O escopo deste trabalho é investigar a natureza e as funções dos ônus de argumentação em suas relações com o sistema jurídico e com a argumentação jurídica. O pano de fundo para o desenvolvimento dessas análises é o triplo condicionamento do direito. De acordo com essa visão, o direito e a argumentação jurídica são condicionados extrínseca, intrínseca e institucionalmente. Nesse cenário, defende-se, por um lado, que os ônus argumentativos são componentes necessários de um sistema jurídico que compreende regras e princípios. Analisados estruturalmente, os ônus argumentativos são compreendidos, por outro lado, como efeitos de regras e standards que consolidam relações de prioridade normativas. A partir dessas relações, defende-se que ônus de argumentação são mecanismos de redução e controle da incerteza que caracteriza necessariamente a subidealidade do sistema jurídico ao (i) facilitarem a manutenção das relações de prioridade que os sustentam na solução de casos concretos, (ii) dificultarem a inversão dessas relações e (iii) instituírem pontos de parada na argumentação jurídica em situações nas quais o desenvolvimento de cadeias argumentativas não é capaz de garantir se, em determinado caso concreto, certa relação de prioridade deve ser mantida ou invertida. / The goal of this thesis is to analyze the nature and functions of burdens of argumentation, within the context of their relationship with the structure of the legal system and their role in legal reasoning. Such analysis understands law as limited domain, subject to constraints that can be analytically represented by a three-level approach. According to this view, law and legal reasoning are extrinsically, intrinsically and institutionally constrained. In this complex scenario, the argument of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it claims that burdens of argumentation are necessary components of a legal system that contains rules and principles. On the other hand, by looking at their structure, it claims that these burdens can be understood as effects of rules and standards that establish normative priority relations. On the basis of these analyses, I argue that burdens of argumentation are mechanisms of control and stabilization of the uncertainty that characterizes the suboptimal character of law. First, they make it easier to justify the maintenance in concreto of a preexistent relationship of priority between different principles. Second, they make it harder to invert these relationships of priority. Lastly, burdens of argumentation create stopping points in legal reasoning whenever there is uncertainty about whether the development of new chains of arguments is enough to justify the maintenance or the inversion, in a concrete case, of a given normative relationship of priority.

O escopo deste trabalho é investigar a natureza e as funções dos ônus de argumentação em suas relações com o sistema jurídico e com a argumentação jurídica. O pano de fundo para o desenvolvimento dessas análises é o triplo condicionamento do direito. De acordo com essa visão, o direito e a argumentação jurídica são condicionados extrínseca, intrínseca e institucionalmente. Nesse cenário, defende-se, por um lado, que os ônus argumentativos são componentes necessários de um sistema jurídico que compreende regras e princípios. Analisados estruturalmente, os ônus argumentativos são compreendidos, por outro lado, como efeitos de regras e standards que consolidam relações de prioridade normativas. A partir dessas relações, defende-se que ônus de argumentação são mecanismos de redução e controle da incerteza que caracteriza necessariamente a subidealidade do sistema jurídico ao (i) facilitarem a manutenção das relações de prioridade que os sustentam na solução de casos concretos, (ii) dificultarem a inversão dessas relações e (iii) instituírem pontos de parada na argumentação jurídica em situações nas quais o desenvolvimento de cadeias argumentativas não é capaz de garantir se, em determinado caso concreto, certa relação de prioridade deve ser mantida ou invertida. / The goal of this thesis is to analyze the nature and functions of burdens of argumentation, within the context of their relationship with the structure of the legal system and their role in legal reasoning. Such analysis understands law as limited domain, subject to constraints that can be analytically represented by a three-level approach. According to this view, law and legal reasoning are extrinsically, intrinsically and institutionally constrained. In this complex scenario, the argument of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it claims that burdens of argumentation are necessary components of a legal system that contains rules and principles. On the other hand, by looking at their structure, it claims that these burdens can be understood as effects of rules and standards that establish normative priority relations. On the basis of these analyses, I argue that burdens of argumentation are mechanisms of control and stabilization of the uncertainty that characterizes the suboptimal character of law. First, they make it easier to justify the maintenance in concreto of a preexistent relationship of priority between different principles. Second, they make it harder to invert these relationships of priority. Lastly, burdens of argumentation create stopping points in legal reasoning whenever there is uncertainty about whether the development of new chains of arguments is enough to justify the maintenance or the inversion, in a concrete case, of a given normative relationship of priority.

From some reflections on the man (culture) nature relationship, the paper arrives at a set of more specific considerations about nature and the legal system. These will allow sustaining some of their legal expressions: natural resources heritage, commons, and ecosystem, among others. To conclude, the theme of nature as subject will be discussed, complementing the discussion with the topic of the legal system and animals. / A partir de unas reflexiones sobre la relación hombre (cultura) naturaleza, se arriba a un conjunto de consideraciones más específicas sobre el sistema jurídico y la naturaleza, las cuales permitirán sustentar algunas de sus expresiones jurídicas: recursos naturales patrimonio, commons, ecosistema entre otras. Finalmente se discute el tema de la naturaleza como sujeto, complementando la discusión con el asunto del sistema legal y los animales.

Este trabalho, eminentemente bibliográfico, destina-se à revisão da teoria dos sistemas sociais autopoiéticos de Niklas Luhmann e à consideração de seus limites e suas implicações para a compreensão da força normativa constitucional do sistema jurídico sanitário brasileiro. Nesse sentido, são discutidas a diferenciação funcional da sociedade e a função sistêmica do Direito e da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988 em generalizar e manter contrafactualmente as expectativas normativas relativas à saúde, indispensáveis para a dinâmica dos processos comunicacionais sociais. A evolução do sistema sanitário nacional é situada no desenvolvimento do Estado brasileiro e na organização de suas políticas públicas em saúde, durante o século XX, em comparação à conformação dos sistemas de saúde europeus, analisada por Michel Foucault em seus estudos sobre os modelos de Medicina Social e a Crise da Medicina Moderna. Nesse contexto, a Constituição Federal de 1988 é identificada como o ponto de convergência dos processos comunicacionais da sociedade brasileira no sentido da mais abrangente forma de institucionalização de expectativas normativas, resultante do acoplamento estrutural dos sistemas sociais nacionais, não restritos, de forma alguma, aos seus sistemas jurídico e político. Incorpora-se, assim, à compreensão do sistema jurídico sanitário a sua crescente complexidade operacional bem como a consideração das expectativas, dos conflitos, do funcionamento dos sistemas que compõe a sociedade brasileira e da função finalística dos programas e princípios constitucionais voltados à implementação dos direitos sociais fundamentais relacionados à saúde. / This work, eminently bibliographical, is destined to the revision of the theory of Autopoietic Social Systems by Niklas Luhmann and to the consideration of its limits and its implications for the comprehension of the constitutional normative power of the Brazilian legal system as related to sanitation. To this end, the functional differentiation of society and the systemic function of the law and the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 to generalize and maintain contrafactual the normative expectations, which are indispensable to a dynamic of the processes of social communication. The evolution of the national sanitary system is part of the development of the Brazilian state and in the organization of its public health policies, during the 20th century, in comparison to the European hea1th systems analyzed by Michel Foucault in his studies of the Models of Social Medicine and the Crisis of Modern Medicine. In this context, the Federal Constitution of 1988 is identified as the convergence point of the communicational processes of the Brazilian society in the sense of a wider form of institutionalization of normative expectations, resulting in the structural connection of the national social systems unrestricted in any manner to the legal and political systems. We arrive thusly to the comprehension of the legal system of sanitation and its growing operational complexities as well as the consideration of the expectations, conflicts and functioning of systems that compose Brazilian society and the ultimate function of the programs and constitutional principles related to the implementation of fundamental social rights as related to health.

O Judiciário sofre crise cujas causas são normalmente atribuídas à falta de infra-estrutura e incapacidade administrativa. Na realidade, a insatisfação decorre da redefinição das funções do Direito, somada à modificação das noções de tempo e espaço do mundo moderno. O câmbio do quadro em que o mundo jurídico opera demanda a revisão dos parâmetros de atuação da Justiça, para atendimento das expectativas de um mundo globalizado, de velocidade acelerada. Iniciamos o estudo do Judiciário nos modelos do estado liberal e do estado do bem-estar social. Em seguida, colocamos as novas demandas jurídicas e sociais que desafiam o funcionamento da Justiça. Há nova configuração normativa, aberta e fluída, com menor precisão na definição de condutas e aceleração da produção de normas. O próprio tempo social experimentou mutação, alimentado pelo movimento da especialização do conhecimento, que adota a urgência como normalidade operacional. Ainda, a diminuição das fronteiras potencializa os contatos humanos, e exige nova forma de regulação, incompatível com a forma tradicional de trabalho do Judiciário. Estruturado como órgão burocrático, o Judiciário não tem condições de ofertar respostas rápidas, fechando-se em um sistema de castas que não se comunicam, e uma estruturação administrativa centralizada e hierarquizada, que tende ao imobilismo. A solução dos problemas do Judiciário passa, por um lado, pelo incremento da profissionalização da magistratura, em seu caráter político, em especial a valorização do espaço de decisão num ambiente de trabalho independente. Por outro lado, passa pela flexibilização da sua administração burocrática, através da racionalização de seus serviços. Somente assim se alcançará a operacionalidade aberta e transparente, que atenda os padrões de qualidade e urgência da sociedade moderna sem prejuízo do viés reflexivo necessário para a produção das decisões judiciais. / The judicial system is currently in a state of crisis. Structural and administration problems are generally given as the causes. The dissatisfaction with its working is, in fact, caused by new configurations of Law in modern society. This change requires revision of Judiciary patterns of work in order to solve the rise of changes and to answer the expectations of a globalized world, which increasingly operates at an accelerated pace. Our work introduces the Judiciary in context of the Liberal and Welfare State. We describe the changes in the nature of Law, now less prescriptive and inspired by principles. We also focus on changes in society, firstly the adoption of urgency within the pattern of work, and, secondly, the diminishing effect of globalization on the world. This new conception of law and society demands new ways of operation, incompatible to the traditional judicial way of work. Currently, the Judiciary has no strength with which to answer those changes. It is structured as a bureaucratic organ, and it is divided in to departments which do not communicate with each other. It also has a centralized and hierarchical administration, tending to paralysis. These problems could be solved by politic valorization of the judicial profession, which would grant greater scope for the judge to decide. Furthermore, administrative flexibility would help to reduce the bureaucratic nature of the Judiciary. In this way, the Judiciary could achieve open and transparent patterns of work, capable of answering the demands for quality and urgency in our modern society.

Comme tout corps de règles naissant et se constituant progressivement en système juridique spécifique, les règles applicables au médicament se nourrissent des régimes juridiques externes préexistants que ceux-ci relèvent du droit public ou du droit privé. Dans les systèmes juridiques reconnus, les emprunts faits, une logique d'appropriation se met en place qui aboutit à la transformation et la spécialisation de la règle empruntée à l'objet ou la situation spécifiquement abordée. Les règles applicables au médicament parviennent-elles effectivement, suivant ce processus classique, à s'approprier les règles et principes des régimes juridiques préexistants. Un système juridique ne pouvant résulter que du sens qui lui est donné. Ainsi, pour qu'il y ait système, les normes constitutives de celui-ci doivent exprimer un objet et un but uniques. La question se pose donc de l'unité des règles applicables au médicament. Ce n'est qu'alors que l'existence d'un système juridique peut être avérée. / Like any set of regulations, which derives its origins from a specific legal system, the regulations for medication is based on an external, pre-existing judicial system of public and private law. Copying the approved judicial system results automatically in recognition, that - depending on the topic - entails a specific change or specification of the borrowed rule.Should the applicable regulations for medication follow the classic process and acquire the principles of the pre-existing judicial system? A judicial system can only follow one principle. Therefore, the constitutive norms of a judicial system must provide a unified objective. The question therefore arises, if the applicable regulations for medication follows this uniformity. These can only be secured by a judicial system.

Cette thèse se donne pour objectif de mesurer la portée actuelle des principales conceptualisations de Hans Kelsen dans la doctrine et le droit positif international. Pour ce faire, cette étude envisage une reconstruction de la pensée du juriste viennois dans la discipline spécifique de droit international placée à la lumière du contexte de l'évolution normative, institutionnelle et politique de l'ordre juridique international. L'ambition est ainsi de faire ressortir l'originalité de son approche du phénomène international et sa portée actuelle. Il s'agira aussi d'en mesurer les limites et les possibilités de dépassement. / His thesis has the objective of measuring the current scope of the main conceptualizations of Hans Kelsen in the doctrine of international law and international positive law. The study envisages a reconstruction of the thought of the Viennese lawyer in international law placed in the light of the context of the evolving normative, institutional and politic of the international legal order. This is the gift of bringing out the originality of his thought, to measure the presence of the positivist approach in debate of the unity of international law.

Le transport de marchandises par mer constitue de nos jours un pilier du commerce international et l’un des principaux moteurs de la mondialisation. De ce fait, le droit du transport maritime de marchandises, en tant qu’élément déclencheur du droit maritime, reste toujours la discipline essentielle dans ce domaine. En raison du développement de la technologie de construction des navires et des modifications des modalités de l’exploitation maritime, les normes en vigueur, relatives au transport maritime, se trouvent confrontées aux changements évolutifs dans la pratique. Tout spécifiquement, en raison de l’absence d’une tradition à ce propos, le droit chinois s’est inspiré inévitablement des normes internationales, quant à son développement. À l’heure actuelle, la question qui se pose ici est de savoir s’il convient d’introduire de nouveaux instruments, et en particulier les Règles de Rotterdam, dans le processus de modernisation du droit positif chinois ? L’étude menée vise à présenter quelques avis de recommandation, proposés pour la réforme du droit chinois du transport maritime de marchandises, vis-à-vis les Règles de Rotterdam. Dans le cadre d’une économie mondialisée, la modernisation du droit positif chinois, et surtout en matière maritime, devrait se développer dans les directions suivantes : d’une part la participation et l’intégration au système international, et de l’autre la reconnaissance de sa particularité au sein de la législation / The carriage of goods by sea constitutes at present time a pillar of international trade and one of the principal engines for the globalization. For this reason, the law of the carriage of goods by sea, being as the primary trigger for the maritime law, remains always its essential position in this domain. Due to the technological progress in the construction of the vessels and to the changes of the operational mode of maritime exploitation, the relevant laws in force are confronted with progressive transformation in practice. Particularly in relation to the Chinese maritime law, because of absence of the tradition in this regard, it has been inspired inevitably by the international norms, with respect to its development. At the current time, the question here is whether to introduce some new instruments, and in particular the Rotterdam Rules, in the process of modernization of Chinese positive law ? The present research is intended to provide some recommendation notices, proposed for the reform of the Chinese law of carriage of goods by sea, vis-à-vis the Rotterdam Rules. In the context of a worldwide economy, the modernization of the Chinese positive law, and especially in terms of maritime law, should be deployed with the following sprits: the participation and the integration to the international system on the one hand, and the recognition of its particularities in the course of the legislation on the other hand

En France et en Iran, le droit de l’arbitrage est le fruit d’une longue maturation historique. L’arbitrage en Iran plonge ses racines dans l’Antiquité. En raison de la culture du règlement pacifique des différends qui dominait alors, l’arbitrage s’est imposé comme le mode privilégié des règlements des différends. Dans le domaine de l’arbitrage commercial international, l’Iran s’est inspiré de la loi-type de la CNUDCI de 1997. Ce pays a également adhéré en 2001 à la Convention de New York. Le point de convergence entre les deux ordres juridiques français et iranien : ils ont cherché à instaurer des règles plus favorables pour la reconnaissance et l’exécution des sentences arbitrales, chacun ayant adopté une démarche différente. La première partie de cette étude est consacrée à la réception de la sentence arbitrale dans les deux systèmes. Seule la sentence définitive peut faire l’objet du contrôle et de l’exécution. Plus concrètement, la qualification en sentence internationale ou étrangère déterminera les règles applicables à la reconnaissance et l’exécution de celle-ci. La sentence arbitrale identifiée et reconnue est susceptible d'être contrôlée par le juge qui déterminera le sort de la sentence. La deuxième partie de notre analyse décrit ce contrôle qui peut être direct à l’occasion du recours en annulation ou indirect lors de la demande de reconnaissance et d’exécution. Ce mécanisme conduit in fine à protéger les droits de la partie gagnante et à empêcher l’abus, par la partie condamnée, des voies de recours. / In France and Iran, the law of arbitration is the result of a long historical development. Arbitration in Iran finds its roots in the Antiquity. Because of a culture favoring the pacific settlement of disputes, which was prevailing at that period, arbitration imposed itself as the privileged mode in resolving disputes. In the field of international commercial arbitration, Iranian legal system has been inspired by the UNCITRAL Model Law in the promulgation of its LICA in 1997. This country has also adhered to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 2001. The converging point between the Iranian and French legal systems is the following: they have tried to establish the rules favoring the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, any of them adopting a different approach. The First Part of this study is allocated to the reception of the arbitral award in the two legal systems. Solely the final award could be subject to control and enforcement. More concretely, the qualification of the arbitral award as international or foreign award will determine the applicable rules in the matters of recognition and enforcement. The arbitral award, identified and recognized, could possibly be controlled by the judge who will determine its fate. The Second Part of our analysis describes the said control that could be direct, on the occasion of the action for setting aside the award, or indirect, when requesting the recognition and enforcement of the award. This mechanism will lead in fine to protecting the winning party’s rights and avoiding any abuse of the means of recourse by the losing party.

Syftet med studien var att med kvalitativ forskningsmetod undersöka vilka tankar och attityder individer ur civilsamhället som varit utsatta för eller bevittnat ett brott och sakkunniga inom rättsväsendet har kring fenomenet anonyma vittnen. Vi ämnade även undersöka om en tillämpning av anonyma vittnen i svenska domstolar skulle förändra respondenternas syn på sin egen benägenhet att vittna. Slutligen undersökte studien om respondenterna upplevde att rättssäkerheten skulle komma att påverkas om det svenska rättsväsendet skulle tillåta anonyma vittnen. Tio personer intervjuades, varav hälften var anställda av rättsväsendet och hälften var civila utanför rättsväsendet. Intervjudatan analyserades med tematisk analys. Resultatet visade att respondenterna från civilsamhället i stort var positiva till att fullfölja sin vittnesplikt så länge det inte fanns någon hotbild. Förekom det en hotbild skulle de endast kunna tänka sig att vittna anonymt. Resultatet visade vidare att majoriteten av respondenterna från rättsväsendet ansåg att rättssystemet var eftersatt när det kom till att bekämpa den grova och organiserade brottsligheten. Några respondenter menade att anonyma vittnen kunde vara en väg att gå för att göra samhället mer rättssäkert då vittnesplikten i vissa fall spelat ut sin roll. Resultatet visade även att både respondenter från civilsamhället och rättsväsendet ansåg att det fanns utmaningar i praktiken med en tillämpning av anonyma vittnen. Båda grupperna kunde peka på både rättspsykologiska och juridiska fördelar och nackdelar med anonyma vittnen.Slutsatsen är att anonyma vittnen kan göra att benägenheten att vittna ökar från civilsamhällets sida. Det finns en möjlighet att anonyma vittnen kan göra samhället både mer rättssäkert och mindre rättssäkert. Det är ett ämne som bör undersökas mer noggrant genom att väga både fördelar och nackdelar. / With the help of a qualitative research method the purpose of the study was to analyze the thoughts and attitudes of the general public (who have been exposed to/or witnessed a crime) as well as experts in the judicial system, regarding the phenomenon of anonymous witnesses. We also intended to examine whether an application of ‘anonymous witnesses’ in Swedish courts would make the respondents more or less inclined to testify. Finally, the study would examine whether the respondents felt that legal certainty would be affected if the Swedish judicial system allowed anonymous witnesses. Ten people were interviewed, half of whom were employees of the judiciary and half were civilians outside the judiciary. The interview data was analyzed with thematic analysis. The result showed that the general public was positive to testify as long as there was no threat scenario. If there was a threat scenario, they would only consider testifying anonymously. The result also showed that the majority of respondents from the judiciary felt that the legal system was neglected when it came to fight the major and organized crime. Some argued that anonymous witnesses could be an approach to make society more legally certain as the obligation to testify in some cases no longer is needed. The results also showed that both respondents from the general public and the judiciary considered it to be a challenge when using anonymous witnesses in practice. Both groups could point to both psychological and legal benefits and disadvantages of anonymous witnesses.The conclusion is that anonymous witnesses can make the general public’s propensity to witness increase. There is a possibility that anonymous witnesses can make society both more legally certain and less legally certain and it should be subject to closer examination by weighing both advantages and disadvantages against each other.