle, great philosophers like Spinoza should not be ascribed ridiculous views in the absence of better evidence. </p> <p>This dissertation seeks to defend Spinoza’s commitment to necessitarianism on both the interpretive and philosophical fronts. I argue not only that the necessitarian interpretation of Spinoza is more plausible than the semi-necessitarian interpretation on textual grounds, but that Spinoza’s necessitarianism is a serviceable philosophical view whose tenability has been almost entirely overlooked and perfunctorily rejected. The principal basis upon which I build this defense is Spinoza’s rich and fascinating view of essences—what I simply refer to as his <i>essentialism</i>. Spinoza’s essentialism forms the bedrock of his metaphysics and is significant not least because it underlies and informs doctrines like his necessitarianism. Spinoza’s essentialism supplies resources to answer not just interpretive problems associated with necessitarianism, but philosophical challenges to the plausibility of the doctrine. My defense of Spinoza’s necessitarianism on philosophical grounds also offers a novel way of getting past much of the current interpretive impasse among commentators by effectively undercutting the methodological motivation for the semi-necessitarian reading. In addition to my defense on the interpretive front, then, my defense on the philosophical front provides supplementary reason to <i>a fortiori</i> favor the necessitarian reading of Spinoza.</p>

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mariana Battistini Dalmolin.pdf: 713395 bytes, checksum: 70d562c24a86d270ac99faa7f6717490 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-11 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / This work is a study on the theory of laws of nature proposed by the Australian philosopher D. M. Armstrong in his work What is a Law of Nature?, published in 1983. In that text, Armstrong shows the insufficiency of the regularty theory and, then, proceeds to develop his own theory, which is able to answer to several of the regularity theory's outstanding issues. In the first chapter of this work, we present (1.1) the naive regularity theory, as well as the critiques that it received from Armstrong and other authors. Afterwards (1.2), we present three suggestions to sophisticate that theory, which are not successful to address the difficulties found in its naive version. Therefore, the regularity theory is refuted, and a new theory of laws is needed. In the second chapter, we present, firstly (2.1), an assumption of Armstrong's theory of laws his realism about universals , and we see how it can be applied to a theory of laws. Afterwards (2.2), we present Armstrong's fundamental thesis: a law is a relation between universals and simultaneously an universal in itself, which regulates the behavior of particulars and generates uniformities in nature in virtue of the instaniation relation. We also show (2.3) how such theory makes it possible to deal with the difficulties faced by the regularity theory. In the third chapter, we evaluate the role of the concept of necessity in Armstrong's theory. Firstly (3.1), we deepen our understanding of the necessitation relation N, and, afterwards (3.2), we show that Armstrong rejects the thesis according to which laws are metaphisically necessary and advocates for their contingency. Therefore, the understanding of his theory is centered in the distinction between the nomic necessity asserted in his conception of laws, on one hand, and the metaphysic necessity of laws, which Armstrong denies, on the other / Este trabalho é um estudo sobre a teoria de leis da natureza proposta pelo filósofo australiano D. M. Armstrong em sua obra What is a Law of Nature?, publicada em 1983. Neste texto, Armstrong mostra a insuficiência da teoria regularista de leis e procede, então, a desenvolver sua própria teoria, que se mostra capaz de resolver diversos problemas que a teoria regularista deixava em aberto. No primeiro capítulo deste trabalho, apresentamos (1.1) a teoria regularista ingênua, bem como as críticas que ela recebeu de Armstrong e de outros autores. Em seguida (1.2), mostramos que três propostas de sofisticação da teoria não são bem-sucedidas para resolver as dificuldades encontradas na versão ingênua. A teoria regularista fica, assim, refutada, e uma nova teoria sobre leis é necessária. No segundo capítulo, apresentamos, primeiramente (2.1), um pressuposto à teoria de leis de Armstrong seu realismo sobre universais , e vemos como este pode ser aplicado a uma teoria de leis. A seguir (2.2), apresentamos a tese fundamental de Armstrong: uma lei é uma relação entre universais e, simultaneamente, um universal em si mesma que, devido à relação de instanciação, regula o comportamento de particulares e gera uniformidades na natureza. Mostramos, também, (2.3) como tal teoria permite dar conta das dificuldades enfrentadas pela teoria regularista. No terceiro capítulo, avaliamos o papel do conceito de necessidade na teoria de Armstrong. Em primeiro lugar (3.1), aprofundamos nosso entendimento da relação de necessitação N, que tem um papel central na teoria apresentada, e, a seguir (3.2), mostramos que Armstrong rejeita a tese de que leis são metafisicamente necessárias, defendendo sua contingência. O entendimento de sua teoria está centrado, portanto, na distinção entre a necessidade nômica afirmada em sua concepção de leis, por um lado, e a necessidade metafísica das leis, que Armstrong rejeita

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Si nos théories physiques peuvent décrire les traits les plus généraux de la réalité, on sait aussi que pour le faire, elles utilisent le langage des mathématiques. On peut alors légitimement se demander si notre capacité à décrire, sinon la nature intime des objets et phénomènes physiques, du moins les relations et structures qu’ils instancient, ne vient pas de cette application des mathématiques. Dans cette thèse, nous soutenons que les mathématiques sont si efficacement applicables en physique tout simplement parce que la réalité décrite par les physiciens est de nature quantitative. Pour cela, nous proposons d’abord une ontologie des quantités, puis des lois de la nature, qui s’inscrit dans les débats contemporains sur la nature des propriétés (théorie des universaux, théorie des tropes, ou nominalisme), et des lois (régularités, ou relations entre universaux). Ensuite, nous examinons deux sortes d’application des mathématiques : la mathématisation des phénomènes par la mesure, puis la formulation mathématique des équations reliant des grandeurs physiques. Nous montrons alors que les propriétés et les lois doivent être comme notre ontologie les décrit, pour que les mathématiques soient légitimement, et si efficacement, applicables. L’intérêt de ce travail est d’articuler des discussions purement ontologiques (et très anciennes, comme la querelle des universaux) avec des exigences épistémologiques rigoureuses qui émanent de la physique actuelle. Cette articulation est conçue de manière transcendantale, car la nature quantitative de la réalité (des propriétés et des lois) y est défendue comme condition d’applicabilité des mathématiques en physique. / Assuming that our best physical theories succeed in describing the most general features of reality, one can only be struck by the effectiveness of mathematics in physics, and wonder whether our ability to describe, if not the very nature of physical entities, at least their relations and the fundamental structures they enter, does not result from applying mathematics. In this dissertation, we claim that mathematical theories are so effectively applicable in physics merely because physical reality is of quantitative nature. We begin by displaying and supporting an ontology of quantities and laws of nature, in the context of current philosophical debates on the nature of properties (universals, classes of tropes, or even nominalistic resemblance classes) and of laws (as mere regularities or as relations among universals). Then we consider two main ways mathematics are applied: first, the way measurement mathematizes physical phenomena, second, the way mathematical concepts are used to formulate equations linking physical quantities. Our reasoning has eventually a transcendental flavor: properties and laws of nature must be as described by the ontology we first support with purely a priori arguments, if mathematical theories are to be legitimately and so effectively applied in measurements and equations. What could make this work valuable is its attempt to link purely ontological (and often very ancient) discussions with rigorous epistemological requirements of modern and contemporary physics. The quantitative nature of being (properties and laws) is thus supported on a transcendental basis: as a necessary condition for mathematics to be legitimately applicable in physics.

Contemporary philosopher of science Nancy Cartwright (b. 1944) has raised many an eyebrow with her books How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983) and The Dappled World (1999), among others. The primary task of this dissertation is to link her philosophy with that of Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914)—a link that includes Duns Scotus. My focus is especially on the criticism Peirce would have of Cartwright, and on the philosophical support he can offer her. The question is this: Given her stated philosophy of science, to what else must Cartwright be philosophically committed? This includes discussions of metaphysics, scholastic realism, laws of nature, and the very possibility of science. There are many striking similarities between Peirce and Cartwright, but I argue that he sees further and deeper into the metaphysical implications of her views on science. / Graduate

The purpose of this work is to detect a pattern: the concordance of Ethics and Aesthetics, Poetics and Politics in the most influential American thinker of the nineteenth century. It is an attempt to trace a basic concept of the Emersonian transcendentalist doctrine, its development, its philosophical meaning and practical implications. Emerson’s thought is analyzed genetically in search of the generating paradigm, or the set of axioms from which his aesthetic ideas as well as his political reasoning are derived. Such a basic structure, or point of convergence, is sought in the emergence of Emerson’s idea of universal laws that repeat themselves on all levels of reality. A general introduction is given in Part One, where the crisis in Emerson’s life is seen as representing and foreshadowing the deeper existential crisis of modern man. In Part 2 we follow the increasingly skeptical theologian’s turn to science, where he tries to secure a safe secular foundation for ethical good and right and to solve the problem of evil. Part 3 shows how Emerson’s conception of the laws of nature and ethics is applied in his political philosophy. In Part 4, Emerson’s ideas of the arts are seen as corresponding to his views of nature, morality, and individuality. Finally, in Part 5, the ancient and classical nature of Concord philosophy is brought into focus. The book concludes with a short summary.